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Following a series of profound conflicts in the early 21st century, Bolivia became the world’s first pluri-
national state in 2009. The idea of the pluri-national state goes beyond the (uni-)national state; 
imagining a state that allows peoples’ coexistence on an equal footing in a state that facilitates their 
autonomy (Garcés, 2011). However, recent research indicates that, in practice, the Bolivian state 
transformation is full of tensions. 
Based on a framework that brings together Open Marxism (Holloway and Picciotto, 1977; Clarke, 
1991c; Bonefeld et al., 1992b, a; Bonefeld et al., 1995b) and the 'de-colonial option' (Quijano, 2006), 
I offer in-depth insights into contemporary Bolivia. In this, I understand the state as the political form 
of the social relations of capital, which is marked by modernity and its 'darker side' - coloniality 
(Mignolo, 2011). This thesis offers tools for studying how the state 'translates' indigenous- and non-
indigenous struggles into policies, law and polity (Dinerstein, 2015) while also mediating external 
pressures. 
After embedding the pluri-national state in its historical context, covering the emergence and 
development of the Bolivian state form, I look in depth at the pluri-national state. In this, I unpack the 
multifaceted struggles for autonomy and find that when mediating autonomy into the pluri-national 
state, something essential to the definition of plurinationality is lost in translation. First, struggles for 
autonomy as peoples’ self-determination and deepened decentralisation became subordinated to, 
yet not annihilated by the government’s social-communitarian model that is advocated in the name 
of the pueblo’s self-determination and ensures the state’s material basis. Secondly, state-recognised 
autonomy comes at the cost of submission to a state which continuously operates pre-dominantly 
according to modern/colonial ideas of law, order and organisation. The contradictions found in the 
pluri-national autonomy regime and the state are inherent in it and hence, cannot be resolved through 
reform. 
299 words  
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
On the 18th of March 2009, the Bolivian President Evo Morales signed Supreme Decree 48/2009. The 
sole article of the decree determines that, in compliance with the new constitution (CPE), the 
denomination PLURI-NATIONAL STATE OF BOLIVIA should be used in all public and private acts, in 
diplomatic relations and official correspondence at the national and international level. With this, 
Bolivia formally turned into the first and so-far only pluri-national state in the world. This took place 
in what has been described as the 'region’s most radical socio-political terrain', one marked by social 
conflicts erupting in the early 21st century, most visible in the 2000 and 2003 Water and Gas Wars 
(Webber, 2016, p.1855). While some articles of the 2008 Ecuadorian Constitution point to pluri-
national characteristics of the Ecuadorian state and society1, Ecuador continues to be a Republic (Art. 
1) and is not a pluri-national state sensu stricto. Although Bolivia is constitutionally defined as a Pluri-
national State (Art. 1 CPE) and the preamble states the intention of leaving the colonial, republican 
and neoliberal Bolivian state behind, the CPE also indicates that refounding a state is far from 
straightforward. Whether literal errors or part of a pact, the Articles 11 I, 146 II, 202 No 1 and No 7, 
238 No 3 and 339 I of the CPE still refer to a 'Republican' state. With this thesis, I propose that the 
practical experiment of the pluri-national state invites a reconsideration of how to approach the state 
theoretically and a reassessment of the conceptual and methodological tools used to make sense of 
it.  
In this opening chapter, I first show how the idea of the pluri-national state challenges and pushes the 
boundaries of the state in an unprecedented way and engage with recent research on the pluri-
national transformations in Bolivia and Ecuador. I show that while many researchers identify tensions, 
contradictions or a gap in pluri-national practice: between ideas, theory or government rhetoric on 
the one side and reality, practice or government policies on the other, they pay little attention to the 
category of the state and the specificity of the pluri-national state idea. Building on this, I suggest that 
looking more closely at the state has great potential for unpacking and making sense of the seemingly 
contradictory pluri-national scenarios. To take the pluri-national idea more seriously, I argue that it is 
necessary to look more closely at self-determination/autonomy, which constitutes the 'umbrella 
demand' of indigenous peoples (Díaz Polanco, 1996, p.157). Then, the aims, objectives and research 
questions of the thesis are set forth, followed by a mapping out of the potential contribution and 
relevance of this thesis. Finally, I outline the remaining chapters. 
                                                          
1 Its 2008 Constitution defines Ecuador as a 'pluri-national (…) State' (Art. 1). Articles 6, 257 and 380 mention 'pluri-national 
Ecuador', 'pluri-nationalism' as principle and Ecuador’s 'pluri-national identity'. 
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1.1. The pluri-national state: Idea and recent debates on the practical experiments 
Following Tapia Mealla, the 'pluri-national horizon is the possibility of a democratic reconstitution of 
the country, which sometimes faces [the need] to overcome hierarchical relations between pueblos 
and cultures, that is, internal colonialism' (Tapia Mealla, 2015, p.8, author's translation). He saw the 
pluri-national reconstitution of the state as 'an opportunity to design multicultural co-government', 
making clear that 'in order to be democratic, it is not enough that it is co-government of 
representatives of different cultures but co-government in and from the bosom from each of those' 
(Tapia Mealla, 2007, p.174, author's translation). This indicates that the pluri-national state idea 
radically differs from the notion of the (uni-)nation state, which has served as inspiration and mental 
model for most state thinking. Unlike the (uni-)nation state, the pluri-national state idea implies that 
the state does not only recognise the existence of different cosmologies, but also facilitates the self-
determination/autonomy of peoples, understood as nations, and promotes their participation in 
decision-making on matters that concern them all (Garcés, 2011, p.63).  
As Quijano (2006) points out, indigenous peoples did not just want state power, they wanted a 
different state. These ideas mean pushing the boundaries of thinking the state and breaking with how 
indigenous people have previously related to the state. For Maybury-Lewis, '[t]he salient characteristic 
of indigenous peoples […] is that they are marginal to or dominated by the states that claim jurisdiction 
over them' and are 'not integral to the states that (…) rule over them' (Maybury-Lewis, 1997, p.8). The 
pluri-national idea seeks not only to end exclusion, but to challenge the very aims of assimilation to 
and inclusion in the dominant, Western epistemology as occurred in the unfinished 1952 Revolution 
and the 1990s multicultural reforms. Overcoming these obstacles with the different state is necessarily 
also a project of decolonising state and society.  
With the increasing mobilisation of indigenous peoples in the late 20th and early 21st century and their 
rising influence in Bolivian and Ecuadorian local and national politics – seemingly culminating in the 
adoption of the aforementioned pluri-national constitutions – enthusiasm spread among observers 
and researchers. Yet, more recently, reality does not seem to live up to the expectations associated 
with the imagined pluri-national states. Reyes (2012) observed increasing 'revolutions within 
revolutions', in which sectors of society that had brought these governments into power, speak against 
them, accusing them of failing to deliver what they had promised. The key turning point in Bolivia was 
the escalation of the TIPNIS conflict2 in 2011, which 'created a political firestorm' (Fabricant and 
Postero, 2015, p.425). It brought discrepancies between and among highland and lowland peoples 
and peasants to the surface and showed the government’s limited capacity and/or willingness to 
                                                          
2 See, for example, Webber (2012) and Morales (2013).  
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handle the situation in the interest of all (Morales, 2013). Nevertheless, the Morales and Correa/Lenin 
governments have been remarkably durable, and have so far resisted the 'ebbing' of most 
governments that swept into power with the pink tide in the early 21st century (Rojas, 2017). 
Turning in more detail to the research conducted on the pluri-national experiences in Bolivia and 
Ecuador, the key questions have revolved around whether and how far pluri-nationalism could 
'reconcile both indigenous rights and strong state sovereignty, while avoiding new exclusions' 
(Gustafson, 2009, p.992). In the following subsections, I briefly revise key strands of debates that 
tackle crucial elements of the pluri-national state idea and assess how these played out in practice. I 
will return to some of them in the literature review.  
Vivir Bien/Buen Vivir 
In Ecuador and Bolivia, the Buen Vivir/Vivir Bien ('good life'/'living well'3) entered public debates, 
providing an 'opportunity for imagining other worlds' (Acosta, 2013). The concepts are both based on 
ancient holistic cosmovisions and philosophies of indigenous peoples, focusing on living harmoniously 
with Mother Earth, other humans and with oneself (Walsh, 2009b). Yet, Zibechi highlights the limited 
attractiveness and feasibility of the Buen Vivir/Vivir Bien as 
those who practice it (…) are impoverished minorities that do not elicit excitement from 
anyone, not even the intellectuals who formulated these key concepts within the 
frameworks of constitutions (in Hardt and Reyes, 2012, p.183). 
Nevertheless, Buen Vivir/Vivir Bien is considered a key pillar of the pluri-national states in Bolivia and 
Ecuador, found in the Constitutions4 and, for example, National Development Plans. However, 
researchers found that in practice Buen Vivir/Vivir Bien has been 'discursively influential and yet 
conceptually reduced and unevenly applied' (Zimmerer, 2015, p.314). It is argued that Buen Vivir/Vivir 
Bien clashes with extractivism, underpinned by constitutionally guaranteed rights of the state 'to 
extract and commercialise natural resources (mainly hydrocarbons and mining) under the banner of 
redistributive justice, welfare reforms and the common good' (Lalander, 2017, p.464). When these 
clash, the latter would come up on top:  
Ecuador and Bolivia continue to pursue an extractivist economic development model, with 
assertions of national sovereignty over natural resources tending to prevail over Earth 
jurisprudence and environmental conservation (Humphreys, 2017, p.459).  
Looking at Ecuador, Nicholls finds that the 'modernizing neo-developmentalism' of Correa’s 
government 'is largely defined by many elements of the development discourse, which the Ecuadorian 
                                                          
3 In Ecuador, it is 'Buen Vivir', translating of the Quechua expression 'sumak kawsay', while in Bolivia, 'Vivir Bien' draws on 
the Aymara notion of 'suma qamaña'. These translation only partially grasp the holistic concepts describing both, vision and 
social practice (Widenhorn, 2013, p.382). 
4 See Preamble and Articles 8, 306 and 313 CPE (Bolivia); Preamble and several articles from the Ecuadorian Constitution. 
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Constitution nominally rejects' (Nicholls, cited by Clark, 2017, p.355). For Lalander, Correa’s 
government is pragmatic when 'the rights of nature risk [are] subordinated to other human values 
amidst strategic State interests in economic development and social programs' (Lalander, 2016, 
p.623). In a similar vein, 'deep contradictions between the constitutional prescriptions and spirit of 
buen vivir and recently formulated policies that reveal a pragmatic approach on the part of the 
government' are identified (Caria and Domínguez, 2016, p.18).  
In her analysis of the legislation and fiscal policies, which are crucial for the governance of natural 
resources in Bolivia, Radhuber finds a 'hierarchy and prioritization of the – de facto highly extractivist 
– development goals vis-à-vis indigenous rights and that fiscal competences of indigenous groups 
remain limited, as they have throughout Bolivia’s history' (Radhuber, 2012, p.181). Others observe the 
Bolivian government’s inability to reconcile tensions, when arguing that despite 
the introduction of the concept into the National Development Plan, the new constitution, 
and the Law of Mother Earth (…), the government has not overcome the conflict between 
growth-driven approaches and sustainability (Artaraz and Calestani, 2015, p.216). 
Ranta identifies a gap between discourse and practice in Bolivia when arguing that 'despite its 
transformative potential, the translation of vivir bien discourses into state practices has not been, to 
a large degree, achieved' (Ranta, 2016, p.425). Elsewhere, she claims that 'while discursively grounded 
on such egalitarian principles as reciprocity and rotating authority, its implementation entails 
bureaucratic propensities to centralise power and authority' (Ranta, 2017, p.1603). When looking at 
a potentially different South–South cooperation in the 21st century, Gudynas, finds that paradoxically 
the contemporary focus in such cooperation reinforces conventional varieties of development – hence 
'it is blocking alternatives, even the Southern option of Buen Vivir' (Gudynas, 2016, p.721). 
Plural economy 
In Bolivia, the notion of 'plural economy' is seen as another key pillar of the pluri-national state 
experiment, it recognises four different economic forms: state-led, private, social-cooperative and 
communitarian (Art. 306 II CPE). Communitarian forms of economic organisation are – unlike, for 
example, private ones – based on communal land ownership and are hence perceived as particularly 
crucial in resisting 'further commodification and foreign ownership or exploitation of land they hold 
sacred' (Grugel and Riggirozzi, 2012, p.8). In the pluri-national state, these different economies should 
coexist without one being subordinated to another.  
However, scholars’ findings reveal the severe limits of this in the pluri-national experiment. In this 
vein, Gustafson and Fabricant (2011) observe continuity in the mode of production, reflected in a 
sustained subordination of communal to private property. Webber notes that promised structural 
transformations that should weaken the pluri-nation’s dependency on commodity exports, did not 
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occur (Webber, 2016, p.1862; also, Molero Simarro and Paz Antolín, 2012). For example, in the mining 
sectors, changes remained at the so-called 'operational level' (Arsel et al., 2014).  
The Bolivian hydrocarbon nationalisation is considered 'neoliberal' and not comparable to 
nationalisations of the 1950s (Kaup, 2010), while the political economy of Morales’ government is 
described as 'reconstituted neoliberalism' (Webber, 2010a). This means that it 'has merely 
implemented a more politically stable version of the model of accumulation it inherited' (Brabazon 
and Webber, 2014, p.435), which Vice-President García Linera calls 'Andean-Amazon capitalism' 
(Lewis, 2013).  
Burchardt and Dietz also find that 'the green economy – the economic model promoted in response 
to the tension between environmental protection and economic development – is still based on raw 
material extraction' (Burchardt and Dietz, 2014, p.470). Gudynas speaks of a 'brown left' – not being 
as environmentally friendly as it presents itself (Gudynas, 2012b). Others identify a convergence in the 
way the 'social democratic neoliberal' and progressive 'self-consciously post-neoliberal' regimes 
handled mining and hydrocarbon extraction and the related socio-environmental conflicts 
(Bebbington and Humphreys Bebbington, 2011, p.131). The continuation or even expansion of 
extractivism and agroindustry often directly affects the local population and their local economies. As 
pointed out in the previous subsection, government priorities were often not to protect the 
indigenous people and their environmental rights.  
Yet, as the widely-used notion of 'neo-extractivism' coined by Gudynas (2009a) indicates, scholars also 
recognise that some changes took place despite the continued extractivism. Most fundamentally, 
researchers highlight that the state’s role underwent change as it became more involved in the 
economy, redistribution and social policies and turned into a 'compensatory state' (Gudynas, 2012a). 
Yet, this does not mean that the state supports the plural economy and different forms of economic 
organisation: 'instead of reducing the dependency of small producers on agro-industrial capital, the 
Bolivian state has increased it' (Cordoba and Jansen, 2014, p.480; see also, Kwon Mun, 2015). 
Andreucci and Radhuber (2015) find that the Bolivian state has been crucial in 'weakening social 
resistance to mining expansion, by demobilising those social forces whose proposals and demands 
conflicted most clearly with extractivist development'. 
Indigenous autonomies 
As argued earlier, peoples’ self-determination is key in the pluri-national state and therefore it is not 
surprising that the new constitutionally-recognised5 indigenous autonomies in Bolivia attracted the 
                                                          
5 See Art. 289-296 CPE (Bolivia). 
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attention of researchers. Tockman and Cameron demonstrate how CPE and legislation seem 'to 
support indigenous autonomy while simultaneously constraining it' (Tockman and Cameron, 2014, 
p.46). For them, this highlights the contradiction between the pluri-national experiment and two key 
aspects of the MAS’ strategy: first, the promotion of the development model based on resource-
extraction and secondly, its attempt to control political space (ibid.) (see also Tockman et al., 2015; 
Tockman, 2016, 2017a; Alderman, 2016). For Powęska, it is 'the character of state' that presents the 
key obstacle in the implementation of indigenous self-determination (Powęska, 2017, p.442). 
Holst (2016) highlights that one needs to discuss not just political, but also educational and economic 
autonomy, which are severely limited despite the state-recognised autonomies. Only by broadening 
the notion of autonomy, could one speak of an environment in which indigenous peoples can 
'maintain the trajectory of their development alternative free of center-periphery dependencies' 
(Silva, 2016, p.15). Yet, as already pointed out in the previous subsections, despite the expansion of 
such ethno-territorial rights, that are protected by the new CPE, these remain frequently subodinated 
to economic interests (Kröger and Lalander, 2016). While in the pluri-national state the recognition of 
collective rights is key, in Bolivia, during 'Morales’ presidency, class-based human rights in practice 
tend to be superior to the ethnically defined rights' (Lalander, 2017, p.464). 
Legal pluralism 
Another crucial aspect of the pluri-national idea, which is recognised in the pluri-national constitutions 
(Art. 190-192 CPE (Bolivia), Art. 171 Ecuadorian Constitution), is the recognition of the practice of 
indigenous community justice on an equal footing with the ordinary justice system. This expresses 'a 
legitimate assertion by the country's indigenous peoples of their cultural integrity' (Hammond, 2011, 
p.649). Indigenous jurisdiction differs from national ordinary justice systems and the human rights 
regime, as it has, for example, an oral tradition, which clashes with the modern vision of written law 
that can be universally applied (Strack, 2014). Yet, also here expectation has so far not been met. 
Barrera finds that  
[w]hile the new frameworks [in Bolivia and Ecuador] constitute remarkable progress, their 
effects in the longer term will depend on the broader political context and the willingness 
to alter the long-established attitudes of justice operators and broader societies alike 
(Barrera, 2011, p.1). 
In Ecuador, Simon Thomas finds that recognised legal pluralism can empower or disempower 
indigenous authorities: 'While it has encouraged local authorities to extend their jurisdiction, 
formalized legal pluralism has also led to national political tensions over the exact interpretation of 
relevant articles in the constitution and attempts to limit indigenous jurisdiction.' (Simon Thomas, 
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2017, p.46). For Strack (2014), national policy-makers and policy–making obstructed drastic reform in 
Bolivia. 
Representation and indigenous participation  
Another crucial element of a pluri-national state is the inclusion of all peoples in decision-making of 
matters that concern them. Rice (2016) highlights that the inclusion of new direct, participatory and 
communitarian aspects into the democratic system, has overall improved and strengthened 
representation for and of indigenous peoples in Bolivia. 
Looking at the representation in the state, in this case, seats in parliament, Htun and Ossa (2013) point 
out that while there has been progress in gender parity, empowerment has also produced new 
hierarchies within the indigenous movement. More generally, scholars find that mainly the Aymara 
and Quechua peoples are represented, while other minority groups remain marginalised (Albro, 2010; 
Postero, 2010). For Canessa, 'there is a tendency to prefer some indigenous identities over others as 
well as to homogenize the experience of being indigenous' (Canessa, 2016, p.75). Nevertheless, ethnic 
identification is not fixed, and changes, according to Flesken (2013), with altering political discourses. 
The implementation of the constitutionally guaranteed right to free, prior and informed consultation6 
is marked by important shortcomings, since these consultations are 'not neutral or a political exercise 
that automatically improves democratic governance' (Fontana and Grugel, 2016, p.249). The way in 
which this is handled in Bolivia is 
in tension with broader ideas of representation and legitimacy, inclusiveness, and 
management of public and common goods because there is no real clarity as to who is 
entitled to participation, why they do, and whether they are doing so as a corrective to 
exclusion, a promotion of citizenship, or as a mechanism for redistribution (ibid.). 
Schilling-Vacaflor, pointing to similar deficiencies in the processes, argues that this reveals that in the 
pluri-national state, 'local ideas of self-determined development remain subordinated to prioritized 
extractive industries' (Schilling-Vacaflor, 2013, p.202). 
Intercultural education 
Another crucial point on pluri-national states’ agenda is education – in Ecuador’s Constitution, 
education is 'intercultural, democratic, inclusive and diverse' (Art. 26), Article 30 of the Bolivian CPE 
grants the indigenous pueblos the right to 'inter-cultural, intra-cultural and pluri-lingual education'. 
The aspired reforms re-imagine education as oriented towards social justice and 'based on recognition 
and inclusion rather than an expulsion of indigenous values, knowledges and languages' (Lopes 
                                                          
6 Art. 403 I CPE (Bolivia); Art. 57 No 7 Ecuadorian Constitution. 
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Cardozo, 2012). Yet, Howard finds that paradoxically under the first Bolivian government headed by 
someone with an indigenous face  
for the first time in the country's history, education policy appears to be on the verge of 
moving in a direction that does not, at least at first appearances, take account of the 
cultural and linguistic diversity of the recipient populations (Howard, 2009). 
At the same time, the education reform process has been far from quick – also due to the objections 
from the 'powerful, militant urban teachers’ union' (Farthing and Kohl, 2014, p.105). For example, for 
Lopes Cardozo (2012), it is clear that it is still a long way from eradicating 'the deep structures of 
indigenous denial in Bolivian education and society'. Hence, also here, high expectations have so far 
not been met.  
Summing-up: The Janus-faced Pluri-national State of Bolivia - How to make sense of the gap? 
The literature reviewed in the previous subsections confirms Centellas’ assessment that overall, 
'celebratory narratives of (…) the possibility of a new social revolution have, after nearly a decade, 
given way to scholarly skepticism' (Centellas, 2015, p.240). Often, a dissonance is identified between 
pluri-national ideals, government rhetoric as well as constitutional and legal frameworks on the one 
side and government policies and practices on the other. Many researchers point to contradictions 
and/or tensions within the pluri-national scenario, firstly between environmental and cultural 
sustainability or indigenous-friendliness, and, secondly, economic development or extractivism (Holst, 
2016). In other words, Bolivia and Ecuador often appear as Janus-faced states with one indigenous-
friendly and one extractivist face. When these faces clash, it is the latter that prevails. Yet, also with 
regard to the indigenous-friendly face, is appears questionable how far this lives up to the idea of the 
different pluri-national state. 
1.2. Identifying the gap and filling it by rethinking the state 
Despite the widespread description and recognition of these tensions in the pluri-national state, the 
focus of enquiry has usually not been the state as a category and its pluri-national specificity. Some 
authors more implicitly offer explanations for the contradictions. A common argument relates to 
'structural constraints'. Centellas points out that  
Morales and his MAS party have had to maneuver within domestic and international 
contexts that (...) also imposed constraints that help explain why Bolivian policies remain 
generally consistent with those of previous governments (Centellas, 2015, p.230). 
Silva offers a different take on it, emphasising 'competing interests (…) between the government and 
social movements as they confront the challenges of constructing a postneoliberal order' (Silva, 2016, 
p.17). Yet, other scholars found internal discrepancies in the government programme. In Bolivia, 'the 
political project of refounding the State that the Morales administration has carried out (…) has 
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adopted an internal tension between national-popular and popular-indigenous elements' (Baker, 
2015a, p.283).  
This thesis suggests that looking more closely at the category of the state helps to make sense of the 
described tensions and contradictory tendencies as part of a bigger picture. Unlike the seesaw of 
different political regimes or varying development models, the (nation) state has existed in Latin 
America for around two centuries. To investigate if and how (far) the pluri-national state is pluri-
national, it is necessary to move beyond the political regime and the model of development. 
Scholars widely acknowledge the state’s centrality, turning it into a key concept in the social sciences 
(Heywood, 2000) that is often seen as the most important or powerful formal institution of communal 
organisation (Gunn, 1994; Faulks, 2000) or the single most important locus where political, economic 
and social power relations are brought together (Boron, 2001). Academics have assigned varying – 
depending on the vocabulary used – elements, roles, functions, characteristics, attributes, among 
others, to the state. While in pluralist approaches, the state is seen as a 'neutral umpire to the freely 
articulated demands of a pluralist society' (Martin, 2008, p.12), this assumed neutrality of the state is 
rejected by more critical accounts, including by those who demanded a different state and – in the 
social sciences most prominently – those that follow a Marxist line of thought.  
Silva’s account demonstrates the importance of addressing the category of the state in the pluri-
national experiments. She finds that to achieve the Buen Vivir/Vivir Bien, a backbone of the pluri-
national state, the state has to be rationalised and modernised, meaning putting an end to 
'administrative irrationalities and corporatist interests' (Silva, 2016, p.8). Yet, speaking of the state’s 
modernisation and rationalisation does not sound like a different state but is a reminder of the second 
wave of neoliberal reforms. As such, it appears to be in tension with the pluri-national idea and the 
entwined agenda of decolonising the state.  
In this thesis, I therefore seek to critically rethink how to approach the state theoretically and 
methodologically. The brief literature review indicated that these expectations of the imagined 
different state were not met. Nevertheless, for understanding continuity and change as well as 
contradictory tendencies in the pluri-national experiments, I suggest that it is important to unpack 
and approach the pluri-national state in a way that can engage with the apparent discrepancies and 
its normative specificity.  
1.3. Taking the pluri-national specificity more seriously by looking at self-
determination/autonomy 
As some of the aforementioned authors recognise, the pluri-national idea is closely tied to the self-
determination/autonomy of peoples. Key promoters of this notion even argue that a pluri-national 
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state cannot be understood without self-determination/autonomy (AA.VV., 2011). Despite being 
often interchangeably used terms, self-determination and autonomy are contested concepts with 
different origins and meanings. Self-determination of a people is a peremptory norm (jus cogens) in 
modern international public law, that denotes people’s (legal) right to choose their destiny within the 
international order. First formulated in the 19th century, it was enshrined in the 1945 UN Charter as a 
foundation for the relation between (modern) states (Art. 1, 2, 55). It became particularly important 
with the UN General Assembly Resolution 1541 (1960), which was enacted in the context of the formal 
decolonisation of Africa. In this, it was stated that to ensure decolonisation, it is required to completely 
comply with the principle of self-determination.  
Since then, self-determination has been revoked for and by indigenous peoples, who are a minority in 
the states they inhabit leaving them unable to determine their destinies. In Bolivia, small groups, most 
of whom live in the lowlands, asked – usually the state directly – for such protection, that would allow 
them the freedom to preserve their way of life and cultural heritage. As I show later in the thesis, this 
has been a key impetus of their struggles leading to the pluri-national state.  
Yet, since the pluri-national state idea goes beyond the existing state and, for example, challenges 
modern law, the notion of autonomy appears to be even more relevant. Autonomy is a broader, more 
open concept and is used to refer to the capacity for self-determination and self-governance of an 
individual or a collective. While often seen as going back to Kantian moral philosophy7 (Hill, 1989), 
autonomy has also been discussed uncoupled from morality. When groups demand autonomy, this 
generally expresses 'a deep desire to expand collective capacity for self government' (Chatterton, 
2010, p.899).  
Yet, the variety of movements and practices that are labeled as autonomous makes it hard to define 
what autonomy and self-government actually refers to and implies (Böhm et al., 2010, p.20). In the 
Spanish language, autonomy also refers to a model of state organisation, in which some entities of 
the (nation) state have considerable political and economic-financial leverage vis-à-vis the central 
state (Real Academia Española, n.d.). Regional movements might demand (more) autonomy from the 
central state (government). In addition, 'conservative autonomy movements' might try to defend their 
benefits from the status-quo when 'under attack at the national level' (Eaton, 2011, p.291).  
The Zapatistas´ uprising erupting in 1994, triggered shifts in debates on autonomy, since with this 
event, 'a tradition of resistance has been transformed into a project of liberation' (Esteva and Pérez, 
2001). This facilitated discussion about autonomy at the ontological level, as the Zapatistas challenged 
                                                          
7 In a nutshell, it is about the capacity to think over and give oneself moral law instead of following injunctions of others. 
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the universe that is presumed in modern ontology by opting for a pluriverse, that is 'a world where 
many worlds fit' (Escobar, 2011, p.139). With autonomy one can then refer to a 'different way of 
imagining life, to an other mode of existence' (ibid., italics in the original). Autonomy is then the 'art 
of organising hope', in and through which new worlds are pre-figured (Dinerstein, 2015, p.9). For 
indigenous people this implies that they relate to Mother Earth, community, and development in ways 
that are alien to the modern/Western universe.  
As in the case of the Zapatistas, in most indigenous struggles, demands for autonomy do not just refer 
to an emancipatory project. For those involved, 'emancipation is inevitably a decolonising project' 
directed not just against capital and the state but also against coloniality (Dinerstein, 2015, p.13). It is 
therefore not primarily about taking state power or similar, but about alternatives forms of politics 
(ibid.) and another state (Quijano, 2006). Only with an other state, is it possible to overcome the 
'inclusion-exclusion paradox', meaning that indigenous peoples have so-far 'either been included into 
the logic of the liberal capitalist state or excluded from it' (Merino, 2017, p.139). The pluri-national 
state idea refers precisely to this different state. 
Despite the outlined differences between the meaning of autonomy in non-indigenous and indigenous 
struggles, autonomy is always 'first of all creative and contradictory practice' (Dinerstein, 2015, p.9). 
Since neither indigenous nor non-indigenous people, who demand autonomy, are outside the state 
and capital, their struggles are marked by constant frictions between institutionalisation, for example, 
into the state agenda, and rebellion. There are always 'contradictory dynamics between the pendulum 
movement of integration and transcendence, negativity and positivity' (Böhm et al., 2010).  
The pluri-national state idea and real experiments provide an excellent context to see how such 
paradoxes and the described differences between non-indigenous and indigenous struggles for 
autonomy, which have not received much attention in the wider debates on autonomy, have played 
out in practice. At the same time, since self-determination/autonomy lies at the heart of the pluri-
national state idea, it provides a promising entry point for studying how far the de jure pluri-national 
state is (not) a de facto pluri-national state. This is because this entry point incorporates the ideas of 
a different state, while enabling us to see how the transformation of the state towards the desired 
other state has and has not unfolded. 
1.4. Research aim, objectives and questions 
The aim of this thesis is to rethink the state in the context of the emerging Pluri-national State of 
Bolivia and to offer a perspective that helps to make sense of the contradictions identified by a 
substantial number of researchers while also incorporating the specificity of the pluri-national idea. 
This can be broken down into four sub-aims, which can also be described as objectives. 
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The first objective is finding an approach to the state, which can grasp its evolving, contradictory 
character and is sensitive to the specificity of the pluri-national idea.  
 Research question 1a: How has the state been approached in recent studies on Latin America 
in general and on Bolivia in particular?  
In this thesis, I bring in the notions of 'form' and 'mediation in motion', drawing on contributions from 
the CSE and Open Marxism. I scrutinise how far this can help to address concerns of post- and de-
colonial scholars, who point out that Western thinking like Marxism reproduce colonial traits.  
 Research questions 1b: How far can a notion of 'form'/'mediation in motion' provide an 
alternative that better reflects the state’s evolving and contradictory character? Does the 
notion need to be decolonised and if so, (how) is this possible? 
The second objective revolves around the implications of the proposed alternative conceptualisation 
of the state for the research design, in particular when investigating a specific state.  
 Research question 2: What are methodological implications of understanding the state as a 
'form'/'mediation in motion'? 
The third objective is to apply the framework to the analysis of the pluri-national state in Bolivia.  
 Research question 3: What light does state theorisation, based on the idea of 'form' and 
'mediation in motion', shed on state transformation in Bolivia in general and in particular, how 
transformational is the introduction of the pluri-national state in Bolivia likely to be? 
To break this down further, the following questions need addressing:  
 Research question 3a: How far is motion towards the pluri-national modality historically 
necessary? 
 Research question 3b: How (far) has the 'mediation in motion' translated struggles (for 
autonomy/ies)? 
 Research question 3c: What are the implications of this translation for present and future 
struggles (for autonomy/ies)? 
The final objective is to reflect on the usefulness of the approach developed and employed. 
 Research question 4: What can the proposed approach to state transformation in Bolivia tell 
us about the contradictions, capitalist and colonial features in the Latin America state and 
beyond? 
1.5. Potential contributions and relevance 
The theoretical contribution of this thesis lies in linking a CSE/Open Marxist approach to the state with 
the 'de-colonial option', bringing in the notions of 'form' and 'mediation in motion'. With this, I seek 
to push towards decolonising the CSE/Open Marxist approach. The pertinence of this undertaking 
goes beyond Bolivia and the pluri-national state. 
23 
 
Methodologically, this thesis contributes to the CSE/Open Marxist body of literature with the 
application of form-analysis to offer a critique of coloniality. It provides methodological innovations 
that operationalise form-analysis into concrete steps that help to unpack the transformation of the 
state. This potentially also adds to de-colonial thought, which is not associated with a specific research 
design or similar. 
At the substantive level, this thesis provides an in-depth analysis of state transformation, thus adding 
to the literature on Bolivia’s political sociology and economy, in particular to the recent contributions 
on the subjects of the pluri-national state and (state-recognised) autonomy. While most existing 
research focuses on the MAS government and hardly distinguishes between government, political 
regime and state, this thesis focusing on the state expands the horizon in a way that incorporates the 
specificity of the pluri-national idea. Instead of describing the apparent discrepancy between theory 
and practice or government promises and its actions, this thesis offers a perspective of how and why 
these contradictions have evolved and coexist. Engaging fully with these tensions is of fundamental 
importance when seeking to acquire an in-depth understanding of contemporary Bolivia.  
1.6. Outline of chapters 
The main body of the thesis is organised in four consecutive parts. It starts with the literature review, 
followed by a chapter on the epistemological-theoretical framework, research methodology and 
design. This leads to the third part, which is dedicated to the analysis of state transformation in Bolivia 
and pays close attention to the pluri-national state. Finally, a discussion and a conclusion follow. 
Chapter 2 engages with prominent debates and approaches that have sought to capture 21st century 
Latin America. I review the regime-centred 'New Left(s)', political economy focused 'neo-
developmentalism' vis-à-vis 'neo-extractivism', 'post-neoliberalism' and '21st century socialism' and 
relational approaches. In this, I pay attention to their capacity for elucidating the contradictory 
tendencies scholars have found in the pluri-national scenarios and if they are able to see the specificity 
of the pluri-national state idea. I argue that while some offer insights into the present tensions, none 
of them pays much attention to 'coloniality' and how this links to the state. Hence, they overlook what 
is specific to the idea of the pluri-national state. 
Chapter 3 reviews three sets of approaches, all of which address the colonial aspect. Firstly, I review 
Latin American Marxists. Not paying much attention to the state as a category and/or lacking an 
understanding of the specificity of indigenous struggles, they are incapable of grasping the pluri-
national idea. I then look at the 'de-colonial option', which emphasises the state’s colonial colouring, 
making it stronger in unpacking the colonial aspect and the indigenous specificity and pluri-national 
idea. Finally, I engage with approaches from the Bolivian comuna scholars. These are strong in 
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addressing state crisis at colonial and capitalist levels, but do not offer a consistent approach to the 
state. In particular in recent years, their debates are highly politicised.  
Chapter 4 is dedicated to epistemological-theoretical framework, methodological approach and 
research design proposed in this thesis. I engage with post-colonial criticism on the applicability of 
Western thought to the non-West and suggest that the Open Marxist notion of 'form' offers a way to 
take these concerns seriously, while not leading to thinking the world in binary terms. After 
introducing the evolution of the notion of 'form' and explaining the CSE/Open Marxist take on it, I 
stretch the approach by using de-colonial ideas, seeking to better grasp the specificity of the pluri-
national state idea and to push towards decolonising the CSE/Open Marxist approach. I then discuss 
the scope of the form-analysis to show how this study relies on the triangulation of a range of primary 
and secondary data and methods of analysis. Finally, I address ethical concerns. 
Chapter 5 situates the pluri-national state in its historical context. I analyse the emergence and 
development of the Bolivian state form through different political modalities. I show how the state is 
a result of, and subject to, domestic struggles and external pressures. In this, I particularly look at the 
discrepancies and the role these played in the development of the form. 
The next three chapters look more closely at the pluri-national modality, using autonomy as the entry 
point, as it lies at the heart of the pluri-national state idea and also distinguishes it from other types 
of state. Chapter 6 offers an analysis of how the struggles for autonomy were mediated by the 
previous political modalities and one another and how they became translated into the 2009 
Constitution. Chapter 7 and 8 examine how the struggles were translated by and in the pluri-national 
modality. While Chapter 7 pays close attention to the central state, Chapter 8 focuses on the 
advancement of the autonomy regime beyond the central state and the re-direction of struggles. 
In the following discussion, found in Chapter 9, I return to crucial aspects of the debates in the 
literature review and re-engage with these in view of the analysis conducted. It is organised around 
five themes, most of which refer to a body of literature. In Chapter 10, I recapitulate the research 
objectives, summarise the main findings of the study, point to the major contributions, acknowledge 
the study’s limitations and develop an agenda for future research.  
25 
 
Chapter 2. Approaching state transformation in contemporary Latin 
America 
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter explores how researchers have usually treated the category of the state when writing on 
early 21st century Latin America. Since it is beyond the scope of this chapter to include all accounts, I 
focus on those approaches which have been most dominant and influential in social scientific debates. 
When reviewing them, I ask how far these serve to make sense of the present scenario, which 
researchers found to be full of tensions, as well as the specificity of the pluri-national state idea. 
2.2. New left regimes 
With the political openings of the 1980s in Latin America paralleling the end of the Cold War, 
democracy became the central reference point in debates around political regimes, and 'gained the 
status of a mantra' (Coppedge et al., 2011, p.247). Initially, the main concern was the transition to 
democracy (O’Donnell et al., 1986; Malloy and Seligson, 1987; Linz, 1990; Huntington, 1991) and with 
formal democratisation, the emphasis shifted to its consolidation (Mainwaring et al., 1992; Tulchin 
and Romero, 1995). The main question was no longer if democracy could survive, 'but whether it 
[could] become a meaningful way for diverse sectors of the populace to exercise collective control 
over the public decisions that affect their lives' (Roberts, 1998, p.2). Anti-democratic structures and 
processes, remaining in place despite formal democracy moved to the centre of attention8. 
Institutions and their quality became a crucial concern in social sciences and key international 
organisations pushed a 'good governance' agenda. In this, little attention was paid to the rising 
exasperation on the continent, which also reflected the developing 'crisis of representation' of the 
masses, which is crucial for understanding the 'left turn' (Mainwaring, 2006; Luna, 2010). 
In the 'left turn', leaders assumed state power, who scholars placed on the left of the ideological 
spectrum. With this, the attention shifted towards the new regimes, how they governed and what this 
meant for democracy. Castañeda (2006) pioneered the dichotomy of bad versus good new left9 – that 
is, the radical populist versus the social democratic left. In this, he reproduces 'the old cleavage 
between revolution and reform' (Beasley-Murray et al., 2009, p.324). Whilst the good ones have learnt 
from the past and moderated, the others remain based on 'good old-fashioned populism' (Castañeda, 
2006, p.33).  
                                                          
8 Concepts like 'exclusionary democracy' (Remmer, 1985) and 'delegative democracy' (O'Donnell, 1993) were coined. 
9 It is the 'new left' since it differed from 'communist' and 'populist' old left (Castañeda, 2006). 
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Castañeda's highly normative dichotomy was criticised for various reasons, for example, for lacking 
clear definitions of concepts like populism, left and social democracy, and for allocating cases to the 
categories on the basis of a blurry mix of rhetoric, attitude and policies (Madrid, 2010; Ellner, 2012). 
Other critics point out that it highly problematic to neglect social movements and extra-institutional 
space (Ciccariello-Maher, 2013, p.228). Partly responding to this criticism, scholars have offered 
alternative explanations for the rise of the two lefts, focusing on institutions (Schamis, 2006), factor 
endowments (Weyland, 2009) and historical origins and timing (Madrid, 2010). Despite partly 
adopting a different terminology, the groupings remain largely unchanged and so, they seem to take 
the two lefts for granted (Ellner, 2012, p.112).  
With regards to democracy findings are mixed. On the one hand, for example, the volume of Huber 
and Stephens (2012) shows how leftist governments account for a positive change. In this, the 
emphasis is often on new social policies and enhanced mechanisms for participation. On the other 
hand, Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán identify in Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela a democratic erosion – 
other new left cases are classified as stable democracies (Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán, 2015, p.114). 
For them, 
erosions occurred where presidents with hegemonic ambitions confronted poorly 
institutionalized party systems and ultimately gained control over weak state institutions, 
including pliant courts and low-capacity agencies unable to check the executive (ibid.). 
Castañeda himself predicted in 2006 that President Morales would 'make news, but not history' if 
Washington 'played its cards right' (Fuentes, 2014, p.103). Yet, given the establishment of the pluri-
national state and Morales’ 2010 and 2014 re-elections, Castañeda seemingly overestimated the US 
influence and underestimated the Bolivian electorate. When focusing on the regime, 'the economic, 
social and even political changes augured by leftist electoral victories are [seen as] superficial, 
transient and reversible' (Hunt, 2016, p.440). Does it do justice to the pluri-national state idea to think 
that the experiments can simply been undone? 
Motta (2006) makes a key point when claiming that Panizza (2005) fails to understand the 'nature' of 
Latin America's left and remains trapped within existing thought frameworks. As in earlier 
contributions on democratisation and institutional quality, the state is treated as having little 
conceptual ambiguity, usually implying a pluralist-liberal and normative notion of the state following 
which it should be a referee of society, steered by the democratic government (Heywood, 2013). If 
the state does not fulfil this role, it is a failure of institutions, leadership or governance and not of the 
state itself. Most observers assume that leftist movements, parties and governments 'share a common 
commitment to egalitarianism; a willingness to use the state to balance market forces; and a belief in 
the importance of popular participation' (Cameron, 2009, p.332).  
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It is highly problematic to interpret the reality of Latin American leftist forces if one assumes the state 
as a key 'focus of political power and democracy; political parties (more centrally elites) as privileged 
agents of structural change; and the nation state as the spatial limit of political agency and analysis' 
(Motta, 2006, p.899). With these assumptions, the failure to fully grasp possibilities for, and address 
obstacles to, social change is likely. In the Bolivian case, it is not the new government that initiated a 
revolution, but 'it was a revolution that brought about the government of Evo Morales' (Hylton and 
Sinclair, 2007, p.17). 
Instead of coining new concepts, which seek to grasp the regime-democracy nexus, a more critical 
engagement with the nature of structures, and primarily the state, and how they are conceptualised, 
is crucial. Otherwise, neither the contradictions in the pluri-national scenarios nor the specificity of 
the pluri-national state idea are fully grasped. 
2.3. The thesis of a 'strong(er) state', or neo-developmentalism vs. neo-extractivism 
This second set of approaches stresses the political economy in transforming Latin America. In 2005, 
Coatsworth observed 'the renewal of interest in the Big Questions that inspired the structuralists, 
"cepalinos", Marxists, dependentistas, and modernizationists of the post-World War II generations' 
(Coatsworth, 2005, p.126). As he predicted, alternatives to neoliberalism were ambitiously debated 
over the past decade and a similar divide as the one between reformist and radical dependistas 
emerged (see also 3.2.3.). This divide, reflected in the notions of neo-developmentalism and neo-
extractivism, is not only relevant for understanding divergent visions on transformation and 
alternative paths, but also shows contrasting perspectives on the state. Notwithstanding, over time 
(neo-)developmentalism and (neo-)extractivism have increasingly been employed 'rather loosely to 
describe current economic policies' (North and Grinspun, 2016, p.483). 
The reformists advocate the revival of ideas on state developmentalism and the developmental state. 
This perspective, which gained prominence during the economic crises in the late 1990s, became 
particularly relevant after the 'left turn'. It was especially important in Brazil and Argentina, where the 
Import Substitution Industrialisation (ISI) polices led to some positive results in industrialisation and 
development. Yet, also the new Bolivian, Ecuadoran and Venezuelan Constitutions 'reintroduce the 
state as protagonist capable of intervening in the economic arena' (Reyes, 2012, p.9). Overall, the pink 
idea is often associated with 'an increasing role for the state in development' (Wylde, 2012, p.187). 
For key promoters, neo-developmentalism refers to a 'national development strategy that middle 
income countries are today using or should use to promote development and economic catching up' 
(São Paulo School of Economics of Getulio Vargas Foundation, 2010). It is an attempt to 'define an 
alternative to the Washington Consensus orthodoxy' (Ban, 2013, p.300) and draws on 'old-style Latin 
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American developmentalism' (Bresser-Pereira, 2006). Yet, it is new in that lessons were drawn from 
earlier shortcomings as well as the experience of the Asian tiger states and it also responds to the 
globalised international sphere (ibid., 2011). In this 'comeback of the state' (Ban, 2013), it needs to be 
a 'capable state' that forms alliances with business, creates investment opportunities and reduces 
inequality, but does not take the lead in making investments as under developmentalism (Bresser-
Pereira, 2011). Similarly in 20th century developmentalism, the state is seen as a means to achieve 
development. 
Recent research on Brazil indicates that within and despite the neo-developmental agenda, 
contemporary governance remains largely driven by a dominant power bloc headed by the national 
and international bourgeoisie with competing interests (Boito and Saad-Filho, 2016). Due to elements 
of a 'search for progressive policy alternatives arising out of the many contradictions of neoliberalism' 
(Macdonald and Rückert, 2009, p.6), authors speak of a hybrid neoliberal-neo-developmentalist 
model (Boito and Saad-Filho, 2016). Analysing Argentina, Féliz concludes that 
[w]hile it has been able to bring back economic growth, the development of its inner 
contradictions is creating growing barriers to the possibility of further expansion within the 
same project of development, particularly as the world economy enters into crisis (Féliz, 
2015, p.70). 
These findings do not come as a surprise, given some questionable assumptions made by neo-
developmentalists. Chibber (1999) calls the East Asian miracle that is used as reference point into 
question, since it can be hardly be reduced to a strong state. At the same time, a key problem with 
the approach is the underlying naïve conceptualisation of the state: The state, represented principally 
by the government, also the key actor in political economy, is seen as 'capable of constituting and 
leading the nation as a "collective actor", and consequently guiding it onto a virtuous economic path' 
(Ebenau, 2014, p.107). Such 'statolatry' (that is, state idolatry) assigns all-embracing and in-depth 
organisational competence to the state (Boris, 2014, pp.182-3). It is assumed that the state can act 
relatively detached from individual or class interests, and has the capacity to implement reforms (ibid., 
p.150). While an alliance of state and business is seen as key in this strategy, the collaboration between 
policy makers and capitalists has not been as straightforward as stated in cheery accounts of 
developmentalism (Chibber, 2009, pp.163-4).  
In neo-developmentalism, the state is perceived as a 'thing' that is outside or peripheral to the 
relations of production, and autonomous from individual and class interests. In this, they miss one of 
the key contradictions of the capitalist mode of production, when 
envisioning of transnational economic competition as a positive-sum game which promises 
gains for all sorts of firms and countries, whatever their initial position, if only they tackle 
the task of competitive insertion in the 'right' way (Ebenau, 2014, p.106). 
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This masks that the universal struggle for shares of the global market, has historically produced 
structural unemployment and excess capacities in many productive sectors, related to the tendency 
towards over-accumulation on a global level (ibid.). The assumption that capital has a national 
orientation is questionable given its universalising tendency, which allows and even promotes varying 
dynamics (Chibber, 2013, pp.101-103). Boron (2010) emphasises the impossibility of catching-up in 
capitalism – a strategy like neo-developmentalism would only preserve the status-quo.  
Apart from this, neo-developmentalism is incapable of seeing the specificity of the pluri-national state 
idea. As Clark finds, the neo-developmentalist agenda adopted by the Correa government is 
incompatible with the 2008 Ecuadorian Constitution (Clark, 2017, p.355). Neo-developmentalism does 
not offer a conceptual tool for unpacking this incompatibility and how the tensions play out in practice. 
On the other side of the divide, closer to the radical dependista strand, the work of Gudynas, already 
mentioned in 1.1., is a key reference point. With 'neo-extractivism', he offers a critique to 'neo-
developmentalism', which would implicitly support a continued subordination to the world market 
(Gudynas, 2009a). It means no other than 'new policies which strengthen the role of the state in the 
exploitation and ownership of resources' that do not address economic structures and its inherent 
risks and ills (Gutiérrez Aguilar, 2012, p.7).  
In comparison to the regime-centred approaches (see last subsection), less attention is paid to the 
willingness of the progressive governments. Instead, these scholars look at the global/international 
capitalist system to explain the lack of 'a dramatic shift towards a new economic model but rather a 
pragmatic way for centre-left governments to better capture capitalist surplus in the exploitation of 
natural resources' (Kennemore and Weeks, 2011, p.12). Then, the interdependence of Latin America 
and the wider international market has helped and continues to sustain the regions’ 
underdevelopment (Kay, 2010). Thus, despite neo-developmentalist efforts or social programmes, the 
pink tide governments did 'little more than perpetuate the colonial state and the neoliberal consensus, 
dressing it up with the trappings of socialism' (Hunt, 2016, p.440). 
As in the earlier dependista debate, the radical strand rejects the idea that the state can help 
overcome dependency (Namkoong, 1999). State reform can be mostly understood in terms of the 
external constraints arising from dependent, unequal relationships between centre and periphery 
(Holloway, 1994, p.26). For example, for Wallerstein, since the 16th century, the one world system, 'a 
unit with a single division of labor and multiple cultural systems', has been the model of the capitalist 
world economy under leading industries and countries (Wallerstein, 1974, p.390). Furthermore, 'the 
"world-economy" contains political structures and state' and hence strategies to overcome 
dependency at the national level can only reproduce capitalism (Wallerstein, 1982, p.13).  
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The 'neo-extractivist' angle is more promising for understanding the disappointed hopes associated 
with the pink tide and the pluri-national state experiments than neo-developmentalism. For example, 
it offers an explanation for why current cooperation between states in the South does not go beyond 
traditional varieties of development, but 'paradoxically' blocks alternatives such the Buen Vivir 
(Gudynas, 2016). 
Nevertheless, there is an important shortcoming when it comes to theorising and conceptualising the 
state that points to the closeness of the overly structural account. Even though the basic exploitative 
relations take place at the global level, their conditions are nationally established (Thwaites Rey, 2010, 
p.10). The neo-extractivist angle falls short in explaining the response to different domestic struggles: 
With regards to Gudynas’ compensatory state (2012a), one can ask why the state legitimises 
continued extractivism in the way it does, why the pluri-national state emerged and how the idea 
differs from other states. This indicates this radical perspective lacks a strong concept, capable of 
capturing the dynamic mediation of global and domestic spheres. Yet, such concept is indispensable 
for grasping the pluri-national state idea and the tensions identified by various scholars (see 1.1.). 
2.4. The state in post-neoliberal times or a post-neoliberal state? 
Besides the 'new left' categorisations, 'neo-developmentalism' and 'neo-extractivism', 'post-
neoliberalism' has emerged as another tool for capturing the changes in 21st century Latin America. 
Since Bolivia and Ecuador have been significantly discussed under this banner, it needs to be seen how 
far this set of lenses can make sense of the contradictory pluri-national scenario and the specificity of 
the pluri-national idea. Underpinned by Polanyi's 'Grand Transformation', the proponents of the 
concept see the new governments as a reaction against the extreme neoliberalisation and the 
accompanying technocratic, elitist democracies of the 1990s – it is a counter-movement of the type 
Polanyi (1944) described. In this, the notion of 'double movement' of market and the state’s corrective 
action is emphasised (Silva, 2009). 
Post-neoliberalism is seen as a call for a new alternative social contract between state and society 
(Wylde, 2012, p.436), that concerns the 'construction of social consensus' (Grugel and Riggirozzi, 2012, 
pp.4-5). In this, the changed role of the state is emphasised:  
The recent history of the leftist movements in Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador relates to the 
failures of the neoliberal reforms applied (…), hence the dismantling of core orthodox 
policies has been critical for them once in power. This has been possible through the 
expansion of state action in the economy (Rosales, 2013, p.1443). 
For other scholars, post-neoliberalism entails a 'strong' state (Radcliffe, 2012), a more 'active state' 
(Macdonald and Rückert, 2009, p.3), or a 'return of the state' (Grugel and Riggirozzi, 2012, p.1) 
compared to neoliberal times, associated with a 'shrinking state' (Lomnitz, 2006).  
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However, this idea of the changed state can be criticised for different reasons. First, neoliberalism 
cannot be associated with a weakening/ed state, as it is 'the role of the state (…) to create and preserve 
the institutional framework appropriate to such practices' (Harvey, 2005, p.1). Neo-Gramscians claim 
that the state was not weakened, but that its role was restructured (Bieler and Morton, 2006, p.198). 
Secondly, the left turn was initiated by the sudden ingress of voices and actions of those, who had not 
been perceived as part of society, or at least not part of the civil or political sector of society (Vega 
Camacho, 2014. p.172). The shift of the political is hence no return, but a result of the power, which 
can change and renew collective conditions of action and its expression (ibid.). 
In this, a key problem is that neoliberalism, the main reference point, is 'an oft-invoked, but ill-defined 
concept'10 (Mudge, 2008, p.703). Since neoliberalism is too broad as a 'descriptor for what is in fact a 
sequenced, fragmented and politically indeterminate process' (Molyneux, 2008, p.775), it is 
questionable if it is a promising starting point for a new concept. Additionally, scholars disagree on 
the relationship between neoliberalism and post-neoliberalism. In Brand and Sekler (2009) and Sader 
(2009, p.174), for example, a clear break between the neoliberalism and post-neoliberalism is 
envisioned, while Grugel and Riggirozzi state that, even though the pre-fix appears to signal something 
different from neoliberalism, this contrast 'should not be drawn too starkly' (Grugel and Riggirozzi, 
2012, p.6). Similarly, Macdonald and Rückert highlight that 'post-neoliberalism should not be 
understood as an era after neoliberalism' (Macdonald and Rückert, 2009, p.6).  
Adding to the lack of definitional clarity, Bebbington and Humphreys Bebbington (2011) note that the 
concept should be treated with caution as the self-proclaimed post-neoliberal governments might not 
be as post-neoliberal as they claim. So far, '[d]ebates about postneoliberalism-as-governance or as a 
discourse lack resolution' (Ettlinger and Hartmann, 2015, p.37).  
Seeking to move beyond these debates, one suggestion is to use post-neoliberalism as  
as an umbrella to explore various concepts [including] regime change, the role of the state, 
the retrenchment of neoliberalism through neoliberal governance, agency and class 
relations, and the potential for the sustainability of these changes (Cockburn, 2014, p.158). 
However, this has little potential to overcome the aforementioned challenges such as lacking clarity. 
Instead of opening up the category, Marston (2015) proposes, following Yates and Bakker (2013), to 
distinguish between post-neoliberalism as a utopian-ideological project (the after neoliberalism), 
which is found in academic and political discourse, and post-neoliberalism 'as a set of on-the-ground 
                                                          




processes and practices', including policies, shifts in state intervention and institutional reform (Yates 
and Bakker, 2013, p.64). 
Another way forward is offered by de Freitas et al., who see the need to 'underscore the ambiguity of 
both putatively neoliberal modes of resource governance and their post-neoliberal alternatives' (de 
Freitas et al., 2015, p.239). Coining the concept 'not-quite-neoliberal', they signal  
both our appreciation of and reservations about theoretical elaborations of neoliberalism, 
post-neoliberalism, and (post-)neoliberal natures in relation to the wide variety of reforms 
currently transforming resource governance in Latin America (ibid.). 
In a similar vein, others elaborate on the 'paradoxical nature of actually-existing post-neoliberalism' 
(Wilson and Bayón, 2017, p.55).  
While such approaches offer lenses that make the contradictions in the pluri-national scenarios visible, 
it appears questionable if they provide the conceptual tools to profoundly make sense of them as 
evolving processes. Instead of continuing to debate the meaning of the fuzzy buzzword post-
neoliberalism or coining more appropriate concepts to grasp the current situation, paying closer 
attention to the category of the state offers a more promising way forward.  
In the debates on post-neoliberalism, the state as a category has so far received little attention. Yet, 
introducing a volume on post-neoliberalism in Brazil, the editors point out that  
states are not unitary actors but must be seen as contested spaces marked by internal 
politics, clashing personalities, competing interests, and different external alliances, 
permeated by historically embedded institutional cultures and politics (Wolford and French, 
2016).  
Thinking about the state through post-neoliberal lenses has so far often implied either a liberal or 
structural vision of the state. The first one is overlapping with the regime-centred and neo-
developmental visions of the state as an instrument of government, and, for example, visible in the 
perspectives on the return of the state with new social policies. When pointing to the limitation of 
post-neoliberalism in practice, a rather structuralist vision of the state is often employed that overlaps 
with neo-extractivism. Also, the specificity of the pluri-national idea has not received much attention, 
since this also requires moving beyond neoliberalism as a reference point. 
2.5. Harnecker and 21st century socialism 
Another radical perspective on transforming Latin America is associated with the work of Harnecker, 
a leftist 'long-term political analyst and activist', who advocated '21st century socialism' (Ellner, 2012, 
p.97). As Althusser’s student, in her early work she developed a structuralist account largely reflecting 
a base-superstructure model of society, in which the state is an instrument of class domination that 
fulfils two functions, one technical-administrative and another of political domination (Harnecker, 
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1974, pp.60-62). Following Marx, Engels and Lenin, she points to the necessity of destroying the 
bourgeois state apparatus and not state power (ibid., pp.63-65). Extinguishing the state becomes only 
relevant with the proletarian state (ibid., p.75). Hence taking state power lies at the heart of radical 
change; practice has shown that 'contrary to the theoretical dogmatism of some sectors of the radical 
left – you can use this inherited state and transform it into an instrument that collaborates with 
building the new society' (Harnecker, 2017). The inherited state is the basis of a new institutional body 
and political system. 
Yet, in her eyes, transforming the state should not involve the leadership of a vanguard party (Chávez 
Frías and Harnecker, 2005, p.9). Instead, two things are needed: first, state institutions run by 
revolutionary cadres, willing to adopt transformative measures of these institutions and secondly, an 
organized popular movement that is capable of controlling its actions and exercise pressure for 
transformation (Harnecker, 2017). Distinguishing repressive, technical-administrative and ideological 
institutions as state apparatus, she is (like Althusser) particularly interested in the latter (Harnecker, 
1974, pp.66-69).  
Considering this, her closeness to Cuban revolutionary process and involvement in the Venezuelan 
Bolivarian Revolution and serving as President Chávez’s advisor early on in his presidency, might not 
come as a surprise. She advocated 21st century socialism, a term coined by Heinz Dieterich, a Mexican 
leftist and subsequently used as a banner by pink tide presidents. With 21st century socialism, one 
seeks to tackle problems of inequality and poverty, which neither free-market capitalism nor 20th 
century socialism addressed. Having learnt from the past, more emphasis is placed on participatory 
and decentralized planning. Harnecker writes  
people involved in the planning process feel dignified, [it] increases their self-esteem and, 
what’s most important, [they] no longer feel like beggars demanding solutions from the 
state (Harnecker, 2014). 
This account has served as an important guide or strategy for recent revolutionary transformations, 
yet, it offers less insights into how the processes under the progressive governments have evolved. 
For example, why do we see 'revolutions in the revolutions' (Reyes, 2012)? Perceiving the state as an 
instrument hardly grasps the contradictory tendencies found in the pluri-national experiments. The 
state is ultimately treated as separated from and externally related to the economic sphere – but is 
it? I later challenge this assumption (see 4.3.2.). Additionally, she does not address the specificity of 
the pluri-national idea and indigenous struggles.  
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2.6. Relational approaches  
Authors like McKay et al. (2014), Ettlinger and Hartmann (2015) and Hunt (2016), pointing to 
limitations in the regime-centre, overly structuralist perspectives and contributions on post-
neoliberalism, propose to better use relational approaches for making sense of transforming Latin 
America. A prominent set of relational approaches that offers a more nuanced take on the state draws 
on Gramsci, whose ideas have been highly influential for Latin American intellectuals (see 3.2.2.) 
Recently, Gramsci’s ideas served as reference point for thinking about changing 21st century Latin 
America in different ways. While some scholars look at the global political economy and, for example, 
the internationalisation of the state, others focused more on the domestic scenario and the state-
society relation. This demonstrates the richness of Gramsci's notion of the state, that is not just 
restricted to the 'government of functionaries' or 'top political leaders and personalities with direct 
governmental responsibility' (Gramsci, 1971, p.178). Rather, the state 
consists of the entire complex of political and theoretical activities with which the ruling 
class not only justifies and maintains its dominance, but manages to win the active consent 
of those over whom they rule (ibid., p.244). 
The state has a political society, that is the legal system, police, and army, and a civil society11, which 
are associated with coercion and consent as modes of domination. Being primarily a surety of an 
unequal, capitalist social relation, the main objective of the state is preserving the system (Thwaites 
Rey, 2010, p.15). Key in this is hegemony, which is used to refer to consensual dominance. Following 
Poulantzas, the state’s concrete characteristics stem from socially mediated power relations, a 
material agglomeration of relations among classes and class factions (Poulantzas, 1978). The state 
always remains 'relatively autonomous' from the historic power bloc, which is the heterogeneous 
conglomerate of the different classes whose interests are perpetuated by the state (see 4.3.1.) 
2.6.1. Neo-Gramscian thought in International Relations and Global Political Economy 
The proponents of Neo-Gramscianism as a theory of International Relations and Global Political 
Economy often divide history into periods, in which capitalism has certain features. Each period is 
'based on (…) a fit between a configuration of material power, the prevalent collective image of world 
order (…) and a set of institutions which administer the order' (Cox, 1981, p.139). These three elements 
are present in the spheres of social relations of production, the forms of state and world order. 
Capitalist crisis occurs in case of arising misfits and it is perceived as a 'crisis of regulation', through 
which transition from one mode of regulation to another takes place. 
                                                          
11 It is the sphere where ideas and beliefs are shaped and where the state makes concessions to political parties and unions. 
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The years after the global economic crisis and the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in the early 
1970s were characterised by a tendency towards internationalisation of production and the state 
(Wissen and Brand, 2011). This period of transnational restructuring of the economy was driven by a 
transnational managerial class. For the new historic power bloc, neoliberalism served as an ideological 
battering ram to ensure, among other things, the passive subordination of the periphery to the 
accumulation in the centre (Thwaites Rey, 2010, p.9). 
Despite similar Structural Adjustment Programmes and US foreign policy, neoliberal restructuring 
varied between Latin American states12. In this, the state was not rolled back – as implied in some of 
the previously reviewed approaches–, but its role was restructured (Bieler and Morton, 2006, p.198). 
It increasingly served as a 'transmission belt'13 for neoliberalism as the dominant logic of capitalist 
competition (Cox, 1992, p.31). However, the transnational capitalist class failed to establish (cultural) 
hegemony largely because it was unable to conceal the contradictions that were arising (Gwynne and 
Kay, 2000). Despite its emphasis on freedom and democracy, neoliberal policies had in fact tightened 
the long-existing marginalisation and exclusion of an increasingly large part of the population (Boris, 
2014, p.162).  
Roughly since 2000, the balance of power has changed in Latin America, and the old historic bloc 
increasingly crumbled (Thwaites Rey, 2010, p.9). New forms of protests and social movements had 
arisen, expressing counter-hegemonic aspirations (Ouviña, 2004). This involvement led to an 
increasing de-legitimisation of traditional parties as key political agents, and of the political 
representative system in line with neoliberal ideals, since these were seen as obstacles to social 
change. The left turn is then the result of such processes, including both a gradual development of 
(material) conditions and class consciousness (Thwaites Rey and Ouviña, 2014, p.296). A new mode of 
regulation became necessary, which is sometimes labelled post-neoliberalism (see 2.4.).  
When giving equal weight to material capabilities, ideas and institutions, one can argue that the 
contradictions become blurred. This perspective accords with Gramsci's mission and is preoccupied 
with ideology, but might underestimated the importance of the capital relation (Burnham, 2006). With 
the focus on regulation, they miss seeing crisis as an expression of accumulation. In the case of the 
state, this leads to a 'slide towards an idealist account of the determination of economic policy' (Bieler 
and Morton, 2003). As I explain in more detail in 4.3.1., a key problem in this thinking is that state and 
market are ultimately treated as separate forms of social organisation, expressing political and 
                                                          
12 This was dependent, among others, on the economic configuration, including the indebtedness, and on the perception of 
this situation held and articulated by national social forces (Thwaites Rey, 2010, p.6). 
13 In this, state agencies closer to the global economy (offices of presidents and prime ministers, central banks, finance 
ministries) gained precedence over those closer to domestic public policy (ministries of industry; labour) (Cox, 1992, p.31). 
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economic power of capital. In this, they are externally related and the state is treated like a state in a 
capitalist society, not as a capitalist state (Bonefeld, 2006, pp.59-60).  
Apart from these concerns that remain within the limits of existing Marxist state theorisation, this 
perspective on transforming Latin America does not address the specificity of pluri-national state idea 
and does not see how indigenous and non-indigenous struggles differ. Nevertheless, it helps shedding 
some light on why the left turn came about in the first place.  
2.6.2. Ecuador and Bolivia through Gramscian lenses 
Relational perspectives have also be used for explaining the transformations of and in Bolivia and 
Ecuador. In this, the current period is perceived as 'transitional' and while the neoliberal restructuring 
resembled a 'passive revolution' (Morton, 2006), this time, a hegemonic restructuring is anticipated 
(Thwaites Rey and Ouviña, 2014). This hegemonic revolution is based on and pushed by domestic 
social forces, 'forming a majority alliance around a hegemonic project that is capable of bringing these 
groups together into a coherent programme' (Bieler and Morton, 2006, p.198). 
Comparing the supposedly hegemonic transitions, Errejón and Guijarro find that while the 'MAS’s 
hegemony seems more comprehensive, capable of dismantling opponents and mediated by organized 
social sectors', in the Ecuadorian alliance, the hegemonic capacity is 'weakly organized and centred 
around the charismatic leadership of an "outsider"' which makes it more dependent on its ability to 
dismantle potential opponents (Errejón and Guijarro, 2016, pp.50, 34). Hence, in Ecuador, the 
government is under more pressure to constantly reaffirm political boundaries. Yet, authors point out 
that also in Bolivia, transition is far from smooth. A counter-hegemonic project emerged in the Bolivian 
indigenous movements, for which the hegemonic project associated with the MAS-IPSP had created 
the space (Burman, 2014, p.247). For Webber (2016), Bolivia under Morales resembles more a 'passive 
revolution' as the post-2006 political economy has witnessed the continuous subjugation of 
indigenous workers and peasants to large capital.  
In referring to the 'passive revolution', Webber also emphasises the need to go beyond the dominant 
perspective of the notion as these have 'treated the socio-political and the ideological as relatively 
autonomous from the process of capital accumulation' (ibid., p.1855). This criticism applies to Errejón 
and Guijarro and Burman, who largely remain at the social level. Webber suggests a perspective that 
better describes the contradictory capital accumulation, in which  
[t]he actions of the state are not the mechanistic expression of an economic law of capital, 
but nor is the political under Morales properly understood except in relation to the 
disciplinary exigencies of capital accumulation (Webber, 2016, p.1862). 
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This is an important move towards identifying contradictions inherent in the state, which could be 
developed further and has the potential for explaining parts of the tensions present in the pluri-
national experiments. However, despite pointing to the importance of the colonial aspect in struggles 
(Webber, 2017, pp.73-75), Webber fails to offer an approach to the state that makes its 
modern/colonial character explicit and addresses the specificity of the pluri-national idea. 
Radhuber offers a different relational take on state transformation in Bolivia, focusing on power 
balances and the economic and political processes these produce (Radhuber, 2012, pp.182-183; 
Radhuber, 2013). In her analysis on pluri-national Bolivia, she borrows Jessop’s notion of 'strategic 
selectivity' (Jessop, 1999) for understanding why the state terrain is 'more accessible for some 
individuals and social groups than for others, and limits the strategies that they can apply when 
addressing the state' (Radhuber, 2012, p.169). For her, this is crucial for understanding why the 
(extractivist) development goals are prioritised over indigenous rights and why in the pluri-national 
scenario, the centralisation of resources has increased (Radhuber, 2013).  
While her analysis provides important insights into the Bolivian process and to the tensions present in 
the pluri-national scenario, she appears to treat state and market as ontologically different entities 
and remains largely at the social level (see 4.3.1.). It is also questionable if the colonial aspect and the 
specificity of the pluri-national idea are sufficiently integrated. Drawing on Jessop, her works seems 
to see the state 'merely an institutional ensemble' with state power being 'the forces acting within it' 
(Jessop, 1982, p.149). Is it just that the indigenous people are historically disadvantaged in influencing 
the state? Focusing on taxes and public finances in pluri-national Bolivia and not paying attention the 
autonomy, Radhuber (2013) is not open to seeing the pluri-national state as something potentially 
different from other states and hence, does not take the pluri-national idea seriously.  
2.7. Summing-up 
In this chapter, I reviewed how the state as a category is treated in key debates on recent Latin 
America. The regime-centred approaches hardly engage with state theorisation and the state is 
assumed to be an instrument of the government, a neutral actor in itself. This is also the case for some 
contributions on post-neoliberalism and neo-developmentalism, which often imagine that the state 
can be revived by government after being 'rolled back' in neoliberal times. Perceiving the state as an 
entity requiring no further analysis leads to a failure in acknowledging the heterogeneity of the state 
and an inability to understand the tensions found in the pluri-national state scenarios and to grasp the 
specificity of the pluri-national idea. 
The more radical conceptualisations opposing neo-developmentalism, I summarised here under the 
banner of 'neo-extractivism', are more promising since they emphasise external constraints of state 
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transformation. Nevertheless, I pointed out that the notion of neo-extractivism fails to provide a 
conceptual tool for how this mediation between international and national takes place and it remains 
more than questionable if the pluri-national state idea can be properly understood from this 
perspective. 
For Harnecker, revolutionary change occurs by taking state power and transforming its institutions, as 
it was attempted through '21st century socialism', a strategy used by progressive governments. For 
her, the state appears ultimately like an instrument, which leads to similar problems identified with 
neo-developmentalism or regime-centred approaches, since 'revolutions in the revolution' cannot be 
fully grasped. While tending to overemphasis the role of ideology, she treats political and economic 
sphere as externally related, which is, as argued in more detail in 4.3.1., problematic. In addition, she 
fails to offer a perspective on the idea of a different state and the rise of the pluri-national states. 
Finally, I reviewed relational perspectives associated with the work of Gramsci and representing the 
most nuanced approach to the state. Yet, the Global Political Economy version falls short in perceiving 
the state as capitalist, and treating state and market as ontologically different entities (see 4.3.1.). The 
examples of relational approaches applied to the pluri-national scenario offer some insights into the 
process of state transformation that go beyond previously presented approaches. However, also here, 
the state is usually not framed as capitalist entity, but as an entity in a capitalist society. The presented 
authors also fail to explain the specificity of the pluri-national state idea. In the next chapter, I revise 
approaches to the state that pay more attention to the colonial aspect of it, which appear to have 




Chapter 3. Approaching the state’s colonial colouring and state 
transformation in Bolivia 
3.1. Introduction 
In the past few decades, indigenous movements have shown their determination to resist 'surviving 
colonialism' (Mariátegui, 1971). They challenged '(post, neo) colonial power relations, institutional 
structures, modern nationhood and the monocultural state, the tare of colonialism' (Walsh, 2008, 
p.507). The literature reviewed in the previous chapter has not examine this aspect in the 
transformation. In this chapter, I engage with three sets of approaches that pay closer attention to 
how colonial history continues to shape Latin American society and state. I evaluate how far these 
accounts can shed light on the contradictory tendencies in the pluri-national experiments and are 
capable of making the specificity of the pluri-national state idea visible. 
I first look at important Marxists, whose works offer perspectives on the colonial question. Then, I turn 
to the 'de-colonial option', which represents a Latin American variant of subaltern thought. The final 
part revolves around recent contributions of Bolivian academics associated with the comuna14, who 
closely observed and are involved in the transformation processes.  
3.2. The colonial question in (Latin American) Marxism 
Marx himself did not analyse the spread of capitalism in Latin America in depth (Aricó, 1982)15. 
However, several scholars employed his ideas to analyse the Latin American reality, yet most of them 
would agree that, 'we cannot mechanically apply what is outlined in Capital to the current reality of 
Latin America' (Harnecker, 2017). In what follows, I engage with Mariátegui and Guevara, Zavaleta, 
and the dependistas. These strands offer different takes on how the colonial experience has shaped 
and continues to shape Latin American state and society. I selected them as they tackle key questions 
related to the struggles of indigenous peoples, Latin American social formations, the spread of 
capitalism and global capital. All these question needs addressing to fully grasp the specificity of the 
pluri-national state idea and the tensions in the pluri-national experiments. 
3.2.1. Mariátegui and Guevara: land reform and anti-imperial/colonial struggles 
Mariátegui, whose works stem from the 1920s and early 1930s, emphasized that '[e]ducators can least 
afford to ignore economic and social reality' (Mariátegui, 1971, p.28). Analysing his home country, he 
found that '[t]he degree to which the history of Peru was severed by the conquest can be seen better 
on an economic than on any other level' (ibid., p.1). Independence was determined by developing 
                                                          
14 It is beyond the scope of this chapter to engage with accounts on the Ecuadorian state transformation. Lander (2012) is an 
important scholar, associated with comuna members, who analyses the Ecuadorian scenario. 
15 This was due to Hegel’s influence, who considered the Americas 'outside of history' (Aricó, 1982).  
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capitalist needs in the West and when, in Latin America, a 'bourgeois economy' gradually replaced 
feudalism, 'its colonial character within the world picture' remained intact (ibid., pp.6-7).  
When considering the 'problem of the Indian', he rejects approaches that fail to see it as a socio-
economic problem (ibid., p.22). Examining it in terms of ethnicity, administration, education and so 
on would just 'mask or distort the reality of the problem' (ibid., pp.22-24). The root of the 'problem of 
the Indian' lies in the land tenure system – hence, as long as landowners’ feudalism exists, the problem 
remains (ibid.). By focusing on land ownership, he pays little attention to state theorisation, but largely 
envision it as a tool or an instrument used by those who control it. For him,  
[a] new legal and economic order must, in any case, [be] the work of a class and not of a 
caudillo. When the class exists, the caudillo acts as its interpreter and trustee. His policy is 
no longer determined by his personal judgment but by a group of collective interests and 
requirements. Peru lacked a middle class capable of organising a strong and efficient state 
(ibid., p.50). 
Under many 20th century progressive governments and revolutionaries on the continent, land reform 
was indeed a common promise, which also resonated with Mao Zedong´s thought. Guevara, for 
example, noted that 'the Agrarian Reform is the basis upon which the new Cuba must build itself' 
(Guevara, 1961 [2002]).  
Yet, Guevara was clear that a revolution involved more than struggles against feudalism and for 
agrarian reform. Confronting capitalism required tackling (US) imperialism and ending formal 
colonialism where present. Yet, to achieve these conditions, state power was needed, and for this, in 
largely rural Latin America, the peasantry as 'dormant force' was crucial 'for Latin America's liberation' 
(Guevara, 1963 [2005]). Being more heterogeneous and smaller in numbers, the peasants could not 
confront capitalism as the (urban) working class in the West could and so, Guevara and some others 
advocated guerrilla warfare as a method, which is 'the classical weapon of the peasantry, and not the 
working class' (Woods, 2007). 
When the indigenous problem is tackled as a problem of land tenure, indigenous people are 
recognised as peasants. Guevara envisions anti-colonial and anti-imperial struggles, but he does not 
acknowledge de-colonial struggles, though these are often seen as crucial in the emergence of the 
pluri-national idea and state (see 3.3.). Hence, these approaches are of limited use for understanding 
the specificity of indigenous people(s). For example, It becomes impossible to grasp, why indigenous 
movements in the Andes repudiated state power when struggling for a different state in the past few 
decades (Quijano, 2006, p.21). Additionally, with their restrictive perspectives on struggles and their 
limited analysis of the state as a category, Mariátegui, Guevara and several others following in their 
footsteps, fall short in elucidating the contradictory tendencies in the pluri-national experiments.  
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3.2.2. Gramsci in Latin America and Zavaleta on heterogeneous social formations 
As already mentioned in 2.6., Gramsci’s work is a crucial reference point for Marxists working on Latin 
America. Some of his concepts were strong in meeting empirical resonance in the region, also because 
they were relatively flexible (Aricó, 1988, p.126). Zavaleta’s work is of great importance here, since 
he, drawing on Gramsci, sought to understand the specificity of the Bolivian society and state.  
In his works that predate the 1952 Revolution, he still argues from a nationalist angle and follows a 
classic Marxist line of thought of a proletarian revolution aiming at bringing the bourgeois to its knees. 
In this, he overlaps with some other crucial socialist and communist revolutionaries of his days (see 
3.2.1.). After the disappointing experience of the unfinished 1952 Revolution (see 5.7.), he sought to 
understand the unforeseen course of events, underpinned by the assumption that self-determination 
of the masses is the principle of world history (Zavaleta, 1983, p.114). This led him not to look for 
underlying laws or similar, but for the specificity of the Bolivian society. With this, he offers a critique 
of the recent development in Marxist state theorisation (see 4.3.1.), claiming that neither 
instrumentalist nor structuralist accounts addressed the questions of generalisability and applicability 
to all societies and times (Zavaleta, 1990, p.176).  
He observed that sectors of the Bolivian society only partially relate to each other, with different forms 
of production and self-government co-existing (Tapia Mealla, 2015, p.14). In contrast to European 
experiences, in Bolivia, the amalgam of sectors of society into one unitary formation did not take place 
(Ortega, 2014, p.117). Instead, a 'motley society and formation' developed (Antezana, 2009, p.131). 
This lack of homogenisation is associated with the incomplete spread of the capitalist mode of 
production and fragmentation resulting from modern forms of political domination, mainly the state, 
that marginalises the majority of the population (Ortega, 2014).  
In such 'motley society', the state has just seemingly sovereign domination over the different domains, 
making it an 'apparent' state (Tapia Mealla, 2014, p.163). For the state, which has to ideologically 
represent the interest of an abstract general public in a credible way and establish hegemony (see 
2.5.), this becomes more difficult if social structures and interests are so distinct. The 'state/public 
optimum', meaning a situation with a positive co-relation of economic activity of a country, societal 
life and state, is prevented in Latin America due to dependency relations (Zavaleta, 1986, p.249).  
Zavaleta´s work is highly influential and his contribution to understanding the specificity of Bolivian 
social formation is enormous. Yet, as I argue in more detail in Chapter 4, it is problematic to assume 
an incomplete spread of the capitalism that leaves some social sectors outside the capital relation, as 
this involves a limited understanding of the universalising tendency of capital. In addition, such 
thinking can trigger the use of binary opposition, in which cultural and similar factors are overstated.  
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At the same time, when considering the state, Zavaleta appears to treat the state as an object of study 
that can be separated from society and the social relations of production. With the 'state/public 
optimum', for example, he delineates an abstract situation, and explains why this is unattainable in 
the Bolivian context. While his approach offers some insights into the emergence of the pluri-national 
idea and state and the conflicts present in it (see 3.4.), his work does not facilitate the development 
of a critique of the state.  
3.2.3. Reformist and radical dependistas 
While the previous perspectives largely focus on domestic scenarios, another major strand of Latin 
American Marxist thinking, dependency theory, is more concerned with perceiving colonial legacies 
for insertion in the world market. The dependistas emerged in the 1950 and 1960s as counter-current 
to the then mainstream a-historical development paradigm, in which development was imagined as a 
linear catching-up process. They instead emphasised the relational character of capital, making the 
insertion of the Latin American economies into the flow of capital to the industrialised world, dating 
back to colonial times, crucial for understanding the present scenario (Marini, 1973, p.15). In the 
periphery, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to achieve an autonomous, dynamic process of 
technological innovation (Vernengo, 2006, p.552).  
Reformist dependistas, among them Prebisch (1949), Sunkel (1969) and Furtado (1973, 1976), saw the 
possibility that with autonomous nationalist development, obstacles could be overcome, similar to 
Bresser-Pereira's more recent suggestion. In 2.3., I rejected the implied notion of the state that cannot 
grasp the specificity of the pluri-national idea as well as the flawed understanding of capitalism of the 
neo-developmental state and similar criticism applies to these forerunners.  
Radical dependistas, building on Lenin and Luxemburg, among others, called the reformist strategy 
into question, often doubting the possibility of overcoming dependency altogether. For Dos Santos 
(1970), dependency is based upon the international division of labour that allows industrial 
development to happen only in some places and Frank (1969) found that the Latin American 
bourgeoisies have been structurally incapable of following a political line independent of imperialism. 
Cardoso and Faletto (1979) criticised the reformists for not looking at the social processes within the 
dependent world and treating the state like a black box, as in fact both external and internal factors 
shape dependency. Hence, not just some reformist policies, but profound change is needed for 
overcoming dependency. The experience from the Import Substitution Industrialisation experiments 
support this position over the reformist account, since the policies did not end dependency. 
As indicated 2.3., radical dependistas sought to bring together internal and external dynamics to better 
capture the how the colonial experience continues to shape the Latin American states. While this goes 
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significantly deeper than just speaking about insertion into the world market, they still lack a concept 
for understanding the dynamic mediation of the international-national state-society relationship 
(Holloway, 1994, p.26). However, for understanding the state transformation and taking the pluri-
national idea seriously, such a concept is indispensable.  
3.3. The state and (de)coloniality in a post-colonial world 
For de-colonial thinkers, early 21st century Latin America did not solely experienced 'a turn to the left, 
but a decolonial turn' (Escobar, 2010). The 'de-colonial option' emerged parallel to rising indigenous 
struggles in the 1980s and 1990s and saw that the demand for self-determination sought the 
reordering of political, economic, administrative and judicial structures (Walsh, 2008, p.511). The key 
de-colonial thinkers are associated with the Proyecto M/C (Proyecto Modernidad/ Colonialidad), a split 
from the Latin American Subaltern Studies Group, that emerged after the group Guha and Stoke had 
founded for studying Indian and South Asian history and present. The 'de-colonial option' formed as 
a critique to subaltern studies: Despite having contributed to the critique of Euro-centrism, the sub-
alternists had favoured when heavily drawing on Gramsci and Foucault, a Western epistemology, 
which limits their ability to develop a critique to Euro-centrism (Grosfoguel, 2008). At the same time, 
de-colonial thinkers sought to offer a way of moving beyond post-colonial studies16 and World-system 
theory17 (Escobar, 2007, pp.179-180). It was also influenced by liberation theology, and earlier debates 
on modernity and post-modernity (ibid.). The 'de-colonial option' is crucial for this review, since it 
offers a distinct perspective on indigenous struggles and a more nuanced approach to the state 
compared to the previous sets of approaches found in this chapter. 
As visible in the name of the group, modernity and coloniality lie at the heart of the 'de-colonial 
option'. Conquest is considered necessary for the rise of Western modernity, which is seen as a 
civilizational project that claims ego-less universality for itself. Modernity is not the result of 'internal 
superiority' of Europe, but of the 'discovery, conquest, colonisation and integration of other parts of 
the world', which allowed the imposition of an apparently universal paradigm (Dussel, cited by Castro-
Gómez, 2008, p.271). In the modernisation processes in the periphery, transmitted values and forms 
have been mediated through the logic of colonial experiences. Hence, coloniality is modernity’s 'other 
face' (Castro-Gómez, 2008, p.283) and its 'darker side' (Mignolo, 2011). 'Coloniality of power' 
(re)produces social discrimination, codified as ethnic, racial, anthropological or national, following 
specific historic, geographic and social contexts (Quijano, 2007, p.168). The nation-state can be seen 
                                                          
16 For de-colonial thinkers, the prefix indicating the 'end' of colonialism was misleading and they found that post-colonial 
scholars overemphasise cultural features, leading to a 'depoliticized evaluation of contemporary history' (Moraña et al., 
2008, p.11). 
17 The main criticism is an overemphasis on structural features (Grosfoguel, 2009). 
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'as the political institutional form par excellence of the modern/colonial capitalist/patriarchal world-
system' (Grosfoguel, 2009). Over the past two centuries, the modern state has stood out in facilitating 
and reproducing modernity/coloniality of power, knowledge and being.  
The nascent Latin America states formally resembled modern states like France and the United States 
(Mignolo, 2007, p.157) and embodied the three elements of Weber’s universal definition18 (Weber, 
2014 [1965]). While imposing these ideas largely from the outside, it implies the vision that 'society 
itself has to be resolved, modified, planned, controlled, ruled and disciplined' (Vega Camacho, 2012, 
p.105). The state appears as the subject appointed to work on society, by facilitating the flourishing 
and mushrooming of modern values and practices.  
With the 'imagination of the figure of law' embodying seemingly universal, hence, ego-less moral and 
ethical standards, boundaries are also created between practices and spaces forming part of, and 
being 'accepted' by the state, and those excluded from it (Das and Poole, 2004, p.7). Such rules are 
enforced by the state through its administration, judiciary, police and military forces. In this, the rules, 
their enforcement and the state itself seem detached from the relations that have produced them. 
Yet, the setting and enforcing of 'objective rules' of 'universal appliance within the given territory', 
justifies and reproduces social order and hierarchies.  
Alternatives to the modern universe, such as indigenous epistemologies, cosmologies and ways of life 
that do not correspond to modernity, are mediated through these apparently universal rules, 
principles and institutions, which conceal how the 'knowing subject maps the world and its problems, 
classifies people and projects into what is good for them' (Mignolo, 2009, p.159). Those who are not 
born into the universe, would either remain excluded, meaning their legal or physical elimination or 
become included at the cost of adaptation or assimilation as in the case of multiculturalism (Rivera 
Cusicanqui, 2012, pp.98-100). In any case, they would be subjected to the 'national interest' defined 
by modern ideas of progress and development (Mignolo, 2007, p.157). This helps to explain why the 
indigenous movement in recent decades did not necessarily covet state power, but were struggling 
for a different state (Quijano, 2006, p.21). This might also help to explain, for example, the current 
experience with the translation of Buen Vivir/Vivir Bien into practice (see 1.1.). 
Since for them, the modern state is deeply colonial, de-colonial thinkers are sceptical about a 
decolonisation of the state and the possibility of achieving profound changes with the state’s help. For 
example, Grosfoguel (2011) admits that the nation-state is an important, yet limited space for radical 
transformation. Alternatives are sought elsewhere, since the solution to a 'global problem' cannot be 
                                                          
18 These are territory, population, monopoly of legitimate use of force. Today, in international (public) law, the recognition 
by others is added as a fourth element. 
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found at the national level, but would 'require global decolonial solutions' (ibid.) (for example, on 
'socialisation of power', see Quijano, 2000b).  
De-colonial thought offers a powerful tool for making sense of the rise of the pluri-national states, 
their normative specificity and why the practical experiments do not seem to meet expectations. In 
de-colonial thinking, the state is seen as inherently colonial and as key facilitator of the rule of capital. 
Nevertheless, the efforts in Bolivia and Ecuador to transform the state, that 'shed it of its colonial, 
neoliberal and imperial weight, and re-found it from below (…) are transcendental' (Walsh, 2009a, 
p.65). Mignolo finds the idea of the pluri-national state 'fascinating', since it makes the traditional, 
modern notions of democracy and socialism obsolete, that are based on their pretence of universality' 
(Mignolo, 2012).  
De-colonial scholars increasingly move beyond offering a critique of coloniality/ modernity and their 
forms, which are constituted and reproduced through cognitive and discursive constructions, that 
appear (misleadingly) as universal and rational (Walsh, 2008, p.509). Going beyond this means 
working towards 'de-coloniality', that is 'de-colonial thinking and doing' (Mignolo, 2011: xxiv). As I 
explain in more detail in the next chapter, such epistemological projects should be treated with 
caution, since they risk triggering binary thinking.  
3.4. The thinkers of the Bolivian comuna 
In addition to Marxist thinkers and de-colonial thought, contributing to broader debates on Latin 
America, more specific contributions from Bolivia offer insights into the specificity of the pluri-national 
state idea. In what follows, I focus on the work of members of the comuna group, which was founded 
in 1998 by left-wing academics affiliated with the UMSA (Universidad Mayor de San Andrés). The 
comuna turned into a think tank of social movements and revolutionary uprisings and their 
contributions show 'the political nature of Bolivian social theory and highlight the social function that 
the intellectuals themselves perform' (McNelly, 2017, p.232). 
3.4.1. The comuna 
Seeking to understand popular uprisings in early 21st century, Tapia Mealla points to a double 
mismatch, firstly, between the cultural diversity of Bolivians and their rulers; secondly, between the 
diverse cultural matrix present and the state institutions (Tapia Mealla, 2008, p.49). With an arising 
new 'common sense'19, the floor was open for alternatives and diverse visions of life, new rights and 
productive capacities (Vega Camacho, 2012, p.105; García Linera, 2010). Partly overlapping with the 
previous subsection, Western epistemologies and the modern nation state were key points of attack.  
                                                          
19 This refers, drawing on Gramsci, to a set of beliefs that organises everyday actions and inter-subjective relations. 
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With varying emphases, all comuna members saw the need for establishing legal and political 
institutions in accordance with the pluri-cultural social reality (Vega Camacho, 2012). In this, Zavaleta’s 
work and in particular his notion of 'motley society' were key points of reference (Tapia Mealla, 2014) 
(see 3.2.2.). The pluri-national concept increasingly prevailed, pointing to the agency of indigenous 
peoples in restructuring the state, aiming at undoing exclusion, marginalisation and subordination. In 
this, the state perceived a set of tools which intends  
[t]o dismantle and take apart the structures of colonial power, in order to guide and develop 
new forms of legality, political institutions and authority, complying with the demands of a 
complex and plural society organised in social movements (Vega Camacho, 2012, p.98). 
Prada Alcoreza links the pluri-national condition with institutional, administrative, normative and 
managerial pluralism needed for the aspired decolonisation (Prada Alcoreza, 2010, pp.89-90). Such 
thinking implicates a reversal of the prior dominant perspective, that sees the state as a subject and 
society as an object; the state becomes the object and society the subject (Vega Camacho, 2012, p.98). 
The joint publication from 2005 shows for Baker (2015b) 'probably the most mature elaborations […] 
on the historicity of the crisis of the Bolivian state' in the early 2000s. In this, their great strength in 
grasping this crisis lies in them working theoretically at two levels20: For example, for García Linera, 
the uprisings expressed a crisis of the neoliberal model, including the social and ideological basis on 
which it was built (García Linera, 2006, p.73). Yet, it was also a crisis of a deeper kind, which is 'an 
institutional and ideological crisis of the republican state, premised since its foundation on a colonial 
relationship to the indigenous majority of the Bolivian people' (ibid., p.74).  
Two more books with contributions from the four core comuna members were published (García 
Linera et al., 2007; Sader, 2010). Despite the continuous acknowledgement of the centrality of the 
state, they do not work within or towards a common or consistent theorisation of the state, which 
could have integrated the two crises into thinking the state. Instead, they approach the state openly, 
visible in the prologue of their 2010 book, where the state is defined as 'a relation and ensemble of 
structures, which is the result of political struggles. The state is battle field and form of political 
struggle' (García Linera et al., 2010, p.7, author's translation).  
Hence, the comuna often broadly overlaps with the perspective on the 'state as a social relation' (see 
2.6.). In this, the comuna scholars did not see the pluri-national as completed with the new 
constitution, but envisioned it as a long-term horizon. Prada Alcoreza (2010), for example, noted that 
the greatest challenge Bolivia faces when moving towards the pluri-national state are those old 'sticky' 
                                                          
20 See also Tapia Mealla (2015, pp.29-33). 
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schemes. Vega Camacho, following Reinaga, sees state building as dependent 'on the amount of our 
work, on the ability and clumsiness of our hands and minds' (Vega Camacho, 2012, p.96).  
Despite these challenges, there seems to be an underlying assumption that the functioning of the 
state can be changed altogether. The state appears to reside in a capitalist society, making it ultimately 
not an inherently 'capitalist state', which can lead to a problematic assessment of the current 
contradictory tendencies as no more than 'creative tensions' (see 3.4.2.). In addition, they might 
ultimately underestimate the colonial colouring of the state, emphasised by de-colonial scholars.  
Against the background of recent 'revolutions in the revolutions' (Reyes, 2012), and the tensions 
identified by various scholars (see 1.1.), the comuna members found different ways of assessing the 
pluri-national scenario. In this, a severe divide between Vice-President García Linera and the others 
became apparent.  
3.4.2. García Linera as a 'collective intellectual' 
When the MAS-IPSP took state power, the vice-president turned into 'an intellectual of the State' 
interpreting Bolivian history and, based on this, develop political proposals (Baker, 2015a, p.283). 
While he is sometimes described as an 'organic intellectual' (Geddes, 2014, p.168), he sees himself as 
an 'collective intellectual', representing the subalterns from emergence to hegemony (Ovando, 2008, 
p.100).  
As mentioned above, for him, the uprisings of the early 2000s expressed a crisis of the neoliberal and 
colonial state, in which the correspondence between society and state regime was distorted (García 
Linera, 2006, p.73). Each crisis happens in five steps (García Linera, 2010): 
1. The revilement, that started in 2000 with the 'Water War'; 
2. Catastrophic stalemate with the presence of two antagonist positions (since 2003);  
3. Substitution of government elites, taking place with Morales’ inauguration in 2006; 
4. The construction and consolidation of a new power block from the state; and  
5. The 'bifurcation point'21, marking the end of crisis and new stable social order. 
While the first ones are closely modelled on the Bolivian post-2000 scenario, the fourth and fifth give 
direction to the process. In 2010, he suggested that recent Bolivia has been a 'living laboratory of the 
rapid and antagonistic transformation from one state form to another' (García Linera, 2010, p.37). 
With the new Constitution, it is time to focus on stabilising control and power exercised by the new 
dominant coalition. In this, the most revolutionary task is the promotion of a new state bureaucracy 
(ibid., pp.38-39).  
                                                          
21 With this concept, he refers to the observation by the physicist Prigogine, who studied non-equilibrium systems that after 
some time, can result in a new order. The point at which the unstable system could move towards a new equilibrium is called 
bifurcation point (García Linera, 2006, p.46). 
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In this, he perceives the state as 'the most idealized totality of political action, since it is the only place 
in the political field where ideas materialize and have a general social effect' (ibid., p.35). It 'is the only 
[one] that can unite society it assumes the synthesis of the general will and the one which plans the 
strategic framework and the first waggon of the locomotive' (García Linera, cited by Solón, 2016, 
pp.56-57, author's translation).  
This perspective of the state appears limited. For Lewis (2013), it shows 'a fine bureaucrat’s mind at 
work', that departs from his earlier thinking. If this was Marxist, the self-emancipation of workers and 
peasants would be 'the idealized totality of political action', while constitutions, laws and so on would 
be rather the consequences of revolutionary activity, which 'may eventually pass through a state 
apparatus as part of becoming institutionalized' (ibid.). What he describes is not a transformation of 
the state, but substitution of new personnel for old, leading Hylton (2011) to write 'new wine, old 
bottles'. There is no scope for deeply and critical engaging with the state’s colonial and capitalist 
colouring, which had triggered the earlier crisis. 
More concerned with re-stabilising the state, he foresees 'a possible opening to alternative forms of 
governance that quite simply refused the State as a legitimate political body' (Baker, 2015a, p.293). 
Struggles, including those of indigenous peoples for a different state become invisible. When 
responding to criticisms from his former colleagues on the government’s approach towards social 
movements, he argues 
[a]nd if there is still much to do in order to construct a new and transparent judicial system 
that truly serves society, in this stage of transition it is the logic of the working people that 
prevails, the State, as the synthesis of the common interest, cannot, nor should it, lose to 
anyone, and the defence of the public patrimony stands above the defence of private or 
personal interest (García Linera, 2011b, p.117, author's translation). 
In this, people appear not to have the right to speak up against this state, which is also unnecessary 
as the state comprehends the 'logic' of workers (Lewis, 2013), while indigenous peoples remain 
unmentioned. From a de-colonial point of view, such thinking reproduces coloniality and naturalises 
if not idealises the state, while the specificity of the pluri-national idea is not seen. As I show in Chapter 
4, this hinders the development of a critique of the state form, which might not be surprising as this 
might go against his interest as intellectual of the state. 
Next to the emphasis on a new state bureaucracy, García Linera’s thinking also serves to legimisatise 
'Amazonian-Andean capitalism', the strategy promoted by the government to ultimately overcome 
capitalism. He advocates, mainly based on Lenin22, the introduction of greater state control over the 
                                                          
22 Lewis (2013) accuses him of misreading Lenin, as he fails 'to understand the specificity of Lenin’s ideas on the 
nationalization of oil and what Lenin had in mind when urging the need to establish state capitalism in 1918', among others. 
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major industries, gas and oil in particular (García Linera, 2011b). His former comuna colleague finds 
that the hydrocarbon nationalisation enabled the state to seemingly modify its role in this sector; yet, 
dependency on revenues would lead to submission to larger forces and a weakening of the dignity of 
the intra-state 'nation' communities (Vega Camacho, 2012, p.106). Also, scholars speaking of neo-
extractivism (see 1.1., 2.3.) and radical dependistas (see 3.2.3.) would reject the idea, that 'Amazonian-
Andean capitalism' can ultimately end capitalism and dependency. This indicates that García Linera 
falls short in seeing how the Bolivian state transformation is embedded in the global sphere, focusing 
overly on domestic affairs and at most seeing external conditions affecting the scenario. In adition, 
this strategy clearly contradicts the demands of some peoples for a different pluri-national state and 
so, García Linera’s recent thinking does not offer a convincing perspective on the existing deep 
tensions in pluri-national Bolivia.  
While the bifurcation point means not an end of conflict, it would then no longer be 'structural' conflict 
(García Linera, 2010, p.36). Accordingly, the contradictory tendencies present in the pluri-national 
scenario appear as 'creative tensions' in the consolidation of the pluri-national state (García Linera, 
2011a). While this appears to severely underestimate the nature of tensions, more fundamentally, the 
specificity of the pluri-national state idea, which appears vital for fully grasping the contradictions in 
the pluri-national state experiments, remains largely unaddressed.  
3.4.3. Tapia Mealla, the impossibility of hegemony and moving the state out of the centre 
Other former comuna members turned into 'fierce critics of the Morales administration and of García 
Linera in particular as an esteemed intellectual ﬁgure within it' (Baker, 2015a, p.295). For Tapia Mealla, 
mainly drawing on Gramsci and Zavaleta, the divided state of the first years of the 21st century has 
given way to what he calls 'constitutional state as tyranny' (Tapia Mealla, 2011). This process was 
facilitated by the conjunctional relative autonomy of the state, which started when the MAS-IPSP took 
state power (Tapia Mealla, 2014, p.163). The government party’s strategy was to expand the political 
monopoly, meaning to reconstitute the state in the sense of unifying political power through formal, 
repressive or institutional measures (ibid., p.164). Thus, the pluri-national idea was not translated into 
practice and the pluri-national state continues to be organised in the format of a liberal state (Tapia 
Mealla, 2015, p.133). Measures, which ended the historically already relatively low autonomy of the 
different state organs, were initiated by the government and enacted with the help of the large 
majority in parliament (Tapia Mealla, 2014, p.165). Hence, the government does not allow political 
pluralism.  
In line with earlier thinkers (see 3.2.2.), Tapia argues that reaching hegemony is impossible in Bolivia. 
The MAS-IPSP was part of the historic block that emerged against neoliberalism, but once in power, it 
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worked towards disarticulating this block (Tapia Mealla, 2015, p.136). As in 1952, the process of 
inclusion meant subordination of the organic representatives of the indigenous-peasant block (ibid., 
p.130). In 2010/11, the contradiction between the economic project of the governing party and the 
horizon and political project of the lowland peoples triggered the rupture of the historic block (ibid., 
p.131). As long as there is contradiction in the historic block between two hegemonic projects, it is 
impossible to build hegemony, which makes it, what Gramsci calls a negative constitution of 
hegemony (ibid., p.138).  
With regards to approaching the state, Tapia Mealla more recently suggests moving it out of the 
spotlight. By this, he means to see it as a social relation that is part of a more extensive whole of 
political forms and relations (Tapia Mealla, 2014, p.170; 2015). With an overly state-centred 
perspective, it would be impossible to grasp what he calls 'wild politics' (políticas salvajes) (Tapia 
Mealla, 2008), that question hierarchical forms and relations of domination, including the state (Tapia 
Mealla, 2014, p.169). Since 'políticas salvajes' are exceeded constituent politics, the state apparatus 
of capture, normalisation and monopoly can never control it (Tapia Mealla, 2008, p.116). When 
seeking to comprehend the contradictory pluri-national scenario, it appears promising to see the state 
as part of an extensive whole. Yet, to move it out of the centre, it must first be theorised and 
conceptualised in a way that allows precisely this.  
3.5. Summing-up 
In this chapter, I engaged with the body of literature that sheds light on questions on how the colonial 
experience continues to shape Latin American states and societies, which scholars reviewed in 
Chapter 2 have either omitted or briefly addressed.  
The Marxist perspectives addressing the colonial question offer very distinct perspectives on the state 
and the colonial aspect. Mariátegui and Guevara are of little help when seeking to comprehend of the 
tensions in the pluri-national scenario, since they do not critically approach the state and its colonial 
colouring. This becomes also visible when they treat indigenous people as peasants and their struggles 
as anti- but not de-colonial ones. The Gramscian relational perspective, already discussed in the 
previous chapter (see 2.5.), and Zavaleta’s work appear more helpful yet fall short in offering a 
profound critique of the state, which is important when attempting to fully understand the pluri-
national idea and the tensions found in the pluri-national experiments. In addition, as I show in the 
following chapter, it is problematic to assume that indigenous peoples are outside the social relations 
of capital. The radical dependistas (see also 2.3.), offer perspectives that reflect on the insertion into 
the world market, dating back to colonial times, and on how this has shaped and continues to shape 
Latin American economies and societies. Yet, they lack a concept of how this mediation takes place. 
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Secondly, I looked at the 'de-colonial option', which offers promising insights into the state and the 
specificity of the pluri-national state idea. It suggests that the state is a modern notion and institution, 
with characteristics partly hidden and deeply embedded in modern thought. The state subtly 
reproduces coloniality through universal laws and rules. This might serve as a starting point for making 
sense of the disappointment of peoples in Bolivia that, having demanded another state, and nominally 
won their demands, are now feeling disappointed or betrayed. Yet, with a more nuanced perspective 
on the state, capitalism and modernity/coloniality could be linked and integrated more clearly.  
Finally, I reviewed approaches, associated with scholars from the comuna. In general terms, they 
reproduce a relational understanding of the state; hence some points of critique raised in the previous 
chapter apply. Since they played a key role in promoting the process, their early rather optimistic views 
are not surprising. More recently, the group split. On one hand, García Linera’s recent work backs up 
the governmental strategy. In his bifurcation thesis, the recent rebellions in the pluri-national state 
are creative tensions and unrelated to structural questions. In his agenda of stabilising the state, he 
fails to account properly for the experiences of those who demanded a different state. At the same 
time, by focusing overly on national processes, seemingly solely affected by some external conditions, 
he appears not to offer a relational perspective on how the Bolivian state is embedded in the 
international system and global economy. On the other hand, Tapia, drawing mostly on Gramsci and 
Zavaleta, charges the government with disarticulating the historic block. With regards to the state, he 
suggests moving it out of the centre of attention, since this would obscure key aspects of struggles. 




Chapter 4. Epistemological-theoretical framework, methodological 
approach and research design 
4.1. Introduction 
As shown in the literature review, relational approaches to the state seem promising for 
understanding the contradictory tensions in the pluri-national experiments. Yet, when wanting to 
make sense of the pluri-national idea and experiment, scholars mentioned in Chapter 3 point to the 
necessity of taking the colonial experience seriously as it continues to profoundly shape Latin 
American states and societies. Some post-colonial and subaltern thinkers suggest colonial history 
renders Western or Eurocentric approaches misleading. 
Starting from this criticism I develop in this chapter the epistemological-theoretical framework, 
methodological approach and research design that will guide my analysis of the recent state 
transformation in Bolivia. Having dealt with the post-colonial and subaltern critique, I propose that 
the recuperation of the notion of 'form' as used in the CSE (Conference of Socialist Economists) and 
Open Marxism seems capable of addressing the concerns of post-colonial and subaltern thinkers. I 
review the development of the idea of political form and pay closer attention to the CSE/Open Marxist 
approach, which sees the state as the political form of the social relation of capital. This leads to the 
reconsideration of (de)colonising CSE/Open Marxism as a Western approach. Finally, I turn to the 
methodological approach and study design. In this, I set forth the fundamentals and scope of the form-
analysis. Based on this, I elaborate on suitable research methods as well as ethical considerations and 
challenges, paying particular attention to the possibilities for decolonising the research process. 
4.2. Addressing post-colonial and subaltern/ de-colonial critiques 
4.2.1. Misleading Euro-centric approaches? 
Post-colonial studies and recent variants, subaltern studies and de-colonial thought, have challenged 
Western world views in several ways. Western theories are especially under attack since these steer 
thinking and evaluating the non-Western world erroneously (Young, 2003, p.2). Particularly 
indigenous peoples, usually 'associated with a non-industrial mode of production' (Eriksen, 1997), 
pose a challenge to the classic Marxist notion of 'class struggle'. Western categorisations such as class 
are 'unable to take into account (…) "lived experience" of religion and social customs' outside the West 
(Prakash, 1994, p.1477). The theories behind such categories would serve to legitimate their existence 
(ibid., p.1490). 
Mignolo (2000) associated with the Latin American variant of subaltern studies, de-colonial thought, 
speaks of a 'colonial difference', that is a difference appearing hierarchically. Finding its origin in racial 
differentiation in colonial times, it has persisted after independence and finds expression in political, 
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social, economic and historical differences (Moraña et al., 2008, p.6). Western thinking would not just 
fail to acknowledge this, but even makes other ways of thinking invisible. Santos calls Western thinking 
'abyssal thinking'. It 
consists of a system of visible and invisible distinctions, the invisible ones being the 
foundation of the visible ones. The invisible distinctions are established through radical lines 
that divide social reality into two realms, the realm of 'this side of the line' and the realm of 
'the other side of the line' (Santos, 2007, pp.45-46).  
Alternative epistemologies become invisible in such Western thinking, since presuppositions 'elevate 
Western knowledge as real knowledge while ignoring other knowledge' (Doxtater, 2004, p.618). 
For de-colonial scholars, modern/colonial Western thinking is incapable of grasping 'internal 
colonialism'23 (González Casanova, 1965) and 'coloniality of power' (Quijano, 2000a), that is a global 
hegemonic model of power which has been 'in place since the Conquest, and articulates race and 
labor, space and peoples' (Escobar, 2007, p.185). With formal decolonisation, coloniality 'transformed 
its outer form' (Quijano and Wallerstein, 1992, p.550) but continues as an 'organizing principle' 
(Grosfoguel, 2009, p.20).  
Even though recent developments of Marxist state theorisation increasingly promote a relational 
approach to the state (for example, Jessop, 2008b), the colonial question has not been properly 
addressed. For post-colonial thinkers and similar, it is impossible to grasp 'coloniality' in terms of class 
struggle, seen as struggles between capitalists and workers or capital and labour. A key concern in this 
is the incomplete spread of the capitalist mode of production, described, for example, by Zavaleta (see 
3.2.2.,3.4). In Marxist relational approaches, a unified social formation is assumed. Therefore, Marxist 
relational approaches only offer a misleading reading of the (pluri-national) state. Is it then necessary 
to develop a new radically different approach towards the state in countries like Bolivia?  
4.2.2. The need to go beyond binary thinking 
To begin with, the agenda of decolonising knowledge by establishing something radically different can 
be challenged by their own practice. Rivera Cusicanqui (2012) finds that the small focal group of de-
colonial scholars privilege some knowledge and colleagues over others. By this, those located in the 
North would - 'through the game of who cites whom' and their links with universities and intellectuals 
in the South - reproduce a hierarchical structure (Rivera Cusicanqui, 2012, p.103). The point is not to 
blame these individuals, but demonstrate that they are not 'outside' but instead reproduce rules 
dominating (Western) academia. How could they then produce radically different knowledge(s)?  
                                                          
23 With this concept, he refers 'to a structure of social relation based on domination and exploitation, among culturally 
heterogeneous distinct groups' (González Casanova, 1965, p.33). 
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At the theoretical level, caution is required with approaches triggering binary oppositions like their 
knowledge against our knowledge. Apparently opposed categories like tradition and modernity, 
(frequently used in literature on indigenous peoples), are not only underpinned by certain value 
judgements implying hierarchising, but are also irrelevant in reality as they are not mutually exclusive 
(Germond-Duret, 2016, p.1544-1549). Binary thinking runs the risk of over-emphasising cultural 
factors and hence only offers a fragmented view on struggles (Dinerstein, 2015, p.212).  
Chibber offers a powerful response to contemporary post-colonial thought and particularly the Indian 
subalternists24 as 'representative stream' (Chibber, 2013, p.9), showing that the idea that Western 
thinking per se 'ignores the nonwest or that it imposes western categories artificially, or that it is blind 
to the realities of the nonwestern world, is pretty far-fetched' (Farbman and Chibber, 2016). 
Subalternists have a misleading view on the colonial experience and misrepresent the relationship 
between modernity and capitalism (ibid., p.24). Instead, 
[c]olonial modernity produces a capitalism that accommodates to the hierarchies and the 
culture of the ancient regime. This is capitalism, yes, but without capitalist power relations 
and without a recognizably capitalist culture (Chibber, 2013, p.16). 
The subalternists would hence misunderstand the 'universalising tendency of capital' as leading to a 
homogenisation of power relations and institutions (ibid., pp.286-287). '[W]hat is universalised under 
the rule of capital is not the drive for a consensual and encompassing political order, but rather the 
compulsions of market dependence', meaning a drive 'to produce in order to sell – production for 
exchange value, not for use' (ibid., p.16). Therefore, differences are even actively promoted when 
beneficial for capital (ibid., p.287). Hence, specific and varying relations of power, including those 
usually associated with pre-capitalist societies, can co-exist as they do in Zavaleta´s 'motely societies', 
while facilitating capital's globalising mission. 
In addition, the claim that the notion of class (struggle) does not reflect the experiences of indigenous 
peoples, reveals a flawed reading of Marxist theorising. Marx indeed focuses on the exploitation of 
workers, who he saw 'at the heart of the capitalist system', and who due to their large numbers and 
strategic position as systematically exploited collective appeared as a crucial potential source of 
resistance (Chibber, 2016, pp.126-127). However, this does not mean that capitalist exploitation is 
limited to the factory floor: Capitalism 'creates an entire culture in which the logics of oppression and 
competition become common sense' that would turn 'people against each other and their own 
humanity' (Majumdar, 2016, p.68). 
                                                          
24 Even though he does not directly address Latin American scholars, his arguments are relevant for the points raised above. 
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Subalternists and de-colonial scholars rightly highlight that the processes in, and through which, the 
Latin American states emerged and developed are different to those in the West. Yet, Chibber (2013) 
shows that the universalising tendency of capital goes hand in hand with varying power relations in 
the world. Additionally, the notion of class struggle should not be read too narrowly (Holloway, 1993). 
Hence, a Marxist relational approach to the state is not doomed to fail on the basis of the 
distinctiveness of non-West relations requiring other non-Western approaches to non-Western states. 
4.3. Towards an alternative approach: The notion of form 
Having argued that Western approaches to the state should not per se be rejected, it is now necessary 
to identify the most appropriate approach for understanding the contradictory pluri-national 
experience in a way that is capable of taking the pluri-national state idea of a different state seriously. 
I propose that the notion of 'form' as employed in the CSE and Open Marxists, offers a powerful 
conceptual device for thinking state transformation in Bolivia, which recognises 'the elastic, adaptable, 
and integrative power of capitalism' (Susen, 2012, p.281). It also appears more promising for 
comprehending the pluri-national state than previously employed relational approaches, since the 
notion of form moves from a photograph of society to its negative (Holloway, 1995, p.165). 
Incorporating 'what is not' is crucial for comprehending the emergence and development of the pluri-
national state, that was underpinned by the idea of a different state, which would not render 
alternative epistemologies and cosmologies invisible or assimilate and subordinate them to the 
dominant ones. Yet, before introducing the CSE/Open Marxist perspective on the state in some detail, 
I contextualise it in relevant Marxist debates in the second half of the 20th century.  
4.3.1. Development of the notion of the state as a form 
The notion of 'form' gained prominence in contributions to the State Derivation Debate, the CSE and 
Open Marxism. Yet, in the following, the Miliband-Poulantzas debate is the starting point, as this 
controversy 'provided a point of departure for many recent developments in state theory' (Hay, 1999, 
p.167) and 'form' was introduced in response to it. 
Miliband-Poulantzas Debate 
With increasing scepticism towards the Post-War compromise in the late 1960s, Marxist academics 
revived debates on the state, seeking to challenge dominant pluralist approaches to the state25, in 
which it appeared as 'neutral umpire to the freely articulated demands of a pluralist society' (Martin, 
2008, p.12). When reconsidering the relationships between state, economy and class in capitalist 
societies, two positions crystallised, with Miliband and Poulantzas engaging in the flagship debate.  
                                                          
25 Pluralist thinking, most prominently associated with Dahl (2005), also underpins the perspectives of the state as a 'thing' 
(see Chapter 2). 
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Miliband’s 1969 book sought to demonstrate with a variety of pieces of empirical evidence26 that the 
governing class was the capitalist class. In this, Miliband defines the capitalist class in classic Marxist 
terms as 'that class that owns and controls the means of production and which is able by virtue of 
economic power (…) to use the state as its instrument for the domination of society' (Miliband, 1969, 
p.23). He nevertheless found that the state has some autonomy from the capitalist class, which 
allowed reforms beneficial for the working class. 
Poulantzas´ professor, Althusser, distinguishes three different but connected levels in capitalist 
society, with politics and ideology being relatively autonomous from the economic base, that 
nevertheless ultimately determines the other two (Carnoy, 1984, p.90). Poulantzas sought to advance 
the theory of the political level, being not less ambitious than seeking 'to complement Marx’s Capital, 
which Poulantzas regarded as providing only a theory of the economic level' (Clarke, 1991c, p.34). In 
his 1968 book, he argues for a relative autonomy of the state from class struggles (Poulantzas, 1968). 
The Miliband-Poulantzas debate is usually seen as confronting instrumentalist with structuralist 
perspectives on the capitalist state27. Poulantzas attacked Miliband for criticising conventional 
theories by 'placing himself on their own terrains' (Poulantzas, 1969, p.69) and bluntly employing class 
reductionism in 'which the dominant class stamped its character on the state' (Clarke, 1991c, p.20). 
Miliband’s emphasis on relations between people with political power as a matter of such ties, would 
be misleading, since he assumes a subjective set of relations (Martin, 2008). For Poulantzas, 
the relation between the bourgeois class and the State is an objective relation. This means 
that if the function of the state is a determined social formation and the interests of the 
dominant class in this formation coincide, it is by reason of the system itself (Poulantzas, 
1969, p.73). 
Therefore, when the ruling class participates in the state, it is an effect, but not a cause. Poulantzas 
argued that 'the state can only truly serve the ruling class in so far as it is relatively autonomous from 
the diverse fraction of this class, precisely in order to be able to organise the hegemony of the whole 
of this class' (ibid., p.74). The lacking theoretical account of the structural relation between class and 
society and his instrumentalist methodology led Miliband to see the state as a state in capitalist society 
(Clarke, 1991c, p.19). 
In response, Miliband criticised Poulantzas’ emphasis on objectives structures and relations, claiming 
that these were merely substitutes for the 'ruling class' (Miliband, 1970). Poulantzas’ position would 
not lead him to abandon instrumentalism, since he saw the ruling class as dominant within the system. 
                                                          
26 Among others, on social background, networks and values. 
27 Still, among others, Carnoy (1984) points out that viewing Miliband as instrumentalist is mistaken, since the differences 
are more related to methods and diverging views on the structure-agency relation. 
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In his structural deterministic approach, Poulantzas would see the 'state elite […] totally imprisoned 
in objective structures' (ibid., p.58). It then would not matter if conservatives, social democrats or 
fascists ruled. 
Reflecting upon this debate28, Jessop finds that both positions were so distinct that 'they were actually 
discussing two different types of theoretical objects' (Jessop, 2008b, p.153). Yet, both appear to work 
'within traditional confines of bourgeois social theory, according to which social theory is either a 
theory of structures or of social action' (Bonefeld, 2008, p.65). They tried to complement Marx’ 
analysis of the supposedly economic level with one of the political level. By this, they atomise the state 
theoretically and detach it methodologically from the social relations of capital (Dinerstein, 2017). This 
means  
a misunderstanding of Marx's great work, which is not an analysis of the 'economic level' 
but a materialist critique of political economy, i.e. precisely a materialist critique of 
bourgeois attempts to analyse the economy in isolation from the class relations of 
exploitation on which it is based (Holloway and Picciotto, 1977, p.82). 
The State Derivation Debate 
In West-Germany of the late 1960s, the 'economic miracle' appeared to come to an end, 'new social 
movements' emerged and the first post-war social-liberal coalition assumed power. This context 
triggered debates about state power, in which the derivationists played a crucial role, who saw the 
need to deepen the understanding of the state-economy relation. For this, they found it crucial to 
move beyond the Miliband-Poulantzas debate, further functionalist approaches of 'state monopoly 
capitalism'29 (Stützle, 2009, p.14) and the works of Habermas (1973) and Offe (1984)30. The 'error' of 
bourgeois theorisation and the aforementioned critical responses is that they 'fetishise the 
differentiated forms of capitalist social relations by detaching them from one another and treating 
them as (…) independent social relations' (Clarke, 1991c, p.10). The 'functionalist' approaches 
furthermore ignored the question of how the state 'comes into being in the first place' (ibid., p.9). 
Seeking to move beyond these shortcomings, the derivationists posed the following question:  
What is it, then, about class domination in capitalist society (…) that generates the 
'fantastic form' of the state, that makes the state assume a form apparently separated from 
the immediate process of production? (Holloway and Picciotto, 1977, p.78). 
                                                          
28 It is beyond the scope of this chapter to recall the whole debate – see, for example, Nash and Rich (1975) and Jessop 
(2008a). 
29 The Monopoly Capitalism School argues that once a large-scale enterprise has obtained a monopoly or the form of a cartel 
in most relevant markets, it melts together with the government. This approach fails to see the state’s class character. 
30 Criticising the Monopoly Capitalism School and drawing on the Frankfurt School, they pointed to the 'integrative function 
of the state, as means of channelling, filtering and reformulating economic, social and political demands in an attempt to 
reconcile the range of conflicting pressures to which the state was subject' (Clarke, 1991c, p.6). The CSE saw in this an overly 
sociological view on the state, in which the capital-state relation is treated as an external one (ibid., p.8). 
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This question indicates that they read Marx’ critique of the political economy and his theory of value 
not 'as a theory of the "economic" but as a theory of the social relations of capitalist society as a whole' 
(Clarke, 1991c, p.9). By this, they could develop a historical-materialist critique of the state, in which 
the state is derived from the categories developed in Kapital. Such derivation needed to be logical, 
meaning that separate spheres are a necessary result of the social form of capitalist relations of 
production, and historical, involving tracing back how the separation emerged historically (ibid.). In 
what follows, I focus on two threads in the debate31: firstly, the most popular and secondly, the thread 
I consider to have dramatically influenced later state theorisation. 
The first perspective is associated with the works of Müller and Neusüß (1971), Altvater (1972), and 
Blanke et al. (1975), which drew on Engels’ Anti-Dühring. In this, Engels argued that the 'modern state, 
whatever its form, is an essentially capitalist machine; it is the state of the capitalists, the ideal 
collective body of all capitalists' (Engels, 1878 [1947]). For the derivationists, it was the generalisation 
of commodity production that led to the separation of state from civil society, which was necessary 
for ensuring capital accumulation, since capital required a political entity not subjected to or bounded 
by the limits of capital. Only by this, it could be capable of maintaining the 'general interest of total 
social capital'32 (Müller and Neusüß, 1971). Hence, they derived the separation from the  
dual character of commodities as involving, on the one hand, an exchange of commodities 
as subject to law of value and, on the other hand, a relationship of ownership between the 
subjects of exchange and their commodities (Clarke, 1991c, p.11).  
Moving beyond hitherto existing theoretical approaches, this approach demonstrates the separation 
of economic and social spheres (Holloway and Picciotto, 1978). Nevertheless, critics point out that it 
was problematic to see the state as formulating and implementing 'the general interest of capital' 
given its assumed but de facto lacking omnipotence and independence (Clarke, 1991c, p.11). This 
becomes particularly apparent when looking at states outside Western Europe. Mainly concerned 
with the contradictory relations of individual capitals, this approach also lacks an understanding of the 
state’s evolution, making it a-historical.  
The second position is mainly associated with Hirsch (1974), who sought to overcome shortcomings 
in the first approach. For him, the state cannot be derived on the basis that it is necessary to establish 
capital’s general interest and results from competition between groups of, or individual, capitals 
                                                          
31 A third position is represented by von Flatow and Huisken (1973). For a summary, see Holloway and Picciotto (1978, p.23). 
32 Altvater defines total social capital as 'the unified organization in the sense of being the real and general existence of the 
various capital units, whose subjective actions, determined by the given conditions, cause, thus, "behind their backs", these 
general conditions to be the conditions of total capital' (Altvater, 1972, p.77). The capitalist 'laws of motion' is, hence, always 
linked with the total social capital and with the single capital units. Still, these units are 'through their actions […} the 




(Holloway and Picciotto, 1978, p.24). Instead, it should be derived from the social relations in capitalist 
society and its proper nature of domination. The creation of 'formal' freedom and equality occurs 
parallel to the establishment of the state as monopoly of force (Hirsch, 1974). While the form cannot 
know what the general interest of capital is, it can only take on functions within the limits posed by its 
own form (Carnoy, 1984, p.141). With Hirsch’s own words, '[t]he bourgeois state as an instance raised 
above the direction production process can only maintain its form if the capital reproduction process 
is guaranteed and its own material basis thus secured' (Hirsch, 1978). This means the functions of the 
state can never be more than creating external conditions for the process of social reproduction that 
regulates itself based on the law of value (ibid.). Hence, as the capitalist state has to rely on expanded 
capital accumulation, conditioning its reproduction, its autonomy is limited (Clarke, 1991c, p.14).  
To grasp the conflict-ridden process of capital accumulation, Hirsch draws on Marx’ tendency of the 
rate of profit to fall33, seeing it as the 'dynamic force behind the development of the process of 
accumulation and hence the development of the state itself' (Holloway and Picciotto, 1978, p.25). In 
this, the tendency of profit to fall is not understood as a law or a logic of capital accumulation, but as 
an effect of capital’s failure to perpetuate domination over labour (ibid., p.26). Since the state’s own 
reproduction is directly affected by the crisis-tendencies of accumulation, it reacts to crises and is key 
in counter-balancing the tendency of the rate of profit to fall (Carnoy, 1984). For this purpose, the 
state employs measures such as the reorganisation of relations of surplus extraction and production.  
Yet, state reorganisation and policies are hardly reducible to counter-balancing the tendency of rates 
of profit to fall. Class struggle also matters, visible in state’s response to working class struggle that 
incorporated welfare state measures (Clarke, 1991c, p.14). State interventions are a necessary 
containment to assure the domination of capital while keeping struggles and capital in motion. In this 
sense, he agrees with Miliband that there is scope for reform, meaning that the state is relatively 
autonomous. Yet, concessions ultimately depend on the growth of production and on more state 
intervention for sustaining capital accumulation.  
This whole process is inherently contradictory and the state neither follows a pre-determined logic 
nor is it rational. It rather reproduces the conflicts we find in society in a political form. As the state is 
                                                          
33 Marx was also not the first to see this 'as the result of the inner laws of capitalism' (Heinrich, 2013), but he claimed to be 
the first to have detected 'a coherent explanation for this law' (ibid.). In Kapital, Marx explains that in capitalism it is the 
competition in commodity and labour markets which tend to aggrandise capital, triggering a decline in the rate of profit. If 
the amount of capital grows, there are two antagonistic forces impacting on the rate of profit. On the one side, the principle 
of diminishing returns – the capital added is less productive. On the other side, the added capital often incorporates new 
technology reducing cost, which increases the rate of profit. In a nutshell, whether or not the rate of profit falls is dependent 
on the rate of change in capital accumulation in comparison to the rate of change in technological innovation and 
improvement. As the rate of profit not always decreases, but is prone to fall in the long run, Marx speaks of a 'tendency'. 
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open to competing capitalists’ demands and interests, the state’s counter-balancing strategy depends 
on political conflict resolutions between fractions of capital and particular capitals (ibid., p.15).  
For Bonefeld, Hirsch enables looking at 'the historical existence of the state as a process, the historical 
form of which is a concrete reality of class antagonism' (Bonefeld, 1992, p.94). By this, he indicates 'a 
way of reconciling the institutional autonomy of the state with its necessary subordination to capital' 
(Clarke, 1991c, p.15). Despite these appraisals, especially with regards to his earlier theoretical 
promises, shortcomings were identified: He failed to demonstrate the historical necessity of the 
differentiation between economic and political spheres and did not provide historical evidence 
showing how this occurred (ibid.). For Holloway, 'the relation between logic and history is never 
satisfactorily resolved in Hirsch’s work': logic appears as a 'general framework of development', a 
posteriori embellished with class struggle’s history and ultimately subordinated to the logic (Holloway, 
cited by Dinerstein, 2017). In Hirsch, struggles seems to mainly take place between fractions of capital 
and particular capitals, which it would resolve in the way necessary for its own reproduction (Clarke, 
1991c, p.16). Hence, Hirsch’s work seems similar to Offe’s 'structural-functionalism' (ibid.). His later 
work shows overlap with a strand of functionalist thought, regulation theory (Hirsch, 1991).  
In the derivation debate, the relation between political and economic spheres was – unlike previous 
attempts – understood as an internal relation, which meant a tremendous advancement in thinking 
about the state. The notion of form was brought into the debate, opening space for seeing the state 
as the political form of the capital relation. Yet, the importance of struggles in the historical 
development of the state 'remained underdeveloped' (Bonefeld, 1992, p.94).  
4.3.2. The CSE debate and Open Marxism 
In the late 1960s, the CSE was founded as a 'non-sectarian and internationalist forum for theoretical 
Marxist political debate in the UK' (Dinerstein, 2017). The emerging debate on the capitalist system as 
a whole, was triggered by growing political conflict and intensifying economic crisis in Britain as well 
as controversies in the British left on the internationalisation of the state and globalisation (ibid.). In 
the 1990s, the debate continued under the banner of 'Open Marxism'. With regards to the state, the 
key contributors followed the derivationists in seeking to transcend instrumentalist and structural-
functionalist approaches34. Simultaneously, they sought to criticise the emerging Neo-Gramscian 
perspectives on globalisation and the 'internationalisation of the state'35. 
                                                          
34Their interest in the debate is also reflected in the volume of Holloway and Picciotto (1978), in which key pieces of the 
debate were published in English. 
35 The volume of Bonefeld et al. (2006) offers a summary of the debate. For a critical account towards Open Marxism, also 
see Drainville (1994). 
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Like the derivationists, these scholars perceived capital as a social relation and the state as the political 
form of it. Forms like the state were recognised as 'determinate negation' (Bonefeld, 1992, p.100), 
meaning that despite being internally linked, they coexist in a seemingly independent manner, being 
no more than externally related. Hence, this notion of form does not refer to a sub-category of a more 
general species, but to a 'mode of existence', living only in and through the form it takes (Bonefeld et 
al., 1992a, p.xv).  
In the CSE debate and Open Marxism, the world is understood in term terms of struggle and so state, 
money and market are forms that struggle takes. Since the outcome of struggle is necessarily open, 
'determinism of all kinds must vanish' (Burnham, 1994, p.225). Speaking of a logic or pre-determined 
function becomes mistaken and so is referring to the state 'as an apparatus or broken down into a 
conglomeration of apparatuses, ideological, mass-integrative, repressive, or whatever' (Holloway, 
1991, p.235). Class struggle does not relate to structures of the state externally, as 'it is not only within 
but also against the existing state form', making the capitalist state form the object and result of 
struggle (Clarke, 1991c, p.41).  
The capitalist state as a political form 
For contributors to the CSE and Open Marxism, the state is a real or determinate abstraction, as it 
'correspond[s] not to essential qualities embodied in things, but to determinate social processes' of 
global capital (Clarke, 1991a, p.144). The apparent separation between economic and political sphere 
alongside with the national state seemingly distinct from global processes, is no more than 'an 
institutionalised illusion' (Bonefeld et al., 1995a, p.26). Hence, it is wrong to conceptualise the state 
as a structure separated from society, which is as a formal abstraction. When abstracting the state in 
and not from society (Gunn, 1994, p.57), the starting point is social relations in the capitalist mode of 
production. 'A materialist theory of the state begins (…) by asking what it is about the social relations 
of production under capitalism that lead to the creation of apparently separate economic and political 
forms' (Holloway and Picciotto, 1977, p.78). 
Since 'the abstraction of the state as such belongs only to modern times' (Marx, cited by Bonefeld et 
al., 1995a, p.23), it is 'a historically specific form of political domination' (Holloway and Picciotto, 1977, 
p.77). In feudal societies, 'personal dependence characterises the social relations of production just 
as much as it characterises the other spheres of life that are based on that production' (Marx, 1872 
[2011], p.89, author's translation). In capitalism, however, we find 'independent man', independent 
from a specific capitalist, who is turn is more flexible than the feudal lords (ibid.). It was hence the 
context of the changing relations of production, in which economic and political rule become 
separated, that gave rise to the political state (Bonefeld et al., 1995a, p.24). 
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Yet, the state did not automatically appear, but was driven by struggle (Gerstenberger, 1992, p.154). 
In a gradual change with political revolutions, sovereign power was brought to its knees and 
constituted the modern state as a 'matter of general concern' (Bonefeld et al., 1995a, p.24). 
Accordingly, the class character of the state is not based on the dominance of the capitalist class or 
the supremacy of production. It instead rests on 'the separation of the state from civil society and thus 
the political regulation of class antagonism upon which the class character of the state rests' (ibid.). 
With this separation, society and production are no longer 'political' – the political form becomes 
sourced out, which allows the emergence of the double freedom of the labourer36. For Bonefeld, 
[t]he political state is the premise of the non-coerced, depoliticised exchange relations 
between the buyers of labour power and the producers of surplus value who in spite of their 
manifest inequality pursue their interests in liberty as equal legal subjects, based on the 
rule of law (Bonefeld, 2014, p.166). 
In capitalism, labour and capital enter a legal contract. Through law, property rights are codified and 
become enforceable, in other words, they become legally guaranteed (Clarke, 1991c, p.11). The state 
acts as enforcer of the rule of law and does this seemingly impartially, as also pointed out by de-
colonial thinkers (see 3.3.). For the CSE/Open Marxists, by enforcing the rule of law, the state 
ultimately imposes 'the rule of the capitalist markets' (Burnham, 1990, p.182).  
Next to law, the state also safeguards the rule of money, the most abstract form of capitalist property 
(Clarke, 1988, p.127). It guarantees 'the general material conditions for the accumulation of capital 
insofar as these conditions cannot be established by individual capitals in the capitalist way, since 
doing so would not yield a sufficient profit' (Heinrich, 2004, p.206). For determining these particular 
conditions, CSE/Open Marxists find the political representation of interests less relevant than Hirsch. 
For them, the state does not ensure the particular interest of particular capitals, as the general 
conditions are not necessarily suitable to every capital and might go against particular interests37 
(Bonefeld, 1992, p.123). Instead, they emphasise the notion of 'capital-in-general' (Burnham, 1990; 
Clarke, 1988), defined as  
the totality of those characteristics which are common to all individual capitals (...) that is 
(…) ought to embrace those characteristics which have to be added to value in order for it 
to become capital (…) and which for this reason also become qualities of each individual 
capital (Heinrich, 1989, pp.65-66). 
                                                          
36 On the one side, the worker is free to his labour-power, not being tied to a particular capitalist, on the other side, he is 
free from the means of production (Marx, 1872 [2011], p.170). 
37 This is close to Poulantzas’ 'power bloc', the term he uses to describe the conglomerate of the different classes whose 
(political) interests are perpetuated by the state. It consists of a variety of fractions from capitalist class and other 
(economically) strong (fractions of) classes. The composition changes over time. Usually the interests found in the power 
bloc are not homogenous, but diversified – with the balance of power also varying over time. 
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From this follows that the state 'meets the interest of capital-in-general by enforcing the discipline of 
the market through the rule of law and the rule of money' (Burnham, 1990, p.182). Through its 
policies, the state, represented by its managers, follows the path of most profitable accumulation 
possible (Heinrich, 2004, p.206).  
In this, as in Hirsch, the process of accumulation is seen as crisis-prone. Capital encounters barriers to 
the realisation of expanding capital and seeks to overcome barriers; for example, by developing new 
needs, intensifying exploitation, expanding the market, or revolutionising methods of production 
(Clarke, 1992, p.137). For the sake of its own reproduction, the state attempts, through its policies 'to 
remove barriers to accumulation' (Burnham, 1990, p.183). It 'filters and displaces struggles, 
subordinating them to the process of value production' (Clarke, 1991c, p.41, italics in the original). 
Dinerstein sees the state as a 'mediation', that 'translates and integrates struggles into institutional, 
legal and political dynamics' (Dinerstein, 2015, p.20). This mediation can involve a restructuring of the 
state which shows that it is a 'transitory form of social relations' (Holloway, 1991, p.235). I thus expand 
Dinerstein’s notion of mediation by referring to it as 'mediation in motion'. 
Picciotto admits that it appears convenient to presume that social classes correlate with the state 
within society (Picciotto, 1991, p.217). However, capital accumulation cannot be understood in 
domestic terms and, hence, the state’s character can hardly be seen as 'defined at the national level' 
(Clarke, 1992, p.136). Despite being politically constituted at the national level, capitalism is 
characterised by a global accumulation process (Bonefeld et al., 1995a, p.30).  
National state(s) and global economy 
Following Marx’ notion of 'world market', accumulation is inherently global: 
The constant tendency to develop productive forces (…) underlies the tendency of capital, 
from its earliest stages, to develop a world market and to generalise capitalist social 
relations of productions on a global scale (Clarke, 1992, p.135). 
While capitalist society is global, states are based at the national level as 'forms of the global totality 
of social relation' that appear to exist territorially and politically autonomously (Holloway, cited by 
Dinerstein, 2017). This is a 'necessary' contradiction between the global, unified world market and the 
partial, fragmented international system (Clarke, 1991c). 
The national state based on the 'principle of territoriality of jurisdiction' facilitates the global 
circulation of capital and commodities (Bonefeld et al., 1995a, p.27). At the domestic level, the 
conditions for exploitation are standardised through national law and policies and enforced by the 
state. In this, the rule of law and money is guaranteed, which transcends domestic legal systems and 
currencies (Clarke, 1992, p.136; Holloway, 1994). The national state is thus the domestic, political 
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underpinning of global capitalist relations (ibid., p.28). It follows that the state mediates not only 
national/domestic, but also international/global struggles.  
The integration into, and position in, the global market, from which power and legitimacy of the state 
are derived, depends primarily on the growth of productivity (Clarke, 1992). Through the exchange 
rate mechanism states are interlocked into a 'hierarchy of price systems' (Burnham, cited by Bieler, 
2006, p.75). Negative growth or growth stagnation with ensuing balance of payment difficulties and 
inflationary pressures, leads to loss of reserves, global exchange instability and financial crisis (Clarke, 
1992). To anticipate this, the state tries to offer favourable conditions for foreign capital, which might 
in turn trigger domestic resistance. Hence, its individual stability is managed at the national level 
(Bonefeld et al., 1995a, p.27). 
However, the state not only deals with (global) pressures to increase productivity within its territory, 
it must, at times, also handle over-accumulation and the rate of profits to fall, already mentioned by 
Hirsch. The global competition pressures capitalists to accumulate ad infinitum, leading them to 
replace labour with machinery, triggering the value of constant capital to increase and the value of 
(domestic) variable capital to drop. However, as labour power is the source of capitalist accumulation, 
and, hence, also of profit, the tendency of the rate of profit to fall occurs. An example for this is the 
crisis of the post-WW2 states, in which domestic labour had become too costly (Bonefeld, 2003).  
Therefore, at the national level, state managers handle on the one side, the consequences of global 
class struggles and the pressures towards using the available resources more effectively and efficiently 
to increase productivity. In this, they are one the other side, constrained by internal resistance to 
increase productivity and also mediate domestic struggles and sometimes also respond to the power 
of labour (Bonefeld et al., 1995a, p.3). The state managers might be able to handle domestic struggles, 
mobilise resources and change its political and economic relations with other states and by this, 
become temporarily better positioned in the global price hierarchy (ibid., p.28). Nevertheless, the 
state is incapable of resolving the crisis-ridden development of global capital. This is because the 
driving force behind the state’s attempt to restructure social relations is not so much the 
attempt to provide a resolution of 'economic crisis', as the attempt to resolve the 'political 
crisis' of the state by trying to disengage the state politically from the economic so as to 
depoliticise economic policy (Clarke, 1992). 
This historical-materialist critique of the state offers illumination on the state as a 'node' in the global 
relations of capital mediating global and domestic struggles. It is a more nuanced perspective than the 
radical dependistas like Cardoso and Faletto (1979), who lack a concept of how the global/national is 
mediated (see 3.2.3). It allows insight into 'the internal relationship between economic and political 
forms of class relations', which is both, global-unified and fragmented-partial (Tsolakis, 2010, p.388).  
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Such perspective might offer an understanding of how and why contradictory tendencies have 
become apparent in the pluri-national scenario. With its emphasis on struggles, the CSE/Open Marxist 
approach seems promising to see the 'agency of indigenous peoples in restructuring, […] determining, 
organizing and administrating their own development' (Walsh, 2008, p.511). Yet, with exceptions (see 
Dinerstein (2015)), the question of indigenous peoples, colonisation and 'coloniality' have not been 
addressed in the contributions to CSE/Open Marxism.  
4.3.3. Reconsidering the question of '(de-)colonising' the CSE/Open Marxism approach 
As mentioned above, post-colonial and subaltern scholars raised concerns about the applicability of 
applying Western approaches to other parts of the world. Mainly drawing on Chibber (2013), I rejected 
the idea of an alternative non-Western approach which accommodated binary thinking of the world. 
I subsequently proposed the notion of 'form' as a way of taking the post-colonial and subaltern critique 
seriously without triggering binary thinking. After having discussed the CSE/Open Marxist approach to 
the state as a political form, I return to considering to what extent this way of thinking the state 
reproduces coloniality or enables (de-)colonising thinking of the state.  
Epistemological underpinning 
The CSE/Open Marxist approach was developed as an 'attack on the dualism' between theorisation 
and practice (Holloway, 1995, p.166). With 'theories of something', people impose an abstract reality 
above the physical and social world, using 'arbitrary' concepts for classification (Holloway, 2005, 
p.106). This becomes particularly relevant in the case of the pluri-national state, which is underpinned 
by the idea of a different state. Given that it is an unprecedented experiment of applying those ideas 
into practice, it is highly problematic to work with a theorisation of the state that delineates a priori 
what is possible within 'an accepted framework of that’s-the-way-things-are' (ibid., p.108). More 
generally, when dualism of social theory and practice is accepted, one fails to acknowledge that 
knowledge and therefore also theory production is 'a form of labour, done by specific groups of 
workers in specific social contexts' (Connell, 2014, p.212). Gunn challenges the wide-spread theory-
practice dualism by asking: How can one know that the categories are valid or not? A meta-theory 
could help – but how would its categories be justified? This could lead to infinite repetition and regress 
(Gunn, 1994, p.54). One ultimately remains trapped in the limited horizon of capitalism-conformist 
theories, as it is capitalist society against which everything is 'measured' or 'operationalised'.  
For Marx, 'the totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, 
the real foundation (…) [to] which correspond definite forms of social consciousness' (Marx, 1857 
[1975]). Theorisation and practice interact dialectically, that is, with a 'unity in theory and practice' 
(Psychopaidēs, 1992). This rejection of ego-less 'theories of' resonates with Mignolo’s denunciation of 
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'arrogance and the dreams of universal solutions for all' that is implied in some Western bodies of 
knowledge that tell history from a modern perspective and omit coloniality (Mignolo, 2012).  
An CSE/Open Marxist approach addresses 'the unity of what appears to be separate, the transitory 
nature of that which appears to be permanent, the untruth of appearance' (Holloway, 1995, pp.165-
166). When critically engaging with social 'structures' like states, it is misleading to accept them as 
given, since this transforms them 'into eternal truth[s] that can be distorted by unwise political 
intervention, but can never be supressed' (Clarke, 1991b, p.85). This disregards not only their 'parlous 
existence' (Bonefeld et al., 1992a, p.xiii), but also their social character, that makes them operate as 
devices 'ordering social relations in a certain way' (Holloway, 1991, p.250). Challenging the 'state' as 
an 'object' is destructive, yet also demystifying and regenerative (Holloway, 2005, p.113). It implies 
resisting dehumanisation and naturalisation of capital and other fetishisms (Dinerstein, 2015, p.205).  
This might also enable the denaturalising of the coloniality in/of the state, to which de-colonial 
scholars point. For this, it has to be possible to understand indigenous peoples’ specificity and the 
pluri-national state, underpinned by the idea of a different state. 
The capital relation, struggles and indigenous people 
As stated in 3.2., Marx did not analyse the spread of capitalism in Latin America. However, when 
assessing the tensions between English and Irish workers, Marx found that subjective, yet real ideas, 
evoking racist and nationalist sentiments served as means through 'which workers who had common 
objective interests could also become mortal enemies' (Taylor, 2016, p.75). Therefore, racism and 
capitalism are not two separate themes, and so the struggle against them intersects (ibid.). 
The dynamics of race in Latin America differ from British factories, since they primarily originate from 
colonisation. As in the case of nations, race is largely considered as socially constructed 'arbitrarily 
designated "inferiority"' (Dinerstein, 2016, p.58). Quijano (2000b) sees race as a mental construction 
expressing no more than the experience of colonial domination. For Wade, 'there is nothing "natural" 
about it [race], save the mere facts of phenotypical variation' (Wade, 1993, p.17).  
Dinerstein suggests that in the transition from formal to real subsumption38, this arbitrary inferiority 
of race became 'intrinsic to the valorisation of capital' (Dinerstein, 2015, p.55). Drawing on the notion 
of real subsumption extended by Italian Autonomists, and Negri (1992)39 particularly, she shows a way 
                                                          
38 With formal subsumption of labour, Marx refers to the processes in which, in early stages of the capitalist mode of 
production, capital imposes itself into an already existing labour process, but the worker is subjected to capital in an external 
way. Capital itself cannot develop on the limited basis it finds in the a priori production process. Capital, thus, gradually 
changes the social relations until they are subsumed to capital (see Murray, 2004). 
39 Cleaver summarises Negri’s idea of self-valorisation as follows: it is 'a process of valorisation which is autonomous from 
capitalist valorisation—a self-defining, self-determining process which goes beyond the mere resistance to capitalist 
valorisation to a positive project of self-constitution' (Cleaver, 1992, p.129). See Nina (1992) for a summary. 
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of understanding 'coloniality' as an inherent part of the social relations of capital. It is hence not 
separate from capitalism, as Zavaleta’s view of a motely society suggests. Indigenous peoples are 
connected to global society through a specific form of real subsumption, i.e. 'real subsumption by 
exclusion' (Dinerstein, 2015, p.55). Thus race-based oppression was 'a necessary condition for the 
formation of the working-class and the foundation and expansion of capitalist modernity in Latin 
America' (ibid.). 
Indigenous struggle in, against and beyond capital is distinct in its coloniality component, which is not 
present in the struggle of non-indigenous peoples. As pointed out in 1.3., for indigenous peoples, 
autonomy as an emancipatory project is 'inevitably a decolonising project', mitigated against 
coloniality (Dinerstein, 2015, p.13). Gutiérrez Aguilar sees a 'dual intentionality' in Aymara struggles: 
On one side, the desire for recognition, on the other, the desire to be left alone (Gutiérrez Aguilar, 
cited by Dinerstein, 2015, p.54). This directly links to the indigenous struggle not for state power, 
associated with reproducing coloniality, but for a different state, that is, the pluri-national state 
(Quijano, 2006). However, the desire for recognition and rising demands for a different state, also 
raised the issue of participating in or taking state power. Therefore, indigenous struggles in, against 
and beyond the Bolivian Republic have been marked by deep contradictions.  
Refining the CSE/Open Marxist approach 
The notion of form does not imply that the state form has emerged or developed in a certain way. It 
offers instead a powerful tool for investigating the relations through which it evolves and the 
processes that underpin its transformation. As widely accepted, independent states in Latin America 
were formed through dynamics different from those of Europe. For the vast majority of the indigenous 
population, no major changes occurred when one elite replaced another, even though the states 
formally resembled the French and/or US model(s). De-colonial scholars seek to explain this by 
pointing out that the arrival and spread of Western modernity has a darker side: 'coloniality' (Mignolo, 
2011; Grosfoguel, 2009). As indicated earlier (see 3.3.) the state was instrumental in obscuring 
indigenous epistemologies, and subsuming indigenous ways of life to the dominant, envisioned nation 
and excluding these people from public decision-making. 
Following Fanon’s argument that 'Marxist analysis should always be slightly stretched every time we 
have to do with the colonial problem' (Fanon, 1983), I propose that the state understood as 'mediation 
in motion' is not 'only' capitalist, but also deeply colonial. The CSE/Open Marxist critique suggests that 
the state is a real abstraction, so that the contradictory nature of the state remains in its conceptuality. 
Seeing the world in terms of struggles and adopting a rather broad understanding of struggles, enables 
seeing Bolivia as a highly complex 'arena where multiple and conflictive struggles are fought and 
68 
 
where knowledge is not just appropriated and recycled, but produced both in dominant and 
dominated languages and cultures' (Moraña et al., 2008, p.16).  
This approach has the potential to push towards decolonisation, which for Morgensen means 
'challenging the settler academy' (Morgensen, 2012, p.805). By settler academy she means not all 
Western academy/ies per se, but, quoting Costas Vargas, the academy as 'long historical complicities 
in racial/colonial genocide' that naturalised and masked 'conditions in which these systems of massive 
violence are reproduced' (ibid.). The incorporation of indigenous struggles in their specificity and not 
making them invisible or re-constructing them, further helps in pushing towards a decolonisation of 
the CSE/Open Marxist framework more generally. After the analysis of the pluri-national state I return 
to the question of how far decolonising CSE/Open Marxism seems possible. 
4.4. Methodological approach and research design 
4.4.1. Form-analysis 
The methodological approach to the state as a political form is a form-analysis that aims at 
understanding processes underpinning the 'mediation in motion'. Through form-analysis, hard reality 
of 'things' and 'facts', is dissolved 'into the flow of the changing forms of social relations' (Holloway, 
1995, p.166). 
In the form-analysis, the state can be unpacked further. Dinerstein (2015) speaks of 'institutional, legal 
and political dynamics' into which struggles are translated. Others suggest differentiation between 
existing apparatus or institutions/bureaucracy and the workers employed by the state (London 
Edinburgh Weekend Return Group, 1980, p.59). I go further and propose to distinguish four main 
components of the state form into and through which demands are mediated: 
 Basis (Constitution, Territory, Population) 
 Rules (Legislation) 
 Enforcing mechanisms (Administration, Judiciary, Police, Military40) 
 Government (strategy, discourse and direct action (policies).  
The existence of these components should not be taken for granted, which is particularly relevant for 
the unprecedented pluri-national state that was imagined as a different state. Yet, as far as I am aware, 
these components have so far appeared in every political state, including pluri-national Bolivia. When 
capital has a universalising tendency, then the state, as a political form of the social relations of capital, 
is composed of these seemingly universal(ised/ing) components.  
                                                          
40 It is beyond the scope of this work to closely consider all mechanisms mentioned here. In the pluri-national state, I focus 
on the first two, since these are the ones that interact frequently with the autonomy regime.  
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In the ideal democratic state form imagined in liberal approaches, the basis is the most rigid or stable 
component, making change from inside and outside less likely or frequent, while government action 
and discourse are the most fluid. The other two are in-between in terms of stability. Yet, from a more 
critical perspective, advocated in this thesis, the seemingly universalising tendency does – as in the 
case of capital – not mean homogenisation of the processes and relations found in the state.  
In line with this, form-analysis is less interested in how the components should look and interlink, but 
how they actually do and which processes underpin them. These four components do not exist 
independently from one another, but interrelate, and can be in tension with one another. Each 
component can embody contradictions. The dynamics of change, degree and exact loci of tensions 
can only be identified in a specific moment.  
I acknowledge that writing and working with these components can potentially risk deepening the 
fetish and rigidifying the appearance of the state and its components as 'things'. Yet, I suggest that 
working with these components as an analytical model allows a more consistent analysis, which is 
crucial when encountering a multi-faceted matter. At the same time, unpacking the form also 
contributes to its demystification. 
Neither CSE/Open Marxism nor de-colonial thought is associated with specific methods of data 
collection and analysis. Open Marxism is not seen by its founders as an empirical research programme 
(Dinerstein, 2017). Accordingly, those methods should be chosen that illuminate the processes 
underpinning the form. Subaltern and de-colonial thought started as critical challenge to strands of 
the post-colonial school which only partly moved beyond the mainstream approaches they criticised. 
Post-colonial scholars failed to give voice to the subalterns – but continued to speak about them 
(Spivak, 1988). From this, it follows that the research design should give voice to and not silence the 
subalterns and/or make them invisible. This is crucial in the push for decolonising CSE/Open Marxism. 
4.4.2. Scope of form-analysis 
Given the limited scope of this ambitious thesis, it is important to discuss what is within the realms of 
possibility. At a more general level, I focus in my analysis only on Bolivia and not on Ecuador. As stated 
in the beginning, both are pluri-national experiments, yet only Bolivia was formally turned into a pluri-
national state and some other changes went further, most crucially, the autonomies. Therefore, 
Bolivia was selected. In the following, I further first outline how I approach the emergence and past 
developments of the form and secondly, pay attention to how to frame the analysis of the pluri-




A form-analysis requires that historical processes of the social formation are reviewed (Gerstenberger, 
1992). Simultaneously, key contemporary Bolivian intellectuals insist that pluri-national Bolivia can 
only be understood considering long-, medium and short-term memories (Svampa, 2007, p.6). Yet, 
how to approach within the scope of this thesis the Bolivian state associated with 'one of the more 
complex and fascinating of human history' (Klein, 2003, p.xi)? 
Clarke (1992) establishes different periods for analysing the development of the state form. Yet, he 
proposes 'this periodisation only to knock it down', as with this, one cannot move beyond 'static 
fetishism of a simple "essentialist" structuralism' (ibid., p.149). It would reify the appearance of the 
state as a thing and pre-determined logics or functions (ibid., p.133). In a similar vein, Bonefeld et al. 
argue that  
whoever divides history into "periods" (…), is thinking of form in a genus/species way. First 
of all, we have a global theory of social change, and then we have its specific, or 
conjunctural, deployment (Bonefeld et al., 1992a, p.xvii). 
A periodisation would resemble the idea of stages of modes of production or capitalism, which closes 
down what is possible and promotes a dualist view instead of a unity of theorisation and practice 
(Bonefeld et al., 1992b, p.xiv).  
Clarke concludes that 'the capitalist mode of production can only be grasped as a complex totality' 
(Clarke, 1992, p.149) – is then every attempt to study a state form in the scope of a thesis doomed to 
fail? If CSE/Open Marxism is an approach that includes Holloway’s 'scream' – the refusal to see how 
the world 'is' and is not – it should offer a way of voicing refusal and critically analysing the status-quo. 
'Confronted with the fetishised world, all we can do is criticise' and insist that forms are 'neither self-
evident nor eternal' (Holloway, 2005, pp.50-51).  
Like other research designs and tools, a periodisation is a simplification. Allowing a systematic, 
consistent and coherent analysis that is easily accessible, is preferable to the development of a grand 
narrative. The use of a periodisation does not imply clear-cut boundaries or periods as subsequent 
stages following a pre-determined logic. One can still emphasise the historical specificity of the state 
and 'the transitory nature of that which appears to be permanent' (Holloway, 1995).  
To avoid confusion and misleading terminology, I oppose the use of the term 'form' to label different 
periods (for example, neoliberal state form), but propose that 'political modalities' characterise 
specific periods, throughout which the form is the continuity, historically specific to the capitalist social 
relations. A political modality refers to a particular mode in and through which the form is expressed 
and experienced. The changing modalities are then expressions of the transformation in the political 
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sphere. A shift from one to another modality is expected to involve a rather rapid acceleration of 
motion, during which profound changes in usually at least two components or their interrelation 
occurs. In intra-periods, the motion is rather slow and less visible.  
In retrospect, it becomes possible to establish a chronological order of political modalities, which is 
convenient for developing a consistent form-analysis. Yet, this does not imply that one sees modalities 
are 'stages' with one logically or necessarily leading to another. Such conclusive determinism is 
inappropriate since the outcome of struggles is necessarily open. 
Autonomies as the entry point 
Since the state is a real abstraction the starting point for the study of the state form is not the form 
itself, but the struggles that underpin its transformation. In the introduction, I argued that autonomy 
is at the heart of the pluri-national state idea, which at the same time distinguishes it from ideas 
around the (modern) nation state. Hence, the pluri-national transformation can best be understood 
through autonomy.  
By studying emergence, development and translation of the key demand of indigenous peoples into 
and by the pluri-national state, it becomes possible to fully comprehend the contradictory tendencies 
in the pluri-national scenario. The figure of the AIOC (ˈIndigenous-Original-Peasantˈ Autonomy), 
established in the new constitution is perceived as crucial pillar of the pluri-national state. 
In addition, studying the pluri-national state through struggles for self-determination, prevents from 
overemphasising or isolating indigenous struggles vis-à-vis non-indigenous struggles which is crucial 
in avoiding the triggering of binary thinking. The existing municipal autonomy and incorporation of 
departmental and regional autonomy into the new constitution indicate that autonomy is the Bolivian 
transformation not just a matter of indigenous peoples. Hence, autonomy appears at a conjuncture 
at which different struggles requiring mediation coincide.  
In the analysis of previous state forms, I pay attention to the topic of autonomy, as this provides the 
background for the more recent struggles. The subsequent analysis deals more closely with the 
emergence of the pluri-national state idea in the second part of the 20th century and how these have 
entered the 2009 Constitution. This then enables me to see how demands have been translated in the 
pluri-national modality and how far this has altered struggles. 
Regarding the development of demands for departmental autonomy, the focus is on Santa Cruz and 
Tarija, since actors from these departments are widely perceived as having taken the lead in the 
struggle. Yet, when investigating the pluri-national scenario, it is important to also include insights 
from other departments, which entered the pluri-national autonomy regime. The quests for regional 
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autonomy are closely associated with the hydrocarbon-rich Gran Chaco province in Tarija. Yet, I 
remain open to whether there are demands for regional autonomy elsewhere. 
For the indigenous struggles for self-determination and autonomy, I strive to gain insight to the 
antecedents, emergences and development of the struggles, which differ from one part of Bolivia to 
another. When focusing on the pluri-national modality, I look at the overall development of the 
processes. In addition, I consider concrete cases of transitions towards state-recognised autonomy. 
To get a sense of different scenarios and dynamics, it is necessary to look beyond a single case. While 
acknowledging time constraints, I mostly draw on the experience of Charagua in the lowlands of Santa 
Cruz, the most advanced process, and Salinas de Garci Mendoza, situated in the highlands of Oruro. 
In addition, I remain open to other cases.  
4.4.3. Research methods 
Methods of data collection 
To best understand the processes underpinning the form, in this study I triangulate different methods 
of data collection. 
Secondary data collection 
I collected a wide range of secondary data, including books, articles, and reports from local academics, 
analysts, NGO staff and think tanks. In addition, I gathered legal and policy documents and other state 
publications. Some were publicly available, others were provided by informants and interviewees.  
Primary data collection: Interviews 
To complement the rich secondary data, I collected primary data, mostly through elite and semi-
structured interviews, that allowed me to develop an in-depth understanding of experiences and 
opinions in a way that stresses 'context over generalizability (…) and complexity over parsimony' 
(Rathbun, 2008, p.686). This resembles the orientation of the Open Marxist/de-colonial framework 
developed in the previous sections. Rather than simplifying, it opens up space for varying experiences. 
Conducting interviews is a good tool for gaining valuable insights into contested, sensitive topics. The 
autonomy regime is still new and is advancing day by day, so available up-to-date secondary data is 
limited to some extent.  
The first interviews in each setting engaging interviewees selected for their perceived knowledge and 
influence, resembled what is widely described as 'elite' interviews. In this, 'elite' does not refer to a 
high social, economic, or political standing or self-identification with a particular class (Hochschild, 
2009), but indicates a 'consultative relationship' (Gillham, 2000, pp.64-65). In this, the researcher is 
'willing, and often eager to let the interviewee teach him what the problem, the question, the 
situation, is' (ibid., p.17). This approach, going hand in hand with a rather unstructured format, was 
73 
 
appropriate for these interviews, as it helped to avoid assumptions, which also supports decolonising 
data gathering. Having already identified key issues, in later interviews I followed a semi-structured 
approach, which facilitates more systematic data collection and crosscheck with already collected data 
(ibid., p.65). While keeping central themes constant, I still left space for new issues. 
Identifying and accessing participants 
When I arrived in Bolivia, I used my few initial contacts, approached some organisations and 
established more contacts through snowballing. Often, interviewees provided me with further 
contacts and others helped me out, too. When I went to a new place, I already had a list with contacts. 
Yet, I was also keen on ensuring that I had different access points to capture a variety of perspectives.  
In the following table, the number of interviewees are listed in broad categories that reflect different 
parts of the study. Some of them fit into more than one category and I assigned them according to the 
perceived primary interview focus. 
 
 Interview locations No 
Struggles for autonomy 
National (01/2015-06/2016) 
- (Former) political authorities, advisors 




La Paz, Cochabamba, Santa 
Cruz, Tarija  
18 
Departmental (01-03/2016; 05/2016) 
- (Former) political authorities, advisors 
- Civil Society Organisations 
- Academics 
 
Santa Cruz, Tarija 
18 
Regional (02-03/2016) 
- (Former) political authorities 
- NGO Representatives 
- Civil Society Organisations 
 
Tarija, Gran Chaco province 
5 
indigenous (11/2015-06/2016) 
- NGO Representatives 
- Civil Society Organisations 
 
La Paz, Cochabamba, Santa 
Cruz, Tarija 
9 
The pluri-national autonomy regime 
National level La Paz 7 
Departmental (01-04/2016) 
- Political authorities, advisors 
- Representatives of civil society organisations 








- Regional authorities 
- Other political authorities 
- NGO Representatives 
- Representatives civil society organisations 
 




- Indigenous Authorities 
- Representatives civil society organisation 
- NGO Representatives 
- People from communities 
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The average interview length was 75 minutes – yet, the rather spontaneous interviews with, for 
example, local authorities or representatives of civil society organisation tended to be shorter, while 
the scheduled appointments with academics, among others, were usually longer. The vast majority of 
the interviews were recorded with a dictation machine and notes were taken. When no recording was 
done, a memory protocol was written directly after the interview. 103 interviewees were male, while 
20 were female. This ratio appears to largely reflect the ratio of people in the relevant positions.  
Language 
All but one41 of the interviews were conducted in Spanish. While this is not my native language, I had 
been fluent before going to Bolivia. The interviews with indigenous authorities or members of 
communities were also conducted in Spanish, often not the interviewees’ native tongue. While this 
can be seen as problematic for data collection, I perceived it less problematic than working with a 
translator. The engagement of a third person is often regarded as negatively affecting the validity of 
the data (Kapborg and Berterö, 2002). Especially considering the short time I spent in communities 
and local areas, it was not possible to develop the necessary relationship of trust with a translator and 
detecting the dynamics between interviewee and translator sufficiently (see also 4.4.4.). 
Arising challenges 
The literature points to several challenges that arise when 'foreigners' conduct research. They are 
perceived as less capable of intuiting cultural aspects influencing answers (Herod, 1999, p.314). The 
data they collect is more prone to be affected by dishonesty or exaggeration from respondents and 
reluctance to answer controversial questions (Morris, 2009, p.206). To confront such challenges, I did 
my best to prepare thoroughly and to be culturally sensitive, also paying attention to collecting data 
from various sources as suggested by Morris (2009). Berry (2002) recommends that the researchers 
should seek to be as neutral as possible, but (s)he should be aware that complete neutrality is 
impossible. I also treat the interview data not as 'true facts', but as subjective reflections.  
It 'should not be presumed that an "insider" will necessarily produce "better" knowledge than will an 
"outsider" simply by dint of their positionality' (Herod, 1999, p.313). Since the social relation between 
interviewee and interviewer interferes with the data collection process, consciously or not, not only 
truth, but authenticity always appears as an 'unattainable goal' (McNeill and Chapman, 2005, p.6). 
I experienced gender and age difference as important in the data collection process. In some 
situations, especially when interviewing lowland elites and (former) political authorities, I felt I was 
                                                          
41 One interview was conducted in German, the native language of the interviewee. 
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being lectured, yet this perceived role often gave me the chance to ask for further clarification. 
Additionally, I found my status as a female German42 opened a variety of doors, some of which might 
have remained closed to a Bolivian conducting such research.  
Primary data collection: Events  
The research is also informed by events I attended in Bolivia. Among them, an assembly of the National 
Coordinator of AIOC (CONAIOC) and the hemispheric summit of the Latin American Federation of 
Cities, Municipalities and Municipal Associations (FLACMA) in May 2016. Those observations were 
important for collecting data on the AIOC, as it was impossible to visit many of them. At these events, 
indigenous authorities from different places that undergo transition towards AIOC were present; I 
could talk to them and also observe interactions between them, ministry personnel and consultants.  
Methods of data analysis 
Before starting the data analysis, I decided to subdivide the form-analysis into four part, to each of 
which I dedicate a chapter: First, the historical background; secondly, the emergence and 
development of struggles for autonomy and how these entered the 2009 Constitution; thirdly, the 
translation of the autonomies at the central state level; fourthly, the pluri-national autonomy regime 
beyond the central state and the redirection of struggles. These parts fulfil different purposes and 
have varying emphases, which I will explain below in more detail. As shown in the following table, the 
type of collected data prioritised varies from chapter to chapter: 
Chapter Types of data 
Chapter 5 – Previous political modalities Secondary data (books, articles) 
Official documents (legal and government)  
Interviews  
Chapter 6 – Struggles for autonomy Secondary data (books, articles) 
Interviews 
Official documents (legal and government) 
Chapter 7 – The pluri-national state– translation of 
autonomies into and by central state components 
Official documents (legal and government) 
Interviews/ observation notes 
Secondary data (books, articles) 
Chapter 8 – The pluri-national state –autonomy 
regime and redirection of struggles 
Official documents (legal and government)/ 
Interviews/ observation notes 
Secondary data (books, articles) 
Table 2: Types of data 
Such flexibility of using different types of data throughout the analysis is crucial for understanding 
both the struggle-driven motion of the state form and mediation of struggles into and through the 
state form. This enabled me to organise and then systematically assess my data. As seen in the table, 
                                                          
42 Some indigenous people and NGO and state employees told me about the work of and with German NGOs, development 
cooperation, volunteers or researchers. In Santa Cruz and Tarija, interviewees and other people I met, told me about their 
German ancestors.  
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throughout, I relied on both primary and secondary data. In the following, I first show how I prepared 
the interview data and then demonstrate how I analysed the data per chapter. 
Preparation of interview data  
First, I classified the interviewees according to location, political affiliations and profession which 
offers no more than a first simplifying edit, but is crucial for ensuring a balanced analysis, which 
considers different perspectives. In a second step, the interviews were clustered according to the 
major focus of interview (see Table 1) – yet, some were marked as belonging to more than one cluster, 
following which different interview sections were later considered for data analysis in diverse parts. 
Once the interviews were organised following these basic categories and clusters, I revised around ten 
per cent of the interview material (balancing the above-mentioned classifications and focus of the 
interview) for the different parts of the form-analysis, which are the struggles for autonomy (Chapter 
6) and the pluri-national scenario (Chapter 7 and 8). While revising, I had the following questions in 
mind:  
 For the struggles for autonomy: What are the key aspects and moments, interviewees bring up with 
regards to the struggles for 'autonomy' that shed light of the meaning of autonomy and the 
development of struggles and how this relates to the (capitalist/colonial) state?  
 For the pluri-national state: Which crucial aspects and concerns do interviewees raise with regards to 
the autonomy regime and redirected struggles for autonomy in pluri-national Bolivia and how does this 
relate to the (capitalist/colonial) state? 
Based on this careful reading, I developed a list of categories and sub-categories, allowing the data to 
speak. In addition, I crosschecked if the categories could answer my inquiry; no major inconsistencies 
emerged. This means that I established the categories and sub-categories in an inductive-deductive 
way. Based on the list of categories and sub-categories, I developed the codes. After having done some 
pilot coding to moderate the categories and codes, I coded all interview material, using NVivo.  
This strategy was chosen for its potential to create a balance between framework- and data-driven 
analyses. Yet, a short-comings with the chosen approach might have been that I was the only one 
involved in the coding. A second person could have helped to balance out my own biases towards the 
data, which are also related to me remembering the interviewees and interviews.  
Data analysis 
While preparing the interview data, I revised other pieces of data, which was mostly secondary data. 
I organised these with regards to their relevance for the different parts of the study and used excel 
sheets for systematisation. Through this, in combination with the interview material, I established a 
large, fairly organised body of data on which my analysis is based. In the following, I show my 




The purpose of Chapter 5 is to provide an analysis of the emergence and transformation of the Bolivian 
state, which follows the developed Open Marxist-decolonial framework and situates the idea of and 
struggle for the pluri-national state and its formation in a historical context. For this contextualisation, 
it is important to pay attention to issues of self-determination and autonomy, which lie at the heart 
of the pluri-national idea. Here, following a chronological order appears most convenient. Following 
the elaborations in 4.4.2., I identified different political modalities, enabling a consistent analysis, 
which can be accessed relatively easy. I suggested that the shift from one modality to another is a 
rapid acceleration of motion, in which deep changes in (usually) at least two components of the state 
form or their interrelation takes place.  
Hence, identifying the modalities involved reviewing different accounts of Bolivian history and finding 
moments of rapid motion. I identified seven political modalities pre-dating the pluri-national one. 
Having established these modalities, I looked more deeply into the data exploring how the emergence 
and development of the Bolivian state form, as result of past and object of present struggles, had 
unfolded. In this, I looked at how the state mediates struggles from domestic sectors of society 
(indigenous and non-indigenous) and external pressures and what appeared mainly to have driven the 
transition from one modality to another. With regards to the reorganisation, I sought to identify how 
much of the form underwent changes and how much continued, which meant looking more closely at 
the different components and their interrelation. Yet, given the limited scope, I cannot fully cover the 
Bolivian history and accurately reflect all different perspectives. Rather I aim to demonstrate key 
moments and general characteristics and dynamics. 
Chapter 6 
The next part of the form-analysis is to analyse the emergence and development of the struggles for 
autonomy and looking at how they entered the 2009 Constitution. I seek to understand how far these 
struggles have changed over time and how far they are or have become capitalist/colonial. 
It is, as in the previous chapter, convenient to follow a mostly chronological order. For this, I revised 
the relevant interview material and secondary data and initially developed a chronology of key events. 
I looked for key themes that came up in the different struggles for autonomy – what did autonomy 
mean in relation to the (neoliberal) capitalist and colonial colouring of the state? How did the agenda 
change and how does this relate to the state form that mediates the struggles? In answering these 




The second part then requires analysis of the processes through which the different sets of struggles 
came together and became informed into the pluri-national Constitution: How were the struggles 
negotiated and why did they enter state matter? How far can capitalist/colonial traits be identified? I 
followed a chronological order and relied on different available accounts, seeking to understand not 
only the vision of individuals from either side, but also different sides of the spectrum.  
As in Chapter 5, the scope of this chapter is severely limited and I am not capable of offering a detailed 
description of many events. I rather show the overall development and go in detail where I perceive 
it as necessary. 
Chapter 7 and 8 
The purpose of the final part of the form-analysis is to unpack the pluri-national scenario and see, how 
the struggles for autonomy have become mediated into and by the pluri-national scenario. This 
means, on one hand how the state form and its (central state) components have translated the 
constitutionally established autonomy regime. On the other hand, it requires looking at how this 
affected the struggles, for example, how they became redirected.  
The most convenient structure was to have the one chapter on the central level and the other one on 
the autonomy regime beyond the central state and the redirection of struggles. Separate the 
translation of departmental and regional autonomies and AIOC into different chapters, would have 
let to an analysis that made it harder to see those as belonging to the same scenario and also, to treat 
the issue of coloniality as a matter that rather belongs to the indigenous peoples’ autonomies instead 
of to the entire pluri-national state.  
In Chapter 7, which looks at the translation of newly recognised autonomy regime by the central state, 
I pay close attention to the four components of the form, each of which I assess by looking at different 
data: 
 Basis: Constitution 
 Central state rules: legal documents, complemented with interview data 
 Central state enforcing mechanisms: observation, interview data, legal documents 
 Central state government: strategy documents, policy documents, budget data, discourse, 
complemented by reports and local scholarship, newspaper articles43, interview data 
For understanding their interrelation, I relied on legal and policy documents (for example, supreme 
decrees). Yet, for the more informal dynamics, the analysis is primarily based on interview data that 
covers distinct perspectives. With this chapter, I seek to understand how this pluri-national central 
state translation is capitalist/colonial. 
                                                          
43 In particular, for post-fieldwork events, I reference newspaper articles.  
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Chapter 8 assesses what has happened in the pluri-national state with the different demands for 
autonomy beyond the central state. The key concern is in how far there is (no) deeper sub-sumption 
to capitalism/coloniality. For each of the three new types of state-recognised autonomy, I address in 
the first part the formal procedures and advancements, which requires looking at legal documents, 
and similar, which are complemented with secondary and interview data. The second part looks at 
the redirection of struggles and, since these are generally open, I approached this part more openly 
and flexibly than the earlier one. In this, I rely more on interview data that I let speak for itself.  
4.4.4. Ethics 
As the researcher undertaking this project, I was responsible for engaging with all people involved in 
in a sensitive, honest and respectful way, meeting the principles and standards, written down in the 
'Code of good practice in research integrity' of the University of Bath (2014). Since I also aimed to 
move towards decolonising the approach and integrating indigenous voices, I paid attention to further 
principles that researchers have found crucial for conducting research in a way which is 'respectful 
and ethically sound from an Indigenous perspective' (Louis, 2007, p.130). In what follows, I first briefly 
engage with the key ethical principles and the move on to the more specific ones, which relate to 
conducting research in a decolonising way. 
Avoidance of deception, presentation of purpose of study 
I explained clearly the purpose of my study to all interviewees. This included providing them with a 
two-page information sheet and a business card, and showing a letter from my supervisor. When 
being asked, I said, I would talk to other people, but did not mention names. I sought to adapt to 
different settings, where social interaction involved different ways of communication. Being 
concerned with decolonising the research process, it was crucial to make clear that I was not 'studying' 
my interviewees. Instead, I wanted to learn from them. 
Obtaining consent, including right to withdraw, arrangements for de-briefing, post-interview access 
Initially, I had planned to let interviewees signed the information sheet to express their consent. 
However, I quickly realised that this caused irritation and scepticism, and seemed to engender 
mistrust. After having consulted some locals on this matter, I decided to not ask for a signature but to 
give the adjusted information sheet and asked for verbal consent. I also highlighted their right to 
withdraw. After the interviews, I offered post interview de-brief and provided post-interview access.  
Avoidance of distress or threats to self-esteem 
Researching the state and conflicts is highly contentious and potentially emotional. To avoid harm, I 
posed questions in a sensitive way and did not continue to ask questions when I felt someone became 
uncomfortable. I explained to all interviewees that in addition to their right to withdraw, they could 
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choose not to answer specific questions and I did my best to create an environment in which 
interviewees felt safe and confident. This usually involved letting the interviewees decide where to 
meet. Most interview situations involved only me and the interviewee44.  
Privacy and confidentiality 
I handled the collected data confidentially. The audio-files were not named after the participants and 
after transcription, they were deleted. In the transcription process, I had support from some Bolivian 
students, with whom I have a trusting relationship, and who were unfamiliar with the research topic. 
I distributed the files in the 'safest' way possible, considering their background and made repeatedly 
clear to them, that the content of interviews is confidential. Particularly controversial interviews or 
where interviewees wanted to be anonymous, I transcribed myself. 
Most interviewees did not want to be anonymised. However, the situation for critical thinkers in 
research institutes, NGOs and the enforcing mechanisms has become increasingly difficult in recent 
years. An illustrative example is the eviction of the CEDIB in April 2017 (Hill, 2017). I therefore decided 
to anonymise the interviewees to avoid possible harm. Initially, I thought of just anonymising those 
had wished it and those I perceived as 'at risk'. Yet, I quickly felt insecure about where to draw the line 
and uncomfortable with treating the interviewees differently. I therefore decided to anonymise all 
and label them solely with numbers in the thesis. 
Additional consideration for working with indigenous peoples 
Since I also work with indigenous peoples and sought to work towards decolonising CSE/Open 
Marxism, I paid close attention to the challenges arising in this context and sought to tackle them 
respecting specific ethical criteria (see 4.4.4.). These include the respect for indigenous regulations, 
critical self-reflection, respectful representation and reciprocal appropriation (Smith, 1999). Yet, given 
the overall approach to the subject matter, it became clear that the research could not involve using 
what the literature calls 'indigenous methodologies' (for example, Louis, 2007; Rigney, 1999). 
As stated above, I quickly realised that the way I set up the research project, did not allow to be 
underpinned by an indigenous methodology, more commonly used in anthropology (Purcell, 1998). 
For example, I could not give much space to peoples for defining or determining my overall research 
agenda and I cannot claim that my indigenous contacts were 'partners in theorising' (Louis, 2007, 
p.135). 
                                                          
44 When visiting the Gran Chaco, I was accompanied by a student, who had been working in the study community JAINA in 
Tarija, a local research community. The student, originating from and familiar with the setting, helped with facilitating some 
contacts. I conducted all interviews, in some interview situations, she was present when the interviewee was fine with it. 
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Initially, I had planned to conduct focus groups in local communities, which is a method, often used in 
research with indigenous people. Benefits include potential empowerment of the participants, who 
might not only feel more comfortable in a group, but identify commonalities and experience a 
strengthening of bonds (Smylie et al., 2009). For the researcher, it also becomes possible to intuit the 
interaction between individuals, which can also enrich the data. Yet, the selection of participants 
requires, and heavily relies on, the researchers’ knowledge about the community (ibid., pp.438-439). 
I quickly sensed in the field that communities in Charagua appeared divided and politicised, which was 
confirmed by my local informants. As I was unable to spend enough time in the communities to fully 
understand the dynamics, I felt focus groups were inappropriate. Additionally, I was concerned with 
biases that might be reflected in the data that I could not see and felt incapable of evaluating the 
implications of focus group discussions for individual members and sought to prioritise avoidance of 
distress and harm. I shared these concerns with key informants and was recommended individual 
interviews.  
A common argument in the literature on indigenous methodologies is that non-indigenous scholars 
like me are incapable of decolonising research, since the 'Indigenous people themselves must analyse 
and critique epistemologies that are commonplace in higher education' (Rigney, 1999, p.110). Yet, 
against this, Louise (2000) points out that '[c]reating methodologies that only apply to Indigenous 
researchers provides fodder for more essentialist arguments', which resonates with my earlier made 
argument against binary thinking. 
Decolonising research does not imply a general rejection of all Western research and knowledge. 
Indeed, indigenous peoples in Bolivia, concerned with the advancement of the state-recognised 
autonomies, were interested in understanding the formal procedures and arising challenges, which 
involves engaging with Western knowledge. As Smith points out, decolonising research for indigenous 
people is less related to abandoning non-indigenous methodologies altogether, but more about 
changing the focus, meaning 'centering our concerns and worldviews and coming to know and 
understand theory and research from our own perspectives and for our own purposes' (Smith, 1999, 
p.39). 
In conversations with people in rural communities I often asked what Living Well (Vivir Bien) meant 
for them and most of them replied 'infrastructure, jobs, and education for the kids' – a concern with 
decolonisation was uncommon. This clearly indicates, as argued earlier in this chapter, that indigenous 
people are not outside capital or modernity, while they might be concerned with their traditions and 
the cosmologies they inherited. It can hence not be appropriate that decolonising research means 
neglecting this and maybe overemphasising culture and similar. 
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The aforementioned interest in state-recognised autonomies helped that knowledge sharing went 
both ways, which is another key principle associated with establishing an ethical research relationship 
with indigenous people (Louis, 2007, p.135). When having conversations with indigenous authorities, 
for example, I was asked for advice several times with regard to the conversion process. In these cases, 
I shared with them what I knew about the formal procedures and experiences in other places and we 
had conversations about their hope and concerns. Yet, I did not give advice on what do within the 
communities, since I did not feel entitled to do this and also said so. 
During my stays in communities and in the conversations with indigenous people, I sought to build 
appropriate relationships. This meant acting in ways I perceived as open and sensitive, for example, 
not giving promises I could not keep. I was aware of my limited ability to access and understand other 
cosmologies or tradition that were alien to me – but I did my best to be an attentive learner and a 
curious, patient listener. The limitations of accessing other worlds became obvious with my inability 
to understand native languages other than Spanish. As already pointed out in the section on 
interviews, I nevertheless decided not to work with translators, which was similarly motivated as the 
decision not to conduct focus group interviews. 
4.5. Summing-up 
In this chapter, I developed the epistemological-theoretical framework, methodological approach and 
research design that underpin the analysis of state transformation in Bolivia, found in the following 
chapters. I first engaged with post-colonial and subaltern critique, emphasising the need to raise 
awareness of a colonisation/coloniality of knowledge. I argued that this should not lead to a binary 
thinking of the world and categories like the state, since this risks triggering a problematic, misleading 
assessment of the world. 
In the second part, I suggested that the notion of 'form' has the potential for taking the concerns of 
post-colonial and subaltern thinkers seriously without leading to binary thinking. At the same time, 
this notion seems open enough for making sense of the specificity of the pluri-national idea and the 
contradictory tendencies in pluri-national Bolivia. After reviewing the evolution of the notion of form, 
I suggested that the CSE/Open Marxist approach is most promising, according to which the state is the 
political form of the social relation of capital. Closing this part, I pointed out that the CSE/Open Marxist 
approach requires refinement when wanting to understand parts of the world, which were colonised 
in the past. Yet, such a push towards decolonising the CSE/Open Marxist approach, supported by de-




The final part revolved around the methodological approach and study design. I engaged with the 
fundamentals and scope of the form-analysis. In this, I argued first, that I would only look at Bolivia as 
the only pluri-national state, in a strict sense. Secondly, I suggested conducting the historical analysis 
through different political modalities. Finally, I proposed autonomy as an entry point for the analysis 
of pluri-national state. Based on this, I suggested suitable research methods and identified ethical 





Chapter 5: A periodisation of previous political modalities 
5.1. Introduction 
In this chapter, I analyse the emergence and development of the Bolivian state form, which I see as a 
result and object of struggles. In this, the state is not so much 'an impregnable seal' but 'a thin crust 
on a seething, bubbling soup' (Holloway, 1991, p.238). Following in chronological order, I establish 
seven different political modalities (see 4.4.3.) that predate the pluri-national state. These changes 
can become necessary due to internal demands that cannot be accommodated, state managers’ 
concerns with profitable accumulation and/or other external pressures. Through these modalities, the 
transformation is expressed in the political sphere and changes in the central state components (see 
4.4.1.) can be identified. As explained in 4.4.2., this is not to reify the appearance of the state as a 
'thing' or establish different stages in the pre-determined or logical development of the state, but 
serves to organise the messiness. A consistent analysis is crucial when covering more than 500 years 
of Bolivian history.  
This analysis seeks to shed light on the historical dimension on the idea of and struggles for the pluri-
national state and looks at how the state form has evolved and how this has related to self-
determination and autonomy. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to look in depth at aspects related 
to the Church or religion more generally, bureaucracy, workers movements or military-government 
relations, among others, which have been important in Bolivian history. Yet, these have not been 
closely entwined with the demands for self-determination and autonomy that have brought about 
and shaped the pluri-national state. 
5.2. Pre-colonial times and the ayllu45 
The starting point of this analysis is the context in and through which the first political modality 
emerged. The Spanish conquest, which began 1524 and was mostly complete in 1533, was without 
doubt a key moment in history. Yet, it is by no means the beginning of history, which would mean 
ignoring, for example, the highly advanced and civilised Tiwanaku culture46, the Inca Empire and other 
smaller cultures in the highlands, lowlands and valleys (Gisbert, 2003a). With the final great expansion 
of the Inca Empire, the former central part of the Tiwanaku Empire came under the reign of the 
ancestors of today’s Quechua people. Yet Inca rule was largely indirect and the highland communities, 
                                                          
45 Since 'there was no state' (Interview 5) in the lowlands until the second half of the 20th century, the first sections mainly 
deal with the highlands and valleys of what became Bolivia. 
46 Tiwanaku developed from a small rural village into an expansionist empire that lasted for at least 600 years. Trade 
functioned as medium and the elite controlled the food surplus, which was crucial in the central region of the empire on 
around 4000 m AMSL. Researchers are not entirely sure what brought the empire to fall in the 12th century (Stanish, 2003). 
It is potentially associated with a drought, leading the food surplus dried up and internal conflicts (ibid., pp.11-12; Gisbert, 
2003a, pp.29-30).  
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especially, remained largely autarkic (Gisbert, 2003a, pp.34-36; Lessmann, 2010, pp.57-60).The earlier 
rebellions against Inca rule also contributed to this and 'a mosaic of political structures, religions, and 
languages' was maintained and integrated 'into a vast nonmarket exchange system' (Klein, 2003, 
pp.19;23). 
The pre-conquest territorial organisation was marked by the presence of ayllus. This is a flexible 
denomination for a community, which partly rests on imagined, partly on concrete kinship that usually 
involves ritual practices, political activities, access to communal land and is based on common 
ancestors (Choque and Mamani, 2001). In the ayllu, all relations should be in harmony with everything, 
which includes Mother Earth and the Cosmos, and if there is disequilibrium, it has tragic consequences 
for all (Huanacuni Mamani, 2010, p.53). Back then, ayllu was not 'defined by a single residential 
community' (Klein, 2003, p.22), but consisted of members in the different ecological zones, enabling 
temporary use of land in these zones (Gisbert, 2003a, p.32). This 'inter-zonal symbiosis' was crucial for 
compensating climatic and geographic limits (Vargas Rivas, 2013, pp.31-32)and helped to secure an 
overall balance of power (Lessmann, 2010, p.28). To ensure an adequate occupation of territory, a 
complex and dynamic network of social organisations was in place, which consisted of largely 
unwritten rules and norms, based on the principles such as reciprocity and redistribution in which 
autonomy was key (Vargas Rivas, 2013, p.32). The authorities, who enacted and safeguarded these 
rules, were obliged to serve the community and could usually be removed by the community (ibid.). 
5.3. The colonial modality: From primary resources to primary globalisation 
The emergence of the colonial modality occurred in the context of the global expansion of commercial 
capital which accompanied the rise of mercantilist political modality in Europe (Clarke, 1992, p.137). 
In the time of America’s discovery, European powers needed silver, as European seams were 
exhausted, which posed a threat to the production of the means of payment in commercial deals 
(Galeano, 1971 [2009], p.12). Hence, the conquest was largely – yet not exclusively – motivated by the 
precious metals found in early expeditions (ibid.). The Andean highlands soon turned into a crucial 
source of minerals and food for colonial Spain (Klein, 2003, p.23).  
The Spanish quickly began building a system that was designed to facilitate large-scale exploitation of 
natural resources. Only 14 years after the discovery of great silver resources close to the soon to be 
founded town of Potosí, the Audiencia de Charcas47was established in 1545 (De Mesa et al., 2003, 
pp.117-118; 155-157). It was administered from today’s Sucre48 and had the key aim of facilitating 
                                                          
47 It had jurisdiction over Upper Peru, today’s Paraguay, Uruguay and northern Argentina. In the 16thcentury, the Audienca 
was divided into La Plata y La Paz. 
48 Back then, the town was founded as Ciudad de la Plata de Nuevo Toledo. It was later renamed as Charcas, then Chuquisaca 
and is today known as Sucre, honouring the Venezuelan independence leader and 2nd Bolivian president. 
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silver exploitation in Potosí, just 50 miles away. In the 1570-1650 boom, the Cerro Rico (Rich Mountain) 
accounted for more than half of silver production in the so-called 'New World' (Klein, 2003, p.50). In 
this, the demand for wheat, maize and coca leaves for the mine workers rose and the land used for 
such purposes increased. Hence, also farmers, who often had Western roots, gained from the boom, 
which in turn attracted more settlers. 
From encomiendas to reducciones: An unequal reciprocity pact 
The conquistadores found different structures in the highlands: a rather rigid centralism from the Inca 
Empire, the partly intact ayllu structures and some smaller cultures (Lessmann, 2010, p.68). To ensure 
access to labour power and territory, they developed the encomienda system, in which the pre-
conquest ayllus were generally retained as part of territorial colonial state organisation, that consisted 
of larger districts and smaller encomiendas (Klein, 2003, p.34). The Spanish King assigned large plots 
of land, encomiendas, to his countrymen (Vargas Rivas, 2013, p.33). The encomenderos were the de 
facto 'governing authority in their regions', who ensured the evangelisation of his indigenous, their 
alimentation and clothes (Klein, 2003, p.34). The indigenous worked in turn on the land, built houses 
and acted as domestic servants on the encomienda and were in turn paid a small salary and allowed 
some freedom for territorial, political and cultural organisation (Vargas Rivas, 2013, p.33). Hence, they 
were not enslaved, but included as 'free men' (De Mesa and Gisbert, 2003a, p.209). In the emerging 
'reciprocity pact of the colonial state', indigenous people were allowed a degree of autonomy in return 
for their tributes and labour as long as it did not disrupt the encomienda system (Platt, 1982, p.100). 
It was not a pact between equal partners and the indigenous people were subordinated to the 
encomenderos, and were, for example, obliged to pay tributes with their salary (Vargas Rivas, 2013, 
p.33).  
The encomienda system was largely based on indirect rule, in which higher level indigenous 
authorities, recognised as caciques49, operated as 'hinges' between communities and the Crown’s 
corregidor50 (Albó, 2009a, p.23; De Mesa and Gisbert, 2003a, p.203). In return for being 'confirmed in 
their rights' and being granted some privileges, the caciques collected the tributes for Crown, Church 
and often also for themselves (Klein, 2003, p.34). In this, the colonisers had opted for preserving and 
using the existing structures to subordinate the indigenous people at lowest cost (ibid., p.35).  
Over time, important challenges arose: Firstly, with the severe decline in the indigenous population 
due to the spread of European diseases and the harsh working conditions, the encomienda system 
became less profitable. Secondly, local Spanish nobility started to emerge, which displeased the 
                                                          
49 This denomination originates from the Caribbean. 
50 The corregidor is at the lowest level of colonial authority and was, also due to poor transportation and communication 
conditions, often very powerful. 
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Spanish Crown (ibid.). Thirdly, in the mining sector, the number of required wage-labourers increased 
together with maintenance costs, while capital for increasing mining output was lacking. Reforms 
were enacted to respond to these challenges and those adopted under Viceroy Francisco de Toledo 
(1571-73) marked a turning point in the colonial experience. 
Key in addressing the first two challenges was the law of 'reducciones' (De Mesa et al., 2003, p.144). 
Following the model of the Mediterranean agricultural community, the dispersed indigenous 
population should be concentrated ('reduced') into fixed colonial villages (Klein, 2003, p.36). By this, 
it was sought to eliminate the 'ecological niches' (Platt, 1982), which were still under the control of 
Andean peoples and facilitated their self-subsistence (Delgado, 2002, p.97). By enhancing direct 
control, it was hoped to make the Crown’s tribute system more effective and efficient. Even though 
haciendas, which are large estates, also emerged in the Yunga valleys, the peoples’ control over the 
niches did not end. Although the overall success of the 'reducciones' was limited, nevertheless 'by and 
large, the system (…) eventually became dominant in the Andes' (Klein, 2003, p.36). Tackling the third 
challenge, the most drastic reform51 was the use of pre-Conquest mandatory community service 
(Mit'a). It was used to secure the flow of cheap labour to the mines while also weakening the 
communities’ autonomy (De Mesa et al., 2003, p.121; De Mesa and Gisbert, 2003a, pp.209-210). With 
these measures, the aforementioned challenges were – largely at the cost of indigenous people – 
successfully confronted in the medium-term. Yet, they could not prevent the 17th century silver mining 
crisis.  
Economic downturn, costly wars, bourbon reforms and unintended outcomes 
After 1650, mining outputs dropped steeply and by the end of the century, the Mexican mining 
industry outperformed the Andean one (Klein, 2003, p.60). This crisis affected not just the mining 
sector, but the entire market, including haciendas producing for the mining sector (De Mesa and 
Gisbert, 2003a, p.212). For the indigenous population, this resulted in less pressure on their territories 
and declining Mit'a obligations (Klein, 2003, p.63), which is why the communities could regain some 
strength and the population started growing again. 
In the 18thcentury, global competition increased, capitalist relations started expanding and profound 
transformations took place in the Andes (Romero Bonifaz, 2005, p.36). The Crown, under the house 
of Bourbon – involved in costly wars in Europe52 – was in increasingly desperate need of capital; 
furthermore, the influence of the 'proud New World nobility' was a thorn in the Crown’s flesh 
(Skidmore and Smith, 2005, p.22). In the Bourbon reforms, which aimed at building 'modern fiscal-
                                                          
51 Toledo also enacted the first basic mining law, addressing the increasingly complex mine ownership in Potosí. It affirmed 
the Crown’s claims for ownership of subsoil and obliged miners to give the Crown 20 per cent of outputs (Klein, 2003, p.38). 
52 Key were the Seven Years’ War, the wars with Britain and France and the involvement in the French Revolution. 
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military state' (Allen, 2011, p.83), taxes were raised, trade laws imposed and monopolies created, all 
of which were designed to support the Bourbon’s war economy. In addition, tributes were expanded 
to all indigenous people, regardless of their land access status. With the aim of making tax collection 
from indigenous people more efficient and effective, the reciprocity pact between colonised and 
colonisers crumbled, since caciques were no longer recognised (Albó, 2009a, p.24). Appointed creole 
intendants, replaced the corregidores, who were directly in charge of tribute collection and allocation 
(Vargas Rivas, 2013, p.34). 
Superficially, the reforms appeared a success for the Crown since between 1778 and 1784, the returns 
to Spain rose by 1,528 per cent (Fowler, 2002, p.10) and the tribute turned into the second most 
important source of income for the Crown (Klein, 2003, p.71). However, it also triggered further 
resistance: First, some creoles, particularly those who had benefitted in pre-Bourbon times, started 
'to exert its independent interests' (Munck, 2012, p.24). Such rising 'creole patriotism' led to 
unwillingness to 'subsidise wars in which they had no interest' and to obey, more generally, the 
Crown’s rules (Fowler, 2002, pp.10;12).  
Secondly, despite or precisely because of the relative relaxation of the indigenous population’s 
exploitation, 'that population remained bitterly opposed to its overlords' (Klein, 2003, p.73) and the 
tributes were 'an obligation without political rights and without citizenship' (Tapia Mealla, 2015, p.10, 
author's translation). The dissatisfaction found expression in the 1780-1783 revolts (Albó, 2009a, 
p.24). In Upper Peru, today’s Bolivia, the most famous uprising of indigenous people took place in 
1781 and was let by Julian Apaza 'Túpac Katari' and Bartolina Sisa (De Mesa and Gisbert, 2003b, 
pp.275-279). After having laid siege to La Paz, demonstrating the indigenous people’s regained 
strength, the uprising was brutally defeated (Klein, 2003, p.77).  
Struggles for independence in the context of 'primary globalisation' 
The experience of revolt in Bolivia, the recent American Independence War and the French Revolution, 
raised some creoles’ consciousness that independence was possible and would enable the exercise of 
self-determination (Albó, 2009a, p.24). The Spanish defeat at Trafalgar and Napoleon’s occupation of 
Madrid triggered further revolts (Gisbert, 2003b, p.309). This initially led to the formation of some 
short-lived government juntas53 and in July 1809, mestizo Murillo declared Bolivia’s independence in 
La Paz. Subsequently, Spanish fought against Spanish(-Creoles), while the indigenous, black and 
mestizo populations were used by both sides (Huanacuni Mamani, 2010, p.20). After 30 years of 
conflict over independence54 and the formation of most Latin American states, a constituent assembly 
                                                          
53 1809 was a key year with the Chuquisaca and La Paz Revolutions (Gisbert, 2003b, pp.315-319). 
54 Gisbert (2003b) offers a detailed description of events. 
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declared independence in Chuquisaca in August 1824. Shortly afterwards, the assembly honoured 
Simón Bolívar by naming the new country Bolivia. Understanding independence through rising 'creole 
patriotism' and desires for self-determination points to an important aspect of the process, yet, the 
changing relations of production on the world stage should not be overlooked.  
Independence is also to be seen as largely 'determined by the needs of the development of Western 
or, more precisely, capitalist civilization' (Mariátegui, 1971, p.7). With the emergent industrial 
revolution in the West, needs started changing, particular in Britain, where capital was increasingly 
penetrated into industrial production (Clarke, 1992). Through the facilitation of 'free' trade, exports 
of products and import of cheap raw materials, metals and food, the increasingly prominent liberal 
paradigm led by Victorian England responded to these needs55 (Mariátegui, 1971). It also opened the 
door to investment in other parts of the world through which capital could be absorbed. 
Against this background, the Bolivian state emerged as a moment of struggles against the Crown’s 
domination that controlled the colonial state in a way that was increasingly a barrier to accumulation. 
The expanding force of global capital or 'primary globalisation' (Romero Bonifaz, 2005, p.36) coincided 
with the interests of the creole elite, which sought autonomy from the Crown (Mariátegui, 1971, p.8). 
Their profits were largely tied to exports, since not much 'domestic' industry existed, which was not 
directly related to exports. While the 'political' state CSE/Open Marxists describe, emerged as a 
moment of class struggles triggered by changing relations of production at the domestic level, the 
emergence of the independent Bolivian state is to be seen more in the context of external and global 
changes that found expression at the domestic level.  
5.4. The caudillo modality: The nascent independent state and 'anarchic' capitalism 
In earlier years, Bolívar’s vision had been heavily influenced by his mentor, who argued that since 
'Spanish America is original, its institutions and government must be original' (Rodríguez, 1990, p.88, 
author's translation). Yet, Bolívar‘s draft, adopted as Bolivia’s first constitution (1826), largely 
responded to the concerns of the creole and mestizo elites. While these supported progressive ideas 
like free trade and sought self-determination, they demonstrated the coloniser’s contempt towards 
the indigenous majority (Fowler, 2002, p.13). As visible in the following, ethnic exclusion became the 
lynchpin of the imagined cohesion of the new republic (López Mercado, 2014, p.77). 
The first Bolivian Constitution: A strong centre and exclusive rights for few 
The 1826 Constitution resembled the Spanish model that was marked by a strong executive, headed 
by an indirectly elected, powerful and life-time presidency (Vargas Rivas, 2013, p.39; Gisbert, 2003b, 
                                                          
55 Importing cheap food facilitated lower wages, the expansion of the industrial working class and urbanisation. 
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354). Given the internal rivalries, the strong centralism reflects Bolívar’s concern about the elite’s 
capacities to govern Bolivia (Vargas Rivas, 2013, p.40). Participation was severely restricted, as only 
citizens could vote (Art. 24) and run for or obtain public office (Art. 17, 42, 46, 50). The vast majority 
of indigenous people did not meet the requirements for citizenship56 (Art. 14) and fell into the 
category of 'Bolivians' (Art. 11). These were obliged, for example, to live subordinated to the 
constitution and laws, obey the constituted authorities, contribute to public spending and sacrifice 
their goods and lives for the Republic’s health when needed (Art. 12). As in colonial times, they were 
recognised as bearers of obligations but excluded from citizenship and so were denied political and 
other rights. With this, the highly unequal power relations between dominators and dominated 
stemming from colonial times were enshrined into the Bolivian state. Such a hierarchical unitary state 
with limited access served as a means to prevent chaos. This was crucial for the desired post-
independence economic recovery and modernisation – and hence, the survival of the state form. 
Enhancing control and facilitating expansion through the Bolivarian decrees and continued tributes 
In line with the contemporary ideas of progress, Bolívar was convinced that the agrarian economy 
should rapidly transition from a communal to a capitalist system (Vargas Rivas, 2013, p.35). The first 
Bolivarian Decree ruled that the figure of the caciques disappears and that usurped or illegally 
acquired land be redistributed (Gisbert, 2003b, p.353). The second Decree, equalizing indigenous 
people and all other 'free' Bolivian men, turned indigenous people into salaried proletariat57. The third 
Decree stated that indigenous people owned the land they possessed, and those without land, should 
receive some through the redistribution following from the first Decree. 
This quasi land reform was not solely about progress and modernisation, but was also a measure to 
limit the communities’ autonomy and the influence of indigenous peoples’ authorities. Some of these 
had accumulated land, gained power and adapted to a Spanish life style, sometimes perceiving 
themselves to be part of the Spanish elites (Larson, 2004). Additionally, even though the decrees 
seemed to favour the indigenous people, these reforms took place within a constitutionally-
recognised liberal state organised into departments, provinces and cantons (Art. 4), ruled by prefects 
(Art. 129), governors (Art. 130) and corregidores58 (Art. 131). In this, the ayllu, for example, remained 
unrecognised. 
                                                          
56 Apart from literacy, one also need to have a certain profession or be sufficiently wealthy. 
57 It said that nobody could use the service of indigenous people without a salary, previously agreed in contract form 
(Antezana, 1992). 
58 The figures of governors and corregidores, introduced under colonial rule, were 'gradually' subordinated to the central 
government and had the task of maintaining order and public security (Art. 138). 
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Bolívar and his successor, President De Sucre, formally abolished the tribute system, but the years of 
independence struggles had been costly59 and so it remained de facto in place, camouflaged as a 
territorial contribution (Albó, 2009a, p.24). The indigenous population’s tribute was the main and 
most stable source of income for the state or better, the caudillo, or strongman, in power (see below) 
(Romero Bonifaz, 2005, p.36). The indigenous people needed to develop their market relations further 
to pay for tributes, yet, this did not bring about capitalist relations of production, as it had in Britain 
and elsewhere and also their relations with the hacenderos continued to be personal and 
subordination was direct. This resembled a Marxist description of feudal social relations.  
Indigenous people were not passively accepting the rule of the state and caudillos and their 
subordination to landowners; they not only resisted but also began early to use the legal framework 
– including Bolivarian Decrees – to defend their rights (Rivera Cusicanqui, 2010). Yet, the state – 
enforcing the rule of law which serves to promote the most profitable accumulation – would prove 
incapable of recognising, for example, indigenous peoples´ ways of living and their cosmologies. These 
appear incompatible with universally applicable laws. Hence, in their relationship with the state, the 
indigenous people showed ambivalence, sometimes supporting, sometimes seeking to undermine it 
(Dunkerley, 2007). Since the beginning, wanting to recover or preserve autonomy, while also wanting 
the state to recognise this, and securing protection from landowners, amongst other things, has been 
deeply contradictory.  
The rise and fall of caudillos in times of 'anarchic capitalism' 
Despite the early aim of achieving stability, tensions between exclusive liberal paradigms set up in the 
constitution and the effective control over territory and population increased rapidly. When De Sucre 
left for exile in 1828, he reasoned that 'the solution was impossible' (cited by Easterly, 2006, p.99). As 
in most of Latin America, in the following five decades, caudillos or quasi-military leaders, who had 
gained power as the Spanish empire weakened, served as presidents. They ‘invaded' the state 
(Dunkerley, 1981, p.23), handled government power as a prize to be captured by the strongest and 
did not respect Republican ideals and principles written in the constitution (Romero Bonifaz, 2005, 
p.36). The constitutions adopted in the 1830s under President Santa Cruz centralised the power in the 
hands of the executive further and gave the Congress a more submissive role (Vargas Rivas, 2013, 
pp.40-42). This centralising tendency largely continued with the following six constitutions adopted 
between the 1830s and 1870s (Céspedes Cossio, 2005, pp.24-27). 
                                                          
59 Trade had almost come to a standstill, as trade with Spain stopped and among the former colonies dramatically declined. 
In Bolivia, the mining industry was in severe decline and agricultural production was low, too.  
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The caudillo modality paralleled the breakthrough of industrial capitalism in the West. In this time, 
global capitalist relations were still largely unchecked by labour (Fulcher, 2015, p.38) and this found 
expression in the state as a political form of those relations. Often, caudillos were owners of large 
estates and/or owners of mines and with fluctuations in sectors of the economy, caudillos rose and 
fell60. Thus, the Republic, in which supreme power is supposedly held by the people and their elected 
representatives, was in 'severe crisis' (Klein, 2003 ,p.18). In this, the Bolivian state could hardly appear 
as a neutral arbiter, since political power and the economic realm were hardly separated. Yet, there 
were some instances of slight movement towards such division, when, for example, with the formal 
expansion of the 1839 Constitution measures for direct political participation61. Yet, in all this, 
citizenship remained heavily restricted and those excluded from citizenship and obliged to pay tribute, 
among other things, could hardly perceive it as an uncommitted broker. 
A recovering economy and the end of the reciprocity pact 
After an almost 50 year-long silver depression, the price started recovering steadily in the 1860s. 
Consequently, relations between indigenous people and creoles/mestizos underwent profound 
changes. The indigenous populations’ tribute turned less important in the public budget (Albó, 2009a, 
p.24). At the same time, since, the mining industry and towns were growing again, more food stuff 
was needed, which led to a more rapacious demand for land (ibid.).  
In this context, the caudillos took a more aggressive approach towards indigenous people (Klein, 2003, 
p.147). Justified with liberal ideas such as modernisation and progress, the 1866 'anti-campesino' 
Decree, was the 'first really sustained attack on Indian communal property' (ibid., p.136). With this 
measure, President Melgarejo (1864-71) indirectly ordered the selling of indigenous populations’ 
lands as individual titles at auction (De Mesa and Mesa Gisbert, 2003, pp.429-430). Shortly afterwards, 
with the 1868 Constitution62 and the 'feudalizante' legislation, the indigenous people’s territory was 
formally turned into state property (Antezana, 1992). The 1874 'Ex-vinculación' Law of Community 
Lands under President Frías (1872-1873; 1874-1876) went even further (Mesa Gisbert, 2003b, pp.506-
507): In Article 2, the prefectural authorities were obliged to claim from the indigenous people their 
right to lay claim on their possessions if they had recovered them. Article 4 declared terrain not 
possessed by indigenous people redundant and, therefore, state property. Article 5 enabled 
indigenous people to sell the titled lands they possessed (Antezana, 1992, p.134). These reforms 
opened the free market of land (Vargas Rivas, 2013, p.37) and hacenderos and latifundistas, including 
                                                          
60 For a list, see Mesa Gisbert (2003a, pp.841-842). 
61 It established a directly-elected president (Art. 66). Previously, the election happened through local electoral juntas (Art. 
66; 1831 CPE). Also municipal councils with directly elected members were established in departmental capitals and in some 
provinces (Art. 130).  
62 Article 10 opened the possibility of expropriation. 
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the caudillos, could legally expand their land at a cheap price or gratis. In this, the idea of communal 
territory had remained not just unrecognised by the state, but the state sought – following in the 
interest of capital-in-general – to eliminate it as far as it was in the way of more profitable 
accumulation. 
In the following decades, Bolivia experienced the expansion of (neo-)haciendas (Klein, 2003, p.147). 
The colonial reciprocity pact was completely called off, when in 1879, the existing tribute categories 
were revised and the indigenous peoples´ community were no longer a taxable entity (Platt, 1982, 
p.101). From then on, taxes were paid according to the production of each plot of land. This was an 
attempt to integrate them as peasants, who work their privately-owned land, into the capitalist 
market system. This aggressive stance towards indigenous people increased tensions and rebellions 
broke out in which they sought to defend their self-determination63 (López Mercado, 2014, p.103).  
The inability of caudillo modality to handle global pressures 
Over time, the world market had turned towards a more 'managed capitalism', under which 
'uncertainties generated by unregulated competition' were reduced (Fulcher, 2015, p.41). Britain 
increasingly faced an over-accumulation crisis and in response, production was more and more 
liberalised, opening spaces for absorption (Clarke, 1992). Parallel to this, Bolivia turned into one of the 
peripheral states in the international division of labour, that had an increasingly modern export sector 
that could satisfy needs and absorb capital from others (Klein, 2003, p.146). 
As 'victim' of 'second colonisation' through the British Empire, the mining industry underwent large-
scale reorganisation facilitated by investments from Britain and Chile (Romero Bonifaz, 2005, p.37). 
Modern machinery and technologies helped to massively increase output and profits without much 
labour power (Klein, 2003, p.145). In this context, the lack, and poor quality, of infrastructure became 
a crucial barrier and required investment (Skidmore and Smith, 2005, p.40). 
Yet, early on, the caudillos had been 'spiritually and organically incapable of directing the task of 
economic reconstitution' (Mariátegui, 1971, p.9). The increasing tensions within the reconfiguring 
creole/mestizo elite made it clear that the 'years of confusion' (De Mesa and Mesa Gisbert, 2003) of 
the caudillo modality lacked the necessary stability and order to survive under 'managed capitalism'.  
                                                          
63 They, for example, were key in the overthrow of Melgarejo’s regime (Albó, 2009a, p.25). 
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5.5. The exclusive liberal modality: Laissez-faire modality and gold, silver and tin 
booms 
The costly War of the Pacific (1879–80)64 triggered deep changes. In its aftermath, a group from the 
mining elite, whose members had benefitted from post-1860s recovery, took state power. They aimed 
to build a civilian and properly administered regime of 'order and progress', which they saw as key for 
(stable) growth. Better infrastructure – mostly rail – was particularly crucial for a cheaper, quicker and 
safer transport of goods, but for its development, a more favourable climate for investment was 
needed (Mesa Gisbert, 2003b, pp.498-500). 
Under the banner of 'national unification', the state underwent formal reorganisation, reflected in the 
1878 and 1880 Constitutions (Céspedes Cossio, 2005, pp.27-28). On one hand, the territorial state 
organisation remained hierarchical and tight, allowing the centre a high degree of control65. On the 
other, the executive-legislative relation changed dramatically, as Congress was no longer envisioned 
as submissive but as a key arena for political debate. With this formal shift in power balance, the state 
started appearing more like the neutral arbiter, separated from the economic sphere. Still, citizenship 
remained tied to criteria such as literacy, making it the exclusive liberal modality.  
From an intra-elite consensus system to the 1898/9 revolt  
In the following years, a two-party system, consisting of a Conservative and a Liberal Party, emerged, 
which was 'necessary [for] the political system [which] the mining elite desired' (Klein, 2003, p.153). 
Since it was based on an intra-elite consensus and with regards to essential ideas, 'very little if nothing' 
divided the parties (Mesa Gisbert, 2003b, p.492, author's translation), indigenous peoples and the 
growing urban working class remained unrepresented.  
Yet, the changes at the world market, which had to do with the industrialisation in the West, triggered 
tensions within the elite. While in the 1880s, the price of silver declined and gold mining entered a 
crisis, demands for tin and to a lesser extent, copper, zinc and lead, were growing (Klein, 2003, p.155). 
Consequently, mining operations shifted towards these sectors and profits were high, also because 
the technology developed during the silver boom could be transferred (ibid.). La Paz, at the centre of 
the increasingly powerful tin elite, had twice as many inhabitants as the capital of the gold- and silver 
industry Sucre, and exported 3 million pesos, while Sucre only reached 40,000 (Roca, 2005, p.212). 
Two proposals for state (re)organisation were developed and increasingly vocalised by the two parties 
(Albó and Barrios Suvelza, 2006, p.18). The Liberals, backed by the emergent tin oligarchy, argued for 
                                                          
64 In this, the forces of Bolivia and Peru suffered a humiliating defeat against Chile's armed forces and Bolivia lost its access 
to the Pacific (De Mesa and Mesa Gisbert, 2003, pp.447-465).  
65 Following both Constitutions, the prefect, sub-prefect and corregidor remained dependent on the next higher authority 
(Art. 101, 103, 104) and prefect and sub-prefects could be removed by the president (Art. 105).  
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a federal state66with La Paz as capital and in which the departments would have greater autonomy 
from the central government than before. Their support base was the growing urban professional 
classes and non-silver-mining groups in La Paz, Oruro and Cochabamba (Klein, 2003, p.155). The 
Conservatives, in power since 1880 and associated with the weakening gold and silver-mining elite 
from Sucre, sought to defend the constitutionally established unitary state, with Sucre as capital and 
seat of government67 (ibid.).  
After increasing mobilisation in 1898 and the revolt of 189968, also called the 'federal war', the 
triumphant Liberals moved the seat of government to La Paz, from where they sought to establish a 
new hegemony (Albó and Barrios Suvelza, 2006, p.18). Yet, apart from the relocation of the 
government, no changes in the state organisation occurred and it is therefore more appropriate to 
speak of a 'war of capitals' instead of a 'federal war' (Albó and Barrios Suvelza, 2006, p.18). When the 
federal idea was discussed at the 1899 Convention, it only received support from 18 out of 50 votes 
and the issue was discarded as symbolic but at the time inapplicable (Roca, 2005, p.258). This shows 
that once in state power, the Liberals – like the Conservatives earlier – seemed to perceive a 
centralised/ing state more beneficial for increasing productivity and maximising (their) profits.  
Indigenous peoples’ rebellions: Entering alliances, anti-climaxes and voicing demands towards the state  
The above-mentioned agrarian reforms had facilitated the growth of 'neo-feudal' haciendas and since 
many indigenous people had been forced to sell a great deal of land, they increasingly rented usufruct 
land from latifundistas in return for working for the hacendero. As in colonial times, this meant 
catering to the needs of the landowners’ family (Easterly, 2006, p.100). Yet, unlike in colonial times, 
the indigenous people had become more deeply incorporated into the capitalist land market. Despite 
points of disagreement69, the mining and hacendero elites which were highly influential in this liberal 
                                                          
66 This was no new proposal, since after Melgarejo´s fall in 1871, there had been a project in a constituent assembly for 
creating the 'United States of Bolivia', pushed by some tarijeños and cochabambinos, that ultimately failed to generate wider 
interest. Some years later, the cruceño Andrés Ibáñez led a movement, which had an egalitarian orientation and a vision of 
a federal state. Despite turning 'federal prefect' in 1877, he was finally defeated by people from his own class, who saw in 
him a 'dangerous dissociate' (Roca, 2005, p.212). 
67 Sucre had been capital during the era of De Sucre, but until 1880, the seat of government and congress depended on the 
president in power. With the conservatives ruling since 1880, Sucre had turned into the de facto seat of government. 
68 When in late 1898, Conservatives proposed to make Sucre government and congress seat, the Liberals wanted congress 
to move to Cochabamba as a neutral space, which the Conservatives rejected. Despite resistance from the Liberals, a law 
was promulgated that established Sucre as capital and seat of the executive. For the radical supporter of the federalist 
proposal, creating a federal regime would require the overthrow of President Fernández Alonso. A federal junta was formed, 
largely supported by paceños and led by General Pando, with Zárate Willka as ally. After large-scale protests in Sucre and La 
Paz, the president sent troops towards La Paz. In Challapata (Oruro), they heard that their opponents had acquired over two 
million arms, yet decided to continue to Oruro, having formed two brigades. The first brigade encountered Pando and many 
indigenous people in Cosmini, and fled to Ayo Ayo, where they were massacred. In the decisive battle in Segundo Crucero 
de Paria on the 10th of April 1899, Pando’s troops won and Fernández Alonso went into exile. 




exclusive modality perceived – like the caudillos – that communal property, key in the ayllus, inhibited 
market capacity and opposed individual freedom (Albó, 2009a, p.24). 
While after the reforms, indigenous resistance was weakened in the short-term, it regained some 
strength in the exclusive liberal modality and discontent erupted in the form of rebellions (Albó, 
2009a, p.24). Other social groups attempted to utilise their determination and people-power for their 
purposes (Albó and Barrios Suvelza, 2006, p.19). According to the 1901 census, for each creole, there 
were four indigenous people (Rivera Cusicanqui, 2011, p.81). 
The most noteworthy alliance was the one between the Liberal Party and the powerful indigenous 
leader Zárate Willka, in the 1899 federal revolt (see footnote 68, Mesa Gisbert, 2003b, pp.509-514). 
General Pando from the Liberals had promised him that in the event of a victory, he would give back 
the land the indigenous people had lost under Melgarejo’s reforms (Tórrez and Arce C., 2014, p.37). 
Only after the entrance of Zárate Willka, the revolt of the rising elite turned into an uprising that was 
unprecedented in scale. In Oruro, La Paz, Cochabamba and Potosí, where land grabbing and repression 
had hit the hardest, supportive indigenous groups´ rebellions were particularly strong. 
This alliance was inherently contradictory from the beginning, as powerful actors in the Liberal Party 
had acquired lands from the indigenous people through earlier reforms. After the Liberal victory, the 
indigenous people and mestizos realised that their allies would not keep their promises and closed 
ranks. Further revolts were brutally repressed (Mesa Gisbert, 2003b, pp.513-514) and rumours of a 
'war of races' spread (Albó and Barrios Suvelza, 2006). Zárate Willka himself was arrested and later 
executed (Albó, 2007, pp.76-77).  
Consequently, the territorial situation of indigenous groups remained largely unchanged. Many 
highland and valleys people were 'yanaconas' (helpers) in the large estates, which involved three to 
five weekly working days on the land and in the house of the haciendas. In their 'free' time, they 
worked as usufructuries on small plots of land, which they had possessed in earlier times. Against this 
backdrop, the indigenous people intensified their efforts to build networks amongst themselves to 
organise against exploiters and those who had taken their lands (Albó and Barrios Suvelza, 2006). 
Despite severe repression, the network survived the following decades. Over time, on top of key and 
closely linked demands for territory and self-determination, other requests were made of the state. 
For example, they asked for state-provided education, which appears to conflict with umbrella 
demands for self-determination, as it implies deeper inclusion into the state and rule of law it 
enforces. This demand shows that the state was also somewhat perceived as an arbiter and not solely 
rejected as something to struggle against, rather its laws could be used strategically. 
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At the same time, the above-mentioned 'neo-feudal' hacienda expansions and also increasingly 
affected the lowlands, where the situation of indigenous peoples worsened. In the Chaco, the military 
supported the expansion of cattle ranches. Many people were as 'peones' quasi enslaved, living in 
worse conditions than the highland people (Albó and Barrios Suvelza, 2006, p.18). The autonomy of 
several groups in the northern lowlands came to an end with the rubber boom in the Amazon Basin 
(1879-1912), which largely served to satisfy the demands of an industrialising Europe (Mesa Gisbert, 
2003b, pp.521-523). As in the highland and valleys, the people did not passively accept these changes. 
Among the lowland groups, the rebellion of Guaraní people was particularly strong (Combès, 2005), 
yet was at times brutally defeated, for example, in Kuruyuki (1892) (Albó and Barrios Suvelza, 2006, 
p.19). 
The politics under the tin barons 
The 1899 revolt had been triggered by shifts in the mining economy that were driven by demands 
from outside Bolivia (Mesa Gisbert, 2003b, p.541). By 1900, tin accounted for over half of export 
earnings and the peak of the boom, more than 30 per cent of world supply came from Bolivia (Romero 
Bonifaz, 2005, p.38). Tin mining absorbed more capital than silver mining, but also produced more 
wealth. The three 'tin barons' Patiño, Aramayo and Hochschild, who controlled most of the Bolivian 
tin mining sector, quickly joined the list of the wealthiest men in the world.  
Under the 'barons', governance was different compared to the now weakened silver and gold mining, 
which had been directly involved70 in the Conservative rule. These had been rather nationally-
oriented, emphasising, order, progress and 'national unification' after the chaotic caudillo rule. In turn, 
the tin barons were more cosmopolitan-minded and professionally managed their international 
companies, while influencing national politics more indirectly through pressure groups. 
The 20-year-long rule of the Liberals, and especially the years under President Montes (1904-09, 1913-
17) are often described as the calmest time in Bolivian political history. With the 1903 Treaty of 
Petrópolis71 and the 1904 Treaty of Peace and Friendship with Chile72, two main border conflicts were 
solved and great financial indemnities were paid to Bolivia. These resources facilitated the 
continuation of the Conservatives’ project of infrastructure development and by 1920, the larger cities 
                                                          
70 Bolivian presidents under the Conservative’s rule in the 19th century were either silver magnates themselves (Pacheco, 
1884–88; Arce, 1888–92) or were closely associated with such magnates (Baptista, 1892–96; Fernández Alonso, 1896–99). 
71 This resolved the ˈAcre problemˈ (Mesa Gisbert, 2003b, pp.523-525), which revolved around the rubber-boom territory of 
Acre close to Brazil. The Bolivian government tried to crush a rebellion seeking autonomy, which Brazil had covertly 
supported. With the treaty, the ruling Liberals agreed to sell the territory to Brazil.  
72 With the treaty, Bolivia accepted the loss of the Litoral province, which implied losing access to the sea and large nitrate 
reserves (Mesa Gisbert, 2003b, pp.529-530). 
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were connected by rail and considerable progress was made in linking Bolivia to neighbouring 
countries73. 
Political turbulences and economic crisis in the context of World War I and Great Depression 
In 1920, the rule of the Liberals ended with a coup and the Republican Party took over. This had been 
founded with a similar ideology and support base as the Conservatives which had stumbled into severe 
crises after their 1899 defeat (Mesa Gisbert, 2003b, pp.537; 545). Yet, after taking state power, the 
Republicans split into two camps and this rivalry characterised Bolivia’s political scenery for the next 
years74. Increasing political turbulence was once again predated by economic instability, the main 
reason for which was to be found outside Bolivia. 
After World War I, the tin industry recovered quickly and in 1929, the production figures reached an 
all-time peak. However, international prices for raw materials steadily fell and between 1928 and 
1932, the unit value of Latin American exports declined by over 50 per cent (Fowler, 2002, p.110). 
With the Great Depression (1928-1941), major capital investments in tin mining ended, while 
production prices increased (Mesa Gisbert, 2003b, p.548). Since Bolivia had no internal savings, the 
economic situation became more severe, which further fuelled political conflict (ibid.). 
To confront the growing crisis, President Salamanca (1931-1934) sought to manipulate the inflation 
rate (ibid., pp.569-570). This led to serious tensions between his party and the Liberals, which 
controlled Congress and ultimately vetoed Salamanca’s proposed measure. Since it was thought that 
'increasing economic crisis would lead to social anarchy' (Klein, 2003, p.174), Salamanca brought the 
long-standing border conflict with Paraguay over the sparsely populated Chaco territory onto the 
political agenda. It was hoped that patriotism would unify people75.  
The Chaco disaster and the fall of the exclusive liberal modality 
A border skirmish provoked by Salamanca’s people in June 1932 led to an open war with Paraguay 
which ended disastrously for Bolivia. Despite having entered with better equipped and probably better 
trained soldiers, between 60,000 and 70,000 Bolivians died and Bolivia lost more territory than 
Paraguay had initially claimed (Fowler, 2002, p.126). Most Bolivian soldiers were people who had not 
been recognised as 'citizens', but risked their lives defending Bolivia. For Zavaleta, the war achieved 
the nationalisation of the Bolivian consciousness (Mesa Gisbert, 2003b, p.585). 
                                                          
73 For example, the railway La Paz-Arica was inaugurated in 1913 (Céspedes Cossio, 2005, p.53). 
74 The heads of the two fractions were Saavedra, a lawyer from La Paz, who had led the 1920 coup and served as president 
from 1921-1925 and Salamanca, a Cochabamba landowner and founder of the Genuine Republican Party. In 1930, a junta 
supporting Salamanca’s fraction that was also backed by several Liberals, overthrew Saavedra’s successor Siles Reyes. 
75 The Chaco War is sometimes also seen as resulting from Bolivian and/or Paraguayan expansionism. Again others make US 
Standard Oil and British Dutch Royal Shell responsible, who in the prospect of profiting from extraction, pressured the 
governments to expand frontiers. For a comprehensive description of events, see Mesa Gisbert (2003b, pp.567-582). 
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In the aftermath of the Chaco War, nation and state became disarticulated, leading to a 'disintegration 
of the established order' (Klein, 2003, p.178). Out of a strong sense of frustration, the Chaco 
generation was born. These younger literate veterans were often not recognised as 'citizens', who 
held the traditional parties and hydrocarbon firms responsible for the war and began setting up more 
radical parties and, for example, workers’ movements as alternatives to the established parties (Mesa 
Gisbert, 2003b, pp.590-592). The exclusive liberal modality was increasingly incapable of resolving 
economic upheavals and facilitating growth. It was also unable to contain the struggles from the Chaco 
generation and other excluded sectors of society.  
5.6. The military socialist modality: Between old order and revolution 
The 1936 coup, which ended over 50 years of civilian rule, signalled the end of the exclusive liberal 
modality and gave way to the military socialist modality. In the following months, key demands from 
the Chaco generation were translated into 'state matter'. Most fundamentally, the Standard Oil 
Company holdings were confiscated and the state-owned hydrocarbon company YPFB was founded 
(Mesa Gisbert, 2003b, p.589). 
The 1938 Constitution 
In 1938, President Busch (1937-1939), a former military officer and hero of the Chaco War, 
promulgated a Constitution, which had compared to earlier ones a radically social(ist) orientation 
(Céspedes Cossio, 2005. pp.30-31). Most fundamentally, the right to private property was no longer 
absolute, but conditional to the interest of society, making expropriation possible (Art. 17). National 
interest in the subsoil was declared and the state was granted the right to intervene in economic life, 
to regulate commerce and address social issues. This was in strong contrast to the laissez-faire 
capitalism of previous decades (Mesa Gisbert, 2003b, pp.595-596). It was also the first constitution 
that recognised the existence of indigenous peoples’ communities and declared the state’s 
responsibility to promote the education of 'peasants' (Art.165-167). 
With the removal of property restrictions on citizenship (Art. 43, 44), another key demand from the 
Chaco generation was translated into the state. Yet, the literacy requirement remained in place, so 
that many indigenous people and more generally, most of those living in rural areas remained 
excluded. Nevertheless, this measure led to a dramatic increase of eligible voters. Consequently, the 
potential key electoral support base for political parties also changed. 
Partial translation and repression triggering further demands and rising resistance 
Despite the recognition of indigenous peoples’ communities, territorial state organisation remained 
unchanged and an agrarian reform did not take place. Hence, demands for territory of indigenous and 
mestizo groups were not met and also the peasant education was not translated into concrete 
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legislation and policies. Some years later, at the 1stCongreso Indegenal in 1945, President Villaroel 
(1943-1946), speaking in Quechua, promulgated decrees abolishing the pongueaje service and 
establishing schools in all haciendas (Albó, 2009a, pp.27-28) – which also did not result in concrete 
action. In this context resistance did not stop as became clear, for example, in the 1947 indigenous 
peoples’ rebellion (Mesa Gisbert, 2003b, p.613). 
At the same time, a crucial demand of the Chaco generation – more specifically the rising urban 
working class, was met with the introduction of the 1939 labour law, giving workers the right to 
bargain collectively. Yet, overall the demands were only partially met and this propelled the rise of 
more movements and parties. Among the forces gaining importance was the Nationalist Revolutionary 
Movement (MNR) which already controlled an important part of Congress in the early 1940s and 
increasingly managed to mobilise popular masses. 
The massacre in Catavi, Potosí in 1942, in which unarmed protesting miners, who worked for tin baron 
Patiño, were killed and their facilities destroyed, fuelled resistance against the military government of 
Peñaranda (1940-1943) (Keen and Haynes, 2009, p.407). At the forefront of the oppositional forces 
was the mostly urban middle-class and the MNR was the key political force. 
Tin barons, the World War II export boom and the end of military socialist modality 
The ideological underpinning of the 1938 Constitution and the rising conflicts and mobilisation in 
which profound change was demanded, threatened the foreign investments climate and hence, 
Bolivia’s competitiveness in the global market. Those who had benefitted in previous decades, above 
all, the tin oligarchy and hacienda owners, were unwilling to tolerate the changes underway. They 
became more directly active in national politics than before forming an alliance with the Party of the 
Revolutionary Left.  
As in the context of World War II, the demand for tin skyrocketed and the tin barons became very 
powerful; they were responsible for almost 80 per cent of Bolivian tin extraction in the 1940s (Romero 
Bonifaz, 2005, p.37). In the military socialist modality, taxes did not significantly rise – despite the 
socialist orientation, for example, Patiño’s operational capital quadrupled between 1940 and 1948, 
while collected taxes increased by only seven per cent (Romero Bonifaz, 2005, p.37). Yet, raising more 
state revenue would have been crucial for responding to demands from the Chaco generation, who 
wanted redistribution, (better) education and social policies provided by the state. 
In 1946, another more conservative regime took over, which was backed by the tin barons and 
reversed some earlier changes (Albó, 2009a, p.28). This signalled the end of the military socialist 
modality, which had incorporated some important demands from the Bolivian population, but in a 
way that not only lacked depth but also seemed to be in the way of the most profitable accumulation. 
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The tin oligarchy, with favourable world market conditions of the World War II76 on their side, had 
stood against this. However, in this case, the pressures inside Bolivia for inclusion and redistribution 
had intensified and found expression in increasingly organised movements including a growing urban 
class, intellectuals, miners, and some indigenous people. Since the export boom had been closely 
associated with World War II, with its end, the demand for minerals dropped dramatically. When the 
mining economy reached a crisis point, the power of the mining oligarchs weakened. This facilitated 
another period of rapid change. 
5.7. The inclusive nationalist modality: An unfinished revolution and economic 
upheavals77 
When the MNR won the 1951presidential elections, the outgoing President Urriolagoitia, who had 
been supported by the oligarchy, refused to accept the results, leading the military to intervene and 
take over (Albó, 2009a, p.28; Mesa Gisbert, 2003b, pp.617-619). In the months of military leadership, 
protests and uprisings turned increasingly violent. Initially, these took place mainly in urban and 
mining centres, but as indigenous people/peasants became increasingly conscious, they started to 
occupy lands and claimed that formal expropriation should follow (Dunkerley, 1984, pp.36-37). The 
long-standing demand for agrarian reform had remained unheard of in earlier political modalities. In 
April 1952, the military regime was overthrown and the MNR took over.  
The state of 1952 
The consolidation of the strong, unitary 'state of 52' was at the heart of the revolutionary agenda and 
designed to create a sense of inclusiveness and pride among Bolivians (Albó, 2009a, p.28). Three key 
demands of the movements, which supported the MNR, were rapidly integrated into the state, which 
reshaped the state’s appearance and its apparent relationship with the market. 
First, following ideas of state capitalism, the three largest mines were nationalised78 and in the 
subsequent years, numerous public enterprises were created (Albó, 2009a, p.29; Mesa Gisbert, 2003c, 
pp.659-660). Since mining was of vital importance and had, for example, in 1952 accounted for 80 per 
cent of the state budget, the state mining company (COMIBOL) was crucial (Lessmann, 2010, p.89). 
Secondly, for creating the inclusive state, universal suffrage was introduced. This meant that women 
and indigenous people and others, who had previously been excluded, turned into key electoral 
support bases and were no longer groups acting outside formal politics (Mesa Gisbert, 2003c, p.661). 
The third measure tackled a long-standing demand of indigenous people – territory, which entered 
                                                          
76 After the government proclaimed its support of the Allies in 1943, the export conditions with the US were more favourable 
(Fowler, 2002, p.112). 
77 Since Chapter 6 deals in more details around struggles for autonomy since the second half of the 20th century, the 
following three political modalities are not discussed in as much depth as the previous ones. 
78 The owners received compensations and given the unfavourable world market, they did not protest.  
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the MNR agenda after massive protests (Lessmann, 2010, p.88). The Agrarian Reform (Law Decree 
3464/1953) sought to break the backbone of the (neo-)hacienda system by giving the land to those 
who worked it. With the reform, pongueaje was legally abolished and land should be divided into small 
parcels or minifundios, and redistributed (Mesa Gisbert, 2003c, p.657-659)79.  
The new Ministry of Peasant Affairs was a key 'hinge' between government and communities and 
facilitated the creation of peasant syndicates. Not just the communities that were part of a hacienda, 
but also others were required to adopt in this syndicalist structure. Participation had benefits like 
discounts on some important consumer goods, but more importantly access to minifundios (Yashar, 
2005, p.160). Each community-level syndicate was part of provincial and departmental centrales and 
the National Confederation of Peasant Workers of Bolivia (CNTCB) (Albó, 1992). When a community 
member was given a small parcel of land, she became part of the community syndicate. The syndicates 
became a key component of the 'state of 52', replacing the hacienda as a means of social control 
(Yashar, 2005, p.159). With their help, the MNR sought to expand and strengthen its ties throughout 
the rural areas (Albó, 1987, p.383). Yet, this new structure did not mean that the ayllus disappeared, 
and is sometimes just seen as a new label for the community as it had always existed (Albó, 1992). 
The two-edged 'campesinación' 
The syndicates recognised their members as peasants or campesinos and not as indigenous people, 
which meant that in becoming part of the 'state of 52', people had to assimilate the dominant culture 
(Yashar, 2005, p.156). Through this 'campesinación' (Albó, 2009a, p.31), they were included in the 
Bolivian nation which was viewed as stable, homogenous and unitary (Sanjinés, 2004). In order to 
achieve this, the MNR sought to support the development of national consciousness through official 
discourse, schooling80and the syndicate structure. In this, mestizaje was promoted as a way of 
combating racism (Albó, 2009b, p.67), which moderated the co-existence of numerous ethnic groups.  
The campesinación, the minifundios and syndicate, together with the lack of recognition of the ayllu, 
was in tension with the long-standing demand for self-determination and territory (Ticona Alejo et al., 
1995, p.102). It can even be said that one of the key objectives of these reforms was to stop or slow 
down the rise of ethno-nationalism (Máiz, 2010) and the construction of a radical proposal of 
indigenous people against creole domination (Rivera Cusicanqui, 1986 [2003]). Such internal conflicts 
would have also stood in the way of profitable accumulation. In turn, the subordination to the rules 
of private property facilitated the increasing expansion of capital into the everyday lives and minds of 
                                                          
79 The maximum number of hectares varied based on the geographical zone and property purpose: For example, in the 
Titicaca region, a small property was 10 hectares, while in the Chaco, it was 80 hectares (Art. 15). A large cattle farm in the 
tropics or sub-tropics can have 50.0000 hectares (Art. 21). 
80 On the Education Reform, see Mesa Gisbert (2003c, pp.661-662). 
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the community members, which threatened the ayllus. In post tin-boom era, this opened up 
possibilities for growth. 
While in the lowlands, where the state was far less present, the reform had less effect and this time, 
a new latifundaria structure emerged (see 6.2.1.), in the highlands, minifundio titling was rather 
widespread. In this, another reciprocity pact emerged: In exchange for MNR support, the indigenous 
people as peasants were allowed to retain some degree of self-management as long as it did not 
threaten the overall project. With the 1952 Revolution, the hunger for territory was quietened in the 
highlands in the short-term. Yet, the reform could not prevent resistance towards assimilation. For 
example, in 1956, Laureano Machaka proclaimed the (short-lived) independent Aymara Republic 
(Keen and Haynes, 2009, p.408) and in the 1960s, the ethno-nationalist Katarista movement emerged 
(see 6.2.2.). 
The unfinished revolution, increasing economic upheaval and internal tensions 
In the medium-term, the 1952 Revolution dismantled the oligarchic-feudal power relations, but it 
remained 'unfinished' (Finot, 2016). The reform did not increase productivity and neither could 
consumption capacity nor savings be built up (Mesa Gisbert, 2003c, p.677). With this, the aspired-to 
modern industrial structure did not emerge and so, Bolivia’s position in the world market hardly 
changed (Romero Bonifaz, 2005, p.38).  
Under President Paz Estenssoro (1952-56) who enacted the major reforms, groups within the MNR 
debated alternative modes of political organization, including the implementation of a workers’ 
assembly. But internal tensions grew81 and apart from a powerful labour movement, organized as the 
Bolivian Labour Federation (COB), no institution was created that channelled the demands of those 
who had supported the revolution (Mesa Gisbert, 2003c, pp.656-657). 
In 1956, the more conservative President Siles Zuazo took office and the revolution’s 'retreat' began 
(Dunkerley, 1984, p.83). His main concern was rising inflation and the increasingly tight state budget, 
both of which threatened the revolution (Mesa Gisbert, 2003c, pp.668-669). Between 1952 and 1956, 
inflation had been 100 per cent (Lessmann, 2010, p.90), largely driven by the costly, rundown tin 
industry and the Agrarian Reform which initially had a disruptive effect on food production (Keen and 
Haynes, 2009, p.408). The mines, managed by COMIBOL produced losses and the massively growing 
public sector and allegedly increasing corruption, also led to a further rise in public spending (Céspedes 
Cossio, 2005).  
                                                          
81 These were related to conflicts over the MNR strategy and access to state employment (Mesa Gisbert, 2003c, pp.668-670). 
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In this context, the US – which had become a key player since the end of World War I, and replaced 
the British as a major influence in Latin America – offered financial support through Kennedy’s 1961 
'Alliance for Progress', which had the aim of curtailing revolutionary movements following the Cuban 
example (Lessmann, 2010, p.90). With US support – which curtailed Bolivia’s self-determination even 
further – an economic programme was enacted to combat inflation. Subsequently, the miners’ 
recently granted welfare benefits82 were cut and the participation of workers in management of state 
enterprises were significantly limited (Mesa Gisbert, 2003c, pp.674-675). In addition, North American 
oil companies were invited to enter Bolivia on favourable conditions. 
The 1961 Constitution, promulgated by President Paz Estenssoro, who had returned to power in 1960, 
codified the major targets of the state of 1952 (Vargas Rivas, 2013, p.48). Yet, his government 
continued the more liberal line of Siles Zuazo and in addition, it agreed to restore a powerful US-
trained army to offset the power of workers and peasant/indigenous militia. These groups were part 
of the protest movements that defended the revolution’s ideals against the MNR’s policies and 
politics, including the growing US influence. Ensuring order by destabilising them was seen as a 
requirement for tackling the unstable economic situation (Keen and Haynes, 2009, p.205).  
Instead of responding to their support bases, the MNR leaders replied to the global pressures for 
sustaining growth and moved closer to the rising national non-industrial bourgeois groups, which were 
crucial for economic development (Romero Bonifaz, 2005, p.38). A new elite had formed around the 
state mining company COMIBOL and another bourgeois group emerged from the growing agricultural 
sector and hydrocarbon industry in the lowlands (see 6.2.1.).  
Against this backdrop, the 'state of 1952' was increasingly called into question by those who had 
helped to incite the revolution and were dissatisfied with the translation of their demands. The 
nationalist and revolutionary left was increasingly divided while the economic situation turned more 
severe. It became apparent that this modality did not resolve the deep-seated economic problems 
and was unable to bring about rising productivity which triggered further social and political pressures 
which it could not contain (Céspedes Cossio, 2005, p.63).  
5.8. The military modality: Recovering growth at the cost of repression 
In the aftermath of the 1964 election, a military junta led by General Barrientos took power. President 
Barrientos (1964-1966; 1966-1969) continued the lines of rather conservative economic reform and 
political retrenchment, aiming at demobilising the popular groups - except for the peasants, who had 
supported him. For example, he prohibited the miners from striking and froze their wages (Lessmann, 
                                                          
82 This refers in particular to the 1956 Social Security Code (Mesa Gisbert, 2003c, p.667). 
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2010, p.92) and when 'Che' Guevara started his guerrilla fight in Bolivia, the president took drastic 
measures in the area, such as the Massacre of San Juan (Dunkerley, 1984, pp.134-140). 
After Barrientos’ death in 1969, which 'left the country in a vacuum' (ibid., p.156), some years of 
political upheaval83 followed during which US Gulf Oil Company holdings were nationalised. Then, 
General Banzer, an associate of the increasingly powerful cruceño elite (see 6.2.1.), assumed power. 
President Banzer (1971-1978)84 arguably headed the most repressive military regime. His government 
suspended all civil rights, suppressed the workers’ movement, banned the peasant syndicates and 
sent the military to occupy the mines. Key actors of the 1952 Revolution were repressed and forced 
into exile.  
The pact between government and peasants drastically changed with this political modality: the 
military agreed to respect the 1952 reforms in exchange for unconditional support of the government 
(Dunkerley, 1984, p.132). As a consequence, the peasants were turned into a rampart against any 
other, especially radical left-wing political influences, perceived dangerous for stability and growth 
(Mesa Gisbert, 2003c, pp.681-682). Yet, in the medium-term, this did not prevent oppositional forces 
gaining strength.  
Also due to rising world market prices for raw materials, the early years under the military had been 
marked by high economic growth (Mesa Gisbert, 2003c, pp.702-704). In the 1960s and 1970s, Bolivia 
became one of the key hydrocarbon exporters in the region (Gandarillas Gonzales, 2014, p.118; Mesa 
Gisbert, 2003c, pp.705-708). For infrastructure projects, serving above all to facilitate hydrocarbon 
exports, international loans were taken out. From 1971 to 1978, public debt increased from 460 
million to three billion USD (Lessmann, 2010, p.96).  
Banzer’s regime not only gave national representation to those who benefitted from the hydrocarbon 
boom, but also to growing commercial agricultural interests in the Santa Cruz region (see 6.2.1.). When 
in 1977, the economic boom came to a close, the economic situation became more severe (Dunkerley 
and Morales, 1986, pp.96-97) and oppositional groups gained strength. At the same time, under US-
President Carter (1977-81), the international pressure on the Banzer regime rose, as it was perceived 
a dictatorship (Mesa Gisbert, 2003c, p.710). In 1978, Banzer resigned under threat of a coup. 
Towards a new political modality: Political creativity and economic upheavals 
In the next four years, Bolivia experienced nine presidents, with seven of them heading a de facto 
government and the average duration of 5 ½ months per presidency, indicates extremely high political 
                                                          
83 For a comprehensive description of events, which were, among others, marked by conflicts between different groups in 
the military, see Dunkerley (1984, pp.158-200). 
84 See Dunkerley (1984, pp.201-248) for a detailed analysis.  
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instability (Mesa Gisbert, 2003c, p.714). While Mesa Gisbert (2003c) finds this time characterised by 
aimlessness, Klein calls this period 'one of the most politically creative [times]' (Klein, 2003, p.234). 
Mobilisations, involving public employees, workers, especially miners, and to a lesser extent, students 
and middle classes increased (Villegas N, 2014, p.19).  
At this time, radical parties such as those associated with the Kataristas, who sought to change the 
overall logic of the state and recuperate self-determination (see 6.2.2.), did not (yet) play significant 
roles on the national scale. Yet, change was underway when the 1978 and 1979 elections showed that, 
for the first time, peasants did not vote as one bloc (Klein, 2003, p.234), which forecasted the end of 
the pact between government and peasants (Dunkerley and Morales, 1986, p.94). In the following, a 
relatively even balance between conservative and leftist forces found in different parties emerged and 
this more complex party system dominated Bolivia until the 2000s (Klein, 2003, p.235). 
These political upheavals occurred in an economically turbulent environment in the context of the 
declining world market. It was marked by severely declining production and in this context, the 
coca(ine) business85, which has a quick economic return, rapidly expanded and some traffickers were 
powerful (Dunkerley, 1984, pp.322-325). At the same time, large public debt was accumulated by 
public enterprises, also due to severe misspending (Mesa Gisbert, 2003c, pp.753-737). 
In 1982, Siles Zuazo (1982-1985) assumed presidency once more. Against a background of severe 
tensions within government, an economically disastrous situation and intensifying social unrest86, he 
called early elections (Dunkerley and Morales, 1986, p.94; Mesa Gisbert, 2003c, pp.737-739; 743-744). 
When he stepped down, hyperinflation was at an unprecedented height which, to this day, remains 
unparallelled87, the economy had almost collapsed, state mines and other public enterprises were 
suffering enormous losses (Garcés, 2013, p.26). In addition, an unusually strong El Niño had disastrous 
consequences for agricultural outputs.  
5.9. The early neoliberal (multicultural)88 modality: Stabilisation and pacted 
democracy 
After the1985 election, Paz Estenssoro from the MNR assumed his fourth Presidency, despite having 
won less votes than former President Banzer, who ran on the ticket of Nationalist Democratic Action 
                                                          
85 Under Banzer, the coca(ine) production had increased, in particular in the Chapare region, and with this, traffickers 
emerged as players on the (informal) political stage (Mesa Gisbert, 2003c, pp.728-730; Dunkerley, 1984, pp.310-314). 
86 Popular mobilisation more than tripled compared to the 1971-76 period and more than doubled compared to 1977-1982 
(Villegas N, 2014, p.18). 
87 In 1985, it was 8,767 per cent (Mesa Gisbert, 2003c, p.740). 
88 Only in the early 1990s, multiculturalism was introduced (see 6.2.2.). In this section, the emphasis is on the neoliberal 
nature of this political modality. 
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(AND), which he had founded in 1979 (Mesa Gisbert, 2003c, p.717). The post-electoral negotiations 
were decisive in the arising multi-party system89. 
Starting his presidency in this dramatic way, Paz Estenssoro’s first speech was entitled– 'Bolivia is dying 
away from us' (ibid., p.745, author’s translation). Under US pressure this made clear that national self-
determination was de facto, almost inexistent, his government rapidly implemented drastic reforms 
to battle hyperinflation, considered by then Planning Minister Sánchez de Lozada 'not as the most 
important but as the only task' (Lessmann, 2010, p.99; author's translation). With Supreme Decree No 
21060/198590, arguably 'the most radical shift in planning and policy in the country for over thirty 
years' (Dunkerley and Morales, 1986, p.86), the Bolivian currency was massively devalued, gasoline 
prices were increased, wages frozen and price supports banned. Furthermore, in the 'shock therapy' 
most tin mines were closed, the state mining company COMIBOL was dismantled91 and the Bolivian 
economy was re-opened to foreign investors. After the 1952 revolution, this was another turning point 
in Bolivian history, this time with the market as the new patron (Interview 8).  
While the economic situation stabilized, the socio-economic outcomes of the shock reform were 
dramatic (Dunkerley, 2007, p.106). Around 20,000 miners became unemployed, which weakened the 
previously powerful workers’ movement. While the government enacted a (small) programme to give 
work to the former miners, they also temporarily sent dozens of labour leaders to detention centres 
in the Bolivian tropic to avoid a general strike or similar. This 'relocation' was no more than 
demobilisation of the mining sector (Interview 8) and the popular movements became indeed 
increasingly disarticulated92 (Romero Bonifaz, 2005, p.39). 
Consequently, private mining co-operatives started to develop and some former miners migrated to 
the valleys and became (coca) farmers, among them, the current President Morales (Padilla, 2014, 
p.131). From there, new resistance emerged, initially mostly directed against US-supported 'War on 
Drugs'93and broadening over the following years, emphasising the importance of recovering self-
determination of the Bolivian pueblos, whose destiny would be largely in the hands of the US and the 
linked domestic elite that did not represent the pueblos’ interests (see also 6.3.1.). 
It seemed that the national political parties, once again made a pact to distribute power among 
themselves and gained an almost monopoly status in political decision-making and management 
                                                          
89 If no candidate receives more than half of the votes in the first round, the congress elects the president by majority among 
the two candidates who received most votes. 
90 For a summary, see Mesa Gisbert (2003c, pp.745-747).  
91 Paz Estenssoro himself had helped set up COMIBOL after the 1952 Revolution.  
92 The number of social conflicts declined severely from around 500 per year between 1983 and 1988 to an annual average 
of 200 in the 1989-1994 period (Villegas N, 2014, p.18). 
93 See, for example, Léons and Sanabria (1997) for an in-depth analysis on Coca-Cocaine in Bolivia until the mid-1990s. 
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(Mesa Gisbert, 2003c, p.747). Despite having Marxist antecedents and having played a key role in the 
'state of 52', Paz Zamora’s government (1989-1993) was characterized by pragmatism and 
moderation, continuing the neoliberal reform agenda, and having close ties with the US (ibid., pp.754-
756). Yet, under his government, it became evident that the achieved stabilisation of the economy 
neither triggered growth nor did it lead to the demanded redistribution.  
5.10. Summing-up 
In this chapter, I revised the transformation of the Bolivian state with the help of the form-analysis 
suggested in the previous chapter. Following this, the emergence of the state was driven by struggles 
and since then it has evolved mediating internal struggles and external pressures. The state form has 
never been stable and reorganisation occurred in reaction to a changing world market conditions or 
other external pressures, domestic demands and/or internal tensions, which the previous modality 
could not contain. Each political modality offered a temporary solution, which has triggered new 
challenges, while state managers tend to attempt to facilitate in different ways most profitable 
accumulation. Overall, this has over time meant a deepening of enforcement of rules of money and 
law for indigenous people – yet, such inclusion has increasingly curtailed peoples’ self-determination. 
In colonial and caudillo modalities, the rather feudalist social relations and indigenous self-
determination were largely accepted as long as it did not stand in the way of profitable accumulation. 
Yet, at moments of tight resources, the space for self-determination was severely reduced, but not 
annihilated. While not recognised as citizens, the indigenous were officially Bolivians and hence bearer 
of obligation, subordinated to the rule of law. While these laws appeared universal, in their 
enforcement, the state form did not appear as neutral arbiter, since political and economic 
domination largely overlapped during this time. 
Change occurred with the exclusive liberal modality, which was needed for more profitable 
accumulation in a more globally managed capitalism. In this, the state appeared more like a political 
state separated from the economic sphere. While exclusion from citizenship remained intact, quests 
for inclusion and struggles for recuperating their lands – needed for self-determination – strengthened 
and also resistance continued, at times in alliance with others. With this, the demands turned 
increasingly contradictory.  
With the rise of the Chaco generation, finding expression in a wide array of partly radical movements, 
reorganisation became necessary, as the exclusive liberal modality was incapable of incorporating 
these pressures. In the following military socialist modality, some changes associated with the 1952 
revolution were foreshadowed. Yet, it was marked by severe internal tensions and faced with 
resistance from the tin oligarchs, who were particularly powerful during World War II.  
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In the aftermath of World War II, which weakened the tin barons, the pressures for inclusion in the 
Chaco generation grew further and this facilitated the rise of the nationalist inclusive modality that 
accommodated these struggles. While being recognised as citizens, able to participate in election, 
indigenous people were incorporated into the state as peasants and with this subsumed to the 
dominant, imagined nation of Bolivians. Hence, the diversity of cosmologies and ways of life were not 
reflected in the state. With land reform, submission to the rules of money and law of private property 
deepened while self-determination was curtailed. 
Yet, the state of 1952 was economically unsustainable and the plan for building an industrial economy 
failed. To sustain growth, the state managers changed their approach and entered a debtor 
relationship with the US, which can be seen as limiting the pueblos’ self-determination. In this context, 
tensions in government and people’s resistance grew stronger and the military modality emerged, 
which was temporarily capable of mediating the different pressures, mostly by using force against 
internal opponents. In favourable world market conditions, economic growth could be recovered in 
the short-term. Yet, in the medium-term, the boom came to a close and the opposition – also from 
indigenous peoples – grew stronger and internationally, dictatorships became undesirable, leading to 
pressures for a democratic option.  
After years of dramatic economic and political upheaval and intense social mobilisation, state 
managers enacted – under the pressure of the US – the first wave of neoliberal reforms, which helped 
to recover macro-economic stability. Yet, redistribution did not take place, leading to social 
disturbances, while movements became increasingly disarticulated also because representation in 
and to the state was severely limited despite formal democratisation. The arising tensions would later 
facilitate the emergence of the pluri-national state, at which I look in more depth in the next chapter.  
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Chapter 6: Struggles for autonomy and the emergence of the Pluri-
national State 
6.1. Introduction 
Having analysed the development of the Bolivian state form through different political modalities, this 
chapter looks in more depth at how the pluri-national state came into being. As explained in 4.4.2., 
struggles for self-determination/autonomy will serve as an entry point, since it is a site of conjuncture 
of different struggles and it is precisely autonomy that lies at the heart of the pluri-national state idea. 
As it has already become apparent in the previous chapter, historically, (more) self-determination has 
not solely been a quest for indigenous peoples, but also for other sectors of Bolivian society, 
particularly new elites far from the centre or as quests for self-determination of the Bolivian pueblo. 
In this chapter, it will become even clearer ˈin Bolivia, there is much confusion about the term 
autonomyˈ94 (Interview 62).  
In the following, I explore how struggles for autonomy evolved since the mid-20th century and how 
they were mediated by, and integrated into, previous political modalities and appeared in the 2009 
Constitution. In this, I largely follow a chronological order. Yet, to organise such a multi-faceted 
matter, I begin with subsections on roots and the evolution of departmental and regional demands, 
followed by indigenous groups’ struggles. In the final part, on the 2005-2009 period, I analyse these 
different strands in a more integrated way and also bring in demands for self-determination of the 
pueblo.  
6.2. Roots and evolution of the struggles for self-determination/autonomy since the 
1950s 
6.2.1. Struggles for departmental and regional decentralisation and autonomy 
Non-indigenous people’s struggles for state-recognised autonomy have been mostly associated with 
the Santa Cruz and Tarija departments. In both places, despite different historical antecedents, the 
demand for what is now known as autonomy largely served to counter the perceived (increasing) 
centralisation of power in La Paz (Interviews 21,36,69).  
Santa Cruz, agribusiness and hydrocarbon business 
As shown in the previous chapter, key events and developments related to the Bolivian state form 
were centred in the highlands and valleys until the early 20th century, which triggered some resistance 
from elsewhere (see 5.5.). In a 1904 memorandum, members of the cruceño elite demanded the 
                                                          
94 Yacuiba, 03.03.2016. 
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integration of the lowlands into the Bolivian state95 (Interviews 20,24,30,35), which did not result in 
action. The Petroleum Law (1921) established the state’s participation in hydrocarbon exploration and 
exploitation with a minimum of eleven per cent of the gross product (Art. 5), but it remained 
unregulated, how these revenues would be distributed. In 1938, cruceño President Busch (see 5.6.) 
enacted a law, which assigned eleven96percent of the value of petrol extracted from their territory to 
the departments which could be used to invest in the regional development (Interview 15). This meant 
an integration into the state without being dependent on the decisions made at the centre (GAD Santa 
Cruz, n.d.-d). Yet, in the following years, an actual transfer of revenues did not occur.  
The 1942 Plan Bohan, sometimes called the Bolivian Marshall Plan, elaborated by a US mission to 
Bolivia, prescribed the diversification of the Bolivian economy (Mesa Gisbert, 2003c, pp.664-665). In 
this, the Eastern lowlands were to be the economic engine of Bolivia (Interviews 15,30). Seeking to 
counteract the vulnerable economy dependent on minerals, mainly tin, suggested measures including 
the stimulation of agriculture and livestock farming as well as the hydrocarbon industry and 
infrastructure development (Mesa Gisbert, 2003b, pp.603-604). The ˈ March to the Eastˈ was supposed 
to properly take off, when in the 1950s, the road from Cochabamba to Santa Cruz was finished and 
Santa Cruz was connected with the highlands via rail (Lessmann, 2010, p.89). 
Yet, this ˈMarchˈ was partly interrupted by the 1952 Nationalist Revolution (see 5.6. and 5.7.), during 
which the demands from Santa Cruz for the transfer of the above-mentioned eleven percent 
intensified. In this, the Committee for Santa Cruz, founded in 1951, played a key role in bringing people 
together and organising the struggle (GAD Santa Cruz, n.d.-d). For cruceños, they were not just fighting 
for themselves, but for all departments (Interviews 18,24,27,29,30,33,35) – yet, at this point, Santa 
Cruz would have benefitted more than others. In 1958, the eleven percent was enacted through a 
decree (GAD Santa Cruz, n.d.-d, Interview 30). Some years later, under President Banzer (1971-1978) 
(see 5.8.), who strongly identified with the lowlands, regional development corporations (CORDES) 
were established in all departments and their major source of income was the hydrocarbon royalties, 
especially benefitting Santa Cruz (Céspedes Cossio, 2005, pp.144-146). The CORDES became crucial in 
executing local and regional public investments in basic services, rural and urban development, and 
the construction of roads, yet, far less in education and health. While these lacked competences, 
power and often resources, it was de facto a mechanism of administrative de-concentration (Böhrt 
Irahola, 2015, p.17).  
                                                          
95 This was in reaction to the 1904 Treaty with Chile, which ended the Pacific War and obliged Chile to compensate Bolivia 
financially and build a railway from Oruro to Antofagasta, facilitating exports.  
96 100 per cent shared by the nine departments means eleven per cent for each. 
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As briefly mentioned in 5.8., under Banzer, Bolivia turned into a key hydrocarbon exporter in the 
region: In 1970, Bolivia produced 30,550 million cubic feet of natural gas per day, five years later, it 
was 140,160 million cubic feet; in the same period the barrels of petroleum produced per year rose 
from 3.5 to 8.8 million (Mesa Gisbert, 2003a, p.860). In addition, the agrarian reform, key pillar of the 
1952 revolution, had been implemented unevenly and, in the lowlands, huge areas were titled for 
individuals or families, which facilitated high growth rates in the agricultural sector (Romero Bonifaz, 
2005, p.113). At the same time, the city of Santa Cruz expanded rapidly97. In this scenario, an 
increasingly powerful non-industrial bourgeois group formed in the lowlands. Contemporary cruceño 
authorities emphasised their own and their ancestors’ entrepreneurial spirit, highlighting that 
cruceños have always been creators of their own destinies– rather than asking for help from the state, 
they look for alternatives themselves (Interviews 20,24,30,33,35). According to a cruceño authority, 
ˈ[w]e are not statists as they are in La Paz and Cochabamba or others placesˈ98 (Interview 15). 
With democratisation, debates over possible models of state organisations intensified, while it 
became evident that at this time, the 1967 Constitution enacted by Barrientos99 was only partly 
translated into formal state organisation. Justified with a concern for stability and order the electoral 
laws from 1983, 1985 and 1991 did not – unlike the constitution – establish the direct election of 
mayors (Choque Aldana, 2014, p.192). This caused frustration among those who had hoped for a 
deepening of democracy beyond the central level. At the same time, it soon became apparent that 
the neoliberal ˈshock therapyˈ had brought macro-economic stability, but neither economic 
development nor redistribution (Interviews 27,32). The lowland elite emphasised that they had 
contributed a large share of the state budget in recent years100, while not having received many 
resources from the central state (Interviews 18,24,29,30,33). 
In this context, some academics and/or politicians, such as the cruceño Molina, demanded a 
municipalisation (Molina Saucedo, 2015), while others like the cruceño Urenda, argued for a 
strengthening at the departmental level (Urenda Díaz, 2007). A shared concern in these proposals was 
that the state should become more flexible and move closer to the population. By this, the state could 
respond better to local/regional needs and facilitate development. For this, both competences and 
resources would be necessary. 
                                                          
97 In 1950, Santa Cruz had 42,746 inhabitants, 254,682 people lived in the city in 1976 and in 1992, and it had 697,278 
inhabitants (Mesa Gisbert, 2003a, p.848). 
98 Santa Cruz, 29.01.2016. 
99 The 1967 Constitution, which Barrientos promulgated without Congress’ approval, did not alter the changes from 1961 
but remained de facto out of force until the return to democracy. 
100 In 1988-1990, 28 per cent of the total value production in Bolivia took place in Santa Cruz (Machicado, 2012, p.34). 
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Under President Paz Zamora (1989-1993), a law on a decentralisation at the departmental level had 
already passed Congress, but the incoming President Sánchez de Lozada, never enacted it (Böhrt 
Irahola, 2015, p.17; Interview 70). Instead, he signed the Law of Popular Participation 1551/1994101, 
which meant the municipalisation of Bolivia that included the transfer of 20 per cent of state budget 
to the municipalities, called co-participation (Mesa Gisbert, 2003c, p.770). 
A year later, the Law of Administrative Decentralisation 1654/1995 was enacted, which brought a de 
facto de-concentration, or a ˈtechnical-administrative decentralisationˈ (Interview 12) to the 
departmental level. Officially seeking to facilitate an integral decentralisation to municipal and 
departmental levels, prefectures102 and departmental councils103 were established with the task of 
managing and executing the budget from the regalías (Mesa Gisbert, 2003c, pp.770-771). Yet, this law 
can also be interpreted as considering the departmental level as an extended arm of the central 
government, coordinating the interaction between the central state level and the municipalities 
(Interview 27). Competences and transfers were severely limited and prefects were appointed by the 
president. A common interpretation is that Sánchez de Lozada had feared a loss of power to 
increasingly powerful regional elites.  
For those who had advocated strengthened departments, this was a major disappointment 
(Interviews 29,30,31,35,40,51,52,54,75,103) – ˈThis law was bad, it was concentrating [power] and 
not decentralisingˈ104 (Interview 15). Urenda himself calls it ˈeyewashˈ (Urenda Díaz, 2007, p.163, 
author's translation). Nevertheless, even though the conditions for formulating public policies and 
effective management were not given at the departmental level (Céspedes Cossio, 2005, p.158), this 
reform was a key step in the construction of the future departmental governments (Böhrt Irahola, 
2015, p.17).  
A side effect of Law 1654 was that the term ˈdecentralisationˈ was thereafter associated with this 
experience due to its name. Against this background, in the aftermath of the reform, autonomy turned 
more and more into a buzzword (Interview 40). Yet, it was not a new demand, the cruceño Urenda - 
inspired by the Spanish model that he had studied closely105 - had started proposing a state model 
with autonomies for Bolivia in the 1980s (Interviews 26,30). He envisioned the autonomies as a 
transitory stage towards a federalisation, which he perceived as the most appropriate state 
organisation for a diverse place like Bolivia (Interviews 27,30). While autonomy and decentralisation 
                                                          
101 See Faguet (2012) for an in-depth study. 
102 The CORDES were subsumed into these, since these were heavily contested and often associated with mismanagement. 
103 These included representatives from all provinces and the departmental capital and was presided by the prefect. 
104 Santa Cruz, 29.01.2016. 
105 Already his thesis of licenciatura was on the Spanish autonomies (Interview 26). 
114 
 
are conceptually different106, for those involved in the struggles, autonomy would be largely the same 
as a ˈrealˈ, ˈfully-fledgedˈ (that is, political, administrative and fiscal) or an ˈimprovedˈ decentralisation 
(Interviews 15,24,30,35) and Spain is an often-mentioned model (Interviews 26,33,37,40). As the aim 
was demanding the election of authorities as well as more competences and resources from the 
central state, it was often considered less important how this demand would be labelled (Interview 
24). 
The notion of autonomy gained particular prominence with the publication of the 2001 memorandum 
of the ˈNación Cambaˈ107 Autonomist Movement (López Mercado, 2014, p.122). It was argued that it 
was necessary to create the Autonomous Region in Santa Cruz, in which all resources are owned by 
the Camba Nation (Nación Camba, 2001a, b). The Bolivian state must recognise the self-determination 
of the pueblos (ibid.). The Camba Nation movement would later turn into the more radical Camba 
Nation Liberation Movement, promoting the creation of a new state (Nación Camba, n.d.; Ballvé, n.d.). 
This happened parallel to radicalising demands in Quispe´s Aymara nation, for example (López 
Mercado, 2014, p.122). 
Initially, the Committee for Santa Cruz, which played a crucial role in the growing demand for a deeper 
decentralisation did not respond to the 2001 memorandum. Those associated closely with the 
Committee made the Camba Nation, which they perceived as a little radical group, responsible for 
being accused of separatism (Interview 15). For them, as history has shown, they had always wanted 
to be integrated as Bolivians and not form a different state (Interview 30). 
Tarija and the hydrocarbon reserves 
Tarija, the smallest Bolivian department, is considered the other pioneer in the struggle for 
departmental autonomy. At Bolivia’s foundation, Tarija had been part of Argentina and joined Bolivia 
in 1826, after the majority of tarijeños had supported this (La Razón, 2013). In the more recent struggle 
for autonomy, it has been argued that due to this historical background, the tarijeños could also decide 
not to be part of Bolivia and – more important – under which conditions they are part of it (Interview 
43). 
Even though more Bolivian presidents were born in Tarija than in any other department, there is a 
sense among tarijeños that governments ignored their department. Instead, they focused on La Paz, 
                                                          
106 In general terms, while an autonomous entity in state organisation remains solely subordinated to the judicial power of 
the national level and is apart from this, as the name says, autonomous from the central government, decentralisation 
involved the transfer of certain functions or attributes (political, administrative, fiscal or economic nature) to the subnational 
level. 
107 Bolivians distinguish between camba, originally meaning ˈthe one who works his landˈ and referring to person from the 
lowlands, and colla (from Collasuya), a descriptor for highland people. Yet, they are not neutral terms but ˈtwo racialized, 




Cochabamba and Santa Cruz and by indulging these three departments, currently inhabited by around 
two thirds of the population, elections were easily won (Interviews 37,54,56). This lack of attention 
towards Tarija is seen as particularly unjust given Tarija’s key role in the hydrocarbon industry 
(Interview 56): In 1924 and 1926, the first two fields of petroleum production were discovered in 
Tarija, following which, the General Management of the Standard Oil Company of Bolivia was 
established to manage operations and logistics in the sector (Torres Orías, 2012).  
As in Santa Cruz, local actors several times sought – often unsuccessfully – attention from the centre, 
which helped create the ˈautonomist spiritˈ (Interviews 37,38,40,54,56). For example, following the 
enactment of the above-mentioned Petroleum Law, tarijeño Congress members demanded that the 
rent from resource extraction should go to the producing department (Böhrt Irahola, 2015, p.15).  
In the context of the second wave of neoliberal reforms in the 1990s, the department and the conflicts 
associated with it, gained national importance (Interviews 43,54). Following the Capitalisation Law 
1544/1994, through which the state-owned hydrocarbon company YPFB was 'capitalized/ 
privatised'108, large hydrocarbon reserves were discovered. While in 1996, 4.24 trillion cubic feet of 
proven and probable gas and petroleum reserves, this number rose to 52.30 trillion cubic feet in 2002 
(Mesa Gisbert, 2003a, p.861). In 2002, 87.3 per cent of these reserves were located in Tarija, followed 
by Santa Cruz with 9.3 per cent (ibid.) and the three mega fields in Tarija alone account for a third of 
the total of Bolivian exports (Gandarillas Gonzales, 2014, p.119). Against this backdrop, the control 
over the eleven percent became a crucial question, which also intensified the long-standing internal 
friction inside the Tarija department between the highland/valley and lowland population109 
(Interviews 54,55,70). 
With the growing importance of hydrocarbons, Tarija’s Gran Chaco Province gained political weight, 
where [at least] two out of the three mega fields are located110. In the Chaco tarijeño, people – and 
especially authorities – speak of long-term neglect from La Paz and Tarija capital, it is ˈa forgotten 
Chacoˈ (Interview 71)111. In the 1983 Quebracho Pact among the Civic Committees from the 
hydrocarbon-rich Chacos of Tarija, Chuquisaca and Santa Cruz local actors expressed their desire to 
form a 10th department (Interview 55). This was not supported from the departmental capitals and 
                                                          
108 Capitalization meant that private companies could buy half of the shares of the state-owned enterprise. The remaining 
50 per cent went to a new institution that administered the received funds in the name of Bolivian citizens. For this, YPFB 
was split into two units, which engaged in exploration and production activities and another one for the pipeline 
transportation. Two YPFB owned refineries and pipelines were completely privatised.  
109 People in Tarija distinguish the chapaco from the valleys and highlands of the department, and the chaqueño, from the 
lowlands (Lizárrago Araníbar and Vacaflores Rivero, 2007, pp.29-31). Shaped by their different historical experiences, they 
are said to have different life styles and so on (Interview 43). 
110 There is a dispute over whether one is partly located in the O’Connor Province. 
111 For example, until today, no asphalted road connects the Chaco and Tarija capital while there is one connecting the Chaco 
and the more distant Santa Cruz capital. 
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the divisions between departmental elites and regional Chaco elites widened in the following years. 
Authorities in the capital of the department considered it a struggle for separation (Interview 52), led 
by the local elite (Interview 69). Authorities in the Chaco, however, see it as a demand from the pueblo 
(Interview 49), which has to do with the centralism at the departmental level (Interviews 61,71). At 
the same time, people had more in common with the other Chacos than with the rest of Tarija 
(Interviews 55,71, see footnote 109). 
In the early 21st century, 45 per cent112 of the departmental hydrocarbon regalías generated in the 
province, were assigned to the Gran Chaco (Lea Plaza Peláez, 2013, p.165), which signalled a response 
to a longstanding demand, first voiced in the 1983 mobilisations (El País Online, 2013). With the 
departmental resolutions113, these resources were required to be transferred to the sub-prefecture in 
the provincial capital, Yacuiba, and corregimientos mayors in the other municipalities, Villamontes and 
Caraparí. In this context, the Gran Chaco authorities, after fierce negotiations, agreed that each 
municipality received 15 per cent despite large population differences (Interviews 54,56). This whole 
development was highly contested in the Tarija capital. In 8.4., I will return to these points. 
Intensification of struggles and rise of a joint opposition in the early 2000s 
With the outbreak of social protests in 2000-2003 and particularly after the 2002 national election, 
the demands for departmental and regional autonomy became louder (Interview 86). In these 
elections, the MAS-IPSP won a majority in four highland departments and its presidential candidate 
Morales came second with a margin of less than two percent (Mesa Gisbert, 2003c, pp.789-790). As I 
will explain more in 6.3.1., the MAS-IPSP had campaigned for the recuperation of sovereignty for the 
pueblo, for which major economic and political transformations would be needed. The election had 
made clear that the pact of the established parties in which local elites were somewhat represented, 
and the neoliberal agenda, from which they had benefitted, were at risk. In this, the election of 
prefects was seen as more pressing than ever (Interview 9): If power were to be lost at the national 
level, the prefectures could still be controlled (Interviews 37,99). In addition, particularly after the 
2003 Gas War (see Dangl, 2007), the economic effects of the 'crisis' became apparent, which increased 
the concerns of those who wanted to benefit from the liberalised economy.  
Demands for the recuperation of hydrocarbons gained force in the highlands, but was not in the 
interest of powerful economic players, whose interests could be defended in the name of a more 
business-oriented and/or liberal-minded cruceño and tarijeño. The rising tensions also fed into the 
                                                          
112 The Chaco Province makes up 45 per cent of the territory of Tarija (Interview 44). 
113 The resolution 034/2001 of the Departmental Council recognises the right to the 45 per cent. Resolution 132/2002 obliges 
the prefecture to transfer 15 per cent to the three municipalities each. 
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radicalisation of some groups alongside an increase in violence114. After Sánchez de Lozada resigned 
due to the 2003 Gas War, interim President Mesa Gisbert was faced with an increasingly difficult 
situation (see Webber, 2010b). In Santa Cruz and Tarija, the demands for autonomy gained in 
popularity. A significant moment was the first cabildo, convened by the Committee for Santa Cruz in 
June 2004. Its President Costas115presented eleven tasks of the Santa Cruz department for Bolivia, 
among them, an autonomy referendum (GAD Santa Cruz, n.d.-a).  
Since formal democratisation, the economic elites’ influence on the government had been upheld 
with positions in, or close ties to, the central government116. Yet, this was at risk given the shifting 
political tide and so, business became more actively engaged. For a cruceño social scientist, ˈthe 
Committee for Santa Cruz became an instrument used by the cruceño elite to construct their 
autonomy discourseˈ117 (Interview 18). Among the Committee’s supporters were business 
organisations like the Agricultural Chamber of the East (CAO), a powerful player in the 1990s and early 
2000s which was crucial in preventing the central government enacting the 1996 INRA land reform 
(see 6.2.2.) (Colque, 2014, pp.180-181). An important ally of the above-mentioned more radical semi-
separatist Camba Nation, was the powerful Santa Cruz Chamber of Industry, Commerce, Services and 
Tourism (CAINCO), which sought increasing economic liberalisation. CAINCO represents around 1,500 
companies active in the Santa Cruz department, among them, international hydrocarbon companies, 
which also provided it with generous funding (Ballvé, n.d.). 
Shortly after the 2004 sub-national elections, in which the MAS-IPSP became the most powerful 
political force at the local level (Georgetown University, 2017), the ˈCabildo of Autonomy and Workˈ 
was organised by the Civic Committee, Departmental Workers Central, the local university and the 
neighbourhood councils (Antelo Vaca, 2015. pp.32-33). This collaboration was perceived crucial for 
legitimising the demand for autonomy against the MAS-IPSP’s accusation that it was a local separatist 
elite, by showing that it was a popular movement with a national vision respecting different identities 
(Céspedes Cossio, 2005, p.164-165). According to cruceño figures, over 350,000 people attended 
(Interview 35; GAD Santa Cruz, n.d.-b; Céspedes Cossio, 2005, p.164). With this cabildo, a 'Provisional 
Autonomous Assembly' and a 'Pre-autonomy Council' were established to advance constitutional 
                                                          
114 In the time of the Gas War, for example, members of the Camba Nation Youth Brigade and others brutally repelled a 
march of indigenous protesters from entering the Santa Cruz (Ballvé, n.d.). 
115 Before assuming presidency of the Civic Committee, Costas led the Confederation of Bolivian Breeders, the Association 
of Milk Producers and the CAO. 
116 At least in the past 20 years, the presidents of the committee originated from business associations, private business and 
political parties and many of them later served as prefects or in congress (Interviews 15,35). 
117 Santa Cruz, 01.02.2016. 
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reform (GAD Santa Cruz, n.d.-b). The council was also expected to develop an autonomy statute, which 
could serve as a model for other departments (ibid.). 
On the day of the cabildo, Mesa Gisbert signed Supreme Decree 27988/2005, which established the 
popular vote of the prefects or, to be precise, the election for the selection of prefects. While this was 
officially presented as a matter of deepening democracy (Interviews 24,45), it did not pacify the 
situation. Instead, it gave further impetus to those who wanted departmental autonomy, since it was 
clear that resources and legislative powers were needed to become properly autonomous (Interview 
70). At the same time, the demand for the hydrocarbon law, which was aimed at restoring Bolivian 
resources so that all could benefit, alongside an apparent government paralysis, led to intensifying 
protests in the highlands.  
In addition, the demands from the Gran Chaco also became louder. A proposal for a law from the Gran 
Chaco province, was sent to Congress and was enacted as Law 3038/2005 without major changes (El 
País Online, 2013). While the earlier departmental resolutions had assigned the Gran Chaco 45 per 
cent of what was produced in the province, this law assigned 45 per cent of Tarija’s hydrocarbon 
regalías to the province (Art. 5). A key local actor explained that this was just since the Gran Chaco 
province was Bolivia’s principal hydrocarbon producing region (La Razón, 2009). Yet, this measure was 
not welcomed by those wanting departmental autonomy in Tarija. 
Shortly afterwards, the Hydrocarbon Law 3058/2005 was passed118. While this clearly responded to 
the strong demands from the highlands, it was also an attempt to placate the lowland movements 
(Interview 12). This law made the state the legal owner of hydrocarbons (Art. 5) and gave the 
government control over resource commercialisation. With the creation of the Direct Tax on 
Hydrocarbons (IDH), taxes were increased from 18 to 32 percent. The existing contracts with foreign 
companies were to be renegotiated (Art. 5), which resulted in none of the companies leaving the 
country (Interview 3) (for a critical analysis, see Kaup (2010)). 
As the law did not go far enough for those who demanded full nationalisation, protests continued and 
those demanding departmental autonomy rejected nationalisation altogether. They were also 
concerned about the economic consequences of the measure - for example, the net foreign direct 
investment had already dropped in previous years and turned negative in 2005 (Fundación Milenio, 
2013, p.2).  
                                                          
118 After it had passed Congress, President Mesa Gisbert refuse to sign it, but did not veto against it. The president of the 
Senate signed the law.  
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Seeking to ease the crisis, Mesa Gisbert shortly afterwards announced two more measures, 
responding to demands from mobilised masses and powerful opponents and seeking to offer a way 
towards a resolution of the crisis during which the state did less and less to facilitate the most 
profitable accumulation. With Supreme Decree 28195/2005, he called for an election of a constituent 
assembly as well as a binding autonomy referendum, scheduled for October 2005. Four days later, 
faced with continued protests, Mesa Gisbert offered his resignation. Over the next few months, 
interim President Rodríguez, former head of the Bolivian judiciary119 prepared the next elections. 
6.2.2. Indigenous struggles for self-determination/autonomy and the pluri-national idea 
As demonstrated in the previous chapter, the experiences of the diverse people in the highlands, 
valleys and lowlands were in many regards very distinct. These differences have also shaped their 
struggle for self-determination/autonomy and relation with the state in more recent years.  
Struggles for indigenous self-determination in the lowlands 
The quest for peoples’ self-determination in recent decades is perceived as originating from the 
minority pueblos in the lowlands (Interviews 5, 13, 36, 80, 84, 86, 91). As shown in 6.2.1., the post- 
1940s were marked by the unprecedented growth of agricultural and hydrocarbon sectors. Previously 
untouched terrain was opened up for agricultural use, hydrocarbon extraction and the required 
infrastructure, which threatened the livelihoods of those inhabiting the Amazon and Chaco regions.  
While especially larger lowland groups had previously made contact, the 1982 foundation of the 
Confederation of Indigenous Peoples of the Bolivian East (CIDOB) institutionalised those linkages in a 
parent body120 (Flores Gonzales, 2014, p.171). This process was not purely organic and external 
actors121facilitated the growing network, at least financially122. Since the beginning, territorial rights, 
which were necessary for self-determination, were a key point on CIDOB’s agenda. As this overlapped 
with the Western environmental movement’s concern with the rainforest, some Western 
organisations offered support for projects that contributed to, yet, sometimes also fragmented, the 
struggles (Interview 4). 
                                                          
119 The presidents of both congress chambers were heavily disliked by the highland protesters and the head of the Bolivian 
judiciary was next in the line of succession.  
120 It was co-founded by representatives of Guaraní-Isoseño, Chiquitano, Ayoreo and Guarayo peoples. 
121 In the 1960s and 1970s, some researchers, especially anthropologists, from the West started working with lowland 
peoples, sometimes leading to the foundation of NGOs or other initiatives.  
122 The interviewees closer associated with the indigenous movement claim that the process was driven by the indigenous, 
who strategically used external actors for financial resources, while those unsuccessfully tried to impose their agenda 
(Interviews 112,115). When talking to (former) external actors, they highlight their importance in the process, going far 
beyond financial support, while a case to case variation is admitted (Interview 4). Another observer recalled that external 
influences made CIDOB adopt what she called civilising agenda that forced communities to move from traditional to liberal 
democratic elections and decision-making if they wanted to have a say in the organisation (Interview 39).  
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As for other sectors of society, also for the lowland peoples, Bolivia’s return to democracy meant hope 
for change. CIDOB with 100,000 signatures proposed – unsuccessfully – an indigenous law that 
recognised territory, collective rights and self-government (Del Pilar Valencia and Egido, 2010, p.22). 
With the 1990 ˈMarch for Territory and Dignityˈ from Mojeño (Trinidad) to La Paz, CIDOB 
demonstrated that it had become capable of confronting Bolivian state and society with indigenous 
demands (Vargas Delgado and Álvarez Paniagua, 2014, p.25). The marchers demanded state 
protection against landowners and hydrocarbon explorers, and their recognition as ˈindigenous 
subjectˈ with rights and obligations (Interview 8). 
In response to the march, President Paz Zamora (1989-1993) granted the first 'Original Peoples’ Lands' 
(TCO) through Supreme Decrees123. While at first sight this appeared like a great achievement, the 
TCO concept also caused disappointment among protesters, since it referred to land and not to 
territory (Interview 7). While both concepts refer to a physical space, land is associated with the bio-
productive system that can be seen as a mercantile object and territory means the concrete 
occupation of the space conveyed through social and cultural structures (Valenzuela, 2009, pp.9-10). 
In other words, land is a far narrower and less political concept than territory (Interviews 7,82). In the 
translation of demand for territory into the TCO concept, something remained untranslated. 
The government also proposed an indigenous law, which was rejected by the organisations as 
insufficient (Lessmann, 2010, p.120). Hope sparked again when Paz Zamora signed the ILO Convention 
No 169 in 1991124 as the first Latin American head of state. Shortly afterwards, CIDOB presented – 
again unsuccessfully – another proposal for an indigenous law (Interview 15). Its dissemination ˈ served 
to systematise the strategic demands from the indigenous peopleˈ125 (Interview 21) and the proposal, 
speaking of indigenous territorial management, concretised the idea of indigenous autonomy in the 
TCO (Salgado, 2010, p.212).  
Struggles for reconstitution of ancestral territories in the highlands and the pluri-national idea 
The mothers and fathers of the pluri-national state appeared on the stage with the indigenista-
katarista movement – often just called Kataristas126, an ethno-centric movement that emerged in the 
1960s and 1970s. It was led by Aymara intellectuals from La Paz and Oruro, who sought to resist the 
assimilation associated with the ˈstate of 1952ˈ (see 5.7.). They found that the peasant category 
                                                          
123 In 1990, two were granted and three more in 1992. In the same period, in the aftermath of the establishment of the 
National System of Protected Areas in 1993, a process of managing protected areas began and some more protected areas 
were recognised (for a list, see Mesa Gisbert (2003a, pp.870-873)). 
124 This convention recognised the collective rights of indigenous peoples. Shortly after the signing, it was translated with 
Law 1257/1991 into Bolivian legislation. 
125 Santa Cruz, 03.02.2016. 
126 For a more detailed analysis of the movement, see, for example, Albó (1992) and Sanjinés (2002). 
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implied relationships within, and among, communities and between people and territory and nature, 
which did not correspond to their original way of life in the ayllu (see 5.2.) (Interview 8). Given the 
large percentage of Aymara and Quechua people in the population, most of the indigenista-kataristas 
were less concerned with seeking state-protection through recognition. Instead, they envisioned a 
hegemonic project that would change the state altogether. Reinaga argues in his 'Tesis India' for a 
transition towards a style of governance inspired by traditional indigenous systems (Reinaga, 1971 
[2006]). Such ideas fed into the 1973 Tiwanaku Manifest, which envisioned alongside cultural, political 
and economic decolonisation, a pluri-national state in and through which autonomy could be 
recovered (Choque Canqui, 2010, p.43). 
Those associated with the movements mostly looked at their situation with ˈtwo eyesˈ (Albó, 1992), 
that is, ethnicity and class, and over time, severe differences emerged about how to make sense of 
the status quo and how to best approach future struggles. The movement split roughly into two 
camps, which represented different understandings of their relationship with the state. First, the 
Indian Túpac Katari Movement (MITKA), focusing on ethnicity and hence also called indigenistas, 
wanted to achieve a higher level of independence from the state, as they thought of the state not only 
as inefficient, but also as oppositional to their interests (Albó, 1987). Therefore, they preferred to 
recover and develop their own institutions. Secondly, the Revolutionary Túpac Katari Movement 
(MRTK) or Kataristas, put more emphasis on class and wanted to deepen their influence within the 
state, with the ultimate goal of controlling it (ibid.). This perception made them more open to forming 
alliances with other groups, in particular the peasants. 
The largest peasant union CSUTCB, founded in the late 1970s used katarismo as its ideological 
principle, which led some of the ideas to appear in national political debates (Schavelzon, 2015, pp.75-
76). Thus, ˈsubversive indiosˈ became ˈallowed indiosˈ (Dunkerley, 2013, p.60). Yet, in this process of 
engaging in the state, those ideas, sometimes carried by opportunism by some Kataristas, were 
modulated so much that they had often little to do with the initial agenda. At the same time, the divide 
between different Katarista strands deepened and the CSUTCB increasingly distanced itself from 
katarismo, which facilitated the rise of the cocalero strand with which Morales is associated (see 
6.3.1.) (Fontana, 2014, p.440). 
While it is beyond the scope of this chapter to recall all alliances, events and similar, I focus on one 
important, concrete initiative, which promoted autonomy and territory and gives insights into how 
such demands were translated by and into the state. In the 1980s,some urban Aymara intellectuals 
including Silvia Rivera, associated with the NGO ˈTaller de Historia Oral Andinaˈ (THOA) started a 
project on reconstituting ayllus within the Bolivian state (Albó, 2009a, pp.54-56). The THOA gave 
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workshops in Aymara-speaking highland communities to restore practices and customs, which were 
perceived in danger after decades of assimilation. Through historical investigation, territorial 
narratives were recovered, supporting the demand for ayllu reconstitution (Stephenson, 2002). 
The vice-president in Sánchez de Lozada’s first government (1993-1997), Cárdenas127, supported the 
ayllu reconstitution. He originated from the MRTK and was the first self-identified indigenous to hold 
such a high political post (Mesa Gisbert, 2003c, pp.762-763). Cárdenas coordinated the formation of 
ayllu federations at the departmental level, which facilitated the foundation of National Council of 
Ayllus and Markas of Qullasuyu (CONAMAQ) in 1997 (Albó, 2009a, p.56). Yet, state organisation or 
internal borders were not altered and so – as in the case of the TCO – something of the original idea 
remained untranslated.  
The 1994 multicultural Constitution and subsequent reforms 
The 1994 Constitution128, adopted with Law 1585/1994, defined Bolivia as multi-ethnical and pluri-
cultural (Art. 1), and was together with some measures from Sánchez de Lozada’s 'Plan for All'129 
initially seen as a major step in the struggles of indigenous peoples. For the lowland peoples, the 
inclusion of the TCO (Art. 171) was key. However, the category remained separate from territorial 
state organisation (Art. 108). Additionally, the ayllu was ignored and the indigenous peoples remained 
unrecognised as a collective subject (Lizárrago Araníbar and Vacaflores Rivero, 2007, p.76). 
The above-mentioned Law of Popular Participation 1551/1994 is often perceived as a government 
strategy to diffuse the struggle of indigenous people (Garcés, 2013, pp.28-29). Their communities and 
organisations were legally recognised at the local level. Yet, since this was tied to imposed borders, 
which did not usually correspond with the peoples’ territories or ayllus, their efforts were redirected 
towards the municipal level. The Municipal Law 2028/1999 later opened the possibility for 'indigenous 
districts' within the municipal border and also 'associations of indigenous districts' were recognised 
with Supreme Decree 26142/2001. The National Dialogue Law 2235/2001 provided the basis for an 
indigenous municipality (Art. 5). Yet, this concept has not been popular130 and, when remembered, it 
is perceived as irrelevant (Interviews 10,23).  
The 1994 Constitution also responded to another key concern of lowland peoples because it rejected 
large estates (Art. 167). For this, a land reform was needed, which was in conflict with another point 
                                                          
127 Following a widely-shared anecdote, his father changed his little son’s family name from Choquehuanca, a typical Aymara 
family name, to Cárdenas, a family name of Spanish origin, to improve his opportunities in life. 
128 For an overview, see Céspedes Cossio (2005, pp.34-35). 
129 Next to the above-mentioned capitalisation and popular participation, the Education Reform Law 1565/1994, was key. It 
allowed for the first time primary education in indigenous languages (Mesa Gisbert, 2003c, pp.771-772). 
130 Jesús de Machaca, Urubichá and the former indigenous district San Antonio de Lomerío are the only cases, all established 
in 2001-02 (Galindo Soza, 2008). 
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on the government’s agenda. In the late 1980s, the government requested support from the 
international community to strengthen the stagnating agricultural sector. While this was a measure 
to revive growth, it overlapped with the interest of sectors of the increasingly influential non-industrial 
lowland elite. Shortly after the president granted the first TCOs and signed ILO Convention No 169, 
the government accepted the 35 million USD World Bank project entitled 'Eastern Lowlands Natural 
Resource Management and Agricultural Production Project'. This concluded successfully, according to 
the completion report, in 1997 (World Bank, 1990, 1998).  
In the meantime, in order to push for agrarian reform, all CIDOB member groups, supported by some 
highland organisations, marched in 1996 for 'Territory, development and political participation of 
indigenous pueblos'. They achieved more TCO titles and shortly afterwards, the long-awaited land 
reform law INRA 1715/1996 was enacted, which concretised aspects of the 1994 Constitution. It 
formalised the TCO concept, ordered a review of all properties and titles for those who proved that 
they had obtained their land legally and used it socially or economically (Colque, 2014, p.180). Within 
ten years, all grand, illegal landholdings were to be recovered by the state and redistributed. Yet, the 
law bureaucratised and slowed titling down (Albó, 2009a, p.53) and in 2007, less than ten per cent of 
the land had been reviewed and the titled land mostly consisted of TCOs (Barragán et al., 2007).  
The reform had been opposed by powerful lowland actors, who benefitted from international prices 
of soybeans and rising investments (Colque, 2014, p.181). Partly as an outcome of the World Bank 
project and indicating the success of the agricultural elite in preventing land reform, the acreage used 
for the cultivation of soybeans, sugarcane and others, massively expanded: in the Santa Cruz 
department, it more than quadrupled between 1990 and 2007 (Urioste, cited by Colque, 2014). 
Simultaneously the hydrocarbon industry underwent change. The different governments pushed for 
the development of the sector which can be seen in the above-mentioned Capitalisation Law 
1544/1994 and in efforts put into the Bolivia-Brazil pipeline, finalised in 1999 (Mesa Gisbert, 2003c, 
pp.765-769). This promoted the interest of the hydrocarbon elite that had formed and gained 
increasingly in power. Taken together, the poor enforcement of land reform and strengthening of the 
hydrocarbon sector, can be seen as facilitating economic growth, required for the state’s material 
survival.  
In this time, the state that had incorporated the different demands appeared Janus-faced. Yet, looking 
more closely, the apparent mismatch was mediated by subordinating indigenous matters or making 
them compatible with concerns of growth and productivity, and the overall functioning and set-up of 
the state was hardly altered. This was opposed to ideas of changing the logic of the state altogether. 
Against this background and in the context of the expansion of agricultural and hydrocarbon sectors 
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that posed a threat to lowland peoples’ livelihoods, indigenous mobilisation continued under Banzer 
(1997-2001). Before the 2002 elections, the CIDOB coordinated a march for 'Popular Sovereignty, 
Territory, and Natural Resources'. This march helped to spread the idea that a constituent assembly 
was needed (AA.VV., 2011, p.35).  
The main highland organisation representing indigenous people, CONAMAQ, became a platform on 
which radical ideas, partly inspired by Katarismo, were expressed. In the 2002 proposal, the 
organisation demanded the redefinition of internal state limits according to the territoriality of the 
ayllus, and the larger entities, markas and suyus (CONAMAQ, 2002). Integration into the existing state 
would hardly go far enough. The term 'autonomy' is used here as free determination in local 
administration and management of territory, including control over natural resources and communal 
justice. However, internally the CONAMAQ was divided into different camps with alternating visions 
of a new state and what and how changes would be possible (Interview 8). 
As it became increasingly clear that the neoliberal multicultural modality was not going to survive 
much longer, since it was incapable of containing the different demands and respond to pressures, 
Bolivian intellectuals developed ideas and proposals on indigenous autonomies too. García Linera not 
only argued against the neoliberal state and the exclusive Republic (García Linera, 2004 [2009], p.271), 
but also rejected 'perhaps more surprisingly, a State model based on indigenous-original national 
autonomy projects such as those being carried out by certain Aymara groups during the years that he 
was writing' (Baker, 2015a, p.289) and which were found in CONAMAQ proposals. He pointed to the 
complexity of achieving an organic integration of the state into a diverse society, highlighting for 
example, the monolingual and –cultural administrative body of the Republic and the state’s privileged 
dominance of the capitalist form over other forms of production (García Linera, 2004 [2009]). This 
made radical proposals such as those by the CONAMAQ unfeasible. García Linera also responded to 
other demands and referred to the formation of departmental autonomies in Spanish-speaking areas 
(ibid., p.332). Other proposals from non-indigenous sectors of society included the territorial 
reorganisation of Bolivia into different regions that would overlap with ancestral borders and would 
respond to demands for ayllu reconstitution, yet, making it less radical and easier for other groups to 
accept (Interview 9).  
6.3. Towards the pluri-national state with autonomies (2005-2009) 
6.3.1. The MAS-IPSP assumes power with a different take on self-determination 
In December 2005, Morales from the MAS-IPSP131 was elected as president. He had emerged from the 
coca-grower union movement of the 1980s in the Chapare region, when unemployed miners, many 
                                                          
131 See Harten (2011) for a comprehensive description of the MAS-IPSP’s rise and development. 
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of them engaged in the CSUTCB, migrated, and became coca-farmers (see 5.9.). In the beginning, their 
resistance was largely focused on the US-supported 'War on Drugs', which directly affected their coca 
production. Quickly, the agenda broadened, directed against US imperialism and aimed at the 
recuperation of sovereignty and the self-determination of the Bolivian pueblos, for which drastic 
change was considered indispensable.  
Since the beginning, the movement was marked by a hierarchical syndicate peasant tradition and not 
by an indigenous mindset (Interviews 5, 21). In the mid-1990s, some of them established the 
'Assembly for the Sovereignty of the Pueblos' and after an internal split, Morales’ supporters founded 
the Political Instrument for the Sovereignty of the Pueblos (IPSP). With the denomination 'Political 
Instrument', they sought to demonstrate their rejection of existing Bolivian parties and wanted to 
present themselves as an alternative. When registration for election proved difficult, IPSP borrowed 
their registration and party name from a Falangist splinter faction, so that they could compete in the 
1999 local election (Harten, 2011). Shortly afterwards, the label MAS-IPSP132 was adopted. Against this 
backdrop, the supposedly socialist leanings of the movement had been called into question – 
opponents claim that they are ˈ pretentious socialists, because their social base [consists of] capitalists, 
they are tradespeopleˈ133 (Interview 20), yet, like ˈreal socialistsˈ, they aspire to achieve a 
centralisation of power (Interview 52). 
Even though self-determination was on the agenda of the MAS-IPSP, this did not mean that they 
reflected the same as the others who demanded self-determination/autonomy. The MAS-IPSP was 
mostly concerned with the self-determination of Bolivia within the international order and control of 
the pueblo over the state. In this, the adopted vision of a stronger, redistributive state – that is also 
visible in the first Government Plan (MAS-IPSP, 2005) and MAS-IPSP’ first National Development Plan 
(PND, 2007) – stands in contrast with desires for peoples’ autonomy and the nationalist-unifying 
underpinning clashes with pluri-nationalism (Interviews 12,22). Also, decentralisation was not on the 
agenda and appeared largely incompatible with it (Interviews 3,54,69,80,91,103).  
When taking power, the MAS-IPSP also won the large majority of deputies (72/130)(Georgetown 
University, 2017). Yet, Morales was confronted by directly elected prefects from the opposition. The 
media luna, a name deriving from the crescent shape of the four lowland departments of Santa Cruz, 
Tarija, Beni and Pando, emerged as the alliance between those four opposition prefectures that joined 
forces under the umbrella of autonomy. Actors in the small and comparatively underdeveloped Beni 
and Pando have long demanded attention from the central state (Interviews 12,29). Being politically 
                                                          
132 This decision provoked internal conflicts and Felipe Quispe, for example, distanced himself. In 2000, he created his own 
party, the Indigenous Pachacuti Movement (MIP) (Mesa Gisbert, 2003c, p.786).  
133 Santa Cruz, 03.02.2016. 
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and economically weaker, demands from the two lowland departments alone have never gained 
national importance. 
Being faced with these opposing prefects, who were increasingly supported by important economic 
players (see 6.2.1.) and attempting to meet the expectations of his supporters, Morales addressed the 
requests for self-determination/autonomy. In his inaugural speech in La Paz, he signalled a willingness 
to find joint solution: 
Autonomy is not an invention of nobody. (…)We want autonomy, autonomy with solidarity, 
autonomy with reciprocity, autonomy where wealth is redistributed, autonomy for the 
indigenous pueblos, for the provinces, for the regions. We search for this and this should 
unite Bolivia (…). (Morales, cited by Página12, 2006, author's translation). 
6.3.2. The Unity Pact 
With the erupting social conflicts of the early 2000s, indigenous peoples’ and peasant organisations 
united in their rejection of neoliberalism, the established political parties and hope for change. In the 
aftermath of the above-mentioned 2002 March, they began working on a proposal for the convocation 
of a constituent assembly and in September 2004, the Unity Pact was founded134. After Morales 
ratified the convocation of the assembly with Law 3364/2006, they started preparing a joint proposal 
for a new constitution (Garcés, 2011, p.49). The coming together of the different organisations in one 
space is considered of great historical value to the pact (Interviews 8,30,93). Three main blocks were 
present and even though the lines between them are not always clear-cut, the main differences are 
as follows: 
 Highland peoples’ organisations like CONAMAQ, whose members saw themselves as indigenous, yet 
preferred the concept originario (original)135. Due to their indigenous majority in Bolivia, they did not 
want to adopt an autonomy model for states with indigenous minorities (Interview 94). Wanting to 
change the state altogether, they advocated the pluri-national idea. 
 Lowland peoples’ organisations like CIDOB, whose members understood themselves as indigenous. 
Representing mainly small minority groups136, they rejected seeing peoples as nations (CEJIS, 2013). 
 Peasant organisations like CSUTCB, Bartolinas137 and Interculturales, for which social class generally 
mattered more than ethnicity and peoples’ self-determination was not a concern. They view land as a 
mercantile object, not sharing the integral vision of territory with the other two blocks (Interview 8). 
This block is seen as the closest ally and key support group of Morales, who had close ties with CSUTCB 
(Interview 21). In line with the MAS-IPSP’ agenda, they advocated the recuperation of the self-
determination of the Bolivian pueblo. 
                                                          
134 For more detail, see AA.VV. (2011).  
135 Representatives of these organisations argued that the indigenous category would directly refer to the mistaken and 
ethnocentric denomination 'indios', the label used by the Spanish (Rivera Mazorco and Arispe Barrientos, 2006). Additionally, 
as it just makes reference to the inhabitants of the Americas, it seems regional and not universal like Western Philosophy – 
the term 'original people' in turn would be more holistic, powerful and unifying (ibid.). 
136 Following the 2001 and 2012 censuses, the lowland indigenous peoples made up 3.3 per cent of the population – with 
group size varying strongly from a couple of families to over 100,000 (CEJIS, 2013). Out of the 36 recognised languages in the 
2009 CPE, 33 are associated with peoples from the lowlands and valleys.  
137 This is the National Federation of Peasant Women of Bolivia – Bartolina Sisa. 
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The organisations entered the negotiations with different ideas of the new state138; but to draft a 
common proposal, they had to find a compromise. In 2006-07, intensive debates revolved around how 
to find a balance between a unitary state tying Bolivians together (key concern of the peasants) and 
pluri-nationalism, aim at decolonisation of state and society (advocated by CONAMAQ) (Garcés, 2011, 
p.52; AA.VV., 2011). The 'tenor (…) was to respect the autonomy of each while working together on 
common demands and proposals' (Garcés, 2011, p.48). This vision is reflected in the pluralist 
conception of identity in the new IOC ('Indigenous-Original-Peasant') subject (Interview 8) and the 
pluri-national concept, through which all would be recognised in a non-hierarchical way (Interviews 
86,104). 
Yet, to find a compromise, the envisioned state organisation needed to be asymmetric, so that some 
entities would be based on the republican state with its borders, while others should be organised 
around indigenous peoples’ territories (Interview 93). Autonomies were not envisioned as solely 
decentralised entities in a predominantly mono-cultural state, but as strengthening self-
determination, and, hence, a mechanism to recover sovereignty of the colonised, oppressed peoples 
(Garcés, 2011, p.56). This came closer to the pluri-national state than other proposals presented at 
this time (see 6.2.1.). In August 2006, the draft included three types of autonomy: AIOC (ˈIndigenous-
Original-Peasantˈ Autonomy), urban-peasant and regional autonomies. After a year of negotiations, it 
had become more complex with six types of autonomies (Garcés, 2011, p.58; AA.VV., 2011, p.65). The 
concepts remained unclearly defined, which also reflects the difficulties in finding a common 
denominator (Interview 93).  
Such a seemingly inclusive compromise had not been possible for all controversial aspects. Regarding 
natural resources, the final proposal represented the peasants’ vision more than the indigenous 
organisations’ ideas. The powerful peasant block – also fuelled by the above-mentioned 
nationalisation of the hydrocarbon sector (Law 3058/2005) –, advocated a model in which non-
renewable resources are owned by all Bolivians and only renewable resources are locally held (Garcés, 
2013, p.34). This was underpinned by a nationalist-unifying rhetoric – also found in the MAS-IPSP’ 
discourse – that undermined the demands for peoples’ self-determination (Interview 84). The 
incorporation of the peasants’ vision into the final proposal, in which other organisations noted their 
disagreement, indicates that the peasant block as ˈbase duraˈ of the MAS-IPSP had been the strongest 
block (Interviews 93,94). In turn, particularly, the lowland peoples are perceived as having lost out 
(Interview 5). Nevertheless, for them the Unity Pact was a key forum for positioning their demands on 
the national stage (Interview 17).  
                                                          
138 For an overview, see AA.VV. (2011, pp.233-237). 
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The final proposal would become a key reference point for the MAS-IPSP in the constituent assembly 
(Böhrt Irahola, 2015, p.12; Interviews 8,17) and so, the indigenous people were, for the first time, 
subject in Bolivian state transformation (Interview 104). Yet, García Linera claimed that parts of the 
proposal presented a more radical position than necessary and possible (Schavelzon, 2013, p.178).  
6.3.3. The Constituent Assembly of 2006-07139 
Morales kept his predecessor’s promise and simultaneously with the election of assembly members 
in July 2006, a referendum on departmental autonomy was held. The MAS-IPSP openly rejected the 
idea (Interviews 8,11,20,56) and often framed the quest as a means of fragmentation driven by the 
(neoliberal) oligarchy (Interview 75). For the media luna opposition, the government failed to 
recognise it as a legitimate demand and did not understand the issue (Interview 69).  
Overall, 57.5 per cent of votes were cast against departmental autonomy (Georgetown University, 
2017). Yet, in the four media luna departments, the majority of voters opted for departmental 
autonomy (see Table 7) and the Convocation Law 3365/2006 established that the results were binding 
for the assembly with respect to those departments where the majority voted in favour (Art. 2). With 
this, the departmental autonomy had to be in the new Constitution.  
When the constituent assembly was convened on the 6th of August 2006 in Sucre, MAS-IPSP leaders 
did not seem to have an elaborate vision of autonomy/ies that responded to the different demands 
for autonomy (Interview 23). Initially, Morales pitched autonomy of the pueblo against the supposed 
autonomy of the oligarchy (Página12, 2006). He connected autonomy to the idea of sovereignty of the 
Bolivian pueblo, requiring leaders to consult their popular base and to be subject to rotation. Yet, with 
the constituent assembly, they needed to find a way of addressing the departmental autonomy. When 
confirming their demands, the media luna was supported by Catalan intellectuals and activists, who 
assisted in the development of their proposals (Interviews 18,72). 
The internal regulations of the assembly 
Debates on the internal regulations of the assembly stalled the advancement of the process for the 
first seven months of the prescribed 12 months period. Particularly contested was the required 
majority for approval (Böhrt Irahola, 2015, p.37): The Convocation Law stated that the approval of the 
constitution needed two thirds of its present members while the opposition forces argued that the 
same should apply for the commissions, in which key negotiations took place. Even though the MAS-
                                                          
139 For a comprehensive description of events, see Schavelzon (2013).  
129 
 
IPSP alone had 53.7 per cent of the seats140, together with its allies it did not reach the two thirds and 
wanted approval in the commissions of 50+1 per cent (Buitrago, 2007, p.192). 
Subsequently, opposition politicians ˈin defence of democracyˈ went on hunger strikes and 
confrontations turned increasingly violent. In mid-December, the 3rd cabildo, took place in media luna 
departments, pressuring the assembly to fulfil its mandate concerning the autonomies. In Santa Cruz, 
it became known as the ˈcabildo of the millionˈ as they estimate that over 1,000,000 people 
participated (GAD Santa Cruz, n.d.-c; Antelo Vaca, 2015; Interview 35). 
Additionally, one of Morales’ main opponents, Cochabamba’s Prefect Reyes Villa141, who had 
previously not been associated with demands for autonomy, called for another autonomy 
referendum. For him, 'people thought autonomy meant you would need a passport to travel from one 
province to another' (cited by McDonnell, 2007). Violent confrontations occurred, during which the 
prefecture cochabambina was set on fire and two people died (Böhrt Irahola, 2015, p.32). MAS-IPSP 
adversaries spoke of a 'Stalinist conspiracy' against the opposition prefects (Lessmann, 2010, p.140). 
At this moment, departmental autonomy had become an umbrella under which some groups 
previously opposed to one another142 joined forces against the government, seeking to prevent a MAS-
IPSP hegemony in the assembly (Peñaranda, 2009, p.119). Yet, this did not mean that the opposition 
was entirely united. For Doria Medina, UN leader, the regional opposition and a radical group from 
Cochabamba sought to impede the assembly without a plan, but said 'today, we have to sabotage the 
agenda and tomorrow, we will see' (cited by Peñaranda, 2009, p.120, author's translation). 
In mid-February, when the whole assembly appeared at risk, a compromise was found. It was agreed 
that while the approval en detalle and the final text would require two thirds of the present members, 
for the project en grande and the commission reports, 50 per cent +1 would be needed (Böhrt Irahola, 
2015, p.43). With this, the assembly could start working. 
Initial plans with different perspectives on autonomy and models of state 
In a first step, the different groupings of the assembly presented their vision of the type of state they 
desired to the plenary, in which different ideas concerning autonomy became apparent: 
 
                                                          
140 For results, votes and seats, see Peñaranda (2009, p.112). 
141 He started his political career in the conservative ADN and later founded the New Republican Force (NFR). Having been 
Cochabamba’s mayor (1993-2000), he stood from NFR as presidential candidate in 2002 and finished third (Georgetown 
University, 2017). 
142 These were mainly those directly associated with the autonomy quests and those affiliated with national political parties 




MAS-IPSP and allies Opposition 
MAS-IPSP (137 seats): indigenous, municipal, 
provincial, departmental and regional autonomy 
PODEMOS (60 seats): departmental and municipal 
autonomy, indigenous municipalities 
MOP (3):ˈoriginalˈ nations as part of the territoriality UN (8): departmental and municipal autonomy 
AYRA (2):autonomy of the indigenous pueblos and 
ˈoriginalˈ nations, territorial division according to 
ancestral territories 
MNR (8): departmental, regional and municipal 
autonomy 
MCSFA (1): autonomy and decentralisation MNR-FRI (): departmental autonomy and self-
government of ˈoriginalˈ pueblos 
MBL (8, partly aligned with MAS): departmental and 
municipal autonomy 
A3-MNR (2): departmental and municipal autonomy 
CN (5, partly aligned with MAS-IPSP): no consistent 
vision 
APB (3): departmental and municipal autonomy 
ASP (2, partly aligned with MAS-IPSP): no consistent 
vision 
AAI (1): departmental autonomy 
 MIR (1): departmental and municipal autonomy 
AS (6): Departmental, regional and municipal autonomy 
Table 3: Visions of the autonomies in the constituent assembly (based on Böhrt Irahola (2015, pp.44-47)) 
Both MAS-IPSP and PODEMOS responded to demands from the apparent opponents. PODEMOS 
incorporated demands from indigenous pueblos – but the indigenous autonomy could be resolved 
with the already existing figure of the indigenous municipality seen as subordinated to the 
departmental level (Interview 103) (see 6.2.2.). 
Following Morales’ earlier suggestions of autonomy for the pueblo, the MAS-IPSP leaders increasingly 
adopted the autonomies rather broadly as their own project. The question was ˈ How do we counteract 
the cambas who want to divide [Bolivia]?ˈ143 (Interview 82). For an enthusiastic MASista, they had 
realised that the people wanted autonomy (Interview 104). For others, it was a strategic move to 
ˈclimb on the bandwagonˈ (Interviews 13,80). A local researcher finds that ˈas the media luna 
proposed I don’t know how many autonomies, the MAS-IPSP came out with more autonomiesˈ144 
(Interview 7). The inclusion of the indigenous autonomy was part of this counterproposal (Interviews 
7,25,39), set up ˈin order to slow down the attack of the otherˈ145 (Interview 86). Something similar is 
said about the regional autonomy, which was incorporated to weaken hydrocarbon-rich departments 
(Interview 72). 
For the MAS-IPSP’ allies, Bolivia was imagined as a pluri-national state, while opposition proposals 
included adjectives like intercultural, multinational or multicultural, with emphasis on the Bolivian 
nation (Böhrt Irahola, 2015, pp.44-47). The MAS-IPSP itself, as in the case of the autonomies, made a 
broad proposal of pluri-national, inter-cultural and pluri-lingual Bolivia (ibid.). In all consistent 
                                                          
143 Oruro, 19.04.2016. 
144 La Paz. 05.04.2016. 
145 Oruro, 21.04.2016. 
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proposals, Bolivia was envisioned as a unitary state (ibid.). While some argue that since the traumatic 
1898-9 federal rebellion (see 5.5.), the federal question is a taboo (Interviews 32,72), others find it 
unrealistic to move from a heavily centralised unitary state to a federal state or similar (Interview 27). 
A territorial reorganisation of the state, demanded by some indigenous representatives fighting for 
their different state was not on the official agenda. A MASista explains  
The initial conception was that the indigenous pueblos also recuperate their territory, but 
this was not possible because other rules of the game had already been established, 
another type of administration, another vision, another conception, which caused the 
actual territorial order of the country in departments, in provinces, in municipalities was 
respected146 (Interview 104). 
In the MAS-IPSP block, the highlands enjoyed stronger representation than the lowlands and the 
peasant block was the largest one (Interview 23). Therefore, this is a similar constellation to the 
aforementioned Unity Pact. For its indigenous members, the assembly was marked by subordination 
or ˈsub-alternatisationˈ instead of decolonisation (Garcés, 2013, p.34). They were faced with racism, 
discrimination and sometimes violent attacks (see edited volume of Defensor del Pueblo and 
Universidad de la Cordillera, 2008). 
The work of the commissions147, the question of the capital and rising tensions 
After public gatherings in the nine departments148, which led to tumultuous situations in the 
departmental autonomy strongholds, the 21 commissions149 of the assembly began their work. The 
MAS-IPSP and allies had the majority of seats in all commissions (Böhrt Irahola, 2015, pp.50-52). Yet, 
progress was limited and in July 2007, all commissions handed in one majority and one minority 
report, which showed the incapacity/unwillingness to compromise (Interview 23). Additionally, some 
reports were incoherent and insufficiently elaborated (Böhrt Irahola, 2015, p.53). A key problem was 
the seemingly irreconcilably different visions of land and natural resource management: While the 
MAS-IPSP opted for national control of non-renewable resources, for example, the opposition, sought 
more regional control, which was against the idea of peoples’ self-determination (Peñaranda, 2009, 
p.118). Some topics were also heavily contested among MAS-IPSP and its allies and inside the MAS-
IPSP itself (Schavelzon, 2013, p.156). When all reports were submitted, less than three weeks were 
left until the end of the one-year period and prolongation was hotly debated (ibid., p.157). In August, 
the Congress approved Law 3728/2007, following which the new deadline was in mid-December 2007. 
                                                          
146 Cochabamba, 01.06.2016. 
147 For more detail, see Schavelzon (2013) or Böhrt Irahola (2015). 
148 In these, around 3,000 proposals were collected from civil society organisations and so on (Böhrt Irahola, 2015, p.49).  
149 For a list, see Gamboa Rocabado (n.d.). 
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The work of the commissions was overshadowed by the emergence of the question over the capital 
(Ibaibarriaga, 2007). Sectors of the opposition had raised this issue and some representatives from 
Santa Cruz and Chuquisaca demanded ˈcapitalidad plenaˈ for Sucre, meaning reversing the outcome 
of the 1898-99 ˈfederal rebellionˈ (see 5.5.) by moving the government seat and all government 
institutions back from La Paz (Peñaranda, 2009, pp.121-123; Schavelzon, 2013, pp.157-159). From the 
official side, this indicated that the opposition wanted to block the assembly, since the opposition 
knew that La Paz would never allow this (Peñaranda, 2009, p.123). For an opposition informant, 
bringing the matter onto the agenda had been an attempt to cause tensions within the MAS-IPSP 
block– much of what followed was an unintended consequence (Interview 72). The escalation started 
with the buoying up of a civic movement for ˈ capitalidad plenaˈ, in which the Civic Committee of Sucre 
played a crucial role (Azcui, 2007). Shortly afterwards, the assembly members decided to eliminate 
the topic from the assembly’s agenda, riots broke out (Ibaibarriaga, 2007). These protests continued 
for several weeks and temporarily paralysed the constituent process. 
Simultaneously, the confrontational approach of the government towards the opposition prefects 
continued. In October, Morales released Supreme Decree 29322/2007, with which the departmental 
share of IDH royalties fell from 56.9 to 24.4 per cent, while the municipalities received 67 per cent 
instead of 34.5 per cent. The media luna prefects perceived this as a direct attack (Peñaranda, 2009, 
p.126).  
Due to continued protests, the assembly in Sucre ended, since the safety of those involved could no 
longer be guaranteed. After the assembly moved to the Liceo Militar, some kilometres outside Sucre, 
the draft constitution was adopted en grande with the majority of assembly members, all associated 
with the MAS-IPSP, while the opposition was absent (Peñaranda, 2009, p.133). However, the next day, 
supposedly adopted texts were circulated which were different and the opposition claimed that the 
session had been illegal (Böhrt Irahola, 2015, p.61-62; Interview 72). Protests escalated and 
Chuquisaca’s Prefect sought to mediate, but was accused of being a ˈtraitorˈ and fled after direct 
attacks on him. At this point, even the police moved away from Sucre. 
Some days later, the oppositional prefects experienced another perceived attack from the MAS-IPSP. 
The enacted Dignity Pension Law 3791/2007 (see 7.5.3.) stated that the prefectures provide 30 per 
cent of their IDH for funding the universal pension scheme (Art. 9). Together with the above-
mentioned decree, over 60 per cent of the IDH had de facto been taken away from the prefectures.  
Shortly afterwards, through a quick – for some ˈforcedˈ – modification of the Law 3364/2006, the 
assembly’s president gained powers to transfer the session to ˈany place in the national 
territoryˈ(Böhrt Irahola, 2015, p.63). A 411-article document was adopted in a 14-hour session in 
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Oruro in the second week of December. At the beginning of the session, the MAS-IPSP and its allies 
were present alongside with UN and MNR, while the largest opposition group PODEMOS was absent 
(Peñaranda, 2009, p.134; Böhrt Irahola, 2015, p.63). Some of them joined later, claiming that the 
proceedings were irregular. The present UN leader is convinced that the MAS-IPSP would not have 
achieved the two thirds if PODEMOS had been present (cited by Peñaranda, 2009, pp.134-135). Still, 
the document was officially perceived as approved and some days later handed over to President 
Morales.  
6.3.4. Post-assembly escalations and negotiations 
While the MAS-IPSP celebrated the approval as a victory, Bolivia was at the cusp of un-governability. 
The opposition did not accept the constitution and continued to demand autonomy, at this point 
essentially referring to control over land and hydrocarbon resources, which the constitution reserved 
for the central state (Achtenberg, 2011). While the MAS-IPSP wanted to hold a referendum on the 
Constitution, the media luna, who had been supported by experts like the Catalan Joan Prats150, 
(Interview 72), published autonomy statutes, which were designed to be adopted in a referendum. 
As both sides attempted to block the other, tensions grew151 and the National Electoral Court ruled 
that the proposed referenda lacked convocation laws (Peñaranda, 2009, pp.140-142): 
Furthermore, we mandate that this law must respect the 90-day minimum planning period 
(…). We advocate that the departmental governors cannot convoke referendums on 
autonomy statutes. This is the responsibility of Congress and Departmental Electoral Courts 
cannot mandate referendums, it is the National Electoral Court’s job (cited by Andean 
Information Network, 2008). 
Nevertheless, in the four media luna departments the statutes were adopted with over 75 per cent of 
vote in May and June (see Table 7). Due to the lack of legal mandate, the MAS-IPSP government and 
the Electoral Court declared the referenda illegal. Yet, since participation and approval rates had been 
high, the government could not ignore them. 
In this tense situation, prefects and the government agreed to hold a recall referenda in the second 
week of August. Yet, this did not lead to a clear resolution, as not only president and vice-president, 
but also the media luna prefects were confirmed in their offices152. Nevertheless, the correlation of 
forces changed (Peñaranda, 2009, pp.144-146), as following the official results, Morales´ support in 
the lowlands increased, which strengthened MAS-IPSP’ position and made the approval of the 
                                                          
150 Prats was married to the Teresa Ossio, the daughter of Luis Ossio, who served as Bolivian vice-president under Paz Zamora 
(1989-1993). She was Bolivian Ambassador to Spain (2004-2006). 
151 For more detail, see Böhrt Irahola (2015, pp.66-69). 
152 Only the prefects of La Paz and Cochabamba were not confirmed in office. With this, the opposition lost Morales’ fierce 
opponent, Reyes Villa. 
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constitution more likely (Böhrt Irahola, 2009, p.59). That same night, MAS-IPSP leaders proposed 
negotiations on making constitution and media luna autonomy statutes compatible (Romero Bonifaz, 
2009, p.15). 
However, the media luna prefects were unwilling to accept the results of the referenda and there was 
further escalation153: Santa Cruz’ Prefect Costas claimed that he wanted to control taxes, and the 
police and would implement the autonomy statute. When action was taken, tensions within the 
opposition deepened and splits occurred since, for some, this went too far. In early September, 
opposition groups started to occupy government offices, airports and block roads more systematically, 
which affected the transport of goods to the highlands. In addition, a bomb exploded in the main gas 
pipeline, affecting exports to Brazil. This was seen as a massive effort to destabilise the government 
and the minister of the government spoke of a ˈcivil coupˈ (Webber, 2008). Part of the response was 
that the government asked the US Ambassador Goldberg to leave Bolivia, since the MAS-IPSP accused 
the US of supporting the lowland elites. Morales declared that ˈ[w]e don't want people here who 
conspire against our unityˈ(cited by Friedman-Rudovsky, 2008).  
A day after declaring Goldman a persona non-grata, the ˈMassacre of Pandoˈ left around 20 people 
dead and over 50 wounded (González, 2008). Achtenberg recalls that  
a protest march (…) by some 1,000 pro-MAS indigenous peasants and their supporters was 
ambushed by truckloads of armed cívicos, waiting behind trenches dug by local road crews 
to block their passage along the road to the departmental capital of Cobija (Achtenberg, 
2011). 
Following that, Morales´ deployed the military to Pando and some days later, Pando’s Prefect was 
arrested154. The Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) sided with the government (González, 
2008) and with this, Argentina and Brazil, the key importers of Bolivian hydrocarbons did not support 
the opposition (Böhrt Irahola, 2009, p.59; Romero Bonifaz, 2009, p.18). The remaining media luna 
prefects, led by tarijeño Prefect Cossío opted for negotiating with the government.  
However, these were not the first negotiations, since an informal commission held meetings since 
June. Figures from both sides tried to find a way of bringing the two extremes together and pacify the 
country (Interview 41). It included the PODEMOS Senators Böhrt (Irahola) and Ruiz, both close to 
Cossío, the MASista Romero (Bonifaz) and the President of the Chamber of Deputies Novillo 
(Peñaranda, 2009. pp.161-165) – Böhrt and Romero had already worked together on a publication, 
asking whether and how the different proposals for a constitution were compatible (Böhrt Irahola et 
                                                          
153 For a summary of events, see, for example, Böhrt Irahola (2009, pp.56-59) and Peñaranda (2009, pp.152-165). 
154 In March 2017, he was sentenced to 15 year in prison (Corz, 2017). 
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al., 2008). This ˈclandestine tableˈ is seen by the figures involved as crucial for moving the positions 
closer together. 
Following that, Cochabamba negotiations155 which started on the 25th of September saw 
representatives from government and prefectures come together (Romero Bonifaz, 2009, p.19; 
Schavelzon, 2013, p.186). After one week, the representatives from the opposition prefectures left 
the tables on the pretext of the detention of a tarijeño who was accused of having participated in a 
terrorist attack against a gas pipeline in Tarija (Romero Bonifaz, 2009, p.20).At first sight the 
negotiation appeared to have failed, since no agreement was signed (Peñaranda, 2009, p.181). 
Nevertheless, following an involved informant, the prefecture representatives had achieved a 
favourable deal, but could not go back, saying that they had come to an agreement with the detested 
government (Interview 72). An important, visible success of the prefects was that the regional 
autonomy could not cross departmental boundaries, as the Oruro version had established (Böhrt 
Irahola, 2009, pp.95-96; Interviews 4,72,103). As a result, the large hydrocarbon-rich Chaco region 
was prevented from forming a regional autonomy – and later eventually a department. 
The second week of negotiations included representatives of MAS prefectures and the Federation of 
Municipal Associations. In addition, two consultative meetings were held with representatives from 
CIDOB and CONAMAQ and another one with representatives from the Chaco region (Romero Bonifaz, 
2009, p.20). However, critics argue that these meeting were short and the government would not take 
those perspectives into account– the government had even wished to cancel them altogether, yet pro 
forma, they were needed (Interview 9). NGO workers with long-term experience of working with 
indigenous people, who closely followed the assembly, do not remember these meetings (Interviews 
10,14).  
After Cochabamba, Morales convened negotiations with the presidents of the Chambers of Congress 
and the leaders of the bancadas of the political parties (Romero Bonifaz, 2009, p.21). Later, a special 
commission was established in Congress. Early in the congressional negotiations, the MAS-IPSP 
organised a march with social movements and indigenous organisations (but not CIDOB), which was, 
according to the vice-president, to ensure that that the negotiations would not go on indefinitely (in 
Peñaranda, 2009, p.185). In the following negotiations, mostly between the government and 
PODEMOS as a main opposition force, IDH and autonomies did not emerge as controversial issues, 
since they had been largely resolved in Cochabamba (Romero Bonifaz in Peñaranda, 2009, p.201). 
Instead, the maximum surface of agricultural property, presidential re-election and condition for a 
partial reform of the constitution were among the contested themes and the concerns of the 
                                                          
155 For a detailed account, see Peñaranda (2009, pp.176-183). 
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opposition were incorporated into the draft (Romero Bonifaz, 2009, pp.22-25). Part of the 
congressional pact was that the ˈindigenous-original-peasantˈ (IOC) jurisdiction could – as desired by 
PODEMOS – only be applied to members of the IOC pueblos (ibid., p.25). Without much debate, the 
MAS-IPSP-dominated Congress adopted the document, in which around 25 per cent of the articles 
were different from the Oruro version156. 
In the referendum in late-January, the constitution was approved with 61.4 per cent of votes cast, yet, 
in the four media luna departments, the majority of voters rejected the document (Georgetown 
University, 2017). President Morales declared the constitution on the 7th of February 2009. In the 
official reading, as compromises were found, the constitutional text is a political pact that integrates 
the different visions of the state (Böhrt Irahola, 2009, p.61). For example, the new autonomy regime 
involves, alongside already existing municipal autonomy, departmental, regional and indigenous 
autonomies. Yet, more critical voices suggest that it did not result in one coherent model of state, but 
in an inherently contradictory and inconsistent document. If and how this is the case will be examined 
in the next chapter. 
6.4. Summing-up 
This chapter unpacked how the different struggles for autonomy have emerged and evolved in the 
second half of the 20th century. It then went on analysing how these struggles became translated into 
the pluri-national Constitution. On the one hand, for indigenous peoples’ self-determination has 
either involved seeking state protection against livelihood threats or altering the logic of the state 
altogether for achieving one that facilitates their self-determination, on the other, autonomy has also 
been advocated for enhancing political leverage as well as territorial and resource control against the 
central state. These strands of struggles are closely entwined and in tension with each other. With 
their incorporations into the neoliberal state modality through reforms, something was lost in 
translation, when these were made more compatible with the neoliberal agenda.  
With the rising protests in the early 21st century and the growing importance of the MAS-IPSP, which 
had since early on demanded sovereignty of the Bolivian pueblo, supported by an increasingly 
powerful block, in particular the peasants, quick motion became necessary. The neoliberal 
multicultural modality could not sufficiently respond to the popular but incompatible demands from 
different sectors of the Bolivian society, and the state managers were incapable of facilitating growth. 
The crucial pacts that were necessary for re-establishing order involved the MAS-IPSP and the national 
opposition, partly backed by key economic players, which also had an interest in the survival of the 
                                                          
156 For a detailed list of changes, see Romero Bonifaz (2009) or Böhrt Iraho (2009). 
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Bolivian state form. In this key part of the re-founding, the indigenous people did not play a crucial 
role – yet, some key demands had been entered into the MAS-IPSP agenda, also – but not only – to 
counter the oppositional demand for autonomy. Yet, demands for peoples’ self-determination were 
inherently in tension with the MAS-IPSP idea of self-determination of the pueblo. In the mediation 
process, the indigenous people were somewhat included, but for achieving change they needed to 
adapt to rules that were not necessarily theirs (for example, deciding by majority) and suffered 
discrimination, among others. 
Overall, when mediating the demands into the pluri-national state, all struggles, including those of 
indigenous people who had wanted a different state were altered insofar as they became more 
compatible with the export-oriented economic model, which appears to need a strong central state 
for the most profitable accumulation. The control over key non-renewable resources remained with 
the central state, which was advocated as enhancing the self-determination of the Bolivian pueblo. 
This is in stark tension with pluri-nationalism as envisioned by indigenous people and the demand for 
a deepening of decentralisation. 
Nevertheless, the umbrella demand for peoples’ self-determination was incorporated into the new 
constitution and the new state-recognised AIOC (ˈIndigenous-Original-Peasantˈ Autonomy) is key in 
this translation. However, the AIOC is part of a larger autonomy regime, including municipal, regional 
and departmental autonomies. In the next chapter, I explore how the new autonomy regime has in 






Chapter 7. The Pluri-national State: Translation of autonomy into and 
by central state components  
7.1. Introduction 
After having looked how the pluri-national state and the new autonomy regime came into being, in 
this and the following chapter, I examine how the scenario has unfolded since then. In the present 
chapter, I focus on how the demands for autonomy were translated into, and by, the central state and 
its components, which are Constitution, rules, enforcing mechanisms, government.  
For this, I start by outlining the autonomy framework established in the 2009 Constitution (CPE). I then 
show how it was fostered in the early days of the pluri-national modality by rules, enforcing 
mechanisms and government, with the latter exercising considerable power over the former ones. 
This enables me to see how the three different visions of autonomy I highlighted in the previous 
chapter have become apparent in the different components of pluri-national Bolivia. Next, I look at 
how the government, particularly since the end of the resource boom, has increasingly undertaken 
measures to limit the other two visions of autonomy, yet without reconciling the tension inherent in 
the modality. Finally, I demonstrate that it remains flexible as to which vision of autonomy is brought 
to the forefront in the international sphere. 
7.2. Autonomy framework in the CPE 
Following Article 1 CPE, pluri-national Bolivia is, among others, a unitary state with autonomies. Article 
269 I CPE states that Bolivia is territorially organised in departments, provinces, municipalities and IOC 
territories (TIOC) 157. At each level of state organisation, territorial autonomous entities (ETA) are or 
can be constituted. At departmental level, the departmental autonomy, in municipalities, it is either a 
municipal autonomy or an AIOC (ˈIndigenous-Original-Peasant' Autonomy) and in a TIOC, an AIOC can 
be established. The AIOC is special as it is the single most important category that concretises the 
constitutionally guaranteed free determination of the peoples and nations (Art. 2 CPE). Finally, 
different neighbouring municipalities or provinces can form a regional autonomy or a regional AIOC, 
if formed by AIOC.  
The state-recognised autonomy implies three aspects: First, the direct election of authorities, 
secondly, the administration of economic resources, and finally, the exercise of the legislative, 
regulative, controlling and executive powers within the range of granted jurisdiction, competences 
and attributes (Art. 272 LMAD). While the first leaves little room for interpretation, the CPE remains 
                                                          
157 With the seventh transitory regulation CPE and DS 727/2010, the TCO category is replaced by IOC territory or TIOC. The 
territory includes areas of production, areas of use and conservation of natural resources and spaces of socio spiritual and 
cultural reproduction (Art. 403 II CPE).  
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mostly silent about the resources of the ETAs. Article 305 CPE states that every assignment or transfer 
of authority must be accompanied by the determination of the source of economic and financial 
resources that are necessary for its exercise. Law regulates the departmental, regional, municipal and 
AIOC income (Art. 340 CPE). Nevertheless, Article 341 lists some sources of income of the 
departmental ETAs, which has to do with the pact between government and prefects (see 6.3.4.). With 
regards to the third aspect, focusing on competences, the CPE establishes a more detailed basis for 
further legislation. 
Article 298 CPE I lists 22 privative158 central state competences, among them, hydrocarbons (No 18) 
and general policies over land, territory and titling (No 17). Furthermore, the central state has 38 
exclusive159 competences, including strategic natural resources like minerals (Art. 298 II No 4 CPE). For 
the AIOC, this puts severe limitation on autonomy, especially not reflecting the concerns of the 
lowland peoples (Interview 3). Reserving certain competences, in particular hydrocarbons, for the 
central state makes a distortion of the extractivist-based growth model less likely.  
Exclusive competences of the departmental autonomies, listed in Article 300 I CPE, involve promotion 
and planning of, for example, employment and natural patrimony at the departmental level. With 
regards to departmental public services, transport and infrastructure, for example, it exceeds 
promotion and planning and involves the development and execution of projects, which must observe 
the CPE and national legislation. Proper policies can be developed with regards to sports and 
conservation of patrimony, among others. Some analysts point out that competences are fewer and 
less relevant compared to those of the prefectures (Interview 20): For example, the presidentially 
appointed prefect was the departmental commandant of the police, while in the new scenario, the 
police are directly subordinated to the national level (Art. 298 I No 6 CPE). This can be seen as a means 
of limiting autonomy.  
Even though all ETAs have the same constitutional rank (Art. 276 CPE), the regional autonomy does 
not have competences in itself (Art. 301 CPE), but requires that the departmental assembly transfers 
competences with two thirds of the members (Art. 280 III CPE). In addition, unlike the municipal and 
departmental autonomies, the regional autonomy also lacks legislative powers (Art. 281 CPE). In other 
words, despite having an assembly, the regional ETAs cannot promulgate laws, but remains 
subordinated to departmental laws – and is hence rather a space of joint planning.  
                                                          
158 Privative are competences reserved for the central state level (Art. 297 I No 1 CPE). 
159 Exclusive are competences in which a level of government has legislative, regulative and executive powers and can 
transfer and delegate the regulative and executing powers (Art. 297 I No 2 CPE). 
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Following Article 303 I CPE, the AIOC assumes the competences of the municipalities, listed in Article 
302 CPE in accordance with the institutional development and their own cultural characteristics. 
Article 304 CPE lists 23 exclusive, four shared160 and ten concurrent161 competences, the AIOC can 
exercise additionally, some of which are repetitive. Key among these, and not found in the 
competence catalogue of the other ETAs, is the exercise of IOC jurisdiction, following its own rules and 
procedures (Art. 304 I No 8 CPE). In addition, the development and exercise of mechanisms of prior 
consultation is included (Art. 304 I No 21 CPE). 
A crucial challenge in the constitutionally established autonomy regime are parallel competences, 
meaning that some competences like productive infrastructure, tourism and cultural goods, are listed 
for departmental and municipal ETAs, and can hence also be exercised by AIOC and/or transferred to 
the regional ETAs. To function effectively further regulation and cooperation of different ETAs is 
needed. Similar challenges also arise with regards to concurrent competences and shared 
competence. Based on prior experiences regarding the interaction between different state entities, 
some analysts suggest that this model can never work and was not set up to function, but to cause 
fragmentation and distortion (Interviews 32,52). 
The competences given to departmental and municipal ETAs do not appear different to those assigned 
in a nation state, making these autonomies appear more as a type of state organisation that aims at 
deepening decentralisation. Only in the specific AIOC competences, does it become apparent that the 
pluri-national state might be distinct from its predecessors. Yet, the specific competences do not 
compensate for the severe limitations of the AIOC in the CPE compared to the vision of a pluri-national 
state (Interview 36). A key theme is the above-mentioned resources control. The AIOC has the 
exclusive competences of managing and administrating the renewable natural resources like water 
and wind (Art. 304 I No 3 CPE). For an interviewee, 
[i]t’s a strong contradiction, no? You have autonomy, but some 60 centimetres further 
down, it’s not mine anymore, it is state-owned (…) if a landowner has had it, what is below 
was also his and not the state’s 162 (Interview 74). 
7.3. Realising the autonomy regime 
7.3.1. Initial government support of the autonomy regime 
As indicated in the previous chapter, during the constituent assembly, the government had moved 
towards supporting an autonomy regime. On the day of the promulgation of the CPE, a Ministry of 
                                                          
160 Concurrent are competences in which the legislation corresponds to the central state level while the other levels 
simultaneously exercise regulative and executive powers (Art. 297 I No 3 CPE). 
161 Shared (compartidas) are competences, which are under the basic national legislation, while legislation of development 
corresponds to the ETAs, in accordance with their character and nature. The regulative and executive powers correspond to 
the ETAs (Art. 297 I No 4 CPE). 
162 Oruro, 12.04.2016. 
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Autonomies was established, which was subdivided into a Vice-Ministry of Autonomies, which 
encompassed a General Direction (GD) of Autonomy and Accreditation of competences, another GD 
of Fiscal Financial Decentralisation, and a Vice-Ministry of Territorial Organisation (Art. 13, 29, DS 
29894/2009). While the first vice-ministry was more concerned with the concretisation of the new 
autonomy regime, the second continued the tasks from previous ministries concerned with planning 
and state organisation (Interview 9).  
A day later, Minister of Rural, Agricultural and Environmental Development Carlos Romero (Bonifaz), 
was appointed minister of autonomies. He had long-term experience working with indigenous 
peoples, having been Executive Director of CEJIS, a key think tank in Bolivia for some years, during 
which the organisation played a crucial role in supporting the 2002 march for the constituent 
assembly. Romero had been a member of the constituent assembly on a seat of indigenous 
organisations and supporting the MAS-IPSP. He became an important figure, presiding over the 
'Commission of Renewable Natural Resources, Land-Territory and Environment' and as shown in 
6.3.4., he was crucial in later negotiations. His appointment, with his association with indigenous 
movements and deep understanding of the pact between government and prefects, was perceived as 
an indication that the government took the autonomy regime seriously (Interviews 7,9).  
Support for the autonomies seems to be also reflected in the MAS-IPSP’s 2010-2015 Government Plan 
'Primero Bolivia y sus ciudadanos - rumbo a una Bolivia Líder', (MAS-IPSP, 2009), which – unlike 
previous plans163 – paid attention to the autonomies. Throughout the 156-page document, 104 words 
start with 'autonom…' and 'autonomía' appears 60 times. In addition, a whole section was dedicated 
to 'Autonomy really for all' (ibid., pp.70-73), which can be read as a pledge for autonomy as self-
determination of the Bolivian pueblo. 
7.3.2. The framework law (LMAD) 
Following the CPE which demands the passing of some framework laws within 180 days from the 
installation of the Pluri-national Assembly (1st Transitory disposition IV CPE), in mid-2010, the 
'Framework Law of Autonomies and Decentralisation Andrés Ibáñez' 031/2010 (LMAD) was enacted. 
It was named after the cruceño leader who had fought for a federal state in the 1870s164.  
Elaboration 
The elaboration of the LMAD had been coordinated within the new Ministry of Autonomies. For an 
involved interviewee, the other Ministries were consulted and their wishes included in distributing 
the competences (Interview 9). It became apparent that some Ministries, above all, the Ministry of 
                                                          
163 Key are the MAS-IPSP’s first Government Plan (MAS-IPSP, 2006) and National Development Plan (PND, 2007) (see 6.3.1.). 
164 See 5.5. and López Mercado (2014, pp.95-98). 
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Economy and Public Finance (MEFP), were more powerful than the Ministry of Autonomies. 
Participation of social movements and public consultations in the elaboration were discussed and 
some attempts were made, but overall, the maxim was to make it function (Interview 9). High-level 
bureaucrats believed too much public engagement caused distortions and the political actors had an 
interest in keeping their power centralised (Interview 9). Media luna authorities complained about 
lack of consultation (Interview 37).  
Article 271 II CPE established that the LMAD would require the approval of 2/3 of the Pluri-national 
Assembly and with the grand majority of the MAS-IPSP, the law passed after superficial debate 
without undergoing important changes in the assembly (Interview 9). This indicates that the 
government has the MAS-IPSP members of the Assembly under tight control. For a former opposition 
senator, summarising the process, the law established 'autonomy for all', but in the way the 
government wanted (Interview 86). 
Competences and organisation 
In the LMAD, 20 articles are dedicated to competences, indicating which aspects are handled by which 
ETAs (Art. 81-100 LMAD). All of them, along with health, transport and natural resources, resemble 
traditional state tasks, suggesting that this pluri-national modality does not differ from its 
predecessors, making the autonomy regime again appear as a form of decentralisation. Despite 
continued criticism that the competence regime would violate the idea of autonomy per se (Interview 
80), interviewees find it questionable that the LMAD clarifies the distribution of tasks well – but it is 
still clear that the central state is very powerful (Interviews 32,52). In addition, since the ETAs have 
constitutionally the same rank, their relationship is not clearly established in the CPE or in the LMAD, 
apart from general guidelines like serving the needs of the population. 
The LMAD establishes tools and mechanisms for coordination between the central state and ETAs 
which is needed for a fully functioning pluri-national state (Art. 120 LMAD). Next to the Integral 
Planning System (see 7.5.2.), Sectorial Coordination Councils165, and intergovernmental conventions, 
the most important ones are the following two: 
First, the National Council of Autonomies (CNA) is established for political coordination. Its members 
are the president, who presides over the council, three ministers (presidency, development planning 
and autonomy), the nine governors, five representatives of the Federation of Municipal Associations 
(FAM) and the AIOC and one representative of the regional autonomies (Art. 123 LMAD). The Council 
                                                          
165 This instrument is consultative, serving to facilitate an agreement between the central state government and the 
autonomous governments. These consist of the minister of the matter and authorities of the autonomous governments, 
who are competent in the relevant area (Art. 132 LMAD).  
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meets twice a year, convened by the president, with extraordinary meetings possible (Art. 124 LMAD). 
Secondly, the State Service of Autonomies (SEA), which is responsible for the technical coordination 
and facilitation of the management of the autonomies (Art. 125 LMAD). Under tuition of the Ministry 
of Autonomies, it supports and assists the ETAs and the central state in the implementation and 
development of the autonomy regime and can for this purpose be consulted by all ETAs and the 
central state (Art. 126 LMAD).  
Resources  
The LMAD concretises the incoming resources of the ETAs as follows: 
Income of ETAs 
Departmental ETAs (Art. 341 CPE, Art. 104 LMAD) 
Departmental royalties (regalías) (Art. 104 No 1 LMAD)  
Hydrocarbon Royalties: Eleven per cent of audit production of hydrocarbons in the departments (Art. 52 No 1. Law 
3058/2005); compensatory royalty for Beni (2/3) and Pando (1/3) (one per cent of audit national production of 
hydrocarbons) (Art. 52 No 2) 
Mining Royalties: If mining activities take place, companies pay royalties to departments and municipalities – following 
Law 3787/2007, 85 per cent go to the producing department, and 15 to the producing municipality (Art. 100). 
Transfers from the central government from hydrocarbon taxes (Art. 104 No 8 LMAD) 
The direct tax on hydrocarbons (IDH): 12.5 per cent of the IDH go to each of the producer departments and 31.25 per cent 
the non-producer departments (6.25 for each) (Art. 2 DS 28421/2005). 56.9 per cent of these were assigned to the 
prefectures. Since October 2007, the share of the prefecture fell to 24.4 per cent (DS 29322/2007) (see 6.3.4.)  
The Special Tax on hydrocarbons and its derivative (IEHD): 25 per cent of the are assigned to the prefectures (50 per cent 
by population, 50 per cent equally) (Transitory regulation 8 LMAD)  
Transfers for the delegation or transfer of competences (Art. 104 No 9) 
Other (potential) sources (Art. 104 No 2-7 LMAD) 
Departmental taxes; fees and special contributions; departmental patents for the exploitation of natural resources; 
income from sales of goods and services; credits and loans; bequests, donations and similar 
Regional ETAs (Art. 107 LMAD) 
Transfers of royalties due to the exploitation of natural resources 
Transfers from the ETAs that constitute it 
Other (potential) sources 
Fees and special contributions, Income from sales of goods and services 
AIOC ETAs (Art. 106 LMAD) (similar to the municipal ETAs, Art. 105 LMAD) 
Transfers from the co-participation and IDH (No 8) 
Transfers from departmental royalties for exploitations of natural resources (No 6) 
Assigned taxes (No 1) 
Transfers for the delegation or transfer of competences (No 7) 
Other (potential) sources (No 2-5) 
Fees, patents and special contributions created within their jurisdiction; income from sales of goods and services; credits 
and loans; bequests, donations and similar 
Table 4: Income of ETAs 
 
7.3.3. Re-organising the Ministry of Autonomies 
Some months after the promulgation of the Framework Law, the Ministry of Autonomies underwent 
restructuring. With Supreme Decree 802/2011, it was organised into a Vice-Ministry of Departmental 
and Municipal Autonomies and another Vice-Ministry of AIOC and territorial organisation, also in 
charge of regional autonomy. This new structure appears more functional for helping the newly 
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created and already existing entities to exercise their assigned competences and supporting the 
elaboration of autonomy statutes and organic charters166.  
While departmental and municipal levels are similar in proceedings, the AIOC has some specificities 
and the regional autonomy does not appear as a prominent figure. It appears therefore reasonable to 
divide the ministry in this way, with the bureaucrats, usually specialised in one area or the other, 
working in their field of expertise. With the LMAD and the restructured ministry, the government 
played a crucial role in steering the autonomy regime on its way to integration into the rules and 
enforcing mechanisms.  
7.4. Three conflicting visions of autonomy in the pluri-national modality 
7.4.1. Two different visions of autonomies inside the enforcing mechanisms 
The reorganisation of the ministry also deepened division and furthered the separation of ideas of 
autonomy as deepened decentralisation and self-determination of peoples in the regime found in the 
CPE and LMAD. For a former Director of the AIOC, 
there are different strands and visions […] we experience this in the Ministry of Autonomies; 
there are people with a developmental vision, municipalista and occidental, and there is 
the indigenous autonomy, which are the weird creepy-crawly [bichos raros], who work on 
something else and propose decolonisation167 (Interview 6). 
The personnel working in the Vice-Ministry on the AIOC I encountered appeared highly dedicated to 
the peoples’ self-determination and senior employees had experience working with indigenous 
people both from within and outside the state168, in NGOs or similar. The same goes for personnel in 
the SIFDE, the entity in the Electoral Organ that supervises and accompanies some steps in the AIOC 
transition process (see 8.4.). Yet, these people perceive their position in the overall ministry and under 
the government as difficult. Keeping in mind that the other vice-ministry is concerned with over 300 
municipalities and nine departments, it is not surprising that far more staff work on these than on the 
only regional autonomy and the few AIOC processes (see 8.4.2.).  
The CPE also brought changes for the municipalities, which required adjustments in business as usual 
that had developed over the past years. For the Director of the Municipal Autonomies, who has like 
most of his senior colleagues accompanied the municipalities since the Law of Popular Participation, 
the municipalities face many challenges (Interview 11). With the CPE, the competence catalogue 
changed, the structure of council and mayor was reorganised and the council received legislative 
                                                          
166 Since the municipalities were already autonomous, these did not need to elaborate statutes, closely entwined with the 
establishment of a new entity. The Organic Charter is to 'perfect' the exercise of the autonomy (Art. 61 III LMAD). 
167 La Paz, 04.04.2016. 
168 For example, in the Vice-Ministry of Asuntos Indígenas y Pueblos Originarios (VAIPO), created in the 1990s. In was 
abolished in pluri-national Bolivia, since the indigenous people should not be treated separately (Interview 5). 
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power. The municipalities are also encouraged to elaborate an Organic Charter to perfect their 
autonomy, which requires checking for constitutionality and approval in a referendum. In addition, 
the rural municipalities often continue to face severe capacity challenges, and the larger, quickly 
growing urban municipalities need to handle more people without receiving more resources169.  
For the Director of Municipal Autonomies, strengthening the municipalities would be even more 
important than the departmental or AIOC processes, since municipalities are closer to the people than 
the departments and unlike the AIOC not just concerned with some people (Interview 11). There is 
also limited willingness to grant the AIOC specificity and to acknowledge disappointment with the 
status quo. A state employee, mainly concerned with municipal and departmental autonomy asserts 
that 
[t]hey are the state, too; they are an indigenous autonomy, but they are the state and they 
have to give the information [to the state], it is impossible that they receive money and you 
do not know what they did with it170 (Interview 4). 
For the Director of the above-mentioned SEA, the SEA would be mostly concerned with border and 
competence conflicts between different municipalities and/or departments – 'In fact, its entire life, 
the SEA has held a municipal-departmental vision'171 (Interview 4). In addition, in the fiscal pact 
negotiations in the CNA (see 7.5.3.), the AIOC was irrelevant. 
When considering the whole central state autonomy regime, the AIOC appears like an annex that is 
granted some specificity. This suggests that instead of the demanded decolonisation of the state, the 
AIOC category is largely integrated with the modern/colonial framework of territorial state 
organisation serving to deepen decentralisation.  
7.4.2. Government’s main agenda: Autonomy as sovereignty of the pueblo(s) 
Despite the MAS-IPSP government’s efforts to concretise the autonomy regime resulting from the 
pact of 2009, it also pushed for a model of state, in which autonomy appears as national sovereignty 
of the Bolivian pueblo(s), which resonate with the history and initial agenda of the MAS-IPSP (see 
6.3.1.), In this, self-determination implies control of the pueblo(s) over the state and overcoming of 
dependency on other states and international organisations. I show throughout the next subsections, 
that that concern is reflected in the social-communitarian state model that underpins much of its 
policies and action and contradicts with autonomy as decentralisation and peoples’ self-
determination. 
                                                          
169 Often people, who move to urban areas and spend most of their time there, remain registered in rural communities. This 
means that the co-participation from the Popular Participation Law continues to go to the rural municipalities.  
170 La Paz, 31.03.2016. 
171 La Paz, 31.03.2016. 
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The origin and basic features of the model 
The social-communitarian model employed goes back to the height of neoliberalism and the unfolding 
state crisis. The comuna members (see 3.4.) had been working on a desired transformation of state 
and society, focusing mainly on the sociological-political dimension, while another group of academics 
associated with the Socialist Party 1 (PS-1) known as Grupo Duende (Group 'Elves') was more 
concerned with the economic dimension. They worked on the notion of post-neoliberalism seeking to 
develop an economic model to overcome neoliberalism (Juárez Zeballos, 2010).  
According to official sources, comuna member García Linera and the Grupo Duende realised that they 
shared the same objective (MEFP, 2011, p.6). This connection turned vital in the MAS-IPSP’s 
government, as alongside García Linera, Luis Arce (Catacora), key member of the Grupo Duende, and 
the associate Carlos Villegas, became key figures. Arce and Villegas are known as key ideologists of 
the first National Development Plan (PND, 2007) which was to become highly influential for future 
development plans and government strategies. Arce was appointed minister of economy and public 
finances in 2006 and was when he stepped down in June 2017 due to health reasons (La Razón, 2017a), 
the only minister still remaining in his position. Villegas served as minister of development planning 
(2006-2007) and minister of hydrocarbons (2007-2008) and in 2009, he became president of the 
State’s hydrocarbon company, YPFB172 (Los Tiempos, 2017b). 
The so-called 'economic-social-communitarian-productive model' is perceived as a response to and a 
break away from the neoliberal multicultural modality. As a transitory stage towards socialism, it 
should gradually resolve many social problems and consolidate the economic base for an adequate 
distribution of the economic surplus (Arce Catacora, 2011, p.4). In this process, the state is key, as 
illustrated in the following graphic: 
 
Graphic 1: The economic-social-communitarian-productive model (Arce Catacora, 2011, p.7) 
                                                          
172 He remained in this position until his death in early 2015. 
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In this model, the state acts as redistributive agent, transferring resources from the strategic sectors, 
fundamentally hydrocarbons, mining and electricity, which generate a surplus to those sectors that 
produce income and jobs (Arce Catacora, 2015, p.203). Nevertheless, the state still needs to increase 
its revenues from the strategic sectors in comparison to the neoliberal model, which happened in 
Bolivia with the so-called nationalisation of hydrocarbons in 2005 (see 6.2.1.). This is a particularly 
attractive strategy for times of rising or high world market prices and a high demand for natural 
resources as in most of first decade of the 21st century. 
The government’s objective to turn Bolivia into the 'energetic heart of South America' as a key part of 
this plan has become even more crucial. Previously forecast in the first National Development Plan, in 
2010 and 2012, strategic parts of the electric sectors were 'renationalised' which helped to control the 
Bolivian electric sector (de Castro and Franco França, 2012). This allowed the government to push 
more directly for the development of different sources of energy. In 2015, the ministry published the 
strategy document, which includes a list of 47 projects for electricity generation, carried out by the 
state-owned Electricity Corporation ENDE and costing over 27.000 million USD, with plants starting 
operation between 2015 and 2025 (Ministerio de Hidrocarburos y Energía, 2017, p.5).  
With this strategy, Bolivia should slowly overcome dependency on strategic sectors and move away 
from exporting primary goods and become an industrialised and productive country (Interview 104). 
The state also actively redistributes income and implements social policies to combat poverty, 
exclusion and marginalisation (Arce Catacora, 2015, p.203).  
The following sketch from the Ministry of Development Planning gives an idea of the envisioned public 
management in the social-communitarian state model:  
 
Graphic 2: Public management in the social-communitarian state model (MPD, 2010, p.6) 
The new state is visualised as breaking with the colonial and neoliberal state that regulates in a top-
down manner. In the new state, the state promotes and acts as development protagonist, while social 
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power also plays a key role in development. Thus, sovereignty is restored, not only in the international 
realm, as stressed in the economic model, but also as envisioned here rooted in, and based on, the 
people.  
The aim of this social-communitarian state is the Living Well (Vivir Bien) of all Bolivians, which the 
president explains as follows: 'Vivir Bien is living in equality and in justice. Where there are neither 
exploited nor exploiters (…) Vivir Bien is not the same as Living Better (Vivir Mejor) (…) than the other' 
(cited by Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, 2013, p.9, author's translation). Vivir Bien has turned 
into a buzzword, found in strategy documents, including Development and Government Plans. Also 
the above-mentioned energy strategy runs under the banner 'Energy for the Living Well' (Ministerio 
de Hidrocarburos y Energía, 2017). Yet, Huanacuni Mamani – who recently became foreign minister – 
points out that the government picks up this concept that stems from the ancestral indigenous 
peoples’ cosmology for itself and distorts it (Huanacuni Mamani, 2010, p.20). It is mistaken that the 
original Vivir Bien could be developed by the state since it is built from the community (Solón, 2016, 
p.56).  
This model does not incorporate a break from conventional ideas of how a modern/colonial state is 
organised and operates, which is required for a different state. However, it indicates a break with the 
neoliberal multicultural modality that is closer to the 'neo-developmental state' (see 2.3.) than to the 
imagined pluri-national state and also decentralisation is not on the agenda. This is illustrated in Arce’s 
425-page book from 2015: While he explains and evaluates the model in great detail, not a single 
section is dedicated to autonomies, peoples’ self-determination, decentralisation, or similar. 
The government’s strategy documents 
The limited space of other autonomies in this model of state is reflected in crucial government strategy 
documents. As stated earlier, the 2010-2015 Government Plan (MAS-IPSP, 2009), dedicated a section 
to 'autonomy really for all'. In turn, the 2013 strategy 'Patriotic Agenda 2025' mentions 'autonom…' 
three times, 'autonomía' not at all (Gobierno de Bolivia, 2013). In turn, 'soberan…' as key term in the 
model of state above, appears 32 times on 12 pages and in the heading of ten out of 13 pillars of the 
agenda. In the 85-pages 2015-2020 Government Plan, 'autonomía' is found four times, with no further 
words starting with 'autonom…' (MAS-IPSP, 2014). 'Soberan…' appears 46 times. 
In the recent 2016-2020 National Development Plan (Gobierno de Bolivia, 2016) 'autonomía', which 
shares the key pillars with the Patriotic Agenda 2025, is mentioned nine times on the 216 pages, while 
'soberan…' appears 69 times. However, 79 words start with 'autonom…', which is to be seen in the 
light of the declaration that the autonomy regime has been consolidated (Gobierno de Bolivia, 2016, 
149 
 
p.186). Therefore, the plan mentions the autonomous entities as already established and functioning 
entities – in Chapter 8, I show that this is a misleading statement. 
7.5. Subordinating other autonomies to the social-communitarian model of state 
In this section, I show how the government has increasingly subordinated the other two visions of 
autonomy – autonomy as deepened decentralisation and self-determination of peoples – to the social-
communitarian state beyond strategic documents. This process started as early as 2011, but has 
accelerated and become more apparent since 2013/14. The more open post-2013 approach is to be 
seen against the background of the changes in the world market, strongly reflected in the Bolivian 
economy. Since the collapse of the world market in 2008, the prices for raw materials have appeared 
to grow steadily. Yet, as the following graphs show, the prices of petrol have dropped dramatically 
since 2014 (Graph 3), which has strongly affected the Bolivian economy, given the relevance of 
hydrocarbon in the total exports (Graph 4): 
 
Graphics 3 and 4: Petrol prices and composition of exports (Left: MEFP (2017b, p.5); Right: MEFP (2015, p.75)) 
In this scenario, the state is more constrained in responding to internal demands, since, seeking to 
sustain growth, it needs to mediate those external pressures. 
In the following, I consider how the space for autonomy beyond the self-determination of the pueblo, 
became smaller, looking at the enforcing mechanisms, rules and government practices. This also 
shows how the government influences these other two components.  
7.5.1. Enforcing mechanisms: Weakening the ministry and other central state entities 
The decreasing emphasis on autonomies in the documents was paralleled by personnel changes in the 
government. In mid-2011, Romero was appointed minister of the presidency173 and Claudia Peña, 
former vice-minister of autonomies, became new minister (Presidential Decree 906/2011). The 
                                                          
173 He remained a key figure in Morales cabinets, serving since 2012 as minister of the government, with a short interruption 
of running for senate and serving as senator in 2014/15. 
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cruceña is associated with the grouping 'Santa Cruz Somos Todos', an ally of the MAS-IPSP (Ministerio 
de Autonomías, 2011). Shortly after the 2014 national election, Hugo Siles (Núñez del Prado) was 
appointed as minister of autonomy (Presidential Decree 2249/2015). Siles had served as municipal 
councillor in Santa Cruz. Like Peña, he does not have a background closely entwined with the struggles 
for autonomy described in the last chapter.  
Peña and Siles were described by observers and ministry employees as politically much weaker than 
Romero (Interviews 44,70,103). After leaving her position, Peña retired from politics according to 
herself174. According to informants, the MAS-IPSP had put her into a difficult situation but expected 
her to reconcile dynamics that seemed impossible to reconcile. She is one of 13 out of a total number 
of 106 former MAS-IPSP ministers, who no longer occupy an official post (El Deber, 2017).  
The budget data might also indicate a weakening emphasis on the matter at the central state level. 
The following table175 demonstrates that the overall exercised budget has dropped and the share of 
the ministry’s budget in the total budget of all ministries has fallen.  
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Exercised budget (in Mio. 
BOB) 
52.2 41.3 56.7 40.3 31.0 34.4 
% of budget exercised for all 










Budget compared to other 
ministries 
5th last 5th last 4th last 4th last Last 2nd last 
Table 5: Budget of the Ministry of Autonomies (2010-2015), data from SEA (2016) 
Furthermore, while in 2010-2013 three or four other ministries exercised a smaller budget, in 2014 
and 2015, it was none or one. 
In early 2017, Morales reshuffled his cabinet (DS 3058/2017; 3059/2017). With this, the Ministry of 
Autonomies was degraded to a vice-ministry within the Ministry of the Presidency, which also meant 
that it returned under Romero’s control, who is now perceived as one of the closest confidants of 
Morales and García Linera. Simultaneously, a Ministry of Energy was established and Morales claimed 
that 'this ministry (…) will be the hope and economic future of our beloved Bolivia' (cited by La Razón, 
2017b, author´s translation), which resonates with the above-mentioned social-communitarian 
model. 
                                                          
174 During fieldwork, I visited her café and she was unwilling to give me an interview, pointing out that she did not want to 
talk and think about this experience. This reaction had been anticipated by some local informants.  
175 In this section and the following sections, I use government data, which is often the only available data. Yet, it should be 
treated with caution since I found inconsistencies in the annual reports and it is not stated, whether BOB are the total or 
controlled by inflation, which is why it appears important to also look at the percentages and treat timelines with caution. 
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Additionally, the SEA remains small, given its task of assisting the ETAs and the central state in the 
development of the autonomies. It can be consulted by all of the approximately 350 ETAs and the 
central state in case of border conflicts, conflicts over competences and similar. During fieldwork, the 
SEA had 38 employees, which was considered by the then Director as insufficient, given the workload 
(Interview 4). Furthermore, the CNA had arguably also not been used by the government as prescribed 
in the LMAD (see 7.5.3.).  
7.5.2. Rules: Limiting autonomy and enhancing control 
Since the MAS-IPSP has two thirds in both chambers of the Pluri-national Assembly and controls its 
members tightly, rule-making in Pluri-national Bolivia largely happens in the government’s interest. In 
this section, I include laws and also some related decrees, which do not belong to the 'rules' 
component of the central state in a strict sense. 
Limiting the scope for self-determination of peoples further 
Some months after the LMAD, the Law of Judicial Demarcation 073/2010 was instituted, which defines 
which legal matters are handled by the 'indigenous-original-peasant' (IOC) and ordinary jurisdiction. 
With this law, the content of which was key part of the pact in congress (see 6.3.4.), IOC jurisdiction is 
reduced to matters that are solely of local relevance and can only be applied to members of the 
community. Article 10 II excludes other matters. An indigenous authority from Salinas complained that 
'before our justice system was more complete, with the Law on Judicial Demarcation they have taken 
away many competences'176 (Interview 88).  
The Framework Law of Mother Earth and Integral Development for Living Well 300/2012, which 
recognises nature as bearer of rights, also known as Pachamama Law received international attention. 
Yet, critics often perceive it as no more than a 'nice poem' and not a proper law, since it lacks 
enforcement mechanisms (Interview 21). In the context of falling raw material prices in the world 
market, the government has increasingly pushed for more exploration for reserves. During the boom 
years, new reserves were hardly tapped and those that were will run out in some time (Gandarillas 
Gonzales, 2014, Interview 7).  
Two decrees from the first half of 2015, are, in this context, crucial for indigenous peoples’ autonomy. 
Firstly, in March, Supreme Decree 2298/2015 sought to accelerate the constitutionally-guaranteed 
prior consultation processes by limiting the consultation period to a maximum of 45 days (Art. 2 II). If 
the process cannot be concluded in this time, it can be prescinded from it and further continued with 
an Administrative Resolution (Art. 3 III). Not only does this limit the rights of peoples generally, it also 
                                                          
176 Salinas, 22.04.2016. 
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constrains the exclusive competence of development and exercise of mechanisms of prior 
consultation, given to the AIOC ETAs. Secondly, two months later with Supreme Decree 2366/2015, 
protected areas were opened for exploration and exploitation of hydrocarbon reserves. Eleven of the 
22 protected areas are directly affected by the present hydrocarbon frontier (Campanini, 2015). But 
even without this Decree, while in 2006, 1.2 million hectares of protected areas were committed to 
hydrocarbons and 285,000 mining, in 2014, there were over three million hectares to hydrocarbons 
and 305,000 to mining (Gandarillas Gonzales, 2014, p.128). This increase has consequences for people 
inhabiting these areas; in particular, lowland people are affected and internal conflicts and corruption 
and/or co-optation of (some) leaders does not facilitate resistance (Interview 5). 
In August 2017, the Law for building the controversial TIPNIS highway was passed. In this context, 
Morales claimed that '[t]his so-called colonial environmentalism is not interested in the indigenous 
movement having schools, hospitals; they are not interested in the indigenous movement having 
electricity or that we have highways' (cited by Collyns, 2017). Some days later, García Linera even 
claimed that the protected areas had been an invention of the gringos (Página Siete, 2017). All this is 
in stark contrast to idea of peoples’ self-determination. 
Taking resources from the ETAs 
The controversial Law 767/2015 also goes against the idea of autonomy, yet more against autonomy 
as decentralisation, since it further restricted the ETAs’ resources. With the objective of promoting 
investments in exploration and exploitation of hydrocarbons (Art. 1), the law establishes a fund that 
serves to attract investors. This fund is composed of 12 per cent of the IDH (see 7.3.2.) before the 
distribution to municipal and departmental ETAs and universities takes place (Art. 12 I). This led to 
criticism since the resources destined for the ETAs are now used to pay for a privative competence of 
the central state (Interview 38).  
Enhancing control over the ETAs through integral planning 
In the LMAD, integral development (Art. 7 II 2 LMAD) and integral planning (Art. 93 I 2 LMAD) are 
already conspicuously mentioned and the integral state planning system is seen as a key mechanism 
for the cooperation between central state and the ETAs (Art. 120, 130, 131 LMAD). Also the 2010-
2015 government plan states that 'we should accelerate the autonomous process in the country (…) 
which guarantees national unity and sustainable integral development in each region and the country' 
(MAS-IPSP, 2009, pp.73-74, author's translation). The above-mentioned 'Patriotic Agenda' (Gobierno 
de Bolivia, 2013) emphasises integral development and the latest national development plan is 
entitled 'Plan of Economic and Social Development in the Framework of Integral Development for 
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Living Well' (Gobierno de Bolivia, 2016). The 2015-2020 Government Plan (MAS-IPSP, 2014) speaks of 
marching towards the integral state (ibid., p.24).  
In early 2016, the government enacted the much-awaited Integral State Planning System Law 
777/2016 (SPIE). With this, integral planning is concretised as a hinge between the social-
communitarian state model and the autonomy regime. As in the case of the LMAD, it passed the Pluri-
national Assembly rather smoothly, given the large majority of the MAS-IPSP. For the Vice-Ministry of 
Planning and Coordination, it was a necessary law since the previous legislation was designed for a 
neoliberal state (Viceministerio de Planificación y Coordinación, 2016, p.2). The SPIE framework seeks 
to ensure that all actions of the public administration are oriented towards 'Living Well', needed to 
fulfil the National Development Plan and Patriotic Agenda (ibid., p.3). It should serve to ensure the 
coordination between different government entities and facilitate integral long-, medium- and short-
term planning. 
Following the SPIE, besides the annual operational plans approved by the highest executive authority 
of the corresponding entity (Art. 23 SPIE), the departmental, regional and municipal ETAs must 
elaborate a five-year 'Territorial Plan of Integral Development for Living Well' (PTDI). On one side, this 
must accord with the five-year National Development Plan (PDES), which is elaborated by government 
and approved by the Pluri-national Assembly in the first year of the electoral term (Art. 15 III SPIE). On 
the other side, it has to be coordinated with the 'Sectorial Plans of Integral Development for Living 
Well' (PSDI), explained, coordinated and submitted by the relevant ministry, checked by the governing 
body of the SPIE, in the Ministry of Development Planning (Art. 16 IV SPIE).  
The PTDI must be formulated within 180 days after the approval of the national PDES (Art. 17 V No 1 
SPIE), which does not respect the subnational electoral calendar and clearly indicates the 
subordination of the autonomous entities to the central level. Like the PSDI, the PTDI is also checked 
by the governing body of the SPIE (Art. 17 V No 2-5 SPIE) and if the plan is not adjusted following the 
check, the governing body informs the comptroller (Art. 17 IX SPIE). The autonomous departmental, 
regional and municipal governments monitor and evaluate the implementation of their plan, working 
closely with the Subsystem of Integral Monitoring and Evaluation of Plans, in coordination with the 
governing body of SPIE (Art. 17 V No 7 SPIE). Further reports and evaluations are prescribed (Art. 17 V 
No 8 SPIE).  
The AIOC must submit a 'Plan of Territorial Communitarian Management for Living Well' (PGTC). As in 
the case of the other ETAs, these must be elaborated in line with the PDES and coordinated with the 
other subnational and sectorial plans (Art. 18 III No 1 SPIE). This plan must follow the following 
structure: 1. Horizon/Vision of the IOC nation or pueblo, 2. Assessment of the situation of the IOC 
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nation or pueblo, 3. Policies and strategic outline concerning communitarian economy and production 
and territorial management, among others, 4. Plan of results and actions and 5. Five-year total budget 
(Art. 18 II No 2 SPIE).  
The elaboration takes place in a participatory way, following their own rules and procedures, yet still 
within 180 days after the PDES has been approved (Art. 18 III No 2 SPIE). Also here, the compatibility 
of the plan with the PDES and the competences assigned to the AIOC is evaluated at the central state 
level (Art. 18 III No 3 SPIE). The highest AIOC authority is responsible for making the adjustments (Art. 
18 III No 4 SPIE). As in the cases of the other subnational plans, if the plan is not adjusted, the governing 
body of the SPIE informs the comptroller (Art. 18 IV SPIE) and reports and evaluations are prescribed 
(Art. 18 III No 7 SPIE).  
This legislation is sometimes perceived as more centralising than the 1990s-legislation associated with 
the 2nd wave of neoliberal reforms (Interview 99). The government defines the role of the state as 
promoter and protagonist of development and decides what integral planning is. The autonomous 
entities develop their plans after and in accordance with the national plan and require approval from 
the central state level. Critics perceive it a top-down process, which opposes autonomy as a deepened 
decentralisation: 'What kind of autonomy do we have if the central government approves all our 
plans?', a departmental assembly member from Santa Cruz asked (Interview 34).  
The SPIE even more strongly contradicts the idea of peoples’ self-determination. While the indigenous 
communities have long experience in self-management, written rules and procedures for 
administrating their public life are not found in most highland, valley and lowland communities 
(Interview 1). Instead, collective decision-making and the context-specific application of values and 
principles are emphasised, which is far more unbureaucratic and flexible than the procedure laid out 
in the SPIE. It does not come as a surprise that some indigenous authorities from municipalities that 
entered the AIOC transition are severely disappointed or even intimidated by this law (see 8.4.) 
7.5.3. Government’ practices in tension with constitutionally established autonomies 
After having focused on enforcing mechanisms and rules, which are heavily influenced by the 
government, I now look at (further) government practices. In the regime set up in the CPE, autonomy 
has three aspects: Election of authorities, competences and resources (Art. 272 CPE). In what follows, 
I show how government actions are in conflict with and partly oppose these principles and how this 
has attracted criticism and led to conflicts. 
Lack of respect of directly-elected local and regional authorities? 
The controversial Article 144 LMAD presented the opportunity for suspending elected authorities 
based on a formal accusation. This was initiated by the governing party and led to the replacement of 
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Tarija’s elected Governor Cossío and Beni’s elected Governor Suárez with interim governors from the 
MAS-IPSP – with this, only Santa Cruz’ Governor Costas was left from the four177 media luna opposition 
prefects/governors178 (see Table 8). Also a considerable number of local authorities were suspended 
based on this norm (Interviews 24,29). In 2012, the Pluri-national Constitutional Court (TCP) declared 
Article 144 LMAD as unconstitutional, which can been seen as a 'tentative early indication of a certain 
independence of the judiciary' (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2016, p.8). 
Yet, it is questionable how far this prevented similar, less formal practices. For those in opposition, 
the MAS-IPSP also used this possibility of Article 144 to threaten oppositional authorities, seeking to 
subjugate them (Interview 20). During fieldwork, I came across cases where local authorities were said 
to be compliant with the MAS-IPSP, knowing that otherwise they would be threatened with, for 
example, trials for tax reasons (Interview 74). If used like this, such practices contravene the autonomy 
regime, as it does not respect elected local and regional authorities.  
Getting involved in ETAs competences through government programmes 
In the social-communitarian state, redistribution through social policies is a key task of the state. As 
shown in Graphic 1, three larger cash transfer programmes are crucial: the 2006 'Bono Juancito 
Pinto'179 for school children, the 2007 'Dignity Pension' for all elderly people180 and the 2009 'Bono 
Juana Azurduy'181 for mothers. In December 2015, almost half of the Bolivian population had received 
a transfer through one of these three programmes (MEFP, 2016, p.57). In addition, smaller 
programmes exist, like the bonus for the best final year student of each educational institution (DS 
1887/2014).  
Also through other programmes, involving specific projects, the government shows its presence in the 
entire country. With the 2006 'Programme of Social and Solidarity Housing', the government has 
directly engaged in the construction of social housing. According to a 2015 report, over 50.000 houses 
were built with a total budget of 1491 million BOB182 (PIEB, 2015). The programme 'Mi Agua' ('My 
Water') (DS 831/2011) , aims at improving water provision for consumption and irrigation and seeks 
to reduce poverty and improve agricultural productivity (MEFP, 2015, p.193). Until late 2016, 3177 
million BOB183 had been invested in 335 out of the total 339 municipalities (Manzaneda, 2016). In the 
                                                          
177 Pando’s Prefect had been arrested after the 'Pando Massacre' in 2008 (see 6.3.4.). 
178 With the CPE, the prefectures were replaced by the gobernaciones and so the former prefect was then the governor.  
179 It was established with Supreme Decree 28899/2009. 
180 This programme was not an invention of the MAS: It was introduced under Sánchez de Lozada in the 1990s, but was 
disbursed only once and the next president abolished it (Mesa Gisbert, 2003c, p.766). In his second Presidency, 'Goni' re-
established it with Law 2427/2002 as BONOSOL (Bono Solidario). With the dignity pension (Law 3791/2007), the access age 
was lowered from 65 to 60 and the amount increased from around annually 225 to around 300 USD (ibid., p.779). 
181 It was created with Supreme Decree 0066/2009. 
182 Approximately £160 mio (August 2017). 
183 Approximately £350 mio (August 2017). 
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first phase of the more recent 'Mi Riego' ('My Irrigation'), 128 million BOB184 were invested in 158 
projects in 322 municipalities (ibid.). 
Critics point out that projects are neither allocated transparently nor according to need, but motivated 
by political concerns. For example, with regards to social housing, local researchers found that the 
projects were not focused on areas of poor quality of housing or high population growth (PIEB, 2015). 
Since president and vice-president show their faces at numerous inaugurations and similar events, the 
perceived populist orchestration of the programmes has attracted criticism. Having said this, these 
projects are often important measures of 'palliative care' (Manzaneda, 2016) and the government 
appears to largely operate in the competence framework established in CPE and LMAD. 
In the following, I examine the programme 'Bolivia Cambia, Evo Cumple' ('Bolivia changes, Evo fulfils'), 
which is larger than the aforementioned ones and illustrates well the tensions between the social-
communitarian state and other autonomy visions. With 'Evo Cumple', resources are sent to 
municipalities and communities for carrying out projects in an array of sectors (MEFP, 2012, p.140). It 
was initially funded by the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA) but since July 
2011, the National Treasury pays for it (DS 913/2011).  
According to government data, a total number of 5,432 projects were carried out between 2007 and 
2013 (MEFP, 2015). If these had been distributed evenly across municipalities, approximately 16 
projects would have been carried out in each municipality in these eight years. In the 2007-2016 
period, education and sports have been the most prominent sectors with 40 and 27 per cent of 
disbursed resources respectively (MEFP, 2017a). In comparison, only 10 per cent were invested in the 
productive sector and six per cent in health (ibid.). In recent years, the investment in productive 
infrastructure has increased (ibid.), depicted by critics as buildings for government-friendly unions or 
similar.  
Since early on, critical voices have pointed to the lack of transparency in how projects are assigned 
and carried out – Evo would decide it all (Interview 25). According to the government, decisions on 
projects are made after a technical evaluation (MEFP, 2012, p.140). Yet, these documents are not 
accessible and critics consider these as vanity projects and as not targeting those in need (Interviews 
23,38).  
The following graph shows that investments were concentrated in the three most populated 
departments: La Paz, Cochabamba and Santa Cruz, with Santa Cruz receiving a considerably larger 
share since 2013: 
                                                          
184 Approximately £14 mio (August 2017). 
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Graphic 5: 'Evo Cumple' – resources per department and year (2007-2016); data from MEFP (2017a) 
The next chart compares the investment ratios to the population ratios and it becomes clear that 
Cochabamba and to a lesser extent, La Paz – the strongholds of the MAS-IPSP and strong in population 
– benefitted far more than Santa Cruz.  
  
Graphic 6: 'Evo Cumple' – resources per department (% of national population) (2007-2016); data from MEFP (2017a) and CEDIB (2013) 
While Cochabamba accounts for slightly less than 15 per cent of the population, it received 23 per 
cent of 'Evo Cumple' resources, while Santa Cruz, inhabited by over 25 per cent of the national 
population, only received 14 per cent of investments. It also does not seem that departments with 
higher poverty rates are targeted systematically over richer department. For example, Potosí, with the 
highest poverty rate of 81 per cent (PIEB, 2014) and inhabited by slightly over eight per cent of the 
population (CEDIB, 2013), has only received eight per cent of the resources. More detailed datasets 
could not be found, for example, projects distribution in departments. In conversation and interviews, 
I heard that in the Chapare – base of the cocalero movement – investments have been particularly 
strong (Interview 3). When I travelled through the region, I saw more 'Evo Cumple' plazas, stadiums 
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Looking at the budget, it becomes apparent that the amount and share in the overall budget has 
generally increased, also since the overall state budget shrunk in 2014/5: 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
 
2016 (p) 
Total (in mio 
BOB) 
99 71 46 91 11 88 754 825 752 2109 
% of total 
exercised 
budget 
n/a n/a n/a 0.6% 0.25% 0.5% 1.2% 1.2% 1.4% n/a 
Table 6: 'Evo Cumple' – resources as share of budget; 'Evo Cumple' data from MEFP (2017a), budget data from SEA (2016) 
For the 2017 budget, 1341 million BOB185 were assigned to 'Evo Cumple', which led to controversial 
discussions. Considering the decreased overall budget and the shrinking royalties and transfers to 
departments and municipalities, the approved amount was considered by some as unreasonably high. 
Yet, Minister Arce defended the plans by pointing to the importance of economic stability and resolve 
in the execution of public investment, which would be vital for economic growth (El Diario, 2016).  
'Evo Cumple' is in tension with autonomy as self-determination of peoples and as decentralisation 
since the central state is embroiled at different state levels. While the government would in fact only 
breach the competence regime established in CPE and LMAD in few cases (Interviews 29,40), 'Evo 
Cumple' often disrupts local planning if not properly coordinated (Interview 80). An employee of a 
local foundation recalled the case of a bridge in El Alto, in which the government did not even consult 
the municipality to ask, for example, how many lanes it should have (Interview 3). More generally, 
'Evo Cumple' is often considered a regression from the 1994 Public Participation Law (see 6.2.1.) 
(Interviews 20,99,103). Now, 'Evo says here and there, no planning'186, which leads to begging and the 
president would seem like a mayor whenever he wants wherever he wants (Interviews 8,62,80) - 'Who 
needs all these pitches? Well, they are now national priority because Evo said so' (Interview 21). With 
'Evo Cumple', the government tried to alleviate the pain somewhat, but it could not give the cities a 
motor so they would start their own lives (Interview 73).  
Another key criticism revolves around supposedly poor project supervision and quality of materials 
used, leading to deficient results (Los Tiempos, 2017a). For a former opposition senator it is clear that 
if they wanted to do this and not let the municipalities or departments do it, they should at least do it 
properly – but they would not be interested in leaving more than their names (Interview 35). Like the 
aforementioned programmes, the president himself or the vice-president would turn up at the 
inauguration ceremonies and celebrate, then just leave care for what happened after. For the 
                                                          
185 Approximately £145 mio (August 2017). 
186 Oruro, 14.04.2016. 
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president of a departmental civic committee, the government would de-concentrate problems, but 
centralise money to appear like a type of Santa Claus, who makes and resolves it all187 (Interview 101).  
The question of internal distribution: The fiscal pact 
Resources are next to elected authorities and competences, the third key aspect of established 
autonomy regime. Without resources, ETAs are severely limited and competences cannot be exercised 
properly. Hence, in what follows, the question of resource distribution inside Bolivia is addressed. 
Background I: Decreasing royalties and transfers for the ETAs 
As became apparent earlier, increasing limitation of the state-recognised autonomies as self-
determination of peoples and deepened decentralisation paralleled the changing dynamics at the 
world market (see 7.5.1.). For the ETAs, this has – as visible in the following graph – resulted in 
decreasing royalties and transfers, which are largely due to shrinking prices, yet also result from the 
above-mentioned legal measures.  
 
Graphic 7: Royalties and transfers (2005-2016); data 2005-2015: MEFP (2016, p.306) (2015 preliminary); 2016 data (estimated) from 
Fundación Jubileo (2016, p.6) 
Apart from the recent decline, this graph also indicates that the distribution between autonomous 
municipal governments (GAM) and prefectures/autonomous departmental governments (GAD) has 
undergone change. With Supreme Decree 29322/2007, the government altered the distribution of the 
IDH beyond the central state (see 6.3.3., 7.3.2.). While in 2005, 36.63 per cent went to the GAMs and 
46.11 to the GADs, since 2009, the GAMs receive more than 50 per cent, while the GADs’ share fell to 
under 30 per cent in 2015 (MEFP, 2016, p.306). In practice, in Cochabamba, La Paz, Oruro and Santa 
Cruz, the municipalities of the departmental capitals have in the past year exercised larger budgets 
than the whole departmental ETAs (SEA, 2016). 
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Background II: Proprietary resources 
With shrinking resources, it becomes even more important, how the remaining resources are spent. 
In this, the gobernaciones and municipalities continue to provide 30 per cent of their IDH share to the 
Dignity Pension, as the MAS-IPSP ruled in 2007 (see 6.3.3.). In late 2015, the above-mentioned 
controversial Law 767/2015 was passed, which further restricted the available resources.  
As mentioned above, the CPE and LMAD give ETAs the exclusive competence to create taxes, charges 
and special contributions within their jurisdiction, among others (see Table 4) and it is unregulated 
how these are to be spent. However, Article 323 IV CPE mentions important limitations and prohibits 
the imposition of taxes that are analogous to existing taxes (No 1). Law 154/2011 on classification and 
definition of taxes restricts this further (Interview 12). In Bolivia, the taxes related to economic 
activities are paid to the central state level and the municipalities collect taxes for housing and 
automobiles and similar (Interview 23). The municipalities also have income from already existing 
patents (Interview 21). This means there is little left for the departmental ETAs to tax considering their 
reluctance to attract anger from the population (Interviews 3,24,38). The following graphs show that 
proprietary resources have slightly increased for the GAD and GAM between 2010 and 2015, but still 
constitute a small share of the total resources with the GAM generating more resources than the GAD: 
 
Graphics 8 and 9: Share of proprietary resources in total resources – GAD and GAM (SEA, 2016) 
Background III: Distribution among ETAs and between central state and ETAs 
In addition to shrinking resources at the general level, distribution of resources remains highly uneven 
across Bolivia. Given the importance of royalties and transfers in the budget, mostly the hydrocarbon 
producing departments and municipalities have received more resources than others. In particular 
Tarija, with less than five per cent of the population and the second lowest poverty rate in Bolivia in 
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Graphic 10: Total resources GAD (2010-2015) (SEA, 2016) 
The 2012 census data also indicates migration towards the valleys and lowlands, since the population 
has increased far more in the lowlands and Cochabamba than in the highlands188 (CEDIB, 2013; 
Montero, 2013). This can be seen as legitimising the demand for redistribution from the former media 
luna departments for renegotiating internal redistribution. 
Key point of attack in the demands for more redistribution is the central state. As apparent in the 
following graph, between 2010 and 2015, less than 20 per cent of the current budget was allocated 
to the ETAs: 
 
Graphic 11: Total annual budget in force (2010-2015) (SEA, 2016) 
Following the estimation of the cruceño GAD Santa Cruz, when considering the above-mentioned 
Dignity Pension and recent the investor fund, the central government effectively controls around 88 
per cent of the total budget (GAD Santa Cruz, n.d.-e, p.17). 
The fiscal pact I: Delayed beginning 
With shrinking resources and uneven distribution, a fiscal pact on the generation, distribution and 
spending of public resources has in the past years turned into a key area of conflict between central 
government and some, mostly oppositional regional authorities. In this, the government has shown 
                                                          
188 When comparing the data from 2001 and 2012 census, the Bolivian population has increased by 25.5 per cent or 2,115,588 
people (CEDIB, 2013). Pando (107 per cent; +56,648), Santa Cruz (37 per cent; +746,773), Cochabamba (33 per cent; 
+482,690) and Tarija (30 per cent; +117,531) are above the average. Oruro (25 per cent), La Paz (17 per cent), Beni (17 per 
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no interest in deepening autonomy, understood as profound decentralisation. Autonomy as self-
determination of peoples has not been on the agenda.  
In the 7th Transitory Regulation of the LMAD, it states that within no more than six months after the 
publication of official census results, a technical proposal for a new fiscal pact is to be presented to 
the National Autonomy Council (CNA, see 7.3.2.) to start negotiations. This proposal is elaborated by 
the State Services of Autonomies (SEA, see 7.3.2.) in coordination with the Ministry of Autonomies 
and the MEFP. The president of the CNA, that is the president of the state, convenes the session (Art. 
124 I LMAD).  
The last census was published on the 30th of July 2013 (DS 1672/2013). Hence, the six months’ period 
ended on the 31st of January 2014. Yet, the first session of the CNA took place on the 11th of February 
2015 (CNA, n.d.). It was the first time the CNA met, despite the 2010 LMAD stating that it has two 
annual meetings. In early 2015, Vice-President García Linera signalled that putting the time-period 
into the Law had been a mistake in the first place (Villa, 2015). Yet, actors critical of the government 
see this delay as an indication of lacking interest. Also, according to an academic from Santa Cruz, it 
was no coincidence that the first meeting was just some months before the subnational elections 
(Interview 26).  
The fiscal pact II: Conformation between government vis-à-vis (oppositional) local and regional 
authorities 
Between February 2015 and mid-2017, a total number of five sessions have taken place (CNA, n.d.). 
In the first session, the vice-president made clear that the fiscal pact  
is a necessary element, but it has to contribute to, maintain, sustain and make the 
successful pluri-national development model better, it has to take place in the framework 
of the government plan, a strong presence of a redistributive state and it has to guarantee 
the Agenda 2025 (García Linera, cited by Chávez, 2015, author's translation). 
Against the demands for redistribution, he argued that giving resources to the regions would not 
establish an equilibrium, but would mean turning back towards neoliberalism 
the camouflaged neo-neoliberals, who are in some gobernaciones try to take from the 
central state, which has transformed itself into the motor of development, production, 
equality; they want to eradicate it while the attitude should be how do we produce more 
wealth (García Linera, cited by Erbol, 2015, author's translation). 
It is questionable how far such confrontational approach is in line with Article 215 LMAD, which speaks 
of decisions being taken consensually.  
In mid-2016, the situation became tenser, when oppositional governors and some mayors of large 
cities (Cochabamba, El Alto, La Paz, Potosí) demanded that against the background of the falling world 
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market prices that let to dramatically shrinking budgets, redistribution should be debated. The 
governor of La Paz, Felix Patzi, former MAS-IPSP ally and sometimes perceived as father of the Vivir 
Bien (Interview 20), even started a hunger strike to highlight the dramatic situation in the department. 
A representative from Tarija, sums up the opposition position as follows:  
The fiscal pact is (…) to give (…) more financial resources to the gobernaciones, 
municipalities and universities so that they can advances the competences, which they have 
been assigned since 2010 (Peralta, cited by Cardozo, 2016, author's translation). 
Local and regional authorities have increasingly negotiated and elaborated proposals for 
redistribution. They all forecast that fewer resources remain at the central level, suggesting that the 
central state should receive no more than 50 (Santa Cruz, Tarija) or 65 per cent (La Paz) of taxes or 
control less than 80 per cent of the budget (Gran Chaco) (see, among others, La Paz (SED-FMC/GADLP, 
2017); Santa Cruz (GAD Santa Cruz, n.d.-e, p.17); Tarija (Escalante, 2017b); Gran Chaco (Alemán, 
2017)).  
The vice-president responded to these demands by criticising the rentier attitude of the actors and 
further blamed them for lacking capacity to generate proprietary resources (Los Tiempos, 2016). More 
recently, Vice-Minister Siles emphasised that the fiscal pact´s vision is not redistributive, but that 
attention should be paid to the development of subnational policies, which generate proprietary 
resources (Los Tiempos, 2017c). Yet, as I showed above the current proprietary resources are not just 
limited, but also the possibility for raising more proprietary income is severely restrained. 
An NGO employee highlights that the government is unwilling to open the debate on the fiscal pact 
on how development should happen, as would be the case in an autonomy regime (Interview 8), which 
would deepen decentralisation. In addition, the AIOC has not been on the agenda at all. At the time 
of writing, a signing of the fiscal pact was officially expected soon, but debates continue and are far 
from settled.  
7.6. The flexible handling of autonomy in the international arena 
While the Bolivian government has increasingly attempted to subordinate the other visions of 
autonomies to the social-communitarian state model associated with the idea of autonomy as self-
determination of the pueblo, on the international stage, the pluri-national modality still appears more 
like a chameleon. This shows how the different visions of autonomy are present in the pluri-national 
modality. 
7.6.1. Autonomy as sovereignty of the Bolivian pueblo 
Within the social-communitarian state model, Bolivia is dependent on favourable deals with 
neighbouring countries to which it seeks to export resources from strategic sectors, mainly gas and 
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increasingly energy. Only with the generated surplus, can Bolivia´s economy slowly undergo the 
aspired structural transformation (see 7.4.2.). Argentina and Brazil especially are key partners and 
signed large deals with Bolivia shortly after Morales’ inauguration.  
Simultaneously, as evident in measures like the investor fund, the government seeks to attract foreign 
companies, ensuring a favourable investment climate. After the renegotiation of contracts following 
nationalisation of hydrocarbons none of the companies left, and more deals were signed. In the 
Magazine of Siemens, the General Manager of state-owned electricity corporation ENDE emphasised 
'we have felt the effects of the global decline in hydrocarbon prices and other commodities, but 
Bolivia’s economy remains one of the most stable and fastest growing in the hemisphere' (Villarroel, 
2016). Signing a deal with Siemens, Morales said that 'our fraternal entrepreneurs have energy 
guaranteed, we have spare energy, we have reserves and with these investments, we are getting 
ready to export' (cited by Cuiza, 2016, author´s translation). On such occasions, he highlights Bolivia’s 
(energy) sovereignty, stating, for example, that projects belong to Bolivia and not to the investor(s).  
7.6.2. Autonomy as peoples’ self-determination 
The pluri-national modality at times also appears to support the self-determination of peoples. For a 
government-critical academic and former political authority, the international partners and 
organisations wish that 'all the indigenous works well' in Bolivia (Interview 32). In 2007, Bolivia was 
the first country to sign UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 61/295 and since early 
on, Morales and his long-term Foreign Minister Choquehuanca189 have on various occasions given 
speeches emphasising their concern with Mother Earth and indigenous peoples. In the 2015 COP21 in 
Paris, for example, Morales claimed that 'Mother Earth is getting dangerously close to its end' and 
made the capitalist system responsible for this, 'saving Mother Earth to save life - that is our 
endeavour' (cited by Gosden and Samuel, 2015). On the 10th anniversary of the aforementioned 2007 
UN Declaration, he pointed out that 'indigenous peoples are the moral compass of humanity, with 
their own ways of organization and production' (United Nations, 2017). The transformation of Bolivia, 
having gone from a colonial to a pluri-national and sovereign state would demonstrate what might be 
possible at the global level (ibid.).  
At times, the AIOC has served as a signpost for underpinning these concerns and highlighting the 
advancement of processes in Bolivia. In May 2106, a Bolivian delegation, including the Minister of 
Autonomies Siles and indigenous authorities from Charagua and Raqaypampa, the most advanced 
transition processes (see Table 14), went to the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues of the United 
                                                          
189 Choquehuanca, associated with the CSUTCB, was in office from 2006 to early 2017, when Huanacuni Mamani became 
Foreign Minister. Since March 2017, Choquehuanca is Secretary General of ALBA and is seen as Morales’ potential successor 
if his re-election is prevented. 
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Nation (UNSDN, 2016). These authorities should share their experience of the advancing AIOC in 
Bolivia.  
7.6.3. Autonomy as deepening of decentralisation 
Finally, the third vision of autonomy becomes apparent at the international stage, too. This is realised, 
for example, in projects of Development Corporation, in which the Ministry of Autonomies is the 
national counterpart. When speaking to a representative of the German Corporation for International 
Cooperation (GIZ), which was then about to sign a contract with the Bolivian government for a project 
supporting the autonomies, she saw the AIOC as a small 'lucky bag', not knowing what to expect 
(Interview 123). The 2015-2018 pilot project objective is that 'selected subnational authorities have 
created better conditions for the coordinated, decentralised provision of their services' in health and 
economic development (GIZ, n.d.). This project does not seem to differ from decentralisation projects 
in other (non-pluri-national) states. 
7.7. Summing-up 
In this chapter, I analysed how the central state components have mediated the new autonomy 
regime. In this, I showed that the pluri-national state and its central state components are 
characterised by the existence of three visions of autonomy, which respond to the different sets of 
struggles, introduced in Chapter 6. Yet, autonomy as deepened decentralisation, as self-determination 
of peoples and as national self-determination of the Bolivian pueblo are inherently conflicting.  
The autonomy regime itself seems, overall, to resemble one that promotes a rather conventional 
decentralisation. In this, AIOC appears as an annex, which is granted some specificity, finding 
expression in legislation and enforcing mechanisms. Profound change and moves towards 
decolonisation, required for the different state have not occurred. Instead, state-recognised peoples’ 
self-determination and the AIOC seems largely subordinated to rule of money and law. 
More generally, the whole autonomy regime appears limited by the government´s concern for 
recuperating the sovereignty of the Bolivian pueblo, with which it seeks to achieve profitable 
accumulation by incorporating the powerful demands for a 'stronger state' and redistribution while 
mediating external pressures. Particularly, since the end of the resource boom, the government 
attempted to subordinate self-determination of peoples and deepened decentralisation to their vision 
of autonomy related to sovereignty of the Bolivian pueblo. This becomes apparent in shaping the 
enforcing mechanisms, enacting legislation with tightly controlled members of the Assembly and 




Yet, it became apparent that this has not led to a reconciling of the contradictory tendencies between 
the different visions of the autonomy found in the pluri-national state. In addition, the presence of 
the different visions of autonomy can also be seen in the government’s flexible use of it in the 
international sphere. 
As shown in this chapter, despite the government’s attempt to limit the space of the autonomy 
regime, it did not annihilate the different visions of autonomy or even the autonomy regime as such. 
The following chapter looks more closely at how the autonomy regime has unfolded beyond the 




Chapter 8. The Pluri-national State: Autonomy regime beyond the 
central state and redirection of struggles 
8.1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I showed how demands for autonomy, which entered the pluri-national CPE, 
have been translated into and by the central state components. It became clear that the government, 
also intervening into the other state components, has made efforts to subordinate autonomy as 
peoples’ self-determination and deepened decentralisation to the promoted autonomy as self-
determination of the Bolivian pueblo. Yet, this did not lead to an annihilation of those other ideas of 
autonomy.  
This chapter covers the last part of the form-analysis in moving back from the form to struggles. It 
sheds light on how state-recognised autonomies have advanced at local and regional levels and gives 
some indications how struggles for autonomy have been redirected. It is organised in three main parts, 
one for each type of newly recognised autonomy. In each of those, I first look at the processes of 
entering the autonomy regime and formal advancement. Then, I provide insights into present 
dynamics and challenges related to the redirection of struggles in pluri-national Bolivia. Yet, I 
acknowledge that all processes are complex, different and recent, and I can therefore give not more 
than an indication in this chapter. 
8.2. Departmental autonomies 
The incorporation of departmental autonomy into the 2009 CPE translated the demands for 
deepening decentralisation at the departmental level (see 6.2.1.). In the previous chapter, I showed 
how the government mostly seems to work against this, which has led, for example, to conflicts with 
the oppositional governors in the fiscal pact negotiations. In the next subsections, I demonstrate how 
the autonomy regime has unfolded at the departmental level. The formal advancements, which are 
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Table 7: Formal advancement of departmental autonomy; sources: Georgetown University (2017) for 2006, 2008 and 2009 referenda; OEP 
(2015a) for 2015 referenda. 
8.2.1 Entering the autonomy status and perfecting it with statutes 
As in the case of the other two newly recognised types of autonomy, entering the departmental 
autonomy requires a supporting majority of voting-age population in the concerned territory. The CPE 
recognised the positive outcome of the 2006 referendum on departmental autonomy in some regions 
(see 6.3.3.), and so, the media luna departments Beni, Pando, Santa Cruz and Tarija could directly 
enter the departmental autonomy regime (Transitory Regulation No 3 I CPE). In the other five 
departments, where the majority had rejected the departmental autonomy in 2006, another 
referendum was needed.  
                                                          
190 The declarations can be found via https://buscador.tcpbolivia.bo/(S(0cbwp0xznyrzefvelz4nixwx))/WfrResoluciones.aspx, 
accessed on the 30.05.2017. 
191 With the first declaration, the TCP returns the Statute with observations for modification and re-submission. 
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These referenda took place alongside the general elections of late 2009, in which Morales was re-
elected as president with 64.22 per cent of the vote and the MAS-IPSP received over two thirds of 
seats in both chambers of the Pluri-national Assembly (Georgetown University, 2017). Following the 
MAS-IPSP’ advice, in all five departments, over two thirds of the voters supported entering the 
autonomy regime (ibid.). Yet, a large share of the population did not know what autonomy would 
involve and also, for example, the LMAD was not yet in place (Interviews 84,86). 
Having entered the autonomy regime, bringing autonomy to perfection needs a statute in force since 
until it is in place, the autonomy is exercised based on the framework law. Once the statute is in force, 
the autonomous territorial entity (ETA) ceases to depend on the LMAD and develops secondary 
legislation in the framework of the competences, established in its statute.  
The new departmental assemblies, whose members were elected in the subnational election on the 
4th of April 2010 (see Table 8), is key in this, since its members adopt the draft statute with a two-
thirds majority before submitting it for the constitutionality check to the Pluri-national Constitutional 
Court (TCP) (Art. 61 I 2 LMAD). The statutes’ minimum content is as follows (Art. 62 I LMAD): 
1. Declaration of subjection to the CPE and laws 
2. Identity of the autonomous entity 
3. Location of its territorial jurisdiction 
4. Organisational structure and identification of authorities 
5. Form of organisation of the legislative or deliberative organ 
6. Powers and attributes of the authorities, assuring compliance with the executive, legislative and 
deliberative functions; its election proceedings, requisites and periods of mandate 
7. General dispositions about planning, administration of heritage and financial regime, clearly establishing 
the institutions and authorities of the administration and control of fiscal resources 
8. Provisions for administrative de-concentration in the case needed 
9. Mechanisms and forms of participation and social control 
10. Regime for minorities which might or might not belong to the indigenous nations or pueblos and inhabit 
the territory 
11. Regime of equality of gender, generations, and of people with disabilities  
12. Institutional relations of the autonomous entity  
13. Procedures of a total or partial reform of the statute  
14. Dispositions regulating the transition until the statute is fully applied 
 
If considered necessary by the pueblo, the statute can, for example, also cover official languages and 
symbols of the pluri-national state and own symbols (Art. 63 III LMAD).  
With regards to how the statute is approved, CPE and LMAD distinguish between the four media luna 
departments, which had statutes adopted in the controversial 2008 referenda (see 6.3.4., Table 7) and 
the other five departments (3rd Transitory Regulation CPE; Art. 61 LMAD). For understanding if and 
how statutes have been adopted, it is important to take into consideration the political configuration 





Table 8: Political configuration in departmental ETAs; sources: OEP (2010) for 2010 subnational elections; OEP (2015b) for 2015 
subnational elections. 
Adjusting the statutes with the CPE in the lowlands 
As mentioned in 6.3.4., in Beni, Pando, Santa Cruz and Tarija, statutes had been elaborated parallel to 
the constituent process. Critics find that the elaboration of the statutes was not (sufficiently) 
participatory and that low numbers of votes cast made it impossible to derive legitimacy from them 
                                                          
192 IOC representatives are elected through traditions and customs (usos y costumbres) and not in the subnational elections. 
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(Interview 104). Nevertheless, actors involved in the process claim that, given the circumstances, it 
was as participatory as possible (Interview 72). 
With the 2008 pact between prefects and MAS-IPSP government, the government accepted the 
statutes and referenda result under the condition that the statutes were made compatible with the 
CPE. This fundamentally involves a check of the TCP (3rd Transitory Regulation II CPE), which should 
take a maximum of 45 days (Art. 119 III Code of Constitutional Procedure 254/2012). The TCP can 
reject the proposed statute or declare it fully or partially constitutional193. In the latter case, the 
statute can be adapted and resubmitted.  
At the time of writing, only Pando and Tarija had approved statutes (Ministerio de Autonomías, 2015). 
In Pando, the statute entered into force in 2014 and Tarija’s statute was declared constitutional in 
2015 (see Table 7). In Tarija, the process was tense since the elected governor from the national 
opposition, Cossío, was forced out of office in 2011 and replaced by an interim governor from MAS-
IPSP, who remained in office until 2015 (see 7.5.3.). In addition, the national opposition held a majority 
in the departmental assembly, but not the two thirds required for approving the adjustments. 
In Santa Cruz, the statute was sent to the TCP some months after the subnational elections in 2015, 
in which the national opposition gained a two third majority in the assembly (Interviews 33,34). 
Members from the largest party led by the governor Costas, the VERDES, describe the assembly 
members from MAS-IPSP as solely responding to the national party, which is why they had blocked 
the earlier adoption of the statute, necessary for the submission to the TCP (Interviews 29,33). After 
17 months instead of the legal prescribed maximum of 45 days, the TCP declared the partial 
constitutionality of the submitted proposal (Table 7). 
A statute from Beni has not been presented to the TCP. The first assembly had been balanced, with 
no party having a strong majority, while three different governors had been in place, which led to 
disruptions. Since the 2015 election, the scenario looks more favourable, since MAS-IPSP has a 
majority, and could obtain two thirds when collaborating with indigenous and peasant assembly 
members. Also the governor comes from the MAS-IPSP. Yet, it requires an analysis of the particular 
setting to see why no statute has been presented. 
The process of making the statutes compatible with the CPE is criticised by lowland actors from the 
national opposition. The whole process would take far longer than expected and the TCP would have 
always exceeded its prescribed deadline by far, which is why people would get tired of the topic 
                                                          
193 It is beyond the scope of this thesis to elaborate on the rulings of the TCP. See Ministerio de Autonomías (2015) for all 
submitted statute projects with the observations and adjustment made. 
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(Interview 34). In addition, the idea of making the statute compatible curtails the autonomy, especially 
since the TCP would be co-opted by the MAS-IPSP (Interview 103). In Bolivia, the judges of the TCP 
and other high courts are publicly elected (Chapter V, Law 26/2010) and the candidate selection 
before the 2011 elections and campaigning caused controversial and polarised discussions. While the 
government speaks of a deepening of democracy, critics point to the heavy involvement of the MAS-
IPSP in the election, seeking to bring in their preferred candidates. Similar debates can be observed in 
the run-up to the elections which are planned to take place in December 2017. 
The statutes in the valleys and highlands 
After Chuquisaca, Cochabamba, La Paz, Oruro and Potosí had entered the autonomy regime following 
the referenda, the elaboration of statutes was the key task of the first departmental assemblies, even 
mentioned as first exclusive competence of the departmental ETAs (Art. 300 I 1. CPE). As visible in 
Table 8, in all five assemblies, the MAS-IPSP had an overwhelming majority, enabling it to approve the 
draft statutes without forming alliances. In addition, the governors also came from the MAS-IPSP.  
All assemblies managed to adopt a draft statute that was submitted to the TCP, where it remained for 
over a year in most cases instead of 45 days. While the statutes were in the TCP, the next round of 
subnational elections took place in May 2015. In these, the MAS-IPSP maintained their large majority 
in the five assemblies and control over four of the five gobernaciones194 (see Table 8). In Cochabamba, 
Oruro and Potosí almost all, if not all, members of the assemblies from the MAS-IPSP were replaced 
and it is likely that something similar occurred in Chuquisaca and La Paz (Interviews 80,104). This led 
to a situation in which new assembly members had to diffuse a statute that they did not elaborate 
and encourage participation in the referenda that were needed for adopting the statutes. In all five 
departments, the majority rejected the statutes in September 2015, leaving them without an 
autonomy statute in force (see Table 7).  
The interviewees who had been directly involved in or closely followed the processes in Oruro, Potosí 
and Cochabamba, observed a lack of autonomist spirit among the local politicians and people more 
generally compared with the media luna (Interviews 73,79). The assembly members from the MAS-
IPSP are often seen as lacking the technical and legal knowledge of the process (Interviews 
73,75,77,80,103), which government critics see as a MAS-IPSP strategy to better ensure their control 
over the assemblies (Interview 80). The assembly members from the MAS-IPSP I encountered had 
been peasant leaders and mining unionists before becoming politicians and often originated from 
rural communities. Critics claim that these assembly members would then not act as proper 
community leaders, but just respond to the party line (Interviews 35,87,98,104). In this context, the 
                                                          
194 Felix Patzi, a former ally of Morales, became Governor of La Paz (also 7.5.3.). 
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replacement of most or all assembly members is seen by critics as a way of preventing the growing 
independence of assembly members through the accumulation of knowledge and experience. 
The rejected statutes are often said to have come from the national level and not from the local 
population and to represent a centralising logic (Interviews 29,30,71,75), which is sometimes backed 
up with an argument that the observations from the TCP were mostly of a formal nature (Interview 
101). Locals reported that initially local organisations and populations were invited to submit 
proposals, yet those were later not or only partially included (Interviews 75,96,101).  
While a former senator from Oruro recalled that the vice-president interpreted the rejection of the 
statutes as evidence that the pueblo wants a strong central state as suggested in the social-
communitarian model (Interview 75), my research showed that a crucial aspect in the rejection was a 
lack of information or even misinformation. (Former) members of the assemblies state that the 
dissemination of the statute went well, or, at least, that they did their best (Interviews 80,87,104). 
More critical voices say that especially in rural areas, people were not familiar with the statute’s 
content, making them prone to spreading rumours which arguably fed into rejecting the statutes 
(Interviews 35,42,89,97). While MASistas claim that many people would not have been interested in 
the matter, other say that they should have taken more time to explain the content of the statute to 
the population (Interviews 77,88,95). In Oruro, for example, people thought that taxes were 
established with the statute, according to which they would have to pay for each llama or similar, 
which is incorrect (Interviews 74,88,89). My spot checks in rural communities confirmed this 
misinformation. The people associated with the MAS-IPSP accuse the opposition of having spread the 
rumour, and vice versa (Interviews 87,95). 
At the time of writing, none of the five assemblies had submitted a new statute for constitutional 
control. The then president of the assembly in Oruro claimed that they would leave the elaboration 
of a new proposal to the next assembly which assumes office after the next subnational elections 
scheduled for 2020 (Interview 87). During fieldwork, also in Potosí and Cochabamba, they had not 
started to rework it either (Interviews 96,97).  
8.2.2. Departmental ETAs in practice 
In this subsection, I present some insights into how the departmental ETAs have been operating in 
past years and how far struggles for departmental autonomy have become redirected. As explained 
in 7.5.3., limited resources are a key challenge for the departmental ETAs (apart from Tarija), as this is 
widely perceived as limiting the capacity to exercise autonomy. It is widely acknowledged that this 





A key innovation of the autonomy regime is that the departmental, municipal and AIOC ETAs can enact 
laws. In the first term of the departmental ETAs, a total number of 1,178 laws were enacted, making 
an average of 131 per department. This number is high when comparing to it to the 1,713 municipal 
laws, which came into force, meaning around five per municipality. The following table shows the 





La Paz Oruro Pando Potosi Santa 
Cruz 
Tarija 
41 215 517 74 68 22 49 72 120 
Table 9: No of laws adopted per department (2010-2015) (data provided by the Ministerio de Autonomías) 
Looking more closely at the new laws, the Ministry of Autonomies classified 133 of these 1,178 laws, 
that is 11.3 per cent, as regulatory ones – all others are considered declaratory (ibid.). Despite 
variations between assemblies, over two thirds of the laws in each department are non-regulatory. 
Around half of the departmental laws concern the annual operational plan, the budget and the 
administration, followed by around 14 per cent being related to culture and tourism, for example, 
declaring something cultural patrimony or granting a holiday. Of the areas with more potential for 
regulation, seven per cent are related to productive development, commerce and agribusiness and 
five per cent concern children, women and the elderly. Three and two per cent of the laws relate to 
motorways and roads as well as sports (ibid.). This indicates that so far the departmental ETAs have 
overall not yet started to properly exercise their legislative competences.  
While the severe budget limitations are seen as playing a role in explaining this, the aforementioned 
apparent lack of education and experience of the assembly members as well as control from the 
centre, especially the MAS-IPSP in the highlands, are often considered key contributors to the limited 
regulatory legislation (Interviews 29,37,75). A former oppositional member of the assembly in Oruro 
told me the following anecdote, which gives an indication of how law-making at the departmental 
level can operate: 
When I was member of the assembly (…) the investment budget of Oruro was 
approximately 150 million BOB, around 20 million USD, little. As Evo goes to all 
communities by plane or whatever, and plays football and he has gifted so many pitches 
already, someone said to the members of the assembly from the MAS: you approve a law 
so that every province has a pitch (…) with money from the gobernación. They proposed a 
law, and said 32 million BOB of the 150, so that each of the 16 provinces has its pitch. Of 
course, I was opposed to this (…). How is it possible that we spend 32 million on pitches, 
when the budget for agricultural development is six million?195 (Interview 80) 
                                                          
195 Oruro, 14.04.2016. 
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Relations between ETAs’ organs  
The relationship between assemblies and gobernaciones is described as far from the imagined ideal 
of respect and control, while the population pays the price for the mismanagement (Interviews 
43,45,77). In cases like Oruro, Potosí and Santa Cruz, where both organs are controlled by the same 
party, the assembly´s control of the executive is de facto absent, since the assembly is perceived as 
subordinated to the governor (Interviews 77,79,97). In the case of Tarija, where the organs had been 
controlled by different political forces, collaboration was reported to often fail (Interviews 43,52) – 
the governor would govern with decrees and the laws from the assemblies would not be applied 
(Interview 70). Santa Cruz´s autonomy process appears the most advanced process, which might not 
come as a surprise given the historical antecedents (see 6.2.1.). Here, assembly members insist that 
they speak up against the governor if they disagree – it does not matter if (s)he is from the same party 
or not, it is part of their mandate (Interviews 19,33).  
Interaction with municipalities and the central state enforcing mechanisms 
Also the relationship with the municipalities poses a challenge to the departmental autonomy 
processes. In some cases, due to political or personal rivalries, there is severe misspending instead of 
collaboration or coordination and the lack of clarity in the competence regime does not help 
(Interview 23, see 7.2. and 7.3.2.).  
Employees of the Ministry of Autonomies told me they observe large differences between the 
attitudes of people working in the ETAs. In the highlands and valleys, at seminars or similar, people 
expect that the ministry staff tells them what to do and how to do it (Interviews 12,30,75). 
Government programmes like the 'Evo cumple' that helps to distort local planning would not help 
them to start assuming their role and exercise the autonomy.  
In turn, in the lowlands, in particular, in Santa Cruz and Tarija, actors would take more initiatives. In 
Santa Cruz, assembly members point to the notion of 'autonomía al andar', frequently used by the 
governor to describe the autonomies as a process, meaning that while working within the existing 
framework, the struggle continues (Interview 29). At the same time, following the Director of the State 
Autonomy Service (SEA), Santa Cruz and Tarija would not even consult the SEA for questions but figure 
them out themselves, since they mistrust the supposedly government-led SEA (Interview 4). Yet, this 
is also possible because their advisors and technical staff are widely described as more competent 
than those in other departments. 
IOC members of assemblies 
A crucial demand of indigenous groups was to enhance their representation. In those departmental 
assemblies where representation is not expected to occur automatically, up to five seats are reserved 
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for indigenous representatives and, in the case of Beni, peasants (see Table 8). These assembly 
members are generally not seen as having so far made a great difference, which is partly related to 
the small numbers (Interviews 19,40,87,95). Those who had been in this position, or served as advisors 
in Santa Cruz and Tarija, reported racism or discrimination and that they were not taken seriously in 
the assembly if they did not join one of the parliamentary groups (Interviews 28,64,68). A former 
indigenous representative from Tarija said that he felt that the different groups in the assembly sought 
to use him to get his vote and did not show real interest in his concerns (Interview 63). For other 
(former) assembly members, the IOC representatives are incompetent and replaced too often196, 
making it difficult to collaborate with them (Interviews 30,33,37,40). 
Redirection of struggles outside the state 
As seen in 7.5.3., Santa Cruz and Tarija, are, together with Patzi, at the forefront of the opposition in 
the fiscal pact. Yet, their power is perceived smaller compared to the early 2000s – it appears mainly 
as political opposition that is not backed anymore by the key business elites (Interviews 12,18). Radical 
cruceño voices have also softened. A former president of the Civic Committee and key figure in the 
Nación Camba (see 6.2.1.) told me that the Camba Nation is one of the nations in the pluri-national 
state (Interview 15).  
At the same time, in some instances, local or regional actors or organisations from the highlands 
started picking up the notion of (departmental) autonomy. This is remarkable since, as shown in 
Chapters 5 and 6, these departments do not have a history of such struggles. For example, the 
president of the Civic Committee of Potosí, who is not associated with a party, advocated a deepening 
of the autonomies, at some points even suggesting a federal state model, which entered national 
headlines in mid-2015. It is his mission to bring the resources to Potosí, which Bolivia historically owes 
(Interview 96). These would be desperately needed to combat the high levels of poverty, the lack of 
decent employment opportunities and the poor quality of public education and health care (ibid.). 
Despite not having had success in the attempt demanding a rewriting of the CPE, the initiative has 
raised awareness and he optimistically sees the autonomist spirit growing.  
8.3. Regional autonomy/ies 
As shown in 6.2.1., the demand for regional autonomy was closely associated with the hydrocarbon-
rich Chaco region. So far, the Gran Chaco province in Tarija is the only case, where the state-recognised 
regional autonomy has advanced, as the following table shows:  
                                                          
196 They are elected following usos y costumbres, making it possible that they are replaced during the electoral term. A former 
representative sees a key problem in that there is little understanding in the communities of the processes in the assembly 
and the dynamics surrounding it – therefore, he found it hard to explain why he could not achieve what his people had asked 
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Table 10: Formal advancement of regional autonomy; sources: Georgetown University (2017) for 2009 referendum; OEP (2016) for 2016 
referendum. 
The scope the regional autonomy 
Following the CPE, the regional autonomy is made up of various municipalities or provinces with 
geographic continuity and that belong to the same department (Art. 280 CPE). The inclusion of the 
departmental limits had been a crucial point in the 2008 pact between prefects and the national 
government (see 6.3.4.) – yet, this was not what Chaco authorities and civil society organisations had 
originally wanted envisioning a large Chaco region, uniting the three Chacos of Chuquisaca, Santa Cruz 
and Tarija (Interviews 53,58,64).  
As pointed out in 7.2., the CPE does not assign legislative power and, more generally, competences to 
the regional ETAs, but states that it receives competences through transfer or delegation199, which 
happens with two thirds of votes in the departmental assembly (Art. 280 III, 301 CPE). With 
Departmental Law 079/2013, Tarija’s departmental assembly conferred all possible competences to 
the Gran Chaco region. 
Accessing the regime and 'perfecting' the autonomy 
As visible in the table above, in late 2009, parallel to the national election and referenda on 
departmental autonomies, over eighty percent of the votes cast in the Gran Chaco province were in 
favour of a regional autonomy. In the subnational elections in April 2010, in each of the three 
municipalities, voters decided over two representatives for the assembly. The three indigenous groups 
in the area, Guaraní, Weenhayek and Tapiete, sent – following their customs – one member for the 
assembly each. Over the next years, the assembly had the primary task of elaborating the statute (see 
8.2.1. for the minimum content), which later received approval from the TCP and from 73 per cent of 
the voters in the September 2016 referendum (see Table 10). 
                                                          
197 The declarations can be found via https://buscador.tcpbolivia.bo/(S(0cbwp0xznyrzefvelz4nixwx))/WfrResoluciones.aspx, 
accessed on the 30.05.2017. 
198 With the first declaration, the TCP returns the Statute with observation for modification and re-submission. 




Even though local authorities and representatives of civil society organisations highlight the unity of 
the actors involved in the process, during the elaboration of the statute conflicts came to the 
forefront. In this, splits occurred along municipal rather than party lines (Interviews 57,59). While 
Yacuiba has the largest population (92,245, Census 2012200), most tapped hydrocarbons reserves are 
in Caraparí, inhabited by around 15,000 people. The third municipality, Villamontes, has 
approximately 40,000 inhabitants. The initial proposal established that the headquarters of the 
regional ETA would be in Villamontes and the assembly in Caraparí. Yet, authorities from Yacuiba were 
unwilling to accept this and the statute in force shows a compromise, placing the seat of the regional 
assembly in Villamontes (Art. 23) and the headquarters in Yacuiba (Art. 34). In Caraparí, the regional 
treasury is likely to be established, even though it is not written in the statute (Interview 54).  
A similar compromise is evident in the three figures in the executive organ comprising a regional 
ejecutivo and two ejecutivos of development (Interviews 54,56). While the first is elected by universal 
suffrage in the region and is hence expected to come from Yacuiba (Interview 54), Villamontes and 
Caraparí elect one development ejecutivo each (Art. 52 Statute Gran Chaco).  
All about controlling the 45 per cent? 
This apparent lack of willingness to enter a deeper regional process can be partly understood against 
the background of disappointment due to the restrictions in CPE and LMAD that establish the regional 
autonomy as a space of joint planning. Yet, it is also often seen as an indication that this autonomy 
project serves the consolidation of the 45 per cent of the regalías, which was achieved some years 
before (see 6.2.1.). The management of their own resources was mentioned to me as key aim of the 
autonomy by different leaders of local civil society organisations and local politicians (Interviews 
57,58,60,65,66,71). As pointed out in 6.2.1., in first decade of the 21st century, exports rose, leading 
to rising regalías201. 
Before the regional autonomy, the 45 per cent went to and were controlled by local representatives 
of the gobernación, who did not always get along with the mayors (Interview 70). In Tarija, the 
ejecutivo seccional/sub-governor202 had been directly elected by the population, but especially since 
the direct election of the prefect in 2005, this figure was controversially discussed (Lizárrago Araníbar 
and Vacaflores Rivero, 2007, p.80). Initially, Prefect Cossío sought to appoint the ejecutivos 
seccionales, which caused conflict, agitated by the peasant movement (ibid., pp.80-85). In the control 
                                                          
200 Census data taken from CEDIB (2013). 
201 In 2000, 763 million cubic meters of gas and one million barrels of liquid hydrocarbons were produced in Tarija, making 
up 24 and eight per cent of national production – in 2011, production had risen to 11,198 million cubic meters and 11.6 
million barrels that together accounted for 71 per cent of national production (Torres Orías, 2012). 
202 The prefect appointed ejecutivos seccionales; when the figure was replaced by the governor, his regional representatives 
became sub-govenors.  
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of their statute, the TCP declared Article 88, which mentions the sub-governor, incompatible with the 
CPE (Resolution 0009/2014, see Ministerio de Autonomías (2015, pp.8;114)). This was often 
interpreted as if the governor would have to appoint her/his local representatives (Interview 47). 
However, some actors argued that it was only a formal observation, since the 2010 subnational 
election had taken place under National Transitory Law 017/2010, which did not prohibit the election 
of ejecutivos seccionales/sub-governors (Balderas, 2014). The Article 88 of the draft also did not talk 
about the direct election. The second interpretation was favoured by the national government and 
in the 2015 subnational election, sub-governors were elected again. Yet, the debate reaffirmed local 
actors in the importance of ensuring local resources control (Interviews 54,55). With the regional 
autonomy, the figure of sub-governor disappears in the region.  
Distribution inside the region 
Even though Supreme Decree 331/2009 consolidated the split of the 45 per cent of regalías into 15 
per cent per municipality that had been negotiated earlier (see 6.2.1.), it remained a contested 
question. A compromise needed to be found with regards to the budget of the regional ETA, which 
mostly consists of royalty transfers and other transfers from the ETAs that constitute it (Art. 107 
LMAD, see 7.3.2.). As can be seen in the following table, the municipalities in the Gran Chaco province 
have had in the past years a higher than average budget per inhabitant than the Bolivian average; yet, 
there are large differences between them:  
 
Average Current Budget 2010-2015 
(in BOB) 
Average Current Budget/Population 
Yacuiba 512 403 812.46 5 554.81 
Caraparí 230 353 250.18 14 991.10 
Villamontes 260 894 892.81 6 544.13 
All Municipalities 23 964 209 932.92 2 306.49 
Table 11: Budget of Gran Chaco municipalities (2010-2015) (census data from CEDIB (2013), budget from SEA (2016)) 
For each person, Caraparí had over six times more resources than the Bolivian average and twice as 
much as Yacuiba and Villamontes, where authorities claim that this is not just. Yet, in Caraparí, it is 
considered fair due to the environmental damage and the social costs of extraction. With the regional 
autonomy, the deal among local actors is that out of the 15 per cent, ten directly go to each 
municipality, while the remaining five per cent is given to the regional autonomy for financing joint 
projects (Interview 65). This is perceived as a piece of evidence for unwillingness or incapacity to move 
beyond a municipal logic (Interview 66).  
Challenges ahead for the Gran Chaco 
The relationship between regional autonomy and municipality is far from clear and the competences 
are partly unclearly defined (Interviews 54,65). It remains to be seen what happens once the 
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authorities assume office. Yet, the scenario with mayor and regional authorities plus governor, seems 
to provide much room for conflict. 
During my visit, shortly after the TCP’s approval of the statute, which was perceived as a major step 
forward, representatives of civil society organisations and local politicians were relieved and said how 
the statute had been elaborated in a participatory way and how the regional autonomy would be a 
joint project by all people of the Gran Chaco province (Interviews 53,59, 61). Yet, local analysts doubt 
that this sense of unity will last long and share the concern that the whole project might not last much 
longer than the non-renewable resources (Interviews 39,54).  
As in the case of the departmental assembly, the incorporation of indigenous representatives in the 
project through the assembly members has not been as imagined by some (Interview 39). A former 
assembly member, representing an indigenous pueblo reported that he only felt included and heard 
when joining a municipal group (Interview 53). For local observers, the indigenous representative have 
been soon or later co-opted by other interests (Interview 55,56). 
After my stay in the Gran Chaco, my major concern was how far the Regional Autonomy would change 
the situation of the local population. Taking back control over our Chaco was declared by 
representatives of civil society organisations and indigenous authorities as the great hope associated 
with the regional autonomy (Interviews 53,57,59,63). The many resources received in the last years 
were often spent on highly visible expensive cement projects, such as building infrastructure, plazas, 
among others, which critics considered unnecessary and often of poor quality (Interviews 
33,60,62,66,70). Despite all the resources, poverty remains wide-spread, particularly in rural areas, 
and there has been little socio-economic development (Interviews 6,7,55,56,69). I visited communities 
located next to the gas pipeline without electricity and/or access to water. For a local analyst, 
sustainable development and proper planning look different (Interview 54).  
Regional Autonomy as a tool for disturbing the opposition or pressuring GAD more generally? 
Several people in the departmental capital see that the regional autonomy leads to a fragmentation 
of the department, which also complicates the competence regime (Interviews 36,39). For an analyst, 
inclusion of the regional autonomy was an intelligent move by the government, it is 'a deception to 
keep the Chaco quiet'203 (Interview 52). For a departmental asambleísta and important figure in the 
national opposition, it leads to distortions in the management of Tarija and potentially other resource-
rich places, which might prevent the development of a strong national opposition (movement) that 
could get into the way of the government’s overall strategy (see 7.4.2) (Interview 40). 
                                                          
203 Tarija, 01.03.2016. 
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During fieldwork, three other municipalities in Tarija (Entre Ríos, Bermejo and Padcaya) began 
speaking of forming a regional autonomy. A key figure was the directly elected sub-governor of the 
Burdett O'Connor province from the MAS-IPSP, who was in political opposition to the governor. This 
province, consisting only of the Entre Ríos municipality, borders on the Gran Chaco province and 
claims ownership of one mega field (Interview 50). At the heart of this initiative, pushed by local 
authorities associated with the MAS-IPSP, was the demand for 45 per cent of regalías – but local actors 
were inconsistent about whether this was 45 per cent of what was produced in their municipalities or 
in the whole department (Interviews 37,40,44,50,56,71). Since the initiative has advanced rather 
slowly since then, some people suggest that it had only been an instrument to pressure the 
gobernación (Interview 38). Yet, in 2017, when demanding a renegotiation of the departmental fiscal 
pact, they pushed for changing the Law 3038/2000, which assigned 45 per cent of the regalías of the 
department to the Gran Chaco province, regardless of where they are generated (see 6.2.1.). For 
them, the 45 per cent should be assigned to each producing region, based on production in its territory 
(Escalante, 2017a).  
Additionally, in the hydrocarbon-rich Chaco in Chuquisaca, the regional autonomy has on occasion 
been considered as an option for enhancing local control over resources (Interview 54). Furthermore, 
in Potosí, some local authorities from a mineral-rich rural area brought the topic of the regional 
autonomy onto the agenda of the departmental assembly (Interviews 97,98). So far, none of these 
initiatives have developed further, yet they indicate that in the future especially people from 
(resource-rich) rural areas could increasingly use the regional autonomy banner to press the GAD or 
even the national government to pay attention to their situation. 
8.4. AIOC 
The AIOC is seen as the single most important category that concretises peoples’ self-determination, 
closely entwined with the idea of the pluri-national state and guaranteed in Article 2 CPE. Yet, as 
shown throughout the previous chapter, the government has curtailed the space of peoples’ self-
determination. The following subsections look in more detail at the transition process, the 
involvement of the state´s enforcing mechanisms and NGOs, the formal advancement as well as local 
dynamics.  
8.4.1 The process of transitioning towards an AIOC 
The LMAD concretises preconditions and prescribes a procedure for the transition towards an AIOC, 
which is often perceived as a source of frustration by those who had wanted peoples’ self-
determination (Interview 89). An AIOC-supporting authority from Charagua recalled that 
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When this possibility of the autonomy came, we were happy [saying] "Good, let’s go", 
because we had been independent. But no, we did not know that they would put us these 
limitations204 (Interview 116). 
The transition towards an AIOC can either happen on the basis of a municipality or of a TIOC. For an 
NGO worker, this already violates Article 2 CPE as municipalities do usually not overlap with the 
ancestral territories and the TIOC-based transition, which is often the only option for minority lowland 
peoples, is limited in that titling has been on hold since 2010 (Interviews 14,21). Since the TIOC status 
implies rights such as the right to prior consultation, not granting titles can be seen as a way of avoiding 
strengthening the rights of those who might object to resource exploitation (Interview 7).  
Requisites 
The following table lists the requisites for entering the AIOC transition: 
TIOC-based AIOC Municipality-based AIOC 
1.Certification of ancestral territory (Art. 56 LMAD) 1.Certification of ancestral territory (Art. 56 LMAD) 
2. Verification of Population Basis (Art. 58 LMAD)  
Highlands: 10,000 inhabitants or more (in the cases of 
minority pueblos, an exception can be made, which 
reduces the minimum to 4,000 inhabitants) 
Lowlands: 1,000 inhabitants or more, can be handled 
more flexibly if other requisites are met 
 
3. Certification of Viabilidad Gubernamental (Art. 57 
LMAD) 
 
Table 12: Requirements for accessing the AIOC status 
For ancestral land certification, the accredited IOC authority has to request this from the Ministry of 
Autonomies and after verification, the ministry hands over the certificate to the authorities (Art. 56 I 
LMAD). For critics, this conflicts with the idea of the pluri-national state, since the state needs to verify 
the indigenous peoples pre-conquest existence, often using documentation from colonial times 
(Interviews 17,39,54). Particularly, for the TIOC aspiring to transition, this step would be inappropriate, 
since to receive the TIOC title an ethnic identity certificate (INRA, n.d.) would already have been 
required (Interview 14). Yet, from the government perspective, it is argued that this is a different 
certificate, more related to territory (Interview 1). In addition, this requisite would prohibit that the 
people, who migrate from the highlands to the valley and lowlands, form AIOC in TIOC, which may be 
inhabited by other smaller indigenous groups (ibid.).  
In the case of the TIOC, the LMAD mentions two more requisites. First, the population basis needs 
verification by the central state (Art. 58 LMAD). Looking at the 2012 census, 14 of the 31 ethnicities 
found in the lowlands and valleys have less than 1.000 inhabitants (CEJIS, 2013) and remain hence 
                                                          
204 Charagua, 13.05.2016. 
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excluded from the process – even if they had a TIOC in which all of them live. Moreover, half of the 
existing TIOC in the lowlands do not meet the population requirement (Fundación Tierra, 2012a). 
Secondly, the 'governance viability' requires certification (Art. 57 LMAD). This refers to the existing 
capacity for management of the territory, the exercise of public responsibilities and obligations 
assigned by the CPE and LMAD. The LMAD mentions two requisites:  
 Organisation: The TIOC has an organisational structure, which includes all IOC organisations inhabiting 
the territory, considering the participation of women and minorities.  
 Territorial Plan: The TIOC presents a plan, which includes the institutional and financial strategies for 
the development of the region. The Ministry of Autonomies approves the proposal, submitted by the 
accredited IOC authorities.  
For senior state employees involved in the elaboration of law, these requisites are key to ensure that 
the AIOC can fulfil the tasks and perform the proposed functions (Interview 9). A state employee with 
long experience in working on the Bolivian decentralisation process, claims that giving small 
populations competences and resources would be 'absurd' and 'institutionally impractical' (Interview 
70). Yet, the director of a key lowland NGO finds that these rules demonstrate the top-down way the 
government wants to run the AIOC, which goes against the idea of self-determination (Interview 14).  
The steps of the transition 
The following table lists the steps of the transition to an AIOC: 
TIOC-based AIOC Municipality-based AIOC 
Step 1: Consultation (Art. 294 I CPE, Art. 50 IV LMAD) Step 1: Referendum (Art. 294 II CPE, Art. 50 II LMAD, Art. 
24 Law 026/2010) 
Creation of a new territorial entity by the Pluri-national 
Assembly 
 
Step 2a: Formation of deliberative organ (Art. 53 I LMAD) 
Step 2b: Elaboration of the statute by the deliberative organ (Art. 60, 62 LMAD) 
Step 3: Control of constitutionality of the statute through the TCP (Art. 53 II LMAD) 
Step 4: Approval of statute through normas y 
procedimientos propios followed by a referendum (Art. 
54 LMAD) 
Step 4: Referendum on statute (Art. 54 LMAD) 
Table 13: Steps in the AIOC transition 
Step 1: Consultation/referendum 
In the case of the TIOC, a consultation is to be carried out by the TIOC-holders, following their own 
norms and procedures (Art. 294 I CPE, Art. 50 IV LMAD). This is supervised by a unit in the Pluri-national 
Electoral Organ (OEP), called Intercultural Service of Democratic Strengthening (SIFDE). If the outcome 
is positive, the transition continues and apart from the locally-centred process, a new territorial entity 
must be created by the Pluri-national Assembly by law before the statute can be approved. 
In the case of municipality, IOC authorities initiate a referendum, in which the population is asked 
whether or not to enter the transition process (Art. 294 II CPE, Art. 50 II LMAD, Art. 24, Law of the 
Electoral Regime 26/2010). The outcome is binding for the municipal council (Art. 50 II LMAD). Close 
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to 200 of over 300 municipalities are inhabited by a majority of indigenous people (Albó and Romero, 
2009) and in over 140 highland and valley municipalities, over 90 percent of the population self-
identifies as indigenous (Cameron, 2012). In the vast majority of municipalities in the lowlands, 
indigenous peoples are in minority, which makes a transition on a municipal base unlikely.  
Step 2: Deliberative organ and elaboration of statute 
When the referendum has had a positive outcome, a deliberative organ or equivalent is elected 
following its own norms and procedures and supervised by the SIFDE (Art. 53 I No 3; 5 LMAD). The 
deliberative organ is expected to collect proposals and elaborate a draft statute, which needs – as in 
the case of the departmental and regional autonomy – approval from at least two thirds of its 
members (Art. 53 I LMAD).  
The minimal content of the statute is same as for other types of autonomy (Art. 62 I LMAD, see 8.2.1.), 
but must additionally include the following points (Art. 62 II LMAD):  
1. The definition of the vision and strategies of its own development, in accordance with principles, 
rights and cultural values.  
2. The definition of the organ and system of administration of justice.  
3. Planning of the decision of the pueblo to renew periodically the confidence in their authorities. 
 
Overall, the prescriptions allow for some specificity. For example, the existence of political parties is 
not required, which are key actors in the modern Western logic of organising society, but are not 
found in the ancestral indigenous cultures (Interview 10). None of the already existing AIOC statutes 
proposes political parties (Tockman, 2017b). Yet, looking at other aspects, these content prescriptions 
are restrictive. The requirement of defining deliberative and executive organs (Art 62 I No 5 LMAD) 
reflects the modern idea of separation of powers that is alien to the (traditional) organisation of ayllus, 
for example. In these, thinking of executive, legislative and judicial powers as separated entities does 
not exist (see 5.2.). For a former indigenous authority from Oruro,  
the power is communitarian, communal. How is this communal power tied together? [With] 
a head which consults everything. But in the municipal environment, there is a head that 
decides without consulting all. And these [heads] are then the extension leads, which 
outline the LMAD. And this is your way of organising yourself. But if we speak of autonomy, 
why don’t you let me organise myself?205 (Interview 79) 
A challenge in the AIOC specific content – and beyond – is that proper institutions and procedures are 
not – and probably cannot be – clearly defined. Local experts claim that it is hardly possible to draw a 
line between what is 'colonial' and what is 'indigenous' (Interviews 10,14,21). Religion and related 
customs are particularly tricky and contested themes (Interview 82).  
                                                          
205 Oruro, 14.04.2016. 
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In the case of (former) municipalities, a major concern is that the statutes would be prone to be 
municipalistas (Interview 7). Since there are only few existing statutes and processes, it is too early to 
say if and how the AIOC goes beyond the municipal logic. Analysis of the existing statutes reveals that 
it varies from one case to the other, how far the given space for going beyond the municipal 
organisation is used or not (for example, Exeni Rodríguez, 2015; Tockman, 2017b). For a NGO worker 
from Oruro, a hybrid model is created in all cases, which in one way or the other brings together a 
municipal system with its own norms and procedures (Interview 84). I return to this in 8.4.4. 
So far, Raqaypampa is the only TIOC-based AIOC and was during fieldwork the only advanced process 
in transition. Before entering the process, Raqaypampa had been a municipal district, which is why 
observers question that this AIOC surpasses the municipal logic (Interviews 10,101). For a fierce 
government opponent, 'the design is completely municipal, in other words, this means they end up 
being an indigenous municipality'206 (Interview 103). This overlaps with Tockman (2017b), who 
analysed drafts of all AIOC statutes and classified them on a communitarian versus liberal-municipal 
continuum, and placed Raqaypampa on the liberal-municipal extreme. However, it remains to be seen 
how the process evolves further. 
Step 3: Control of constitutionality  
As with the departmental and regional autonomies, the draft statute, once adopted by the deliberate 
organ, is submitted to the TCP which within 45 days rejects it, declares it as constitutional, or returns 
it with observation (Art. 53 III LMAD, Art. 119 III Code of Constitutional Procedure 254/2012). Like in 
the case of the other autonomies, the 45-day-period was so far massively exceeded. An indigenous 
authority from a municipality in transition experiences this process as follows,  
[i]n the communities from which I come, we have norms and customs, but according to the 
CPE and TCP that is not good. Therefore, we have to change, in other words, they constrain 
and this constraints we do not like much, not totally, but it always constraints us. This is 
centralism, they want to manage everything from above207 (Interview 91). 
Needless to say that critics find this control as in conflict with the idea of peoples´ self-determination.  
Step 4: Consultation and/or referendum 
Once a statute is declared constitutional, one more step is necessary for achieving the AIOC status. 
For municipalities in transition, it is a referendum (Art. 54 I LMAD) and in the case of the TIOC, another 
consultation following its own rules and procedures is needed and succeeded by a referendum (Art. 
54 III LMAD). In the referenda, the participation of IOC and non-IOC people must be guaranteed.  
                                                          
206 Cochabamba, 01.06.2016. 
207 Sucre, 20.05.2016. 
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If the outcome of this process is positive, the formation of the AIOC follows the procedures laid out in 
the statute, yet is in this supervised by the OEP, which also accredits the authorities (Art. 55 I No 3 
LMAD). In the case of the municipalities, the AIOC comes into being with the termination of the 
mandate of municipal authorities (Art. 55 I No 2 LMAD). Yet, one exception is made for those 
municipalities that entered the transition process in 2009 (Art. 55 II LMAD). Here, the rules established 
for the TIOC apply, and so, the municipal authorities do not finish their term, which has triggered 
conflicts and resistance in some places (see 8.4.4.). 
8.4.2. State’s and NGOs’ support in the transition and beyond 
The support for the transition from the state´s enforcing mechanisms and from NGOs appears, overall, 
not to facilitate peoples’ self-determination as imagined for a pluri-national state. As argued in 7.4.1., 
the AIOC appears within the central state autonomy regime as an annex and makes up a small part of 
the Ministry of Autonomies (Interview 1). Alongside this comes limited personnel and budget in the 
ministry and SIFDE (Interview 8).  
Local NGOs have so far played important roles in the transition processes with the concrete 
configuration of actors and the case-specific nature of support208. NGO workers emphasise their 
limited resources and that their attempts to support all processes are inevitably uneven (Interviews 
13,14). The NGOs’ own agendas partially determine the processes selected for support: CEJIS, for 
example, decided to only become involved in TIOC-based transitions, since they do not see that the 
municipality-based AICO has potential for going beyond the municipal logic (Interview 14). Other NGO 
workers agree with this (Interviews 10,13,21). 
Also, those working in the enforcing mechanisms do not appear neutral when offering support; several 
employees have experiences working with some groups or in certain areas. I found that Raqaypampa, 
the only TIOC-based AIOC, appeared to be a pet project of the former vice-minister of IOC (and 
Regional) Autonomies (now Director of IOC (and Regional) Autonomies), who had long-term 
experiences working with the people from Raqaypampa and, as he stated, already wrote his 
licenciatura thesis on Raqaypampa several years ago. In turn, an indigenous authority from a marka 
in Oruro, who wanted to advance the TIOC-based transformation, complained that he had tried to get 
support from the ministry, but they did not seem interested (Interview 91).  
                                                          
208 In the case of Charagua, no local actor contested that CIPCA played a crucial role in transition. Yet, their engagement in 
the process is contested: while local critics to the AIOC claim that they have written the statute (Interviews 108,111) and 
that these were friends with the indigenous authorities (Interview 113). One interviewee was convinced that they were sent 
by the government or at least receiving money from the MAS (Interview 116). Local supporters point out that they have no 
more than facilitated and enabled (Interviews 114,115,119). 
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For a former NGO worker, state and NGO employees tend to focus on working with local leaders – 
which appears convenient, yet is highly problematic especially when there is too limited knowledge 
of the local reality (Interview 25). A former consultant shared his impression that consultants and 
ministry staff demonstrated limited understanding and even disrespect, when claiming IOC authorities 
were incapable of abstract thinking, for example (Interview 80). Another NGO worker recalled that he 
often observed that if the indigenous people did not use the appropriate (political) language, or asked 
the wrong questions, they would be rebuked or threatened with no support (Interview 82). The former 
consultant recalled one occasion, where he was training in what he called the 'conventional way', 
meaning giving a presentation and sharing manuals (Interview 80). Since this did not work out, he then 
changed his methods: 
eating sandwiches, having a drink, in poor conditions we planned, they understood better 
than me and gave me a lesson in how to manage their land, how to move forward, how 
they see education, their family209 (ibid.). 
Another NGO worker agrees that state employees, consultants and NGO workers need to listen more 
to the indigenous peoples, trying to understand their specific context, their past and vision of the 
future – only then could processes move forward (Interview 69).  
It is important to recognise that much of the mentioned points do not have to do with individuals 
unwilling to establish different relations or similar. Indeed, state and NGO employees working on the 
AIOC are often very dedicated and try their best to make it work (Interview 82). They are aware that 
the autonomy framework, as written down in the CPE and LMAD and other laws, implies many 
restrictions and also requires the AIOC authorities to follow these rules. While acknowledging that this 
goes against the idea of self-determination, ministry staff, NGO workers and consultants stress the 
need for indigenous people to learn the rules. A key challenge is identified in the management of 
resources (Interviews 74,99). For an interviewee,  
[t]hey lack much knowledge and administrative management, what has happened with the 
fondo indígena210, they were given resources and they wanted to spend the money as if it 
is of the pueblo, not subject to administration, control and they are in prison211 (Interview 
34). 
When I attended a CONAIOC assembly meeting in May 2016, where authorities from the different 
processes in transition were present, I observed how ministry staff and consultants tried to teach 
                                                          
209 Oruro, 14.04.2016. 
210 In 2005, the 'Indigenous Fund', officially called 'Fund for Development for IOC Communities', was created. With five 
percent of the IDH, it had the objective to finance projects that improve the development in rural areas. In late 2015, it was 
abolished after a corruption scandal became public. Several people, including union leaders and senators from the MAS-
IPSP, were prosecuted and some were incarcerated. In Bolivia, this has been an issue of heated debates and investigations 
have not yet ended.  
211 Santa Cruz, 02.06.2016. 
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these authorities the rules of the state-recognised autonomy. As in a classroom, presentations were 
given on different pieces of legislation to follow, for example, the Integral Planning, SPIE (see 7.5.2.). 
The audience was quiet most of the time, and most questions were asked by NGO workers.  
My observations and (informal) conversions at the CONAIOC assembly indicate that the present IOC 
authorities indeed struggled to understand the rules they were required to follow. When speaking to 
official representatives from an advanced process, they revealed to me that they did not know about 
'all the legal stuff', not even having seen the CPE before. Some days later, I attended a presentation 
on the AIOC transition in Raqaypampa at the FLACMA Congress and despite having three speakers – 
two authorities and the then vice-minister, it was the vice-minister, who spoke most of the time and 
answered all questions from the audience and the presentation slides came from the ministry.  
Some of the present representatives at the CONAIOC assembly expressed disappointment since 
ministry staff and consultants did not properly explain the procedures and laws to them so they could 
understand. Some indigenous authorities thought initially that once an AIOC, they could be 
autonomous in any way they chose. There are increasing doubts that the government and ministry 
would support them. One group appeared intimidated by the rules and in this, seemed to have largely 
accepted that the state defines the AIOC proceedings and rules. They wished for more help and 
involvement, asking consultants or ministry staff, if they could come for a workshop or help them to 
write the plan they have to submit following the SPIE legislation. One even mentioned to me that (s)he 
was scared of ending up in prison if (s)he did something incorrectly.  
Another group insisted that they have always been autonomous, hence, it would be wrong that 
ministry employees and consultants now tell them how to be autonomous. For them, the government 
had not understood what autonomy was about – one authority stood up while the then vice-minister 
spoke and cried out 'Why do you always put more obstacles into our way?'. While some authorities 
told me that they had lost hope that they could change their situation for the better with the AIOC, 
other authorities, who seemed well aware of the limitations of the AIOC, told me that is was best for 
them and other authorities to think strategically, meaning that to make progress, they had to move 
away from their current situation and try to push the boundaries. The AIOC is then just a step on the 
way towards their self-determination or autonomía plena (Interview 91). 
8.4.3. Summarising the formal advancement 








Table 14: Formal advancement of AIOCs; sources: Georgetown University (2017) for 2009 referenda; OEP (2015a) for 2015 referenda; OEP 
(2016) for 2016 referenda; OEP (2017) for 2017 referenda. 
                                                          
212 The declarations can be found via https://buscador.tcpbolivia.bo/(S(0cbwp0xznyrzefvelz4nixwx))/WfrResoluciones.aspx, 
accessed on the 30.05.2017. 
213 With the first declaration, the TCP returns the Statute with observation for modification and re-submission. 
214 September/October 2016: Elections; 08.01.2017: AIOC authorities assumes office. 
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59.9% YES 
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No proposal presented  
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In late 2009, parallel to the referenda on departmental and regional autonomies and before the 
promulgation of the LMAD, twelve out of over 300 municipalities voted over entering the process of 
transitioning towards an AIOC. At this point, without more concrete legislation than the CPE, it was 
for many unclear how the autonomies would work and an NGO worker from Oruro recalled that it felt 
like the beginning of something radically new, which would go far beyond what the LMAD later 
established (Interview 82). Back then, in all except for one, Curahuara de Carangas (Oruro), the 
majority of votes were cast in favour of entering the process. Since then, two more municipalities have 
held referenda on entering the process in 2016 and 2017 and in both, Gutiérrez (Santa Cruz) and 
Macharetí (Chuquisaca), the majority opted for starting the conversion. 
Four of the municipalities that entered the process in 2009 are inhabited by a majority of Aymara 
people, four of Quechua people, three processes are led by Guaraní peoples and in one, Chipaya, it is 
the Uros, the smallest highland group (Exeni Rodríguez, n.d.). Hence, the processes are largely 
concentrated in the highlands and valleys and on the larger groups of people, unsurprisingly as almost 
all municipalities with an indigenous majority are there. The extensive municipality of Charagua (Santa 
Cruz) alone is located in the lowlands.  
In five municipalities, the second referendum on the approval of the statute took place. In three, San 
Pedro de Totora (Oruro), Mojocoya (Chuquisaca) and Huayaca (Chuquisaca), statutes were rejected 
and only in two, Charagua and Chipaya (Oruro), was the outcome positive. Of the remaining six 
municipalities, which entered the process in 2009, four did not submit a draft statute to the TCP, while 
one, Tarabuco (Chuquisaca), had its proposal rejected upon admission and no resubmission 
happened. Pampa Aullagas (Oruro), has a TCP approved statute, but no referendum was held. 
At the time of writing, Raqaypampa (Cochabamba) alone, out of 180 titled TIOCs (Fundación Tierra, 
2012b), has turned into an AIOC. Yet, in 2013, the Ministry of Autonomies was aware of eight TICOs 
which had entered the process (in Aguilar Agramont, 2013) – as stated above, no initial referendum is 
needed, hence the initiation of the process is less visible than in the municipalities. During fieldwork, 
I came across some TICOs like Corque Marka and Lomerio in which actors were interested in the 
transition – yet, it was not clear how the processes would unfold. At the time of writing, the process 
in Corque Marka appears to have advanced quickly and consultation and referendum on the statute 
are expected in 2018 (Clavijo, 2017).  
8.4.4. Conflicts in the transitions 
While I demonstrated throughout the previous and present chapters, how the figure of the AIOC and 
the transition processes are shaped and restricted by CPE, LMAD and other legislation and interaction 
with state employees and others, I balance this in the following by looking at the local dynamics. I 
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discuss four themes that came up during fieldwork which give some indications on the redirection of 
indigenous peoples’ struggles. Even though some analysts and observers already claim that the AIOC 
failed (Interview 103), it appears more sensible to be patient (Interview 94). The AIOC transition is 
expected to trigger discussions in communities about identity and visions of the past, present and 
future, which cannot happen overnight (Interviews 1,82).  
Mismatch of municipal and ancestral borders (highlands) 
As previously mentioned, the municipality-based transition is more likely in the highlands and valleys, 
where the majority of the population identifies as indigenous. Such transition is said to have less 
potential for making a difference, since it is so closely built on the previous entity. In these transitions, 
a crucial challenge is the very common mismatch between the borders of municipalities and the 
ancestral territories of the indigenous. This limits the potential for peoples’ self-determination and 
can trigger conflicts in the transition (Interview 3).  
For example, in Salinas de Garci Mendoza (Oruro), people involved in the process agree that the 
municipal borders and structures led to tensions, which hindered the progress of the transition. The 
municipality of Salinas consists of seven municipal districts and five markas, each of which consist of 
a number of ayllus (Interviews 88,89). The majority of the population lives in the town of Salinas and 
usually, the elected mayor came from Salinas town and rural areas were under-represented if not 
ignored (Interviews 82,90).  
When the option of the AIOC opened in 2009, members of the rural markas sought to join forces 
against the people from the town and the respective marka, to enhance their situation, meaning 
better representation and attendance to local needs. It was clear that they also had to negotiate with 
representatives from Salinas town, since the AIOC is required to be approved by a majority of the 
population (Interview 88). Yet, these negotiations were paralysed since no agreement could be found 
on how the AIOC should be run. There was agreement that a rotation principle was favoured and that 
the turn in office should be longer than a year, the usual mandate of the local indigenous authorities. 
The representatives of the rural markas argued that each marka should have the same right in taking 
the lead with one following the other. However the representatives from Salinas town claimed that 
they represented more people and that not all markas should be treated the same (Interviews 
82,87,88,89). They would not accept that their marka only takes the lead every 10 or even 25 years 
and suggested that every second term would be theirs, while the other markas would rotate for the 
other terms. 
At the time of my visit in April 2016, despite having started the process around seven years ago, no 
deliberative organ had been formed. A local authority pointed out that in his/her community, they 
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had started discussing transitioning towards an AIOC via the TIOC in their area. Yet, the process 
appeared bureaucratically more challenging; it was not clear which resources they would receive and 
they also feared getting into trouble with other markas and with Salinas town (Interview 88).  
In Salinas’ neighbouring municipality Pampa Aullagas such problems did not exist and the elaboration 
of the statute was a much smoother process. Here, the territory, which had initially been a municipal 
district of Salinas de Garci Mendoza, overlaps with only one marka, which made the transition much 
easier (Interview 82, 89). Also in Chipaya (Oruro), municipality and ancestral territory of the Uros 
overlap, and here, the elaboration of the statute was quicker, with less conflict, and approved in the 
2016 referendum.  
Leadership (and hydrocarbons in lowlands) 
The existing relationship between community leaders, who play a crucial role in the transition, and 
the community seems crucial in shaping the transition processes. Particularly in places like Salinas and 
Charagua, remote and densely populated areas with limited internal infrastructure, and, in the case 
of Charagua, extensive territory, the relationship between authorities and the local population 
appears particularly vital. Some local analysts go as far as claiming that all pueblos are essentially 
characterised by authoritarian leadership and their customs are authoritarian (Interview 20). Hence, 
the recognition of norms and customs in the prodedures of establishing and managing the AIOC would 
undermine democracy. Such overarching claims appear problematic.  
Nevertheless, I found that the population living in rural communities often knows little about what an 
AIOC is and how the transition process is evolving, which seems similar to issues raised about the 
departmental autonomies (see 8.2.1.). For a former authority from Salinas, the rural population barely 
knows their rights as indigenous people (Interview 88).  
While it needs to be acknowledged that the overall situation in the communities in Charagua is diverse 
(Bazoberry Chali, 2012), a local capitana216 of a small community reported that information had been 
deliberately withheld from her, since the Gran Capitán, that is a high authority of the Guaraní, 
mistrusted her critical thinking (Interview 111). It is hard for the local capitanes to stay informed 
themselves since one cannot travel easily to meetings in Charagua town (ibid.). Similar observations 
were shared by NGO workers and other locals (Interviews 22,25,28,39,116). In the rural communities, 
I felt that people would be interested and engage more if they knew how and had someone to come 
and help them to understand (Interview 118). For an NGO worker, in Charagua 'you see leaders that 
                                                          
216 The Guaraní people are today organised into capitanías, encompassing one or some communities. In the municipality of 
Charagua, there are four Grandes capitanías, which encompass several communities. Additionally, there are two urban 
centres, Charagua town and the nearby Charagua Station.  
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are removed from the bases. This is also not autonomy'217 (Interview 39). Looking at the history218, 
those tensions are not new. Already early on some Grandes Capitanes tried to 'modernise' quickly, 
imitating the whites, which led to tensions with the basis (Albó and Barrios Suvelza, 2006, p.19). 
In Charagua, leadership and AIOC transition cannot be understood when ignoring hydrocarbons. Over 
the decades, the capitanías have acquired experience in dealing with hydrocarbon explorers and 
exploiters and handling compensation paid directly to them. As in other cases in the Bolivian lowlands 
and the Chaco, these payments are often said to have distorted the previously more responsive 
leadership (Interview 117). The funds are not managed transparently and are often misused, filling 
the pockets of the leaders (Interviews 39,61). After the death of Bonifacio Barrientos Iyambae or 
'Grand Shadow', who had been not only a key figure in bringing the lowland peoples219 together in the 
1970s and 1980s, but had also managed to keep the Guaraní communities united220 (Interview 112), 
conflicts increased and escalated. His son, Bonifacio Chico, was unable to prevent constant battles 
over who manages the resources, especially in the Izozog, the remotest area of Charagua (Interviews 
23,106). Not much of these resources reached the communal base and improved their situation, 
keeping poverty rates high and infrastructure limited.  
The official Gran Capitanes221, who were crucial in initiating and advancing the transition process, are 
now said to mostly work into their own pockets (Interviews 38,106,107,108,110,111), spend little time 
in communities. While I was on fieldwork, they lived in Santa Cruz and came to Charagua town for 
meetings and so on. Unlike the people I found in the communities, they possess big cars and showed 
off other luxury objects. They did do no more than promote their 'living well' in Santa Cruz, an 
interviewee said cynically (Interview 38). Also for me, it was easier to meet them in Santa Cruz than in 
the communities or in Charagua town. 
Since so far not many of the compensation resources have reached the communities, a reasonable 
concern of locals and observers is that when the AIOC resources are controlled by the capitanías, they 
will not be invested in improving the lives of the local population (Interview 38). It appears likely that, 
at least in some areas, centralisation is reproduced at the local level, which contradicts the idea of 
self-determination of peoples (Interview 19).  
                                                          
217 Tarija, 23.02.2016. 
218 Combès (2005) offers an in-depth historical study of those peoples now considered as Bolivian Guaraní.  
219 He played a vital role in the formation of the CIDOB. 
220 In 1987, the APG, the 'Assembly of the Pueblo Guaraní', was founded (Caurey, 2012, p.16), bringing together Guaraní 
people in and beyond Charagua. It is today a key civil society organisation in areas inhabited by Guaraní people. 
221 Leadership is at least in parts of the Izozog contested, which is why there are often also unofficial capitanes. In recent 




Municipal authorities and redistribution as horizon 
Resources interfere for additional reasons in the transition processes. One reason relates to the role 
of mayor and other municipal authorities, whose jobs would sooner or later disappear (Interview 89). 
The resources needed for the referenda come from the municipality and not the central state, 
meaning that the municipal authorities need to be willing to spend part of the budget (Interview 84). 
A lack of resources was the key reason that the referendum in Pampa Aullagas did not take place last 
year, despite having a statute that was approved by the TCP. Here, the mayor had opposed the 
process, probably because he wanted to continue his salaried role, which had started less than 18 
months before.  
In Salinas, the previous mayor who was in office between 2010 and 2015, had not supported the 
transition, which for locals helped to paralyse the process, yet, with the new supportive mayor, who 
also reserved a share of the budget for the process, a new attempt to push the process has started 
(Interview 91). In the case of Charagua, the mayor, who was elected in 2010, had supported the 
process. The 2015-authorities including council members and sub-mayors seemed aware of their 
temporary roles and a sub-mayor even agreed not to receive his salary, since all the money had been 
spent on the referendum (Interviews 117,119).  
In the case of potential TIOC, an additional challenge arises in the transition, since it affects borders 
and ceases to belong to one or more municipalities. Hence, the municipalities lose inhabitants, 
territory and therefore, resources, which then go to the TIOC, which can trigger resistance from the 
municipal authorities since they do not wish to lose control over resources and the people from in the 
municipal capital more generally. 
In all cases, I studied in some detail, (re-)distribution of economic resources appeared to be a major 
theme in the transition. Consultants with long-term experience of working with indigenous peoples, 
and who work closely with the transition process even find that the AIOC revolves fundamentally 
around economic resources (Interviews 8,25,28,99).  
As pointed out above, in some cases the AIOC has also been initiated by authorities representing rural 
areas in the municipality, who have felt neglected by the municipal authorities. This can be seen in 
Salinas (see above) and is also a crucial aspect of the project in Charagua. Here, in the four districts or 
capitanías, those in favour of the AIOC often state that investment was so far mainly focused on urban 
centres and that the AIOC is concerned with bringing resources to where they are urgently needed. 
The transition principally means a decentralisation of power and resources within the municipality 
(Interview 25). With the AIOC, resources are decentralised to these six entities. For a municipal 
authority supporting the AIOC, this suggests 
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(…) one thought: once we managed to achieve all which is the autonomy, that each district 
could manage their own resources, without much bureaucracy and without dependence on 
other levels222 (Interview 116). 
The importance of resources received from the state is in tension with the idea of self-
determination/autonomy. For an interviewee, 'they say: "We want to be autonomous and that they 
send us money", but if you are autonomous, this means that you bring money yourself, no?'223 
(Interview 39). Historically, the autonomy of indigenous peoples consisted in surviving on their own, 
without receiving anything from the state (Interview 88). It hence appears that through the state-
recognised AIOC, the rule of money is deepened further. 
Conflicts with world views and ways of life 
An important conflict in the transition processes in Oruro, but according to local researchers is also 
relevant in Chuquisaca, has emerged between those living in rural communities and those members 
of the community who spend most of their time in cities, called residents (Interviews 82,84,87,91). 
While in 1960, slightly over 36 per cent of the Bolivian population lived in urban areas, in 2016, it was 
68 per cent (World Bank, 2017). Often the younger generation has moved from the rural community 
to the city, enhancing job prospects, obtaining better formal education for their children and living a 
'modern' life. This leaves many rural communities inhabited mainly by older people and little children. 
Yet, those who move to the city, remain part of the community, including the obtaining of social 
functions and the obligation to serve as authority224, when it is their turn (Interviews 84,87). Remaining 
part of the community means that they retain their right of access to land and, for example, that they 
also vote there, meaning that they are registered in the village – directing resources from the 1994 
Public Participation Law to the rural community (Interviews 84,88). Usually, they strongly identify with 
their community, coming for festive activities, among others.  
The first generation of those who received their formal education, including university degrees in the 
city are now young adults. They often have a distinct perspective on life and of how things should be 
in contrast to those who have spent their entire life in the community (Interview 84). Those who 
remained in the communities often claim that the others are just interested in what is good for 
themselves and their family and lack civic or regional consciousness (Interview 77). A common 
argument of those spending most of their life in towns is that the most capable, for them meaning 
educated, people should be in influential positions rather than relying on a system of taking turns. The  
                                                          
222 Charagua, 13.05.2016. 
223 Tarija, 23.02.2016. 
224 Obligations can also be transferred to someone else, but this is often not welcomed in the communities (Interview 88). 
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Aymara authorities only fulfil their function for one year, yet, for the AIOC, this is insufficient, since 
not enough can be achieved in one year.  
Conversely, elderly people living in the communities argue that the AIOC runs the risk of corruption 
(Interview 87). Key to this is that the role of the indigenous authorities is incompatible with the state 
structure and could be undermined (Interview 88). An indigenous former authority from Salinas, who 
has also worked in the GAD Oruro, explains,  
The spirit and strength of the indigenous authorities [is that] they serve the community, no? 
If you lose this spirit of serving the community and you only think of the pay, the salary or 
the benefits that you can get from the administration of economic resources, it distorts the 
structure of the indigenous authorities225 (Interview 84). 
In the municipality, there is the risk that certain groups create a monopoly, holding power for a longer 
time (ibid.).  
For residents, when the AIOC authorities are elected according to customs, this signifies a return to a 
situation, where women are discriminated against and power is only distributed between a few male 
members of a family – 'we do not want to live again in a monarchy as we did in the Aymara and Inca 
Empires' (Interview 74). Their interest in changing the customs is that under those old rules they have 
little chance to obtain influential posts at a young age, despite being more educated if they are not 
spending much time in the community. Yet, in the AIOC Chipaya, among the first authorities accredited 
in mid-2017, are a 20-year and 22-year old, which can be seen as a tentative indication that the young 
generation is not systematically excluded (El Diario, 2017). 
In Charagua, such clashes were not very apparent to me. Most people I encountered – authorities or 
other members of communities – generally expressed modern visions of progress or development, 
and were concerned with improving job prospects, healthcare, education, infrastructure and so on 
(Interviews 112,113,114). Living well for them meant ending poverty. Only some people who had been 
part of the deliberative organ, shared with me that the restoration of tradition lay at the heart of the 
transition. For those opposed to the process, this was no more than discourse that they picked up 
from an NGO and the government they supported and from which they might have obtained some 
benefits (Interviews 19, 116). In long conversations226 with a senior former authority from a rural 
community in the Izogzog, he told me about a very different 'living well', a very different community 
life, characterised by mutual respect and support, and respect for Mother Earth. Over the past two to 
three decades, he observed drastic change and expressed deep concern about the behaviour of 
                                                          
225 Oruro, 20.04.2016. 
226 I spent some days in the local health post in Charagua and he was there as company of his wife. 
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leaders, the values of the younger generation, who seemed to forget more and more where they come 
from.  
8.5. Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was to provide insights into how the pluri-national autonomy regime has 
unfolded beyond the central state. Overall, the processes do not seem to develop as many of those 
involved in the struggles for departmental, regional and indigenous autonomy had hoped, which 
might not come as a surprise given my findings in previous chapters.  
Looking at the departmental level, particularly in the highlands, where there had not been prominent 
demands for departmental autonomy, the regime does not seem – as the government recently 
claimed – consolidated, as indicated by the missing statutes, but also in the relationship between 
assembly and governor, among others. Additionally, as visible in the legislative activities, so far the 
departmental ETAs do not (yet) appear to properly exercise their given competences. While much of 
this seems to have to do with a lack of experience of officials and tight budgets, it also remains 
questionable how far this process can deepen given the strong presence of the MAS-IPSP in the 
highlands in particular. Yet, in oppositional lowland departments, the incorporation of the autonomies 
into the CPE is perceived as a massive success and progress. Still, it is only a struggle in the battle that 
continues, now at least partly inside the state – as visible in the fiscal pact (see 7.5.3.). Looking beyond 
the state, in some instances, autonomy has been used by local actors to bring attention to their local 
situation and pressure the government. 
The first and only regional autonomy, the Gran Chaco province, is more restricted than the other types 
of autonomies and offers no more than a space for joint planning. The Gran Chao regional autonomy 
appears closely associated with the consolidation of hydrocarbon regalías, while there seems little 
capacity/willingness for going beyond the municipal logic and it is questionable if the current sense of 
unity will lead to more sustainable development than in the previous years of the resource boom. As 
in the case of departmental autonomies, some local actors from rural resource-rich areas use the 
regional autonomy banner to draw attention to their situation, expressing their concerns about 
centralisation at the departmental level, particularly under an opposition governor.  
Finally, the AIOC, which translated the demand for indigenous peoples’ self-determination into state 
matter, is often seen as the key pillar of the new pluri-national state. Apart from being subordinated 
to the state managers’ agenda of facilitating profitable accumulation, it is largely subordinated to a 
modern character of the state, seen in its apparently universal laws and involvement of enforcing 
mechanisms. This has not just to do with the lack of government support, but shows how the pluri-
national state is still a modality of the inherently modern/colonial state form. Looking at the struggles, 
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the cases of transition indicate how modern state borders and mindsets of those, who have become 
more closely included into the modern/colonial state and life (through more education, among others) 
as well as concerns with resources have influenced the processes in ways that seem at odds with the 
idea of peoples’ self-determination.  
This scenario appears to have led to a fragmentation of earlier struggles, as it triggers looking at local 
scenarios and confront arising challenges. For those who wanted autonomy, an additional challenge 
arises from the fact that formally, autonomy and self-determination 'really for all' became state-





Chapter 9. Discussions 
9.1. Introduction 
In this chapter, I return to key aspects of the debates in the literature I reviewed throughout Chapters 
2-4 and re-engage with them in view of the collected data and the conducted analysis. This discussion 
is organised around five themes, which refer to particular strands of literature. These five themes are 
addressed in one subsection each; they partly overlap, but are not all closely connected.  
First, I restate the importance of moving beyond thinking about the pluri-national state through 
regime-centred approaches or the notions of post-neoliberalism, neo-developmentalism and neo-
extractivism, as these tend to lead to simplistic interpretations that are of limited use for 
understanding the pluri-national experiment in Bolivia (9.2.). This leads me to highlight that relational 
approaches are generally more promising, but need to take into account the implication of colonial 
history (9.3.). For this, the 'de-colonial option' offers key insights. I thirdly re-engage with the debates 
on autonomy and show why and how debates should be opened up (9.4.). I argue that it is of limited 
use to see autonomy as an option that can be chosen from a list of options or a public choice. The 
search for autonomy – in which autonomy can have different meanings – and their translation into 
and by the state offers more insights. Fourthly – and reconsidering methodological aspects – I 
recapitulate the proposed operationalisation of the capitalist/colonial state and reflect on the benefits 
of considering struggles for, against and in the pluri-national state (9.5.). Finally, I pose the question 
of whether and how far the Pluri-national State of Bolivia is truly pluri-national (9.6.). Even though 
pluri-nationality has a strong normative dimension implying the idea of a world in which different 
worlds coexist, when discussing the pluri-national state in practice, its development should be seen as 
the object and result of historic-materialist domestic struggles and international pressures. 
9.2. Moving beyond regime and post-neoliberalism 
This analysis has shown that the regime is important when wanting to make sense of the pluri-national 
experiment. It became apparent that when exercising power, the MAS-IPSP government partly acts 
against the constitutional norms and has a great deal of influence over rule-making and (parts of) the 
enforcing mechanisms. Recently, Morales even claimed that the separation of powers is part of the 
North-American doctrine that has been used to bring democratic governments to fall (Trigo, 2017). 
Some practices reveal that MAS-IPSP’s government power is not solely exercised within the political 
sphere. Against this background, it is reasonable to question – as several scholars do – how far the 
MAS-IPSP government is democratic or authoritarian.  
However, when the pluri-national scenario is understood solely in terms of the political regime, a 
problem emerges, that is similar to Marx’ description at the beginning of Kapital: His critique of 
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political economy showed how Smith and Ricardo treated and conceptualised value as a purely 
economic category, that is as an not connected with the inner nature of commodities (Marx, 1872 
[2011], pp.88-95). By this, they fail to properly understand those categories. 
In a similar vein, regime-centred approaches perceive the regime as an object, which can be classified 
as totalitarian, authoritarian or democratic. These scholars start, with the 'living whole, the population 
(…) etc.; they always end, however, in such a way that they discover a few determining, abstract, 
universal relationships (…) through analysis' (Marx, 1857 [1975], p.72). What does it say about pluri-
national Bolivia if we label the regime as democratic/authoritarian? Meta-concepts like the above are 
not given and if we take them for granted, we do not see they have emerged and developed in a 
specific context with the work of certain people. The problem is neither taking the concrete as a 
starting point (what else could be that starting point?) nor abstracting from it. The problem is that this 
abstraction is the end point, which leaves them unable to understand the inner nature of the present 
regime. Marx instead suggests that  
[i]f I begin with population, then that would be a chaotic conception of the whole, and 
through closer determination I would come analytically to increasingly simpler concept; 
from the conceptualised concrete to more and more tenuous abstraction, until I arrived at 
the simplest determinations. From there the journey would be taken up again in reverse 
until I finally arrived again at a population, this time, however not as a chaotic conception 
of a whole, but as a rich totality of many determinations and relationships (Marx, 1857 
[1975], p.72). 
The real abstraction of the pluri-national state as 'mediation in motion' has shown the importance of 
the way the MAS-IPSP exercises power, yet, it does so by embedding it in the past struggles that have 
produced it and the present struggles that continue to shape it. 
In debates on 'post-neoliberalism', a similar problem arises when this notion is treated as an 'adjective' 
for the government that specifies the regimes, defined by factors like specific adopted policies or the 
use of a certain rhetoric. Notions of 'neo-developmentalism' and 'neo-extractivism' can run the same 
risk when used as a label to describe a (aspired) changed role of the state or similar. What do we know 
about Bolivia or another state if we classify it as post-neoliberal, neo-developmental or neo-
extractivist? The limitations of the concepts become particularly apparent considering the explanatory 
power for the contradictions found in the Bolivian state transformation.  
One could argue that autonomy as decentralisation resonates more with neoliberal thinking of an 
efficient state, than autonomy as self-determination of the Bolivian pueblo and peoples. If we were to 
accept that post-neoliberalism is about rejecting and moving beyond neoliberalism, both self-
determination of the Bolivian pueblo and peoples could be seen also as post-neoliberal while 
decentralisation less so. Nevertheless, all three visions of autonomy are present in the state and 
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unlikely to disappear and so pluri-national Bolivia appears neoliberal and post-neoliberal at the same 
time. 
In addition, the different ideas of autonomy found in the pluri-national state are in tension with one 
another in the pluri-national experiment. With the notion of the 'stronger state', the literature on 
post-neoliberalism, neo-developmentalism or neo-extractivism seems to pay more attention to the 
self-determination of the Bolivian pueblo than to decentralisation and self-determination of peoples. 
By this, they run the risk of not seeing or adequately incorporating the colonial features in state 
transformation. 
Caution is also required when thinking of post-neoliberalism as a utopian project. By using 
neoliberalism as a reference point, it is questionable how this can shed light on ideas for a different 
state. The rise of the pluri-national idea and state implies not only a rejection of and an attempt to 
move beyond neoliberalism, but also refers to the colonial and republican/nationalist experience.  
More generally, the Bolivian experiment understates the urgency of going beyond wishful thinking 
that abstracts utopia from the relations that constitute it. In the current scenario, in which frustration 
is widespread among those who hoped for a different state and important challenges have arisen, it 
is crucial to focus on the here and now. There is a need for what Bloch (1959) calls 'concrete utopia', 
that is not about yearning to receive without much effort, but 'reaches forward to a real possible 
future'.  
9.3. Taking coloniality seriously 
Few scholars studying Bolivia would disagree with Farthing and Kohl in that '[o]f course, the indigenous 
Americas are not only shaped by the short memory of neoliberalism but also by the long memory of 
five hundred years of colonialism' (Farthing and Kohl, 2014, p.157). This indicates that there might be 
a problem with prominent capital relational approaches to the state, since they offer limited/ing 
perspectives on how the colonial experience has shaped and continues to shape Bolivian state and 
society. Following such relational thinking, indigenous people have an underprivileged position in 
society that has become more rigid over time and enshrined in the state and its institutions. Yet, it 
also implies that if the indigenous could improve their position, they could achieve that the state 
represents them properly and incorporates their demands as desired. Yet, is this feasible? I think such 
thinking is misleading. 
The capital relation is without doubt a relation of domination. Yet, for indigenous people, domination 
means something more than exploitation of wage labour. Among others, Guevara’s experience in 
Bolivia and the emergence of and debates within the Katarista movement demonstrated the short-
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sightedness of treating – as a great deal of Latin American Marxists did – indigenous people as 
peasants. Such campesinación treats people as relating to land as something they work, which implies 
being blind to alternatives and assimilating them to the modern universe facilitated by the state 
enforcing of rules of money and law. By this, the cry for a different, pluri-national state, which is an 
ontological struggle against this universe, cannot be grasped.  
Yet, this specificity of indigenous peoples’ struggles does not mean that these should be simply viewed 
through the lens of coloniality, implying that they are outside capital or unable to be understood in 
the context of Western thought, as argued by some post-colonial scholars. Capital is a global relation 
of domination which, following Chibber (2013), has a universalising, yet no homogenising tendency. 
Dinerstein (2015) suggests that indigenous people have been subsumed by capital, but in a different 
way, that is, by being excluded. Looking at the emergence and development of the state form, 
throughout most of Bolivian history, indigenous people remained formally excluded from citizenship. 
Yet, they were – when needed – responsible for a large share of state budget and made up the majority 
of the labour force in mines and fields. While this facilitated the breakthrough of industrial capitalism 
in the West, the relations of production in Bolivia were significantly shaped by colonial relations. In 
this, the pluriverse was subordinated as much as necessary for profitable accumulation. Yet, this 
subordination has not been complete, which is also indicated by the continued resistance of 
indigenous. 
In the pluri-national state, which prominently incorporated the indigenous peoples´ quest for self-
determination, it became apparent that state-recognised AIOC largely means a deepening of 
enforcement of rules of money and law as far as it is necessary for facilitating accumulation. The space 
for AIOC largely seems to have been limited to the extent that is does not interfere with the agenda 
predominantly pushed by the MAS-IPSP government, serving to sustain high growth rates under the 
banner of self-determination of the pueblo. Also in the enforcing mechanisms limited change 
occurred, for example, in interaction with peoples.  
This research highlights the need for addressing the dominant capital relational approaches in an 
attempt to denaturalise capitalist/colonial society and state and escape entrapment in the 
modern/capitalist universe. For this, the 'de-colonial option' provides key insights into how the state 
reproduces social hierarchies, among others. The importance of this extends beyond the specific case 
of indigenous people and their resistance, since a demystifying analysis of the status quo and the 
imagination of concrete alternatives to the capitalist/colonial society is badly needed in challenging 
times – from climate and the so-called refugee crisis, among others. In this, scholars and activists in 
the West and elsewhere can learn from the indigenous peoples’ knowledges and experiences. 
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9.4. On stimulating debates on autonomy 
While I have not reviewed much of the large body of academic literature on autonomy, this study has 
shown the importance of introducing a substantial historical-materialist perspective to such debates. 
In Bolivia, autonomy quests have referred to distinct projects, it is not always a matter of emancipation 
as understood in most contexts. In the Spanish-speaking context autonomy can also refer to a type of 
state organisation, in which some entities are autonomous from the central state. This is 
fundamentally about obtaining more leverage within the state against the central state and not a 
project of seeking emancipation/liberation from the state. In Bolivia, these struggles were at some 
points underpinned by powerful economic actors, seeking to preserve their influence and potential 
for profits. This should lead to reopening debates on autonomous projects, as these often refer to 
autonomy from capital, state or development (Böhm et al., 2010). At the same time, indigenous 
struggle for autonomy, in which emancipation necessarily refers a decolonising project, underpins 
suggestions raised in the aftermath of the Zapatistas uprising, that coloniality and decolonisation 
should be taken more seriously when discussing about autonomy more generally.  
Furthermore, this study emphasised the contradictory nature of struggles for autonomy that demand 
recognition or resources from the state or even push for changing the state altogether, yet also want 
to be left alone by the state. This highlights the need to consider what happens when demands for 
autonomy are mediated by the state. The AIOC, as key pillar of the pluri-national that translates the 
demand for peoples’ self-determination, shows the impossibility of state-recognised self-
determination implying autonomy from capital, state and development. As part of the 'mediation in 
motion', it cannot be autonomous from the state and since the state is deeply capitalist/colonial, it is 
incapable of seriously moving beyond notions of capitalist development. In this, I follow Böhm et al., 
who suggest that 'autonomy can never be completely fulfilled, as capital, the state and discourses of 
development continuously attempt to capture the idea of autonomy to make it work for their own 
purposes' (Böhm et al., 2010). 
The impossibility of state-recognised autonomy as moving beyond the universalising rules of money 
and law also means the impossibility of decolonising the state, even if the government appoints a Vice-
Minister of Decolonisation, as happened in Bolivia. As long as capitalist/colonial society exists, an other 
state is impossible and it is, as Holloway (2005) points out, indeed not the right starting point for 
bringing about such aspired revolutionary change. 
How the state captures ideas related to the different state, can be seen with the example of the notion 
Vivir Bien/Buen Vivir– that has been espoused by the pluri-national state and used for different 
purposes. It was presented as an alternative development that stresses the self-determination of the 
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pueblo. Yet, this has little connection with its original idea, which refers more to an alternative to 
development (Huanacuni Mamani, 2010; Solón, 2016).  
The MAS-IPSP strategy also raises questions on who the pueblo is and who defines what self-
determination means for the pueblo – and where the indigenous peoples are in this. The translation 
of the demands for the pueblo’s self-determination, which is high up on the MAS-IPSP agenda does 
not aim – at least in the short-term – to move beyond capital and (capitalist) development in concrete 
policies and so on. If self-determination of the pueblo is framed as greater independence from the US 
and financial institutions it might be attainable, yet it might also lead to new dependencies.  
9.5. Operationalising the capitalist/colonial state and unpacking 'struggles' in the 
form-analysis 
This research has shown the importance of approaching the pluri-national state of Bolivia with a set 
of lenses that make the capitalist and colonial colouring of the state visible. With this, I agree with the 
comuna scholars, who saw a dual crisis in the early 2000s, that is a crisis of the neoliberal (capitalist) 
and a crisis of the colonial state. I also follow them in stressing the importance of paying attention to 
the emergence and development of the state, which I propose to see as a 'mediation in motion', to 
better represent its temporarily specific and evolving character. With the developed framework, I 
showed a way of operationalising such thinking into a historical-material study of the pluri-national 
state. 
Both, CSE/Open Marxists and de-colonial scholars are concerned with denaturalising the state and 
capitalist/colonial society. This joint line of attack creates space to integrate CSE/Open Marxism and 
the 'de-colonial option' into one framework. While it is sometimes argued that Marxism and post-
colonial studies are incompatible since they have different starting points, the rise of capitalism and 
the point of Conquest, in my opinion, this does not apply to CSE/Open Marxism and the 'de-colonial 
option'. CSE/Open Marxists emphasise the social relations of production, which were of course not 
inexistent before the spread of capitalism. For de-colonial scholars, who identify the Conquest as a 
point that was necessary for the rise of the Western modern civilizational project, which claims ego-
less universality for itself and makes other epistemologies and ways of life invisible and facilitated the 
expansion of capital. I proposed that the notion of form can help when combining the two in one 
framework – while drawing on CSE/Open Marxist notion, I then stretched it, following the suggestion 
of scholars like Fanon (1983). 
CSE/Open Marxism is open for seeing the unevenness in capitalist development around the world. As 
capital is a global relation, states are fragments or 'forms of the global totality of social relation' that 
appear to be territorially and politically autonomous (Holloway, cited by Dinerstein, 2017). Yet, they 
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are not autonomous, since states are interlocked through the exchange rate mechanism into a 
'hierarchy of price systems' (Burnham, cited by Bieler, 2006, p.75). This capital relation is not a 
homogenous one – but it can even promote difference if this facilitates accumulation. I suggested that 
the 'de-colonial option' offers crucial insights into how the relations in the formerly colonised parts of 
the world have unfolded in ways that are different from other places. 
For the task of denaturalising the capitalist/colonial state, it is important to explore, determine and 
unpack the different components of the form. Otherwise, it cannot be properly conceptualised and 
ultimately remains a 'box' or a 'thing' with a rather mysterious content. Precisely this had been a 
weakness in the work of the (radical) dependistas, who pointed to the importance of external 
pressures and domestic struggles, but failed to show how these are mediated. Yet, when referring to 
the different components, it might appear that their existence is taken for granted, which would work 
towards their naturalisation, the opposite of what I aim to do. I proposed to understand them as part 
of the universalising tendency of capital, which finds expression at the political level of the political 
form of the global relations of production. This does not mean that the relations that underpin the 
'mediation in motion' are the same in different places and at different times.  
The developed framework and conducted form-analysis indicate the richness of perceiving the state 
as result and object of struggles, which allows unpacking the notion of 'struggles'. Looking at the Pluri-
national State of Bolivia as a result of struggles makes the struggles for and against the pluri-national 
state idea visible, which predate the 2009 Constitution. Since the pluri-national idea is closely tied to 
self-determination of peoples, the struggles for indigenous autonomy are crucial in the struggles for 
this other state, those who demanded a more deepened decentralisation, were not in favour of the 
pluri-national state idea. The struggles that expression in the rise of MAS, in which the pluri-national 
state idea was picked up, illustrate how the pluri-national idea has been used in different ways. As 
demonstrated in Chapter 5 and 6, a historical-material analysis is crucial for understanding how these 
struggles emerged, unfolded, were mediated and became informed in the 2009 Constitution.  
Yet, the Open Marxist/de-colonial perspective also allows seeing the Pluri-national State of Bolivia as 
an object of struggles. This involves, firstly, struggles within the pluri-national state, partly as a result 
of the incorporations of different demands into the state. Hence, some of the struggles between 
government and actors or movements outside the state have become internalised. In Chapter 7 and 
8, I demonstrated how tensions within the Bolivian states have increased, which becomes, for 
example, apparent in the (Vice-)Ministry of Autonomies but also between different ETAs. Secondly, 
the pluri-national state is – like earlier modalities – an object of struggles from the outside. Such 
struggles against the pluri-national state are also the redirected continuation of earlier struggles for 
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and against the pluri-national idea. In this redirection, triggered by the pluri-national experience, 
voices for going beyond the pluri-national state become louder in parts of the indigenous movements. 
Yet, others continue to reject the pluri-national idea of the other state altogether.  
Taken together, these categories of struggles for, against, within and beyond the state, have shown 
to be very helpful for unpacking the multifaceted and evolving struggles in the Bolivian state 
transformation and enable grasping continuity and change in state and struggles. Such unpacking of 
struggles has the potential to also offer insights into other processes of state transformation.  
9.6. How 'pluri' is the Pluri-national State of Bolivia?  
Compared to previous political modalities, the pluri-national modality brought important changes 
which should not be underestimated. The representation of the indigenous people in the state has 
increased and with the pluri-national idea, IOC jurisdiction and AIOC, key demands from some 
indigenous groups turned into state matter. These have, however weakly, altered the state 
components and led to internal changes. Following this study, the AIOC and vision of peoples’ self-
determination more generally has not been completely subsumed to other logics of autonomy or 
become invisible, which might be considered 'cracks' in the state form (Holloway, 2010).  
While acknowledging that the state has become more plural, my argument is that the decolonisation 
of the state is improbable given that its political form is inherently capitalist and colonial. What does 
this mean for the pluri-national state and its normative dimension? Analysing it as result and object 
of struggles, the pluri-national state does not resemble the radical idea of a different state. Instead, it 
continues to be a capitalist/colonial state, which predominantly enforces the rules of money and law 
that facilitate profitable accumulation. The practical limitations of the imagined pluri-national state 
are also observable in that the different nations do not appear on equal footing, as imagined for a 
pluri-national state. This could be seen already in the Unity Pact and constituent assembly, as argued 
by Garcés (2011) and confirmed in my study. The TIPNIS conflict and the opening of natural parks, 
among others, support Canessa’s point that highland peoples are more privileged in the pluri-national 
state than the lowland peoples (Canessa, 2014). 
This study revealed contradictory tendencies found inside the pluri-national state, and suggested that 
these tensions cannot be reconciled by the state; they are not creative tensions in the consolidation 
of the pluri-national state (García Linera, 2011a). For an 'intellectual of the state' working on the 
establishment of hegemony from the state, it makes sense to adopt a perspective on the state that 
can unite society (Solón, 2016, pp.56-57). Yet, such view is severely limited – since the state has so far 
never shown itself capable of uniting all Bolivians in their diversity and also in pluri-national state, 
fragmentation (and demobilisation) instead of unification of the pueblo appears to take place.  
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It is much more convincing to see the state, pluri-national or not, as inherently contradictory. With 
the mediation of demands pushed by social struggles which sometimes involve austere reorganisation 
of the state, some tensions appear to be solved. Yet, as derivationists and CSE/Open Marxist highlight, 
accumulation is always contradictory – and there seem to be no more than 'temporary fixes', as 
Harvey (2011) calls it. If the state is the political form of the social relations of capital, this applies to 
some extent to the state, too. At the same time, facilitating the seemingly universal rules of money 
and law imply the impossibility of mediating the ontological dimensions of indigenous peoples’ quests 





Chapter 10. Conclusion 
10.1. Introduction  
In this chapter, I first review the research objectives outlined in Chapter 1 and summarise the key 
findings by answering my original research questions. Building on this, I elaborate on the key 
contributions made within this thesis. Then I engage with limitations of the study and potential further 
research.  
10.2. Summary of research objectives 
This thesis began with the suggestion that taking the state seriously allows deep insights into the 
contradictory tendencies several researchers previously identified in the pluri-national experiments 
(see 1.1.). Consequently, the first objective of this thesis was to identity an approach to the state that 
is capable of explaining its evolving and apparent contradictory tendencies and the specificity of the 
pluri-national state idea (Chapters 2-4). Since achieving this first objective led to designing a new 
epistemological-theoretical framework, a second objective was to work out the methodological 
implications of the approach (4.4.). The next research objective was to apply the developed approach 
to a real-world phenomenon, the first pluri-national state: Bolivia (Chapters 5-8). The final objective 
was to reflect upon the usefulness of thinking of transformations beyond Bolivia (and the state), 
involving rethinking the link between empirical findings and the epistemological-theoretical and 
methodological aspects of the study and reflecting on further implications (Chapters 9-10). 
10.3. Responding to the research questions: main findings 
 Research question 1a: How has the state in Latin America in general and in Bolivia in particular 
been approached in recent studies?  
Throughout the Chapters 2 and 3, I argued that most of the reviewed perspectives on the Latin 
American and Bolivian states fail to offer a concept of the state that reflects its evolving and 
contradictory character and is sensitive to the specificity of the pluri-national state. While approaches 
perceiving the state as a 'thing' fail to see its transitory nature which is full of tensions, many current 
relational accounts and Marxist perspectives from Latin America have failed to understand or identify 
the colonial underpinning of the state. Yet, this colonial colouring of the state is critical in any serious 
analysis of the pluri-national idea and state. De-colonial thought offers important insights into the 
colonial aspect of the state and in rethinking history; yet, this sometimes runs the risk of binary 
thinking and a problematic understanding of capitalism.  
The Bolivian comuna thinkers are strong in making sense of the general (capitalist) and specific 
(colonial) state crises in the early 21st century. However, they did not develop a coherent theorisation 
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of the state that helps to understand its transformation. As self-proclaimed 'collective intellectual', 
García Linera more recently diminishes the deep-seated contradictions when speaking of 'creative 
tensions' in the consolidation of the pluri-national state (García Linera, 2011a). Yet, his assumption on 
the state as unifying actor appears particularly problematic. Tapia Mealla offers a more critical stance 
on the process and his argument for moving the state out of the spotlight is comprehensible (Tapia 
Mealla, 2014). Yet, this should not imply abandoning the category of the state. 
 Research questions 1b: How far can a notion of 'form'/'mediation in motion' provide an alternative 
that better reflects the state’s evolving and contradictory character? Does the notion need to be 
decolonised and if so, (how) is this possible? 
In Chapter 4, I proposed an epistemological-theoretical framework for approaching the state that 
enables one to see its contradictory and evolving character. For this, I drew on the CSE/Open Marxist 
notion of 'form', which depicted the state as a historically specific political form of the social relations 
of capital. The CSE/Open Marxist approach involves looking at the world in terms of struggles; the 
state is the political form that these struggles take. This form mediates domestic/national and 
external/international struggles and pressures. To emphasise its transitory nature as both a result of 
past and object of present struggles, I proposed perceiving it as a 'mediation in motion'. 
The CSE/Open Marxist notion of struggle is wider than in some classic Marxist perspectives, which see 
struggle as a confrontation between working class and bourgeoisie (in the West) as it 'cover[s] a huge 
range of different activities', which are – like capitalist society – inherently contradictory (Holloway, 
2010, pp.38; 63-64). Dinerstein’s notion of 'sub-sumption by exclusion' (Dinerstein, 2015) offers a way 
of seeing indigenous people as part of the capital relation while still pointing to the specificity of how 
they are subsumed, which also shapes their struggles. Hence, I found that the critique from post-
colonial sources identifying Marxism as misleading in formerly colonised places as not generally 
applicable. 
With its emphasis on struggles, it is possible to incorporate the specific indigenous struggles for a 
different state, which is of crucial importance for the 'de-colonial option'. Such scholars reject those 
approaches that naturalise and/or legitimate the existence and action of the state and hence not 
necessarily CSE/Open Marxism. I suggested that their concern with denaturalising the apparent 
'universal' is compatible with the CSE/Open Marxist epistemological underpinning. Yet, to make the 
decolonising agenda more explicit, the approach should be refined with de-colonial thought or, 
'stretched' as suggested by Fanon (1983). Nevertheless, this does not necessarily lead to a decolonised 




 Research question 2: What are methodological implications of understanding the state as a 
'form'/'mediation in motion'? 
When approaching the state as a 'mediation in motion', it is abstracted in and not from society; the 
starting point for the study is not the state itself, but struggles. In order to understand the pluri-
national state, which partly emerged out of previous struggles that normatively rest on the rejection 
of the colonial and nation state, it is valuable indeed to develop an historical-materialist perspective 
on the 'mediation in motion' in Bolivia.  
Yet, given the limited scope of this study, a specific set of struggles is chosen and within this thesis I 
argue that struggles for autonomy are a particularly promising entry point. This is because 
contradictions of struggles against and beyond but still in the state (form) appear particularly palpable 
and it allows the incorporation of the specific indigenous struggles for an other state. In other words, 
it hence becomes also possible to grasp struggles for and against the pluri-national idea, which predate 
the pluri-national modality and to unpack struggles in, against, for and beyond the pluri-national 
state/idea in the pluri-national scenario.  
Neither CSE/Open Marxist form-analysis nor de-colonial thought are associated with a specific set of 
methods for collecting and analysing data and I argued that tools should be used that best help to 
explain the processes underpinning the transformation. For embedding the present state in past 
struggles (Chapter 5), I suggested working with a periodisation of the state form into different political 
modalities. These express the changing form at the political level. While this can run the risk of 
seemingly naturalising the state or even assuming a pre-determined logic, I argued that it facilitates a 
consistent analysis.  
In addition, I unpacked the state form into different (central state) components (basis, rules, enforcing 
mechanisms, government) that appear universal in the sense that they are (so far) found in every state 
form. Not only does this generally help with a further demystification, it also serves to shed light on 
where the contradictory tendencies are located at a particular moment in time and how tensions in 
and between the components unfold. 
I sought to pay special attention to decolonising the research methodology, meaning, among other 
factors, including other alternative knowledges. Yet, given the focus of this study, it was not possible 
to work with indigenous methodologies (see 4.4.3 and 4.4.4.). Also because of this, I do not offer a 




 Research question 3: What light does state theorisation, based on the idea of 'form' and 
'mediation in motion', shed on state transformation in Bolivia in general and in particular, how 
transformational is the introduction of the pluri-national state in Bolivia likely to be? 
The analysis demonstrated how since the beginning, the Bolivian state has been marked by tensions, 
which were – when required – temporarily addressed through transformation but never resolved. I 
showed how the evolution of 'mediation in motion' has been pushed by domestic struggles and 
external pressures, often pushing state managers to seek the most profitable accumulation. When the 
state is a form of the social relations of capital that is deeply colonial, since it facilitates and enforces 
the rules of money and law, one cannot move beyond capitalism and/or coloniality through the state, 
whether called pluri-national or not. While struggles for a different state are expressed at the political 
level of the pluri-national state, there is continuity in the form.  
When studying the pluri-national state transformation in more detail and unpacking different strands 
of struggles for autonomy – some closely tied to, other rejecting the pluri-national idea – and their 
translation into and through the new political modality, the capitalist and colonial colouring of the 
mediation became apparent. In the cases of departmental and regional autonomy as well as the 
struggles for self-determination of the Bolivia pueblo and their translation in and by the state it 
became apparent how state managers have sought to defend the most profitable accumulation. This 
also meant incorporating domestic demands to re-establish order, which is crucial for investment 
climate. The analysis of the AIOC additionally disclosed how the translation has involved a deeper 
subordination to the rule of the apparently universal law and no radical change in the enforcing 
mechanisms occurred. In addition, state resources are a key theme in the some transition processes 
and that seems to further facilitate the rule of money. Taken together, this shows that instead of 
triggering decolonisation, the pluri-national state modality is deeply colonial. 
Nevertheless, I found that the pluri-national state modality is more plural than its predecessors. While 
the government’s state managers attempt to subordinate autonomy as deepened decentralisation 
and self-determination of peoples as much as necessary to their advocated model of state that aims 
to recover the self-determination of the pueblo, it has been impossible to annihilate the new regime 
of subnational autonomies. In this scenario, the yet recent types of state-recognised autonomies have 
helped to not only partially incorporate the struggles in a certain way, but also to redirect them in a 
variety of ways. While it appears too early to offer an assessment of change, it seems that overall, 




 Research question 3a: How far is motion towards the pluri-national modality historically 
necessary? 
This research found that the pluri-national state has been necessary for two reasons: The first one is 
related to the long- and medium-term colonial and nationalist experiences and the second one has to 
do with the neoliberal short-term experience. As I showed throughout Chapter 5, from early on, the 
Bolivian state included but also excluded indigenous people. While having been excluded from 
citizenship until 1952, they nevertheless were indispensable for growth, as tribute payers and as work 
force. In this, their self-determination was accepted by state managers as long as it facilitated, or at 
least did not stand in the way of, profitable accumulation. Indigenous people’s struggles, in, against 
and beyond the state were marked by severe tensions between defending their self-determination 
while increasingly demanding recognition or more profound inclusion. This appears to have 
strengthened since the state appeared more as a neutral arbiter separated from the economic sphere. 
The 1952 Revolution (see 5.7.) meant progress in inclusion, yet it came at the cost of recognition as 
peasants, and meant the assimilation of indigenous people instead of acknowledging them as who 
they were and how they lived. It also involved a deeper subordination to the capitalist mode of 
production and the rule of law of private property, since they were recognised as individuals working 
their small plots. Yet, this revolution remained unfinished and growing resistance from different 
sectors of society, also finding expression in the Katarista movement (see 6.2.2.), as well as rising 
tensions in the popular block, demonstrated that subordination was incomplete and contradictory 
tendencies remained unresolved. 
In the following military modality (see 5.8.), the indigenous people’s resistance was confronted with 
oppression and violence and a new pact, which did not resolve the inclusion/exclusion tension. 
Additionally, people’s livelihoods in the lowlands were increasingly under threat. In the neoliberal 
multicultural modality (see 5.9.), the indigenous people’s inclusion/exclusion was initially not a matter 
of great concern to state managers. While the movement grew stronger, the set of multicultural 
reforms offered partial responses to demands (see 6.2.2.). Yet, it also assured those who wanted 
profound change that a radically different – that is a pluri-national – state would be needed for 
achieving proper recognition as indigenous subject. 
As well as having been unable to resolve the tensions of indigenous inclusion/exclusion, the neoliberal 
multicultural modality triggered further resistance that it could not incorporate sufficiently in the 
medium-term. As argued in 5.9., the neoliberal economic model did indeed initially bring economic 
stability and, through further reforms, some growth was stimulated. However, it did not bring 
redistribution and left many people in precarious socio-economic circumstances, which fostered 
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increasing resistance and the formation of a new popular group – especially the cocaleros – that 
replaced the disarticulated strong block of miners.  
Even though the neoliberal multicultural modality came with the banner of democracy, it was 
characterised by limited public participation in decision-making. Subsequently, frustration among the 
excluded, who suffered the consequences of neoliberal reforms, increased. With the second wave of 
reforms in the mid-1990s, the government sought to respond to, and incorporate demands from 
indigenous people and other sectors of society. Yet, this was not enough in the medium-term because, 
as I showed in 6.2., these changes came at the cost of subordination to the neoliberal model. The 
events in the first years of the 21st century further showed the inability of the neoliberal multicultural 
modality to properly respond to the increasingly popular demands and rising pressures from the 
regions. At the same time, the nascent resource boom created the possibility of responding to internal 
pressures but also triggered fear of loss of control. As in the case of some previous motions of the 
mediation, when tensions – in this case, mostly expressed at the domestic level – became too severe, 
this left state managers incapable of ensuring order and growth. Hence, a restructuring of the state 
took place.  
Having pointed out that the pluri-national state can retrospectively be seen as a historical necessity 
given previous struggles and unresolved tensions of earlier political modalities, this does not mean 
that it was inevitable. Suggesting its inevitability appears to imply a predetermined development, 
which goes against understanding the world through struggles, since the outcome of struggles is 
always open.  
 Research question 3b: How (far) has the 'mediation in motion' translated struggles (for 
autonomy/ies)? 
In Chapter 6, I showed how different demands for autonomy became translated by and into the 
ˈmediation in motionˈ. By focusing on struggles, I demonstrated how non-indigenous and indigenous 
people’s struggles partly differ in the sense that indigenous groups’ demands have at least partly, and 
at times, challenged the state form itself in that they struggled for a different state that is the pluri-
national state. The non-indigenous struggles remained within the existing state form, yet demanded 
modification. In other words, they were struggles against the pluri-national state idea demanded by 
the indigenous movements. However, the different strands of struggles are not homogenous in 
themselves and evolve also through previous interactions with state components (for example, the 
multicultural reforms) and interaction among themselves (for example, the Unity Pact). At the same 
time, the demand for indigenous peoples for self-determination remains contradictory in itself: it is 
about recognition by the state (pluri-national or not) but also about being left alone by state.  
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The neoliberal multicultural modality was incapable of responding to intensifying internal conflict and 
facilitating profitable accumulation and so the state form underwent political restructuring. It 
becomes apparent how the pluri-national state emerged through this as pacts following a highly tense 
situation that appeared to threaten the survival of the Bolivian state form, which was not in the 
interests of those involved. The indigenous people who wanted a different state did not play a leading 
role in these negotiations. However, the MAS-IPSP incorporated elements of the demands made by 
indigenous peoples, including the notion of the pluri-national state, partly to ensure support but also 
to offer a counter to the departmental autonomies. Yet, the MAS-IPSP’s original self-determination 
project, triggered mostly by the consequences of neoliberal restructuring, was related to the recovery 
of national sovereignty of the Bolivian pueblo, meaning autonomy from international organisations 
and other states, particularly the US. Autonomy inside the state - as decentralisation or self-
determination of peoples - was not up for discussion.  
As seen in Chapter 7 and 8, the different demands for autonomy were only partially translated into 
the pluri-national autonomy regime. In the case of state-recognised departmental, regional and IOC 
autonomies, struggles were mediated in a way that made them more compatible with a social-
communitarian state and growth model, advocated by the government aiming at facilitating profitable 
accumulation. This is associated with a strong centre and – for the moment – a largely extractivist, 
export-led economy and appears to sustain economic growth particularly when resource prices are 
high in the world market. Furthermore, I showed in Chapter 7 how the government, particularly since 
the fall of resource prices, has taken a more open approach against the autonomy regime, which is 
visible in a variety of measures, including: strategy documents, proposed laws (adopted with its large 
majority in the assembly), policies and direct action. However, I also demonstrated that this 
subordination also remains incomplete inside the state, as, for example, some employees in the 
enforcing mechanisms work towards deepening the state-recognised autonomy regime. 
In the case of the indigenous struggles, it also became apparent that the demands were mediated in 
a colonial way that does not properly translate their struggles at the ontological level. The state 
defines the scope and content of what self-determination means and enforces it through seemingly 
universal laws. At the same time, by providing them with resources, dependency is created and rule 
of money is potentially deepened, while local dynamics can change. All this contravenes the idea of 
peoples’ self-determination, which starts at the communal level and should not be a top-down 
process. This shows the continuity in the capitalist/colonial state form, despite the changes that found 
expression at the political level.  
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Despite this continuity and the government efforts to limit the autonomy regime, visible in the 
different components, it became clear that the pluri-national modality leaves more scope for plurality 
than previous modalities. The different visions of autonomy – autonomy as self-determination of the 
Bolivian pueblo, decentralisation and self-determination of peoples – are part of the pluri-national 
state and its autonomy regime. Yet, they remain in tension and incompatible in their realisation.  
 Research question 3c: What are the implications of this translation for present and future 
(autonomy/ies) struggles? 
The pluri-national modality enabled a 'temporary fix' to the major challenges that caused the 
neoliberal multicultural modality to fall. Yet, the contradictory tendencies in the pluri-national state 
and the autonomy regime cannot be resolved. As in pre-pluri-national times, within the pluri-national 
state, there are forces supporting and forces opposing the pluri-national idea. Even though the 
government attempts to subordinate autonomy as self-determination of peoples and decentralisation 
to autonomy as self-determination of the Bolivian pueblo, this does not lead to the elimination of the 
other ideas of autonomy in the state.  
With this inaccurate translation of the demands for autonomy into the state, struggles have not been 
reconciled but instead have become redirected and often fragmented. Parts of the struggles have 
infiltrated the state (for example, the fiscal pact) or could do so, while others have remained 
untranslated (for example, local control of all resources). In Chapter 8, I showed how this situation has 
brought great challenges for those who had demanded the now state-recognised types of autonomy.  
As shown in 8.2. and 8.3., struggles for departmental and regional autonomy have been partly 
incorporated into the state as conflicts over resources and competences of the ETAs, either among 
themselves or with the central state. For example, this is evident in negotiations around the fiscal pact 
and new or more intense conflicts between gobernaciones and municipalities in some cases. In Tarija, 
the conflict between the capital and Gran Chaco province has also been incorporated into the state. 
More generally, the figure of the regional autonomy has the potential to be used by different regions 
against the governor or official with whom they are in conflict. While most departmental autonomies 
struggle to manage with limited resources, particularly in the highlands, gobernaciones and assemblies 
are in an additionally difficult position due to apparent limited autonomous spirit. Yet, some incidents 
show that this could change and that autonomy could become a vehicle to address local situations.  
The AIOC status comes at the cost of a (deeper) subordination to modernity/coloniality and capital. 
Not only are several peoples, especially those in the lowlands, excluded from entering the AIOC 
transition, I showed in 8.4. that, at the local level, struggles for state-recognised autonomy can reflect 
conflicts over state resources and involve clashes between different visions. This goes partly against 
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the idea of self-determination of peoples. In several cases, the processes are time-consuming if not 
stalling for years and have sometimes deepened tensions within the communities. The resulting 
fragmentation of indigenous people’s struggles in communities and the efforts put into the AIOC 
transition by those who had previously accompanied the struggles and who are now found in NGOs 
and state offices, demonstrates how struggles have become redirected to the local level. This helps to 
understand the current fragmentation and demobilisation of the indigenous movement at the 
national level. Due to a largely disappointing experience in the pluri-national setting, there seems to 
be a lack of direction regarding how to continue resistance, which could be directed against as well as 
beyond the pluri-national state. This has started already with the terms autonomy, self-determination, 
pluri-nationality and territory reflecting the umbrella demands of the indigenous people, which have 
become captured by the state.  
At a more general level, this research suggested that achieving autonomy from state and capital is 
impossible. The state, pluri-national or not, cannot be used for moving away from capitalism and 
traditional ideas of development towards a de-colonial/ising alternative since it is a form of the social 
relations of capital that is deeply colonial. A decolonisation of the state is then impossible, despite 
being necessary for a pluri-national state that meets the normative expectation; it then becomes 
necessary to struggle beyond the pluri-national state. For future struggle, this research, drawing on 
Bloch, recommends a critical rethinking of the state as a category and a focus on concrete rather than 
abstract alternatives. In other words, instead of wishing for a different state, what is needed is 
educated hope that relates to the ˈ real-possibleˈ, which is informed by current tendencies and credible 
options (see 9.4. and 9.6.). With struggles for autonomy now both internal and external to the state, 
this is particularly crucial since different strategies are needed for different aspects in the struggles. 
 Research question 4: What can the proposed approach to state transformation in Bolivia tell 
us about the contradictions, capitalist and colonial features in the Latin America state and 
beyond? 
This research underscored the importance of approaching the state not as an entity, but as a concept 
to be examined and understood as temporary and spatially specific. The transformation of a state 
cannot be properly understood without its historical-materialist context and without considering 
domestic struggles and external pressures that have shaped it and that it has shaped. Domestic 
struggles and external pressures can be contradictory and hence require mediation. The Open 
Marxist/de-colonial framework I developed and used for approaching the state proved capable of 
illuminating the capitalist and colonial colourings of the state.  
The importance of paying attention to the colonial features of and in the state goes beyond those 
parts of the world that were colonised, since, by enforcing the rule of law and money, each state 
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reproduces certain hierarchies between social groups, cosmologies and so on. Attempts to decolonise 
thinking about the state must be a global mission.  
Furthermore, this research demonstrates that contradictions are inherent in the state and cannot be 
resolved as long as the state is a capitalist/colonial one. These can often be seen in and between the 
different components of the state, which also indicates that these are not simply related to the 
political regime, found, for example, between discourse and policies (see 9.2.). 
10.4. Contributions 
This research adds to the rich literature on state transformation in Bolivia and the pluri-national state 
in particular by showing what pluri-nationalism means in practice in Bolivia. While several researchers 
have already described the present tensions and contradictions in the pluri-national scenario, this 
thesis offers a way of theoretically and conceptually revealing such contradictory tendencies; it does 
not seek to reconcile them but sees them as inherent in the state. This is of crucial importance when 
a growing body of literature refers to the end of the leftist cycle or the return of right-wing regimes, 
which may trigger a new chapter and compare different regimes, instead of unpacking the complex 
dynamics of continuity and change.  
This thesis proposed that struggles for autonomy are an appropriate entry point for studying state 
transformation, which offers a great deal of insight into the underlying processes and allows for the 
incorporation of the idea of a different state closely associated with the normative dimension of the 
pluri-national state. It shows that, in Bolivia, struggles for autonomy have very different meanings and 
forms through which they assert themselves. It is a particularly convenient point of venture for de-
colonial struggles and struggles that rather reproduce coloniality.  
Additionally, this thesis contributes to debates on autonomy and particularly on movements seeking 
self-determination/autonomy and calls for further discussion to clarify the concept itself. The 
struggles for departmental autonomy are a reminder that not all movements demanding 'autonomy' 
want to be autonomous from the state or capital, as it is often assumed. At the same time, this study 
showed the contradiction between wanting to be recognised by, but (more) autonomous from the 
state and how this has played out in the Bolivian practice. 
More specifically, this work enriches the growing body of literature on the state-recognised 
autonomies in Bolivia. By looking at the bigger picture and revealing tensions between different 
visions of autonomy inside the state and its components, it complements on one hand the in-depth 
analyses of the AIOC and on the other, the fewer contributions departmental, regional and municipal 
autonomies as well as decentralisation. This research also adds to the literature on the pluri-national 
218 
 
state idea and pluri-nationality and the struggles for, against and beyond it – which are closely tied to 
the different demands for autonomy. 
Furthermore, this thesis adds to existing state theorisation by proposing an alternative approach that 
bridges CSE/Open Marxism and de-colonial thought. Opening up the state as a category in this way, 
this thesis contributes to both the literature on Latin American politics and states as well as the 
development of CSE/Open Marxism as a theory of struggle (Holloway, 1993). The thesis shows the 
'coloniality' of some radical ideas and seeks to push towards decolonising such thinking with particular 
reference to the state. 
Methodologically, this work contributes to existing literature by suggesting some precision with 
regards to the notion of form and its analysis. I engaged and expanded Dinerstein’s understanding of 
the state as a 'mediation' to a 'mediation in motion' to better emphasise the transitory nature of the 
state form. In addition to this, I proposed to study the development of the state form through political 
modalities. This challenges Open Marxists’ criticisms of dividing history into periods, but points to the 
benefits of organising a complex matter into a consistent analysis. Furthermore, I introduced four 
components of the state (basis, rules, enforcing mechanisms, government), which I see as expression 
of the universalising but not homogenising tendency of the political form. These can help guiding the 
form-analysis and contribute to a demystification of the state.  
Finally, this research showed how, in such a form-analysis, the notion of struggles can be unpacked 
further: First, in pre-pluri-national time, struggles for and against the pluri-national idea took place, 
during which the notion of pluri-nationality was also contested. Secondly, in the pluri-national 
modality, in which struggles have become incorporated and redirected, I identified struggles in, 
against and for as well as beyond the pluri-national state. Thinking transformation through differently 
directed and redirected struggles can also useful for shedding light on other processes.  
10.5. Study limitations and agenda for future research 
This thesis touches upon large topics and covers, especially in Chapter 5, an extensive period of time. 
The ambition to capture the bigger picture in its historical context goes hand in hand with some 
shortcomings, given the limited scope of this research, both in terms of time and space. In the 
empirical-analytical part of the study, the cost of this has been the lack of detail. For example, to offer 
a fuller analysis of the state components, I could have looked more closely at the police and military 
as parts of the enforcing mechanisms. Many themes in Chapter 5 could be developed further, for 
example, more attention could have been paid to the role of military, religion and bureaucracy in the 
evolution of the state form. In Chapter 6, I could not include the different proposals from grassroots 
organisations or their internal conflicts and divisions, particularly the peasants-indigenous relation. In 
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the analysis of the period 2006-2009, a much more detailed analysis of how the pluri-national 
autonomy regime came into being could have been developed. For Chapter 7 and 8, I could have 
looked more closely, among others, at the role of the CONAIOC, which appears to function like a hinge 
between enforcing mechanisms and the indigenous authorities/communities transitioning towards an 
AIOC. 
Given that the experience of the pluri-national state is so recent, a follow-up study appears promising, 
which could address several aspects mentioned in this thesis: for example, the AIOC processes, 
including an observation of the fragmentation of the struggles, the fiscal pact, the working of the 
departmental autonomies and regional autonomy/ies, and potential initiatives of (regional) 
autonomies. On a larger scale, it is useful to follow-up on the evolution of the contradictions in pluri-
national Bolivia and, for example, examine in more depth what the growing importance of China 
means for the aspired self-determination of the pueblo.  
The framework developed in this thesis could be applied when studying other processes of state 
transformation like the Ecuadorian one, which is also associated with an explicitly pluri-national 
agenda. This might help to concretise the framework further. In this, a reconsideration of (pluri-) 
nationalism also appears promising for understanding the overall potential of such a different state – 
asking, for example, to what extent nationalism is a modern/colonial category and if its use as a 
reference point enables one to transcend this, in terms of building up anti-power, or simply constructs 
an alternative or counter-power that continues to follow the similar traits (Holloway, 2005). In this, it 
seems also fruitful to critically rethink the notion of pueblo.  
I also suggest that the Open Marxist/de-colonial framework should be used for making sense of other 
states, as none appears outside coloniality. Such studies would be important for progressing and 
critically assessing the attempt to decolonise CSE/Open Marxism further. Another approach that 
would contribute to developing the epistemological-theoretical framework further could start with a 
more detailed study on the historical processes involving Dinerstein’s notion of 'sub-sumption by 
exclusion'.  
Finally, more work is needed to address the question of the possibility of decolonising (Open) Marxism 
and re-engage with the identified limitations in decolonising the conducted form-analysis (see 4.4.). 
For this, it appears crucial to consider topics other than autonomy, which might provide more severe 
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